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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE DEMOCRAT AS A SOCIAL TYPE:  
THE CASE OF TURKEY IN THE 1990s 
 
 
 
Akdeniz, Eylem 
 
PhD, Department of Political Science 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil 
 
December, 2011 
 
 
The main purpose of this dissertation is the explanation of the emergence 
of a new social type of political opinion producers in Turkey, namely, "the 
Democrat", throughout the two decades following the 1980 military coup. The 
common characteristics that constitute the Democrat is investigated utilizing the 
"social type analysis" approach. Within that methodological framework, the 
following analytical steps are followed: (1) First, in order to identify the 
components of the social type, a socio-historical analysis the political history of 
Turkey between 1980-1999 is completed, with three focal points: The September 
12, 1980 coup (with specific emphasis on neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish 
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state and Özalism); re-emergence of the Kurdish Question; and the revival of the 
Islamic movement. (2) Secondly, collected qualitative data, through in-depth 
interviews with three representative figures of the Democrat (Ali Bayramoğlu, 
Etyen Mahçupyan, KürĢat Bumin) is analyzed in order to lay out the profile of the 
social type. (3) Lastly, the constitutive components of Democrat as a social type 
are brought together, in relation to the qualitative data and the socio-historical 
analysis. 
Keywords: Social type, political opinion producers, the Democrat  
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ÖZET 
 
BĠR SOSYAL TĠP OLARAK DEMOKRAT:  
1990‟LARDA TÜRKĠYE ÖRNEĞĠ 
 
 
 
 
Akdeniz, Eylem 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil 
 
 
 
 
Aralık, 2011 
 
 
 
Bu doktora tezinin temel amacı, Türkiye‟de 1980 askeri darbesini izleyen 
20 yıl içinde yeni bir politik kanaat üreticisi sosyal tipinin, “Demokrat”ın ortaya 
çıkıĢını açıklamaktır. Demokrat‟ı kuran ortak özellikler, “sosyal tip analizi” 
yaklaĢımı kullanılarak araĢtırılmıĢtır. Bu metodolojik çerçeve içinde, Ģu analitik 
adımlar takip edilmiĢtir: (1) Ġlk olarak, Türkiye‟nin 1980-1999 arası politik tarihi, 
üç odak nokta öne çıkarılarak, incelenmiĢtir: 12 Eylül darbesi (Türkiye devletinin 
neo-liberal yeniden yapılandırılmasına ve Özalizm‟e özel vurguyla); Kürt 
Sorunu‟nun yeniden ortaya çıkıĢı; ve Ġslami hareketin canlanıĢı. (2) Ġkinci olarak, 
Demokrat‟ın üç temsilci figürü (Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, KürĢat 
Bumin) ile yapılan derinlemesine görüĢmelerle toplanan niteliksel veriler, sosyal 
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tipin profilini ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla, analiz edilmiĢtir. (3) Son olarak da, bir 
sosyal tip olarak Demokrat‟ın kurucu unsurları, niteliksel veriler ve sosyo-tarihsel 
analizle iliĢkili olarak, bir araya getirilmiĢtir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Sosyal tip, politik kanaat üreticileri, Demokrat 
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  CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
As the third term of the AKP government unfolds in contemporary Turkey, a 
certain level of democratization has been achieved and significant steps have been 
taken towards the normalization of civil-military relations (Heper, 2011), an area 
which had for long been a source of accountability problems. Parallel to this 
recent (albeit imperfect) advancement of democratic consolidation, compared to 
the period of two decades spanning 1980-2000, political discourse on 
democratization has also deepened and proliferated. “Democracy talk” in Turkey 
has, in only three or four years following the 2003 elections, has thoroughly 
encompassed previously “thinly debated” topics like civilian control of the 
military, Kurdish autonomy and normalization of Turkish-Kurdish relations, 
illegal paramilitary organizations backed by the state, and the democratic 
transformation of Islamism in particular and Sunni-religious voters in general. 
In our contemporary era of media-orchestrated (chiefly by TV channels, 
newspapers and the Internet) circulation of political opinions, “who carries the 
word?” is a significant question. As there is ample “democracy talk” today, 
producers and diffusers of this vast discourse are in high demand. These 
individuals as they appear on TV debates, newspaper columns and nowadays on 
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social media websites, are competing for attention, influence and political 
alliances.  
Therefore, the dissertation concerns itself with the producers/disseminators 
of liberal and democratic opinions during the democratic consolidation period in 
Turkey following the 1980 military coup – a period which has not yet been wholly 
concluded to this day. The liberal and democratic discourse, as commonly labeled 
in the political-scientific literature, can safely be said to be more widely diffused 
in Turkish academic and political circles only after mid-1980s, as the Turkish 
Armed Forces (henceforth, TAF) once again allowed the return to the multiparty 
system. The previous polarization inside the political structure during the 60s and 
70s left little opportunity space for the diffusion of a critical, non-communist, 
libertarian discourse focusing on individual rights and liberties. While, after the 
return to the multiparty system in 1983, producers of political opinion of the 
liberal-democratic variety remained politically marginal, their reputation and the 
relative reputation of their ideas (as compared to, for example, “old-fashioned” 
socialist ideals) were strengthened inside the emergent political opportunity 
structure of Turkey. 
The opinion producers that constitute the research subject of this 
dissertation are a distinctive group claiming to go beyond the conception of 
democracy defined within the theoretical and ideological limitations of the liberal 
thought. These figures argue for a democracy constructed upon multiculturalist 
values and ideals concerning the coexistence of cultural differences neglected by 
classical liberal thought. They raise sharp objections to what they regard inherent 
to liberalism, that of the instrumentalization of democracy, and define their 
political standing beyond the theoretical and ideological borders of liberal 
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democracy. Yet, drawing upon the central tenets of liberalism, they represent a 
certain juncture within the whole body of liberal and democratic thought. They 
contribute, albeit in a critical and often disapproving manner, to the development 
of a liberal and democratic agenda despite asserting a posture defined far beyond 
the liberal and democratic politics. The aspects and components of this 
contribution need to be examined in order to understand the facets of the 
democratic trajectory of the country.  
Then, for the purposes of the study, the discursive content of what is said 
about democratization is secondary. The central focus will be the producers, 
carriers, disseminators, i.e., agents of the democratic and at times liberal way of 
speaking about politics. Rather than a thorough analysis of the democratic 
rhetoric, the discussion will be built around the particular social type of opinion 
producers who found new opportunities to pursue academic, journalistic, literary, 
etc. careers within Turkey‟s changing political scene throughout late 80s up until 
the first decade of the 21st century. Instead of only dealing with what sort of 
opinions are in circulation, the study aims to make its scientific contribution by 
investigating what type of individuals, under what socio-political conditions, 
fulfilling what purpose, have been supplying these opinions.  
Throughout the dissertation, when I use the category „opinion producers,‟ 
not only scholars / academics per se are included. Producers of liberal and 
democratic political opinions who later converge into the social type of the 
Democrat also include journalists, television commentators, publishers, editors 
etc. Furthermore, the kind of political opinions that will be associated with the 
social type of the Democrat in the dissertation embody two main dispositions: (i) 
emphasis on individual liberties; (ii) emphasis on an ethical approach to 
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democracy, that is, an understanding of democracy based on the dismantling of 
military tutelage, reinforcement of civilian rule, of rule of law and on a strong 
civil society; this defines the category „democratic.‟  
1.1. Main Questions of the Dissertation 
The main question that this dissertation aims to explore might be 
formulated as follows: Is there a causal relationship between the post-80s socio-
political dynamics and the emergence of the “democratic opinion producer” as a 
social type in the same period? The aforementioned post-80s socio-political 
dynamics are going to be operationalized as: the September 12, 1980 coup (with 
specific emphasis on neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish state and Özalism); re-
emergence of the Kurdish question; and, the revival of the Islamic movement 
during the 80s and 90s.  
It is believed that the political dynamics set out in the research question are 
related to the emergence of the social type of the Democrat in a number of ways. 
First, since the liberal-leaning and/or democratically-oriented figures formulate 
their opinions with regards to the changing socio-political environment; the 
democratic challenges of these political developments constitute the very nature 
of the given social type. Secondly, these opinion producers sustain themselves 
through discursive attempts to shape the perceptions about democracy and 
democratization in Turkey. In other words, as they occupy positions in the media 
as columnists and television commentators and/or in the university as academics 
and/or in the publishing world as editors, they function as mediators of political 
opinion between the people and the government. They “translate” the democratic 
demands of the citizens for the government, and in reverse, they also “translate” 
the democratic intentions of government policies to the citizens. Therefore, 
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through these positions they are able to produce and circulate influential political 
opinions.  
1.2. Methodology of the Dissertation 
First, this dissertation regards the representatives of the social type of the 
Democrat as “producers of political opinions.” There is a solid methodological 
reason behind the preference to speak about the Democrats as “producers of 
political opinions” instead of using the commonsensical, much-abused category of 
“intellectuals.” For one thing, the newly emergent carriers of liberal democratic 
discourse cannot be seen as privileged and exempt from social analysis. Much like 
everybody else, their political dispositions, their career moves, their “public 
relations” strategies, media appearances, etc. are shaped and constrained by the 
overarching processes of change. Moreover, in Turkey where the value of 
“knowledge” is increasingly replaced by a moral political economy of “opinion” 
supply and demand, in all spheres of life, distinguishing a certain group of people 
as „intellectuals‟ hinders our understanding of the relations between politics and 
society.  
Furthermore, the category of „intellectual‟ is a far too catch-all category.  It 
also contains processes of knowledge production and issues specific to the field of 
academy. Since the dissertation is not interested in the processes of academic 
production with regards to liberal-democratic thinking, it is probable that the 
emphasis will be on the production of political opinions that are liberal-
democratic. The broad concept of „intellectuals‟ does not always lead us to 
opinion producers who may come from a broader spectrum of occupational 
positions. Therefore, it should be once more stressed that, the dissertation is 
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interested in the production of political opinions and the socio-political conditions 
shaping this production process. 
Secondly, “social type analysis” is the dissertation‟s methodological 
framework. Throughout the study, rather than perceiving these categories and/or 
groups only in discursive basis in an ambiguous abstraction level; I will be able to 
describe the characteristics of this category of persons („suppliers of liberal and 
democratic opinions‟) in a socially and historically grounded manner through the 
methodological advantages provided by social type analysis. Thus, the study will 
primarily try to explore the socio-historical moments that have constituted the 
suppliers of liberal and democratic opinions in Turkey. As it has been mentioned 
in the previous section, the following conjunctures will be examined as the 
“constitutive contexts” that shape the parameters and the criteria defining our 
„social type‟: September 12, 1980 coup; the Kurdish movement and the Islamist 
movement during the late-80s and 1990s.  
I contend that social type analysis, while avoiding the probable 
shortcomings arising from either over-theorized or over-sociologized accounts, 
will offer a methodological framework that recognizes the significance of the 
post-Kemalist political terrain in the flourishing of the Democrat. 
There are three case studies in the dissertation completed using social type 
analysis: Opinion producers Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan and KürĢat 
Bumin are studied as representatives of the Democrat. These individuals are part 
of the heterogeneous group of scholars, journalists, writers, etc. that contributes to 
the shaping of public opinion on the democratic profile of rights, liberties and rule 
of law in Turkey. Their political opinions provide direct or indirect consultancy 
service to the government. They critically comment on the policies of the state 
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and provide insight for policy-makers about what the citizens think of those 
policies. They function as „gate-keepers:‟ Through their liberal and/or democratic 
opinions they draw boundaries between what is properly political and what is 
outside the boundaries of the political.  
1.3. Significance of the Dissertation   
The literature on the democratization processes in Turkey almost never 
focuses on the carriers of the political opinions on these processes. This 
dissertation will be a contribution to the political-scientific literature on Turkey by 
making the category of “political opinions” and their “producers” the object of 
analysis. This perspective lacks in the literature debating democracy in Turkey.  
One significant contribution of the dissertation is methodological. The 
dissertation primarily contends that political opinion production cannot be 
thoroughly explained by the catch-all category of intellectuals. Therefore, in order 
to analyze the trajectory of liberal and democratic opinion production in Turkey in 
a socially and historically grounded manner, „the Democrat‟ as a type of opinion 
producer is offered to the literature. To accomplish the operationalization of „the 
Democrat,‟ the methodology of social type analysis is utilized. 
This dissertation further contends that the much used (and abused) 
concepts of intellectuals or intelligentsia fail to socio-politically ground what goes 
on in political opinion production. In the classical conceptualizations on 
„intellectuals‟ (a discussion given in Chapter 2), although it is almost always 
submitted that the category emerges from the sphere of contentious politics, 
scholars tend to glorify the category by imposing trans-historical „missions,‟ 
„functions,‟ or „tasks.‟ In other words, a concept that is supposed to explain a 
group of individuals whose conditions of existence are politically and historically 
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shaped is then misleadingly placed on an altar, outside history. This dissertation 
further contends that the much used (and abused) concepts of intellectuals or 
intelligentsia fail to socio-politically ground what goes on in political opinion 
production. Studying the opinion suppliers of a specific period who were 
socialized and politicized under distinctive historical circumstances (very 
different, for Turkey, than the positions of political opinion producers of late 
Ottoman modernization, or of the 1950s and 1960s) as an emergent and “living” 
social type enables us to treat them as ordinary social actors. They may have left 
their political or cultural impression on their era through their columns, TV 
appearances, books or academic works, but they are still mere creatures of the 
political events of their times. The significance of this dissertation is to 
demonstrate the Democrat‟s ordinariness and distinctiveness at the same time, in 
relation to three fundamental turning points in recent Turkish politics: The 1980 
coup and its aftermath, the Political-Islamist movement and the Kurdish 
insurgency. 
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is planned in eight chapters. This first chapter introduces 
the purpose, research question, methodology and the organization of the 
dissertation. It also demonstrates the significance of the subject matter. The 
second chapter is divided into two major sections: Firstly, it presents a conceptual 
analysis. Secondly, it deals with the assessment of most common treatments of the 
category of intellectual and draws attention to the shortcomings of why 
“intellectual” is a cumbersome concept for this dissertation. 
In the third Chapter, I lay out the theoretical and methodological 
framework that will guide the rest of the arguments in the dissertation: The 
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concept of “social type” and the methodology of “social type analysis” are 
analyzed and the specific application of social type analysis for the purposes of 
the dissertation is described.  
The fourth chapter, positions the first step of my argument by revisiting 
the debates in Turkey concerning liberal and democratic politics and political 
opinions. In the Turkish political scene of the 1980s, two basic challenging 
positions have emerged, which attempted to objectify liberal-democratic opinion 
producers and analyze them: (1) the “nationalist scapegoating” position, which 
was overtly hostile and reactionary towards political proponents of liberal 
democracy, (2) the “orthodox Marxist” position, more rational than the first, 
which tended to reduce liberal and democratic opinions to class positions. On the 
one hand, this discussion is crucial for it demonstrates that the emergence of the 
Democrat as a social type within Turkey‟s political arena has been noticed and 
political-intellectual adversaries felt the need to respond to and interpret this 
emergence. On the other hand, although both positions are political-ideologically 
motivated, they offer alternative ways to understand newly emergent liberal and 
democratic positions. Moreover, since they both suffer from bad reductionism 
(not a methodological reductionism) with varying degrees, both positions aim to 
destroy the credibility of their liberal democratic adversaries. Yet, it is believed 
that, the discussion of these two approaches will provide an opportunity to 
contrast them against social type analysis. The debate around civil society/left 
liberalism that we summarized above with its main features went on in the 80s 
rather as inner to the socialist left. Again as stated before, in spite of some 
weaknesses, the parties to the debate could develop their arguments on a specific 
theoretical and ideological base. Towards the end of the 90s, however, debates 
  
10 
 
over civil society or left liberalism largely lost this theoretical refinement and 
turned into a totally reproachful rhetoric.  This rhetoric was adopted and 
reproduced especially by those sections of the left having some linkages with 
Kemalism. Meanwhile, since some Marxists no more regarded those opinion 
producers who declared their identity as „democrats‟ as parties to any debate 
within the left, they opted for polemic loaded debates rather than theoretical-
philosophical discussions.  
I begin applying social type analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 which attempt to 
complete the socio-historical analysis phase of the methodology in order to situate 
the emergence of the Democrat as conditioned by Turkey‟s political 
transformations during the two decades following the 1980 coup. Chapter 7 
completes my social type analysis by focusing on the three case studies. 
In Chapter 5, what I call the “first moment” in the shaping of the socio-
political conditions for the emergence of the Democrat is discussed: The 1980 
coup, the initial attempts (during ANAP years) for democratic consolidation, and 
the authoritarian shortcomings of these attempts are explored. This first episode of 
weak democracy, I argue, paradoxically led to the proliferation of public 
discourse on democratic thought. The opinions produced in the journal Yeni 
Gündem are specifically investigated to make my case. 
Chapter 6 lays out the “second moment” through which the Democrat 
social type consolidates itself in political debates: The challenges of the 
emergence of Political Islam and of the Kurdish Movement, while reshaping 
politics itself in Turkey, have also supplied those political opinion producers who 
can be grouped under the Democrat, with new problems to tackle with. Both 
challenges touched upon civil-military relations and through issues related to 
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religious and ethnic rights, allowed debates on the condition of civil liberties in 
Turkey and those conditions could be improved. In other words, for opinion 
producers working with democratic and/or liberal assumptions, the challenges of 
Islamism and Kurdish politics supplied argumentative opportunities and even new 
avenues of political contention against the regime – as a result, the Democrat 
social type came to be represented by increasing numbers of opinion producers 
and the characteristics defining the type have become more clear-cut.  
In Chapter 7, the second tier of social type analysis is completed. My 
argument first tackles with the conceptual confusion of describing outspoken, 
publicly visible (especially in terms of media appearances) individuals with liberal 
and/or democratic leanings. The usage of various categories like “liberal,” “left-
liberal” are discussed, in order to demonstrate more recent attempts to classify the 
group under investigation in this dissertation. Secondly, the practical-political 
moment which became a locale of convergence for many exemplars of the 
Democrat social type, is analyzed: The brief New Democracy Movement (YDH) 
of mid-1990s and the discourse of “second republicanism.” This political position 
is also where my three exemplary case studies (Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen 
Mahçupyan, and KürĢat Bumin) intersected. With this background established, 
thirdly, I move on to the individual case studies in order to substantiate the 
common characteristics of the Democrat. In each case, the individuals‟ political 
life histories, their political writings and the in-depth interviews I conducted with 
them for the dissertation, are used to analyze their social-typical profile. The 
dissertation ends with an overall assessment of my social type in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
 DISCUSSION ON INTELLECTUALS 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The term “intellectual” is very frequently employed in the literature and still 
remains to be largely an ambiguous concept. Due to the variety of political 
perspectives and theoretical approaches in which the term has been utilized, 
differing meanings and explanations has been attached to it, hence the ambiguity. 
As Bauman states, the common denominator of various definitions of the 
“intellectual” is the fact that “they are all self-definitions.” 1  This statement 
implicitly conveys the idea that the content of any definition of the intellectual 
differs according to the methodological priorities and paradigms adopted by those 
who attempt to “define” it. Taking this point into consideration, this chapter 
devotes itself to the elaboration of the major theoretical positions that have made 
substantial contributions to the discussion of this category of the intellectual. In 
this regard, differing conceptions deriving from differing methodological 
concerns will be discussed in order to demonstrate that for the purposes of this 
                                                 
1
 By drawing attention to Bauman‟s argument, Eyerman makes a similar emphasis (Eyerman, 
1994: 1). 
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dissertation, the theoretical baggage of the concept is too heavy to provide the 
necessary explanatory power. 
Although the concept at hand, as mentioned, is burdened with ambiguity, 
the excursion proposed in this chapter should begin with an attempt to clarify the 
conceptualization of the “intellectual” (Bauman, 1987: 8). In this respect, the first 
section of the chapter will discuss and describe the historical roots and the 
evolution of the category. This section will include preliminary remarks 
concerning the early formulations on intellectuals. More precisely, it will offer a 
brief overview of the birth of the modern intellectual and historical development 
of the concept. 
Since the problem of defining what intellectuals are mainly consists of the 
problem of categorization, categorization of various definitions itself is a 
theoretical issue to be resolved. Accordingly, the second section of this chapter 
will discuss existing categorizations and account for the theoretical strengths and 
weaknesses of these. 
From the perspective of the main puzzle of this dissertation, that is, the 
explanation and analysis of the social type of the Democrat denoting emergent 
groups of political opinion producers in Turkey, the problematization of the 
category of the “intellectual” is important. The category is extensively used in 
political science, but most of the time, it fails to denote socio-politically 
determined common characteristics capable of explaining how a discernible group 
of political opinion producers can be lumped together. 
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2.2. Conceptual Analysis of the Category “Intellectual” 
2.2.1. Historical Roots 
It is a very difficult enterprise to propose a clear-cut definition of the 
concept of the intellectual, since the meanings ascribed to the notion vary from 
one framework to the other. Different scholars attempted to operationalize the 
concept in order to explain different things. However, leaving aside theoretical 
concerns for the moment, it might as well be argued that “intellectual,” in its 
broadest sense, somehow relates to the faculties of thinking and knowing. That is, 
engagement with speculative thought and expressions of this thought, the art of 
“living with ideas,” emerges as the principal criteria distinguishing intellectuals 
from other types of people (Mann, 1983:172-173). In this respect, the most 
common, but unfortunately the least elaborated, basic definition suggest that, 
 
intellectuals are persons possessing knowledge or in a narrower sense, 
those whose judgment, based on reflection and knowledge, derives less 
directly and exclusively from sensory perception than in the case of non-
intellectuals (Michels, 1964: 118).  
 
Although its emergence as a noun is no older than the last century, as an 
adjective naming anything relating to mind or knowledge, “intellectual” has long 
been utilized at least since the end of the sixteenth century.
2
 Before being 
burdened with its “modern” meanings, in pre-industrial times, the term, devoid of 
any professional connotation, was meant to signify either a thinker or a “seeker of 
truth”. In that sense, intellectual‟s role was equivalent to the role of the priest, the 
shaman, the philosopher or the artist (Marshall, 1998: 319). Yet, the real 
development of the concept began when it was no longer associated with the 
                                                 
2
 Its retrospective usage should not be mistaken with the debates on intellectuals that have 
commenced after the end of the 18th century (Brooker, 1999: 20). 
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religious rank-and-file (Shils, 1968: 407). The tension between the intellectual and 
the religious authority figure and the process of secularization of knowledge as a 
consequence of this tension paved the way towards the emergence of the first 
“modern intellectuals.” The advancement of the Renaissance and the Reformation 
movements might be seen as the first significant historical moments in terms of 
the birth and development of the modern understanding of the intellectual.  
Still, following the emphasis of Eyerman that “the idea of the intellectual 
is a child of Enlightenment and the forces that supported or opposed what has 
come to be called modernization” it can be argued that Enlightenment was the 
most important historical moment that established the grounds for the flourishing 
of the modern concept of the intellectual (Eyerman, 1994: 27). That is, “the idea 
of progress, of social development through the application of human reasons to 
the world, has been a central theme in the generational formation of intellectuals” 
(Eyerman, 1994: 27). As individuals who claim authority over reason and truth, 
the early intellectuals in Europe from the Renaissance onwards, represented the 
faith in reason and in that respect, have become both the carriers and products of 
modernity. 
The modern notion of the intellectual, implying a significant social 
category whose members share a belonging, an identity, did not emerge until the 
episode of intellectual-political engagement of the Dreyfus Affair. The triggering 
event of the Affair was the arrest of a Jewish officer in the French Army on the 
grounds that he was spying for Germany. Contrary to the evidence, Captain 
Dreyfus was found guilty of espionage and treason. The Affair was a 
manifestation of the anti-Semitic prejudices within the French Army and society. 
As a reaction to the verdict, the novelist Emile Zola published “An Open Letter to 
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the President of the Republic”, denunciating the army, titled with the famous 
phrase “J‟Accuse” (I accuse). Following the publication of the letter in a daily, 
another letter supporting Zola‟s arguments circulated, which demanded a new trial 
for Dreyfus. The second letter was signed by academics, men of letters, artists, 
journalists, students and other citizens who protested the verdict. The event was 
tagged “The Protest of the Intellectuals” in an article by Maurice Barres, thus the 
word “intellectual” entered the Western vocabulary as a figure taking active role 
and responsibility inside the political field (Charles, 2008). 
As intellectuals, who became generators of politically and ideologically-
loaded opinions in the public sphere, engaged in contentious issues similar to the 
Dreyfus Affair, the usage of the category was also imbued with negative 
connotations. “Intellectual” was often used “as a term of abuse and of negative 
identification” (Eyerman, 1994: 23). Such negative associations further 
contaminated the concept with commonsensical notions that occasionally seeped 
into scholarly debates. As an after-effect of episodes like the Dreyfus Affair, 
where intellectuals occupied anti-establishment positions, the category was 
identified with individuals who were against the highest values and institutions of 
the established order. Being an intellectual was seen as synonymous with being a 
traitor. As Christopher Charles points out, the Dreyfus Affair defined the essential 
characteristics of intellectuals (2008). From this contentious episode on, the 
notion of the “intellectual” denoted the idea of struggling outside the socially and 
politically accepted norms: The Affair was an attack towards the highest 
authorities of the state. The letters circulated in support of Dreyfus took sides 
against discrimination, against anti-Semitism and against arbitrary abuse of power 
by state authorities. Moreover, French secular intellectuals openly attacked 
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Catholic prejudices that have influenced staff decisions within the army and rest 
of the bureaucracy. They called for a democratic “rule of law,” which was raised 
as a voice parallel to but outside the system of party politics. As a result of all 
these, due to the collective affirmation of the birth of the category, the term 
“intellectual” has inherently retained a communitarian aspect. Once all these 
characteristics have been considered, it might well be argued that “intellectual” 
embodied a political character since its modern conception. 
2.2.2. The Emergence of the Twin Concept: The Intelligentsia 
The sibling concept, “intelligentsia,”3 similarly emerged from within the 
terrain of the political and was imbued with its descriptive, or at times, 
explanatory powers through its politicized meanings. In terms of its roots and 
historical emergence, this term is older than the term “intellectual” (Eyerman, 
1994: 21). In its early usage, “intelligentsia” referred to the déclassé elements of 
major estates in 19
th
-century Russia and denoted a small group within the 
educated elite of the society. The term gained its full content during the reign of 
Peter the Great and it can be argued that as a social category, it is a product of the 
process of Russian modernization set out by it. As Eyerman states, the 
intelligentsia were the group of persons whose identity was marked by education 
and an orientation towards European culture, an identity constructed by the 
modernizing policies of Peter the Great. In this political framework, Europe was 
identified with modernity, with “higher” education and intelligence (Eyerman, 
1994: 21). Simply defined, the intelligentsia were the carriers of the values and 
norms of European culture. Still, their identity was not confined to only this 
                                                 
3
 In this section, the term “intelligentsia” is used as a collective noun referring to intellectuals as a 
social category. 
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aspect; a sense of mission, of duty and responsibility was an integral part of it. 
This mission was defined as the desire or even the obligation to carry 
enlightenment to the uneducated masses. Needless to say, the state was the 
principal ally of the intelligentsia throughout this process of “bringing light” 
(Eyerman, 1994: 21).  
It might be argued that, building upon this historical heritage, the term 
came to be used to identify “the educated and half-educated individuals who 
carried the torch of ideological enlightenment and served various causes: narod 
(people), proletariat, progress, or revolution” (Nahirny, 1983: 5).  
2.2.3. Conceptual Clarification: Intellectual or Intelligentsia? 
The debate over the emergence and historical evolution of the concepts 
“intellectual” and “intelligentsia” offers more than a simple historical account. 
Such a discussion enables us to compare two different conceptual backgrounds. 
Although the enlightenment of uneducated masses is the dominant theme shared 
by both categories, there is a fundamental difference between each 
conceptualization. The “intellectual,” as associated with political engagement 
episodes like the Dreyfus Affair, is conceived inside a struggle against established 
authorities of the state. In contrast, the “intelligentsia,” historically associated with 
early Russian modernization, is more power-friendly: the state is its ally, its chief 
supporter. 
The intellectual as crystallized during and after the Dreyfus Affair is the 
specific outcome of the historical processes which made the West what it is. 
While thinking and writing about the structures and dynamics of the world in 
universal terms, the intellectual always feels responsible for intervening in the 
political domain to transform the existing reality towards a more desirable one 
  
19 
 
(Ross, 1991: 69). Throughout the process of intellectual production, however, the 
intellectual always tends to maintain a distance between himself and the existing 
authorities and institutions; he is imbued with the task of “speaking truth to power” 
(Said, 1993: 23). To what extent intellectuals identify with this ideal position is of 
course a matter of argument. Still, the question of the autonomy of the intellectual 
has always occupied a prominent place within the theoretical of research-oriented 
debates on intellectuals. This question of the intellectuals‟ relation with power has 
always remained unresolved within the category itself – it can even be argued that 
the ambiguity of the place of power in the activities of the intellectual often 
helped the glorification of the category, and moreover, reinforced its usage as a 
catch-all phrase covering all sorts of opinion producers. 
The other category, the intelligentsia, on the other hand, tells something 
about the tragedy of intellectuals in the modernizing or Westernizing countries, 
about their problematic relationship with the state. In that respect, once its 
historical origins have been taken into account, intelligentsia refers to a group of 
educated individuals sent to the West by the national government in order to 
import the technique and values of the Western civilization to their home country. 
In a way, they were the “offspring of the state” (Belge, 2001: 43-55).4 Service to 
the state via service to the people was these individuals‟ reason for existence, and 
the question of “intellectual autonomy” either was not on their agenda or did not 
occur to them as a significant topic of debate. The conditions of intellectual 
formation within modernizing countries gave much more emphasis to duty and 
responsibility with respect to the state, and in turn, a comparably different 
typology of educated knowledge and opinion producers emerged. It could be 
                                                 
4
 As Belge states, defining the intellectual imposes the task of building a historical perspective. For 
an elaborate discussion of the emergence and historical evolution of the intelligentsia/intellectuals 
in two modernizing countries, see also: Belge, 1995.  
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argued that in countries like Turkey, while “intelligentsia” became a privileged 
group, invested in by the state, “loyal” to power; “intellectuals” became a 
category defined as “subversive” for the perceived dangers they pose to the 
regime. 
Despite their differing origins and historical evolution, today, the terms 
“intellectual” and “intelligentsia” are used as synonymous. Late modern usages do 
not take into consideration the differences in the political character of each term. 
“Intelligentsia” is often employed as the plural form of “intellectual” (Leopold, 
1983: 172-173).  
Nevertheless, it would be too simple to be content with a brief account of 
the historical evolution of the terms which conceives them as synonymous. A 
theoretically deeper investigation is required in order to better observe the diverse 
framings of both concepts and understand the shortcomings of them as politically-
loaded categories. 
First of all, the definition of the intellectual differs according to the 
theoretical perspectives behind the use of the concept. Different dimensions are 
formulated according to the methodological priorities of different theoretical 
positions which necessitate distinct categorizations. The question of how to 
categorize various definitions appears to be the key issue. The following section 
will dwell upon the same problem of definition and categorization. 
2.3. Problem of Definition 
2.3.1. Two Contrasting Conceptualizations 
The contrasting conceptualizations of the intellectual by Julien Benda and 
Jean-Paul Sartre would be an enlightening point of entry because of the way these 
idealizations (Benda‟s “intellectual as cleric” and Sartre‟s “engaged intellectuals”) 
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shaped the discussions on the topic in the 20th century. These two accounts 
represent two politically different (if not conflicting) views on the Dreyfusard 
intellectual, Benda‟s being located on the right, while Sartre‟s closer to the left. 
In his prominent work, La Trahison des Clercs (1927, translated in English 
as The Treason of the Intellectuals in 1928), Benda offered a classic definition for 
the intellectual. According to him, an intellectual is a critically independent 
person loyal only to reason and universal truth. In that respect, he is over and 
above topical interests and therefore holds a privileged status within society. 
In Benda‟s original formulation, the term “intellectual” refers to those 
clerics who devote their lives to knowledge and thought without having any 
practical interests and considerations. In contrast to laymen, “whose whole 
function consisted in the pursuit of material interests,” clerics were defined by 
their indifference to worldly affairs and material interests (Benda, 1969: 43). 
Benda offered this formulation within an atmosphere of frustration concerning the 
intellectuals of his time, during the 1920s. As he stated, this was “essentially the 
age of politics” (Benda, 1969: 29) and intellectuals had lost their faith in universal 
principles of truth and associated themselves with worldly interests and partisan 
politics exemplified by their passions for class, race and nationalism. In Benda‟s 
account, only those who committed themselves to the pursuit of universal truth 
and justice were “true” intellectuals. 
This was obviously a challenge to the not-very-popular, “subversive” 
understanding of who intellectuals were, which was formulated after the Dreyfus 
Affair. Benda‟s scholarly, if not scholastic, definition appeared to prohibit the 
realm of active politics for the sake of a pure search for truth.  
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A generation later, when political engagement was once again strongly 
introduced into the agenda of academics, artists and other “intellectuals,” Jean-
Paul Sartre challenged Benda‟s notion. He “epitomized the committed intellectual” 
(Drake, 2002: 4) in contrast to Benda‟s clerical emphasis where intellectuals were 
“disinterested,” in pursuit of truth. Benda‟s intellectuals did not get involved in 
politics, and that was highly unsatisfactory for Sartre. Sartre‟s generation 
experienced the WWII and its aftermath, an episode where intellectual 
commitment reached its peak. During the Nazi occupation of France (as well as 
other European countries), intellectuals, along with everybody else, were faced 
with a choice – either do something against the occupation, or collaborate with the 
Nazis. Their choices shaped this new understanding of the “engaged intellectual”: 
In the aftermath of the war, intellectuals‟ taking side in politics was regarded not 
as a choice, but as a prerequisite for intellectual work, almost inscribed in the job 
definition (Hewlett, 1998: 174).  
In that context, Sartre defined the intellectual as someone who concerns 
himself with what is none of his business. In What is Literature? (Qu‟est-ce que 
la littérature) he proposes that, 
 
the function of the writer is to act in such a way that nobody can be 
ignorant of the world and that nobody may say that he is innocent of what 
it is all about (Sartre, 1988). 
 
In his formulation, since writing was defined as action, the writer who 
committed to writing as a form of action was an engage (Poster, 1998: 174). 
Clearly then, this was a definition constructed upon the Marxian dictum that 
intellectuals do not simply interpret the world but act upon it in order to transform 
it. The definition inherited the core points of Sartre‟s synthesis of Marxism and 
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his own version of existentialism. In that respect, freedom occupied a pivotal role 
in defining the position and the role of the writer.
5
 Sartre‟s problematic rested 
upon the statement that humans‟ condition of freedom defined their condition of 
existence. Leaving no room for determinism, those lines of thinking bestowed 
upon human beings a limitless potential towards realizing themselves, since their 
response to the determining effects is always a matter of choice. That is, freedom 
constituted the basis of the intellectual‟s opportunity to have an effect on the 
world (Poster, 1998: 39). 
Sartre‟s concept of the intellectual was the outcome of the historical 
specificity of the postwar period marked by great expectations for social progress 
and a strong faith in reason. Since the postwar period opened the way before a 
process of democratic rebuilding and renewal for Western Europe, Sartre‟s 
conceptualization rested upon the basic premises of the Western philosophical 
tradition, especially the emphasis on “progress.” At the epistemological level, 
while maintaining the key assumptions of existential Marxism which dominated 
the intellectual atmosphere of France until the late 1960s, Sartre‟s approach also 
shared the general accent of the Enlightenment tradition. In that respect, essential 
to the Sartrean intellectual was his/her claim to defend and enrich universal ideals. 
Furthermore, this intellectual, through her claim to universality, donned the 
mantle of universalism herself – as a nationless, lone fighter of truth everywhere. 
Still, for Sartre the universalism of the intellectual was conditional upon the 
achievement of a classless society. 
                                                 
5
 Here “writer” refers to the “intellectual”, since Sartre discussion on literature in his famous essay 
What is Literature? covers history and philosophy, too. As Mark Poster underlines, Sartre used the 
term in the broad 18th-century sense where literature included these two intellectual spheres 
(Poster, 1998: 38). 
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The distinguishing characteristic of this “universal intellectual” which 
actually came into being in the very person of Sartre was, inevitably, 
“engagement.” In the sense that he was obliged to be concerned with the issues of 
his day, issues which were none of his business, this intellectual had to engage in 
active politics or take a political position. Sartre went one step further and argued 
that the intellectual should necessarily be on the left of the political spectrum. This 
statement, deriving from Sartre‟s original synthesis of Marxism and existentialism, 
constituted the major difference of his model of “universal intellectual” from the 
classic definition proposed by Benda. Sartre‟s “engaged intellectual” resembles 
Benda‟s “true intellectual” in the sense that s/he was the sole possessor of 
independent judgment owing loyalty to truth alone. Yet, the truth being pursued 
by the Sartrean intellectual was defined according to the dictums of existential 
Marxism which takes the class nature of actual society as granted. In this vein, 
while acknowledging the potential for the realization of freedom, Sartre admitted 
that the class structure of society stood as the major obstacle to this end. Since the 
class nature of the prevailing social conditions determines the vision of the writer 
and necessarily restricts his/her perception of reality, the intellectual does not 
possess the right to speak for the rest of the society but only for the certain groups 
with which s/he identifies. In Sartre‟s account, the intellectual can defend the 
interests of all only within a classless society, and thereby emerges as the sole 
representative of universality. That is, the question of universality, according to 
the Sartrean framework, is defined with regards to class analysis. 
Now, despite the differences in emphasis between Sartre‟s and Benda‟s 
approaches, their distance is not substantial. As Steven Ulgar mentions, both 
thinkers share a common concern while casting the writer as the embodiment of 
  
25 
 
collective conscience (1988: 39). Yet, whereas Benda‟s “true intellectual” 
intervenes in temporal affairs in the name of mankind, Sartre‟s “engaged 
intellectual” intervenes in the course of history in the name of one specific class as 
she (he) herself (himself) is the product of a class-divided society and thus a 
product of history.
6
 Hence, in contrast to Benda‟s cleric who puts a distance 
between himself and his society and who argues for non-material, non-immediate 
values, avoiding the particularistic conceptions of truth, Sartre‟s engage comes 
into existence when s/he engages in active politics, is involved with a social 
project or a movement in order to change the world. 
These two seemingly contradicting variants of the Dreyfusard model of the 
intellectual have long been the common reference points in the discussion over the 
intellectual. In its Sartrean variant, the Dreyfusard ideal has been the source of 
inspiration for the contemporary discussion and analyses of the intellectual. 
Besides, questioning the Dreyfusard ideal has been the common concern shared 
by two major accounts analyzing the issue in completely different analytical 
planes: Marxian analysis of Antonio Gramsci and the post-structuralist account 
Michel Foucault‟s have been the two main contemporary contributions built on 
questioning of the conventional conceptualization of the intellectual (Broker, 1999: 
120-122). Still, contemporary discussion over the role and function of the 
intelligentsia cannot ignore another key figure that emerges as a response to the 
Dreyfusard ideal. This last figure is Karl Mannheim whose work provided the 
major parameters of the definition of the „intellectual‟ within a new synthesis.  
 
                                                 
6
 “The intellectual, the product of a class-divided society, … is thus a product of history. In this 
sense, no society can complain of its intellectuals without accusing itself, for it has the intellectuals 
it makes” (Sartre, 1988: 18). 
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2.3.2. Major Theoretical Approaches: Gramsci, Foucault and Mannheim 
2.3.2.1. Karl Mannheim and the „free-floating intelligentsia‟  
 
 Mannheim conceptualized the intellectuals as a “free-floating” stratum 
situated over and above a particular class position. This concept emerged as a 
response to the Marxian and Dreyfusard conceptualizations. In contrast to the 
Marxian conception, which rests on particular sets of functions being fulfilled by 
the intelligentsia in favor of one of the antagonistic classes, Mannheim claims that 
intellectuals are to be defined a „classless‟ or a „transcended class‟ devoid of any 
sort of relationship or bounds with either of the antagonistic classes. He also 
refused the Dreyfusard claim that intellectuals constituted a significant class 
within the society. In this formulation intellectuals were defined as a social 
stratum of any sort of economic interest which enabled them to stand distanced to 
the terrain of ideology and to attach themselves with the domain of knowledge.  
 The roots of Mannheim‟s analysis of intellectual are found in the 
distinction he makes between the „static‟ and „modern‟ societies. First of all, 
Mannheim gives a general definition of the intellectual. According to him, the 
intelligentsia can be defined as the social group whose special mission is to 
provide an interpretation of the society of which it is a part. In static societies, this 
stratum has a well-defined status organized in the form of a castle. It enjoys a 
monopolistic control over the construction of the society‟s world-views. This 
stratum, composed of the medieval clergy, Brahmins and the magicians, possesses 
the power of reconciling the divergent world-views of the other social stratums 
(Mannheim, 1985: 10).  
 In Mannheim‟s schema, the defining characteristic of the modern times, in 
contrast to the Middle Ages, is the emergence of a free intelligentsia (1985: 11). 
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This is the outcome of the breaking of “the monopoly of the ecclesiastical 
interpretation of the world which was held by the priestly castle” before 
(Mannheim, 1985: 11). Once this monopoly is broken, intellectual production is 
exposed to free competition which in turn brings about “a sudden flowering of an 
unexampled intellectual richness” (Mannheim, 1985: 12).  
 As it has been noted in the previous paragraphs, the free-floating 
intelligentsia defined by Mannheim, is a relatively classless stratum (1985: 155). 
Despite the fact that, intellectuals come from very different social and economic 
backgrounds, the differentiation among them is overcome by the unifying power 
of “education” (Mannheim, 1985:155). Put it differently, education is given first 
and foremost importance in Mannheim‟s schema. It suppresses differences of 
birth, status, profession, and wealth among the intellectuals and binds them 
together (1985: 155). Still, the unifying power of the education does not eradicate 
the heterogeneous character of the intelligentsia as a social stratum. Accordingly, 
since its heterogeneity is maintained, the intelligentsia cannot be characterized as 
a „class-in-itself.‟  
 Mannheim devotes a particular priority to the social role and historical 
mission that are to be performed by the intellectual stratum. The primary mission 
of the intelligentsia, in Mannheim‟s analysis, is to provide knowledge; that is, 
providing the society a picture of itself as a totality (Longhurst, 1989). 
Accordingly, due to its relative uncommittedness, the intelligentsia is capable of 
producing disinterested and relatively objective knowledge. Utilizing the insights 
of the discipline of sociology of knowledge, of which Mannheim was the 
foremost exponent, the „socially unattached intelligentsia‟7 acquires the power of 
                                                 
7
 Mannheim, himself, acknowledges that, he borrows the notion of „socially unattached 
intelligentsia‟ from Alfred Weber: “This unanchored, relatively classless stratum is, to use Alfred 
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reconciling competing claims to truth raised by differing and opposite stratums 
within the society. Therefore, in Mannheim‟s formulation, the intellectuals serve 
as the synthesizers of the opposing worldviews, and in that way prevents the 
society from fundamental conflicts and turbulence.
8
 
 In that respect it might well be argued that, the missionary and indeed the 
privileged position ascribed to the intelligentsia in Mannheim‟s model, is 
provided by the virtues of the „sociology of knowledge.‟ To put it differently, the 
theory of free-floating intelligentsia has been built upon the premises of a 
sociology of knowledge. Mannheim‟s sociology of knowledge was brought to full 
development in his most influential work, Ideology and Utopia (1929, translated 
into English in 1936) (Longhurst, 1989: 23). In the opening paragraph of the book, 
while clarifying the ambition of his work, Mannheim gives a brief explanation of 
the discipline: “(It) is concerned with the problem of how men actually think” 
(1985: 1). He maintains that, it is both a theory and an historical-sociological 
method of research (1985: 266). In Mannheim‟s own words, 
 
as theory it seeks to analyze the relationship between knowledge and 
existence; as historical-sociological research it seeks to trace the forms 
which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of 
mankind. On the one hand, it aims at discovering workable criteria for 
determining the interrelations between thought and action. On the other 
hand, by thinking this problem out from the beginning to end in a radical, 
unprejudiced manner, it hopes to develop a theory, appropriate to the 
contemporary situation, concerning the significance of the non-theoretical 
conditioning factors in knowledge (1985: 264).    
   
Obviously, Mannheim‟s detailed analysis in Ideology and Utopia rests 
upon a categorical distinction between the concepts of ideology and utopia. His 
                                                                                                                                     
Weber‟s terminology, the “socially unattached intelligentsia” (freischwebende Intelligennz)” 
(1985: 155). 
8
 As Longhurst emphasizes, in Mannheim‟s model, intellectuals are portrayed to possess the 
„potential‟ to perform the „true‟ synthesis. Whether this is realized or not is with the historical and 
social conjuncture (Longhurst, 1989: 23).  
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account on the nature of ideology is of central importance for the theoretical 
model he built. For him, ideology is a vehicle utilized by the ruling groups to 
maintain power (1985: 40). In contrast, utopia is the tool that could be used by the 
ruled groups in their struggle for power (1985: 40). Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to arrive at the „true knowledge‟ by utilizing either ideologies or utopias, 
Mannheim claims. The partiality that either of these two categorically separated 
domains retains stands as the main obstacle to the correct understanding of the 
totality and the process of capturing the reality. Unless these two categories are 
exposed to a critical examination, particularization and then a process of synthesis, 
the „true knowledge‟ cannot be attained. This process of particularization and total 
synthesis can only be realized by some social group, namely the intelligentsia, 
utilizing the best method, that of the „sociology of knowledge‟ in fulfilling their 
mission.  
 To recapitulate, sociology of knowledge has provided the main analytical 
domain for Mannheim‟s analysis of intellectuals. Endowed with this discipline, 
the intelligentsia would be able to perform its historical mission, that of achieving 
“the true synthesis of all the diverse aspirations of the existing groups in society” 
(1985: 154). In other words, sociology of knowledge would serve as the 
fundamental point of reference in intellectuals‟ attempts of integrating and 
evaluating the divergent views produced by different sections of the society. The 
dynamic synthesis of several partial perspectives provided by the intellectual 
stratum would in turn ensure the „true‟ interpretation of the world and the correct 
view of reality (Mannheim, 1952: 171-179). In that respect, intellectuals, defined 
as the exponents of synthesis, have occupied a value-free position within 
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Mannheim‟s theoretical model and portrayed as the neutral arbiters between the 
views raised by antagonistic classes.  
2.3.2.2. Gramsci and the theory of „organic intellectual  
 The analysis of the political function of the intellectuals was the starting 
point for the studies of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). 
Utilizing the insights of Marxism and building up a theory of politics from which 
is implicit in Marx‟s analysis, Gramsci devoted particular emphasis to the 
functions to be played by the intellectuals in class-divided societies (Showstack-
Sassoon, 1983: 194; Carnoy, 1984: 65). As many commentators have noted, he 
was the first Marxist to problematize „intellectuals‟ on theoretical grounds 
(Karabel, 1976).  
 Gramsci‟s formulation rested on a distinction between the „traditional‟ and 
„organic‟ intellectuals. The major theoretical inspiration behind his 
conceptualization of the „traditional intellectual‟ was a critical reading of Benda‟s 
„true intellectual‟ and the questioning of the Dreyfusard ideal. According to the 
thinker, Benda‟s „true intellectual‟ stood as the perfect exemplar of the „traditional‟ 
intellectual. In that respect, the intellectuals who were engaged with speculative 
thought and knowledge and conceived of themselves as over and above the topical 
interests are defined as the „traditional intellectuals.‟ This group was composed of 
the literati, philosophers, artists, and the clerics who assumed in themselves a 
certain amount of neutrality.  
 In Gramsci‟s analysis, intellectual activity is seen as a human potential 
commonly shared by all. Yet, the realization of this potential is conditioned by the 
specific social relations. More precisely, since engagement with knowledge 
necessitates certain amount of time to be devoted to this special activity, and since 
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access to knowledge requires certain material resources, only some privileged 
groups can have the opportunities absolutely essential for intellectual 
development. That is, only some „function‟ as intellectuals. In Gramsci‟s original 
formulation, this issue is addressed as follows: “All men are intellectuals, but not 
all men have in society „the function of intellectual‟” (Gramsci, 1986: 8-9).  
 It is noteworthy here that the emphasis Gramsci attached to the question of 
intellectuals is closely related to the significance he devoted to „the political.‟ 
Indeed, the major inspiration behind the thinker‟s whole body of work was 
politically motivated. That is, although the theory of intellectuals is one of the 
keystones of Gramsci‟s thought, it becomes valid when its connections with his 
conception of hegemony have been considered. Gramsci‟s starting point for his 
theoretical concern was composed of two questions on the failure of the socialist 
revolution in advanced capitalist countries of the West and its success in Russia. 
Once the thinker realized the inadequacy of the deterministic explanations 
towards the problem, he set out his explanation on a comparison of the political 
structures of the „East‟ and the „West.‟ Locating the relationship between state 
and civil society at the center of his analysis, he claimed that, 
 
In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and 
gelatinous; in the west there was a proper relation between State and civil 
society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was 
at once revealed (1986: 238). 
 
Gramsci‟s theoretical investigations addressed one core question: How can 
the ruling class manage to win the consent of the subaltern classes while 
achieving the reproduction of the capitalist relations (Carnoy, 1984: 69). The 
political ambition behind this question was to find out how the subordinate classes 
can manage to overthrow the old order via a socialist revolution and bring about a 
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new one? Gramsci developed his answer by according priority to the conception 
of „civil society.‟ In his account, in contrast to Marx‟s original conceptualization 
which held that civil society referred to the realm of economic relations, the 
sphere of civil society embraced not only the whole body of the material 
relationships but also the entire complex of ideological and cultural relations.
9
 
That is, in the West, political power was not concentrated within the state 
instrument but dispersed throughout the tissues of the society and its whole body 
of ideological and cultural practices. This was indeed the explanation of what 
Gramsci called „hegemony.‟ Briefly defined, it came to mean “the ideological 
predominance of the dominant classes in civil society over the subordinate” 
(Carnoy, 1984: 68). Put differently, hegemony referred to the attempts of the 
dominant class to offer its own rule as “all-inclusive and universal to shape the 
interests and needs of subordinate groups” (Carnoy, 1984: 70). Besides, it 
indicated the process within which a fraction of the dominant class enjoyed its 
control through its moral and ideological leadership over the other fractions of the 
dominant class (Carnoy, 1984: 70). To sum up, hegemony was the major vehicle 
through which the dominant class gained the consent to its rule. Although 
hegemony was a vehicle mostly enjoyed by the ruling classes, the whole complex 
of ideological and cultural practices were designed to gain the active consent of 
the masses to overthrow the existing social order and building up the socialist 
society. It was here that the problem of intellectuals appeared in Gramsci‟s 
political and thereby theoretical agenda. They occupied pivotal role within the 
                                                 
9
 There exist contradicting views concerning the meaning Gramsci ascribed to „civil society.‟ For 
instance, Norberto Bobbio argued that Gramsci‟s conception of civil society was located to the 
superstructure. And thereby, it no longer referred to the relations in production, but rather to the 
ideological realm and the political expression of the relations embedded in it (Bobbio, 1988). In 
contrast, one another commentator, Texier, claimed that, there never existed some sort of 
divergence between Marx‟s analysis and Gramsci‟s account. While employing a working class 
perspective, Gramsci never ignored the fact that economy was the determinant in the last instance 
(Texier, 1982).   
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thinker‟s problematization of hegemony, since the hegemony in society was 
expressed as “the complex institutions, ideologies, practices, and agents that 
comprise the dominant culture of values” (Buci-Glucksmann, 1974). However, 
intellectuals‟ significance stemmed not only from the role they played in the 
process of building the hegemony of the dominant class but also from their 
potential to provide the basis for a revolutionary political strategy. This constitutes 
the major reason behind the elaborate analysis of the intellectuals in Gramsci‟s 
account.   
 Gramsci discussed the topic of intellectuals at length in his Prison 
Notebooks (1929-35) (1971). Throughout the book, he analyzed the composition 
and the functions of the intellectuals in modern society. His analysis did not focus 
upon the cognitive or intellectual engagement itself but the functions undertaken 
by the intellectuals in structural and superstructural levels. That is, in Gramsci‟s 
formulation, definition and the content of the intellectual was extended from the 
base to the superstructure.  
 As it has been indicated in the opening paragraphs of this section, 
Gramsci‟s analysis rested on a distinction between the „traditional‟ and „organic‟ 
intellectuals. The traditional intellectuals refer to the men of ideas whose positions 
in society derive from the past and present class relations which in turn conceals 
their attachment to class positions (Carnoy, 1984: 85). They represent “historical 
continuity, uninterrupted by even the most complex and radical changes in social 
and political forms” (Eyerman, 1994: 25). Put it differently, they are composed of 
the intellectual stratums of the former social formation; and, in a sense, the 
remnants of the historical bloc conditioned by the whole body of the structural 
and superstructural activities (Carnoy, 1984: 85). The class-less or the so-called 
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neutral appearance of this stratum derives from the historical and social 
characteristics of its coming into being. 
Yet, the analysis of the traditional intellectuals is not confined to the above 
mentioned discussion. Having in mind the „free-floating intelligentsia‟ of 
Mannheim, Gramsci added a new dimension to his analysis of „traditional 
intellectual.‟ In this vein, he contended that, one sub-category of the traditional 
intellectuals was to be constituted by the intellectual stratum who regarded itself 
autonomous and independent from the class relations. Those intellectuals who 
believed to be the representatives of reason and objectivity strengthened their self-
image through the intellectual power they enjoyed.  
2.3.2.3. Foucault and the “universal” versus “specific” intellectual  
In Foucault, the opposition to unitary bodies of theory, to global and 
systematizing thought, and the advocacy of autonomous decentralized forms of 
theorizing and criticism reinforces his distinction between two types of 
intellectuals: the “universal” and the “specific” (Smart, 2002: 66). He argues that 
intellectual‟s traditional role has been to reveal the truth to those who cannot 
perceive the truth. Therefore, this kind of “universal” intellectual was tasked with 
upholding reason, to stand by principles of justice, to represent universal values. 
In a way, the universal intellectual took it as his or her main task to be the 
conscience of everyone. Foucault disputed this seemingly neutral and benevolent 
understanding of the intellectual‟s role and function by arguing that events like 
May 1968 or struggles for prisoners‟ rights demonstrate the fact that “ordinary” 
citizens do not need intellectuals to express and defend universal values. People 
were quite able to acquire and act upon the knowledge of the unjust conditions 
they were forced to live in. They did not have to “outsource” their conscience to 
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be represented. To make things worse, according to Foucault, protesting citizens‟ 
access to local forms of knowledge have been marginalized and censured by a 
system of power in which intellectuals had complicity. Based on this observation, 
Foucault stated that intellectuals should not be concerned with attempting to 
represent “the truth of the collectivity” – a concern which was actually connected 
with an effect of domination (Smart, 2002: 67). Intellectuals should rather seek 
different ways of fighting against forms of power in which intellectual activity 
was embedded (Foucault, 1980). 
Foucault contended that the understanding of the universal intellectual as 
the bearer of universal morals, theoretical and political values had been displaced 
by a radically different and more “political” intellectual subject, which he called 
the “specific intellectual”: 
 
A new mode of the „connection between theory and practice‟ has been 
established. Intellectuals have become used to working, not in the modality 
of the „universal,‟ the „exemplary,‟ the „just-and-true-for-all,‟ but within 
specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or 
work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the 
university, family, and sexual relations). This has undoubtedly given them 
a much more immediate and concrete awareness of struggles. And they 
have met here with problems which are specific, „nonuniversal,‟ and often 
different from those of the proletariat or the masses. (Foucault, 1984: 68) 
 
Faced with life challenges not very dissimilar to those faced by the 
proletariat, intellectuals, according to Foucault, have more stakes in representing 
“specific” issues that concern their own wellbeing, related to the struggles they 
find themselves in. The emergence of the specific intellectual is related to 
expansion of technical and scientific structures, to the growth and diffusion of 
forms of scientific rationality, and a series of occupations, offices, and subjects 
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bearing form of knowledge and techniques invested with scientific legitimacy 
(such as teachers, social workers, professional researchers, etc).  
The specific intellectual, unlike the universal intellectual, is not a scholar, 
a “man of letters” so to speak. She or he is a practical expert with a localized 
connection to scientific knowledge. That form of knowledge the specific 
intellectual is engaged with is politicized through an immediate involvement in 
everyday struggles and conflicts. The key task of the new, specific intellectual is 
not that of restoring the purity and ultimate truth of scientific practice (which can 
be achieved through the mundane practice of criticism of ideological content). 
Intellectuals should no longer lose time with trying to free truth from power. 
Instead, they should endeavor to detach “the power of truth from the forms of 
hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present 
time” (Foucault, 1984: 75). This task defined by Foucault ultimately corresponds 
to a new “politics of truth” (Foucault, 1980: 133). 
In other words, specific intellectuals should be aware that they too, 
through their monopoly over expert knowledge, are part of the system, or, 
“governmentality.” Being part of the system, though, they are exposed to the same 
forces of disciplining and domination as the “masses”. Yet once they being to 
learn to use tactics of political struggle according to this realization, they will not 
have to be confined within the space of “representation”. Specific intellectuals can 
thus learn to stop thinking in terms of “what‟s in people‟s heads” and instead turn 
their attention to “the political, economic institutional regime of the production of 
truth” (Pritchard, 2000: 160). 
Foucault‟s fundamental point in his distinction between the “universal” 
and “specific” is his rejection of the split between the externally situated 
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intellectuals and the internally situated practitioner. There is no justifiable 
separating line between intellectuals as free subjects and intellectuals as 
practitioners. The fact that the specific intellectual is, inevitably, embedded in 
institutional power/knowledge regimes is not self-defeating – this complicity is 
what politicizes and empowers. His notion of the specific intellectual pulls the rug 
out from underneath the “just-and-true-for-all” intellectual; problematizes the 
academic/practitioner relationship in new ways; resituates the intellectual as a 
practitioner and the practitioner as an intellectual.  
2.4. Concluding Remarks  
The classical debate on the concept of intellectuals might provide 
ammunition for political rhetoric, but is constraining for the political-scientific 
task of studying the emergent groups of political opinion producers during 
Turkey‟s experiences with democratic consolidation since early 1980s. 
First, it is difficult to retool either the concept of the “intellectual” or that 
of the “intelligentsia” by attempting to eliminate the moralistic baggage that 
comes with it. As I aimed to demonstrate in this chapter, despite various well-
intentioned attempts to historicize intellectuals by drawing upon their relation to 
politics, the category is always consecrated, surrounded by an aura of good or bad 
“missions”, liked or disliked “functions” or overburdened “tasks.” The best way 
to avoid this baggage is to utilize a different concept-method toolbox. 
That alternative brings us to the second point, and closer to the unfolding 
of the dissertation‟s research questions: Instead of using a moralistic catch-all 
concept, a concept that can do the job of providing insights on a specific group of 
individuals with common characteristics embedded into a particular era of Turkish 
politics is preferable. It will be demonstrated in the following chapters that social 
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type analysis can deliver this: The Democrat of the two decades following the 
1980 coup is an emergent, distinctive, nevertheless ordinary social type, no 
superior or sacred or special than the social types of the Hobo, the Stranger or the 
Loser. The Democrat of this era is not the same as the Democrat in 1950s‟ Turkey. 
Nor does he have a trans-historical “responsibility” (although she may 
misrecognize her “disinterestedness” as such and this misrecognition is a 
significant object of analysis). The Democrat is both a creature of the 
shortcomings of democracy in Turkey‟s political sphere and civil society, and acts 
and socializes through these shortcomings, and leaves his impressions in the 
public sphere with his opinions. 
The usage of “intellectuals” implies that they are almost treated as an 
occupational group that responds to political events like the Turkish Medical 
Association does. Whereas the operationalization of the social type of the 
Democrat enables us the following: It helps reveal how certain characteristics, 
political attitudes, opinionated dispositions, reactions to authority, etc. coming 
from different individuals with comparable trajectories form recognizable social 
and political patterns, patterns that inspire or antagonize others and gain causal 
power over political and even mental structures. In the remainder of the 
dissertation, I will qualify this claim. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
 SOCIAL TYPE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I have dwelt upon the most common academic 
discussions on political opinion producers, revolving around the much-exploited 
category of the “intellectual.” As I have justified at the end of that discussion, 
coming up with another explication on the category will not be the task of this 
study. Theorizing on the “intellectual” might as well appear attractive on paper, 
but as I hope to demonstrate in this chapter through the discussion of a theoretical 
and methodological framework, such rhetoric usually is poorly grounded in actual 
social relations. 
The main problem with most analyses based on the category of the 
intellectual is a problem of operationalization rather than one of poor 
conceptualization. Usually, the category is much pervasive and creates difficulties 
for making political, cultural, habitual distinctions between various people 
empirically occupying the category. Since it fails to distinguish different agents, it 
is also unable to explain what kind of agents they are: Are “intellectuals” merely 
people who use their intellect more than others? Is the category ascribed to them 
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because they earn their lives through the production of ideas? It is my contention 
that regardless of what we call a group of people – “intellectuals” or “Robinsons” 
– the true political-scientific issue is about grounding. A well-constructed 
theoretical framework helps the scholar generate knowledge by allowing him or 
her to comfortably move between levels of abstraction; such a framework enables 
the investigator to constructively move between the facts and their analytical 
interpretation and explanation.  
This study‟s theoretical basis offers such an alternative framework. Here, 
George Simmel‟s “social type analysis” will be deployed  for the study of a 
particular type of political opinion producers which emerged in Turkey through 
the 1980s. It might well be claimed that, “social type analysis,” originally 
developed through the works of  Simmel, has been an understudied and unheard 
social-scientific approach. Yet, certain significant researchers have made 
unpretentious effort to expand on the concept of social type or to develop 
empirical and theoretical tools with which to analyze it (Strong, 1943; Strong, 
1946; Klapp, 1958; Burgess, 1968; Coser 1974; Arditi 1982; Arditi, 1987).  
Before entering into a discussion on the differing analytical usages of the 
“social type,” let me shed light on the fundamental difference between the 
conventional and social scientific interpretations of the concept of “type.” As 
Almog suggests, in everday usage, the concept of “type” usually retains two 
alternative meanings (1998). The first meaning implies that the person exposed to 
our personal observation is a unique person with specific traits (Almog, 1998). 
The second meaning, on the other hand, suggests that the person under 
observation connotes to a typical example of a recognizable social category 
identified with similar values, behavior, style, and habits. This second usage of the 
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“type,” appears to be the analytical focus of this dissertation purporting to suggest 
deeper knowledge on the political-scientific understanding of a specific group of 
persons.  
When we see an individual person as exemplary of a “kind,” or “mold,” a 
familiar intuitive process is at play. Our understanding processes a plethora of 
markers, like the person‟s clothing, the words (especially certain socio-politically 
loaded keywords, like “democracy,” “our nation,” etc.) the person‟s uses of 
his/her posture, etc. We then relate what we perceive to our memories and 
judgments of similar traits and place that set of traits into a social type. 
Accordingly, a fundamental analytical guideline I subscribe to in this dissertation 
is that this process can be fine-tuned in order to study social groups. For one thing, 
the category of “intellectuals” depends on the identification of a set of such 
impersonalized traits, which can later be paired with specific individuals. When 
we encounter (in a book, on TV, in a newspaper column, etc.) a political opinion 
producer of a certain brand, we utilize epithets like “nationalist,” “liberal,” 
“Islamist,” “leftist” too easily. Yet we usually take such categorical descriptive for 
granted and seldom reflect upon how we agree to associate people with certain 
characteristics to social types. We spontaneously recognize social types such as 
the Islamist without being reflexive about what justifies that person being an 
Islamist. My starting point is the consideration of this question of “what justifies” 
when it comes to analyzing intellectual producers of political opinions. If we 
attempt to delve deeper into the puzzle of why a group of scholars, academics, 
writers and journalists would be labeled as “liberal” and how come this labeling 
makes sense, we have to start historicizing. The spatial, social, cultural elements 
of a complex socialization process need to be addressed (Almog, 1998). Then, in 
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this chapter, two things will be accomplished: First, the meaning of the concept 
"social type" will be scrutinized. Second, the concept‟s significance for the 
purposes of this dissertation will be clarified and a methodology for “social type 
analysis” of liberal and democratic opinion producers will be discussed. 
3.2. Social Types: Definitional Dilemmas  
In the social science literature, the concept of social type is employed in 
varying and at times unclear ways. Parts of the methodological puzzle are 
common: Many researchers dealt with the question of finding and 
operationalizing a principle of categorizing groups of people with shared traits. 
According to Orrin Klapp (1949; 1954; 1956; 1958; 1964) who has published on 
social type analysis more than other researchers, two different understandings of 
the concept might be utilized (Almog, 1998). The first interpretation conceives the 
social types of legendary characters built upon a collective imagination process 
(Klapp, 1949; 1956).
10
 The second use of the concept found in Klapp, removing 
the approach further from Georg Simmel‟s (1971) original formulation, associates 
social types with existing individuals (Almog, 1998).  Here, social types are 
defined as 
 
consensual concepts of roles that have not been fully codified and 
rationalized, which help us find our way about in the social system (Klapp, 
1958: 674). 
 
This second definition, has been constructed upon a utilization of the 
concept defined beyond the historically-informed categorical analysis. Here, the 
concept merely connotes to a spontaneous, commonsensical means of labeling 
                                                 
10
 This interpretation is manifest in Klapp‟s famous essay, “The Fool as a Social-Type.” See: 
Klapp, 1949:157.  
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used by ordinary people (Almog, 1998). Not suprisingly, in the second definition, 
the concept has been stripped of its analytical content and is yielded to the 
subjective interpretations of the certain individuals.  
Deriving inspiration from Klapp‟s social - scientific enterprise, Taub and 
Leger (1984), have also offered a definition of the social type as a spontaneous 
social classification rejecting to perceive it as the formulation of a researcher 
(Almog, 1998). They observed specific small groups within the society and 
preferred to attribute identification of social types to these certain groups. For 
instance, in their study of a young gay community, they have employed the term 
social type to identify the features attributed by the gay group itself to its own 
members. Yet, it should be noted that, Samuel Strong‟s (1943; 1946) utilization of 
the social type in his investigation of the race relations in Chicago was forerunner 
to the conceptualization coined by Taub and Leger (Almog, 1998). Several social 
scientists have contributed to the literature on social type defined from within (by 
society) rather than by an outside observer, specifically by a social-scientist: 
Wirth (1968), Glick (1955) and Kinloch (1972) have all added more to Strong‟s 
handling of social types (Almond, 1998).  
The conceptualization of the social type offered by Reading (1977) markly 
contrasted with the former conceptualizations. Reading (1977) embraced the 
epistemological roots of social type analysis and understood social types as 
ascribed by social scientists for analytical purposes, rather than identified by 
individuals in everyday life. While a majority of (mainly US-based) social 
scientists who wrote about social types focused on how society stigmatizes 
“unruly” elements using social types, Reading thought that the concept is "an 
objectively derived summary description of the characteristics of a category of 
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persons" (Reading, 1977: 196).  The same framing of social types as an analytical 
tool for social-scientific typology can be found in Howard S. Becker‟s 
classification of artists into four social types (Becker, 1976; Almog, 1998).  
The significance of social type analysis in macro social understanding was 
underlined by Georg Simmel. However, instead of offering a clear definition of 
the concept, he provided case studies of social type analysis that gives us clues 
about his methodology (Almog, 1998).  His classic essays on “the stranger” 
(Simmel, 1950), “the poor” (Simmel, 1965), “the miser” (Simmel, 1971), and “the 
metropolitan type” (Simmel, 1964) have been read as the blueprints of social type 
analysis in the 20th century. Simmel uses the concept analytically, as the construct 
of the social scientist: the social type emerges out of complex relations, delimited 
by social structures. It is a conglomeration of personality traits, socio-political 
convictions, mannerisms and mentalities that can be observed when we analyze 
what differentiates people inside a social space. The following quotation is 
revealing in this respect:  
 
When we look at human life from a certain distance, we see each 
individual in his precise differentiation from all others. But if we increase 
our distance, the single individual disappears, and there emerges, instead, 
the picture of a “society” with its own forms and colors – a picture which 
has its own possibilities of being recognized or missed. It is certainly no 
less justified than is the other in which the parts, the individuals, are seen 
in their differentiation. Nor is it by any means a mere preliminary of it. 
The difference between the two merely consists in the difference between 
purposes of cognition; and this difference, in turn, corresponds to a 
difference in distance (Simmel, 1950: 8).  
 
In light of these definitions of the concept, it can be argued that 
epistemologically, there are two main ways of operationalizing social type: 
(1) Social type has been used in social-scientific studies through the 
recognition of its everyday usage by individuals – as a “folk notion.” This leads to 
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at best subjectivist, descriptive analyses of how people categorize other people. 
The approach provides little analytical room to explain emergent properties of 
social interaction that acquire a causal power of their own. 
(2) Yet the concept has also been applied as an analytical construct of the 
social scientist. Here, a social type does not refer to everyday epithets to 
categorize real individuals. It is used to explain certain tendencies and potentials 
which conglomerate and create the effect through which certain characteristics in 
individuals are recognized as belonging to a common “kind”. The point is not to 
empirically identify “personality patterns” across real individuals, but to reveal 
social-type-forming relations and explain how those relations interact with other 
social and political relations.
11
  
In this dissertation, especially when the discussion focuses on particular 
figures like Etyen Mahçupyan, my goal is not to submit a biography of an 
empirical individual. Rather, the point is to construct an epistemic individual in 
order to demonstrate the emergence and influence of the social type of „the 
democrat‟ in Turkish politics.  
It shouıld not be overlooked that the emergence and social recognition of a 
social type is dependent on “folk notions” as well. All in all, social type can be 
more soundly defined as a social-scientific summary of the shared and observed 
properties of a particular group of persons that might occasionally be given a 
commonsensical nickname. “Liberal,” for example, in Turkish social and political 
debates, has emerged as both a category of insult and gratification, thus earning a 
                                                 
11
 According a researcher, the second, more analytical approach is in line with Pierre Bourdieu‟s 
distinction between “empirical individuals” and “epistemic individuals” (Bourdieu, 1988). 
According to him, a less analytical, more commonsensical approach would be to point out merely 
that there are certain characteristics (“indicators”) between individuals which create differences 
among them. This emphasis on “empirical individuals” is incapable of explaining what really 
differentiates certain individuals and at the same time creates similarities between certain others 
(Almog, 1998).  
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“folk notion” or “public nickname” status. Yet “liberal” also denotes a social 
space occupied by relations and differences, which has real and identifiable 
effects. The group or category signified by a social type may be a community, a 
profession, a subculture, a status group, or a class that is characterized by its 
outward appearances (physical, fashionable or both), life style, and pattern of 
interaction (particularly linguistic), attitudes or certain political opinions.  
Following the guidelines offered by Almog, we can emphasize three points 
out of this definitional discussion (1998). First of all, social type analysis calls for 
detecting similarities within the group or category characterized by the social 
type, not perfect homogeneity. It entails to reveal the dominant social features 
common to certain types of human beings. Therefore, my social scientific 
ambition falls outside the investigation of characteristics that define a complete 
unique mold of personality. In subscribing to social type analysis, I take for 
granted that, the social mark of an individual‟s category is recognizable in certain 
forms of social relations, certain ways of position-takings and also the ways of 
expressing opinions and convictions. It is these positions and dispositions that 
make the members of a group or category resemble one another and distinguish 
them as a whole from others. Needless to say, this model of social type 
distinguishes the majority of group members, not the exceptions or the marginal 
cases. 
The second point in the proposed operationalization is about what 
construes as “signals,” “traits,” “characteristics” that are shared and/or ascribed 
(Almog, 1998). Each individual representative of the social type does not possess 
all the typical features displayed by it. The social type I will be investigating (that 
of the Democrat) will serve only as a model for analyzing the characteristic 
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features of a particular type of individual. The concept I use is analytical, an 
abstract
12
 depiction constructed from a number of real cases in order to reveal 
their essential features and causal powers. While it might be possible to identify 
an individual who closely approximates the analytical model of his or her social 
type, this is not a condition for the theoretical portrayal of the social type model. 
Nevertheless, this dissertation is not a purely theoretical one, and I will make use 
of individuals‟ cases to illustrate the social type I aim to analyze. 
Thirdly, the essential difference between the concept of social type and 
that of stereotype should be underlined. For instance, the characters portrayed by 
Nuri Alço in the Turkish cinema of the 1980s as the image of a wealthy and 
corrupt villain (kept still alive in contemporary popular culture) is an example of 
streotyping.  Alço‟s characters are commonly used as a basis for portraying real-
life “evil womanizers.” In order avoid streotyping, the social type model must be 
constructed only on the observed features and relations as guided by the research 
question (Almog, 1998; Lyons 1989). An unquestioning acceptance of 
stereotypical descriptions of group characteristics would diminish the value of the 
analysis.  
3.3. Methodological Guidelines for Social Type Analysis 
Many commentators agree upon the absence of a specified valid empirical 
method in social type analysis (Almog, 1998; Lyons 1989). Yet above all, social 
type analysis is largely a qualitative enterprise, and the ultimate aim is not to 
                                                 
12
 “Abstract” here does not refer to an idealistic dimension entirely delinked from empirical 
observations. In this dissertation, the practice of abstracting the social type of the “liberal-
democratic opinion producer” is grounded in social relations. By attempting to link the properties 
of this group of persons to socio-political developments, I “abstract” from the level of empirical 
individuals.  
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construct quantitative data on individuals members identified as representative of 
the social type in focus. Some general steps can be outlined. 
3.3.1. Identifying a Social Type  
Following the social type analysis originally derived from Simmel‟s  
theoretical enterprise, I start with the conviction that the categorization of a social 
type is not illusory and that the category can reasonably be abstracted (Almog, 
1998).  
In detecting the features of the social type, the method of nickname 
investigation, may provide certain methodological advantages. This method draws 
its logic from Klapp‟s assumption that for a social type perceived as significant, 
people would create names or give newer meanings to existing names (Klapp, 
1958; Almog 1998). In the context of Turkey, we can think of condemned 
nicknames that are politically loaded, like dinci
13
 or laikçi. 14  These two 
widespread categories give us clues about the emergence of an axis of contention 
between religiously-oriented and Kemalist politics in Turkey; and the dispositions 
and attitudes critically associated with these two social types, while caricaturized, 
point towards real convictions and political relations.  
3.3.2. Building a Data Framework   
As Almog emphasizes, the nature of the data base used for social type 
analysis depends on the nature of the social type itself (1998). For instance, if the 
investigation centers on a historical social type that no longer exists, such as the 
Jöntürk of the Ottoman era, historical data will be required. Such data could be 
                                                 
13
 A rough translation would be “religious zealot,” originally coined to talk about Islamist 
hardliners inside and around the Welfare Party, but later came to be associated by most politically 
outspoken conservative and religious people. 
14
 A “secular/laicist zealot” coined originally in the Islamist movement to counter the dinci insult. 
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provided by newspapers, photo albums, or personal and formal correspondence, 
diaries, and collections of personal effects. Needles to say, following the cultural 
hints, the researcher operates with interrelated and contextually bounded social 
actors resembling the matryoskha dolls often designed to follow a particular 
theme.  Certainly, when dealing with modern-age social types, screening and 
analyzing the written and visual media, written and visual material could be useful 
in investigating the salient aspects of the social type.  
The study of contemporary social types calls for two basic data collecting 
methods (Almog, 1998). The first method, “reflective participation,” combines 
participant observation with face-to-face in-depth interviews.
15
 The second 
method, known as “life history,” resembles much as a detective‟s task and 
therfore neccessitates deriving as much information as possible on the behavior 
and way of thinking of the social type:  
 
The sociologist can be likened to a detective who collects and records 
trivial evidence, such as eating habits, aesthetic taste and linguistic 
conduct. Just as in crime solving, such trivia could be highly significant 
clues to the full socio-historical "story" of the emergent social type 
(Almog, 1998).  
 
3.3.3. Analysis of Data   
In social type analysis, the evidence gathered about the type needs to be 
processed. Such processing requires identification of qualitative codes within the 
discursive material being analyzed (Almog, 1998). The researcher might use 
semiology (Barthes, 1967; 1977) in order to decode cultural symbols embodied in 
                                                 
15
 The usage of this method has been generally associated with Anderson‟s (1923) study of the 
hobo type (Almog, 1998). The other researchers who generally resort to this method are Forsyth 
and Bankston (1983) who participated in the lives of merchant seamen and conducted in-depth 
interviews with retired and currently employed seamen to obtain more detailed and general social 
biographical knowledge regarding their lifestyle (Almog, 1998).   
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material objects (such as clothes, accessories) and in parts of the ethos (such as 
music, art, and rhetoric) by producing a gamut of connotations derived from the 
symbols or signs (Almog, 1998).  
Alternatively, the researcher can also use content analysis in order to 
explain the emergence of a social type from within real events (analyzing media 
reports) and political discourse (analyzing books, articles written by either 
representative of the social type or written about it). Certain themes or codes need 
to be decided by the researcher, which would, when discovered within the content 
analyzed, serve as evidence of the existence of the social type (Nalbantoğlu, 
2003).  
3.3.4. Bringing the Components of the Social Type Together   
At some point, the researcher has to name and justify the basic 
components of the social type. These cultural, political, ideological, etc. 
components in toto characterize the emergent social type and are found in accord 
(but spread over a socio-spatial distance) in various sources / locales the 
researcher is digging in (Almog, 1998). For example, Sway (1981: 42) lists eleven 
basic “distinguishing characteristics” for the gypsy type, including “strangeness of 
origin”, “landlessness”, and “wandering.” Then, for methodological precision, it is 
important to attach a mnemonic name to each feature defining the type in order to 
be able to sum up its various components (Sway, 1981).  
3.3.5. Socio-Historical Analysis   
For the purposes of this dissertation, this is perhaps the most important 
methodological step for the explanation of the social type. The researcher needs to 
account for what historical conditions lead to the emergence of the social type. 
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The defined components of the social type may separately or collectively be in 
touch with near-historical events or have entrenched cultural roots. These need to 
be uncovered to situate the social type. The researcher must develop working 
assumptions about historical conditionings that create the social space in which 
the type matures.
16
 
Almog contends that, the socio-historical roots of the features of a social 
type can be traced by clarifying the processes by which the social type has been 
developed (1998). He offers an understanding of the nature of the type‟s 
socialization agents and agencies as a very useful tool to this end (Almog, 1998).  
3.4. Application of Social Type Analysis in the Study of the Democrat  
This dissertation subscribes to the approach in social type analysis where 
the social type under investigation is a construct of the researcher. I will argue that 
within Turkey‟s political and cultural fields, an opinion-producer social type of 
the „liberal democrat‟ has emerged as conditioned by the various moments of 
democratic consolidation process in the 20 years following the 1980 coup. As 
already discussed, construction and exploration of this object of analysis partly 
draws upon Turkish “folk notions” about intellectuals, writers, journalists in 
general and about liberal ideas in particular. Subjective perceptions of who a 
„liberal democrat‟ is condition the constitution and functions of the social type. 
Nevertheless, our fundamental analysis will attempt to reveal the relational 
aspects of the social-type formation that do not readily appear in everyday 
perceptions or media discourses.  
                                                 
16
 This method has been traditionally assocciated with Smith‟s analysis of the dandy (1974) 
(Almog, 1998).  
  
52 
 
The formation of the Democrat as a social type will be treated more in the 
lines of analyses drawing particularly upon Simmel‟s (1950) original treatment of 
types like “the stranger,” as a crystallization, or, an “emergent property” of 
interactions in times and places. The „democrat‟ social type is a product of 
political and social relations, but perhaps most significantly, its “credit,” so to 
speak, was accumulated because of the systemic deficiencies of democratization 
in Turkey. Principally the political establishment‟s questionable performance in 
the area of civil liberties, in responding to the challenges of the Kurdish and 
Islamist movements and the accountability problems with civil-military relations 
have “selected” the emergence of a social space: in this space, liberal-democratic 
political opinions that were structurally excluded from state affairs offered 
discursive checks and balances to Turkish politics. 
As in Simmel, our social type is a mediating concept between the general 
democratization dynamics of Turkey and the specific responses given to these 
dynamics in the political culture (Morris-Reich, 2003: 136; Pyythinen, 2010: 
148). It does not refer to a “metaphor” or “transcendent essence”. At the same 
time, while accomplishing the real abstraction of the social type, our analysis is 
derived from empirical examples. As Pyythinen puts it:  
From the perspective of the individual, the type is thus never identical to 
the individual in its singularity. Therefore the individual exemplifies the 
type rather than instantiating it (2010: 148).  
 
Therefore, our point is not to discuss that political opinion producers are nothing 
but the instances of a type (a nonsensical idea) – individuals may embody various 
social types at the same time: 
Only the combination and fusion of several traits in one focal point forms 
a personality which then in its turn imparts to each individual trait a 
personal-subjective character. It is not that it is this or that trait that makes 
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a unique personality of man, but that he is this and that trait (Simmel, 
2004: 296)  
  
As we shall discuss later in Chapter 4, the debates around intellectuals and 
political opinions in Turkey tend to reduce individuals holding ideological 
positions to singular forms of relations. By introducing social type analysis to 
political science, our basic epistemological aim is to underline to Simmelian 
dictum that relations involving human agents engaging in politics are always 
multi-faceted: “Human nature does not allow the individual to be tied to another 
by one thread alone” (Simmel, 1971: 77). More specifically, the state of being a 
liberal and democrat includes but cannot be reduced to class positions, strategies 
of cultural distinction, political criticism or patterns of socialization.  
In this dissertation, the analysis of the liberaland democratic social type is 
developed through the following methodological steps: 
1) Socio-historical analysis: In order to identify the components of the 
social type, an analysis of the political history of Turkey is completed in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6.  
2) Data framework and data collection: Three individual representatives 
(Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, KürĢat Bumin) of the social type are chosen 
and are analyzed as cases, in order to provide details for the social type. Writings 
of these figures are used as discursive data, and in-depth interviews have been 
completed with each of them. The discussion is covered in Chapter 7. 
3) Bringing the components of the social type together: After the first two 
steps, an overall discussion about the social type and its positioning in Turkish 
politics is done in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
THE BASIC POSITIONS CONCERNING “LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC OPINION PRODUCERS” IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Moving on from the general academic positions on „intellectuals‟ outlined 
in Chapter I this chapter will explore the Turkish side of the debate. Similar (if not 
less advanced) to the Western academic debates, the basic shortcomings of the 
Turkish literature on „intellectuals‟ are related to the inability to come up with 
„socialized‟ and „historicized‟ categories which can provide in-depth explanations 
of why and how a group of individuals specialized in political opinion production 
emerge.  
This chapter discusses two basic positions that can be encountered in the 
related Turkish literature on „liberal democratic opinion producers.‟ Of course, 
this specific category/concept is not used in the debates. More commonsensical 
terms like “liberals,” “liberal left” are utilized.  
 Marxist criticism considers this group in class terms, believing that 
“liberal democrats” are nothing but the “organic intellectuals” (the term used in 
the Gramscian sense) of the capitalist class. According to this criticism, “liberal 
democrats” do not concern themselves with political economic questions, but are 
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interested in “revisionist,” “culturalist” questions concerning democratization. 
According to this Marxist criticism, the emergence of the liberal democratic 
discourse is nothing but a superstructural epiphenomenon reflecting the neo-
liberal transformations beginning in the 1980s.  
The nationalist scapegoating approach, which tends to label this group 
with negative characteristics, antagonizes them through slanders/accusations like 
“Americanists,” “traitors,” “children of George Soros,” and so on. This approach 
stems from conspiracy thinking and is derived from the ideology of the Turkish 
state.  
4.2. Marxist Criticism 
4.2.1. Leading Journals Representing Marxist Posture against Civil Society  
The roots of the critiques that arose from this kind of view date back to 
early 80s.  With the emergence of the early versions of the liberal and democratic 
opinion producers in Turkey in the 1980s as the “voice of civil society,” Marxists 
responded to this development. It can be stated that the Marxist critiques appeared 
as a reaction to the civil society argument, specifically with reference to the 
arguments in Yeni Gündem.17  According to commentators adopting a Marxist 
perspective, left liberalism in Turkey, or using the more common term, 
„proponents of civil society‟ (sivil toplumculuk), was represented most concretely 
by the Yeni Gündem circle. The figures who gathered around Yeni Gündem circle 
presented themselves as socialists. Nevertheless, according to the Marxists, the 
leading figures of Yeni Gündem were responsible of contaminating Turkish 
socialism with neo-liberal ideas. Besides, those who see themselves as “Second 
Republicans” were regarded by definition outside of the left, and by the all 
                                                 
17
 For a detailed discussion on Yeni Gündem, see: Chapter 5.  
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meanings of the word as liberals. Thus, initially, “liberals” did not much appear in 
Marxist criticisms.  
 The reactions of the Marxists can be followed through three political 
journals: The journal Saçak published by the Maoist Aydınlık circle (Proleter 
Devrimci Aydınlık – PDA); Gelenek (Tradition) published by a group of radicals 
who left the  Turkish Workers‟ Party (TĠP); and the journal 11. Tez (Eleventh 
Thesis) published by a group of critical Marxist scholars and Trotskyite political 
figures.  
Though Uğur Cankoçak, a writer in Zemin and Mehmet Ali Aybar, the 
former leader of the Workers Party of Turkey (TĠP), were occasionally selected as 
targets of orthodox Marxist criticism, the occasional target of the debates was 
weekly Yeni Gündem and Murat Belge, as the leading figure of this journal. 
Saçak, Gelenek and 11.Tez addressed the issue of civil society and its proponents 
mainly through the writings of Murat Belge.
18
 As exemplified in Murat Belge, the 
discourse exalting civil society was considered as praising bourgeois democracy 
in Turkey.
19
 Other than Belge, the term “proponent of civil society” was used 
mainly to point at KürĢat Bumin20, Asaf SavaĢ Akat and Seyfettin Gürsel.  
                                                 
18
 See: Gelenek (anonymous), “Murat Belge: Entelektüel Rantiyelik,” Gelenek, Vol:19, January 
1989; Salih Ural, “Murat Belge‟nin GeçmiĢ ArayıĢı,” Saçak, Vol. 3, April 1984; Mehmet Gündüz 
(Gün Zileli), “Uzatılan Elma ġekeri ya da „Avrupa Komünizmi,” Saçak, Vol.7, August 1984. The 
periodic Sınıf Bilinci, which followed 11.Tez in content then published articles on the same issue. 
See: Tarık Ali Diyar, “Murat Belge‟nin Cephesi,” Sınıf Bilinci, Vol:18, Summer 1997. For other 
articles including debates over Murat Belge‟s stance, see: Cemal Hekimoğlu, “Kundera‟nın 
Ağırlıksız Varlıkları,” Gelenek, Vol:1, January 1986; Gelenek (anonymous), “Bir Saçak Yazısı 
Üzerine,” Gelenek, Vol:7, May 1987.  
19
 See: Gelenek (anonymous), “Murat Belge: Entelektüel Rantiyelik,” Gelenek, Vol:19, January 
1989 
20
 KürĢat Bumin, who was awarded 1982 Yazko Prize for his book Sivil Toplum ve Devlet, was 
often the target of criticisms though as not frequently as Belge. See: Gelenek (anonymous), “Bir 
Saçak Yazısı Üzerine,” Gelenek, Vol:7, May 1987; Aydın Giritli, “Türkiye‟de Sivil Toplumculuk 
(1981-1986),” Gelenek, Vol:3, January 1987; Editorial, “Tarih, Devrim, „Sivil Toplumculuk,” 
Saçak, Vol.3, April 1984; Anonymous, “KürĢat Bumin‟in Ġlerlemeye KarĢı Tutumu,” Saçak, 
Vol.2, March 1984; Reader‟s Letter, Saçak, Vol.13, February 1985. For a more recent study see, 
Ali Doğan GüneĢli, “Sivil Toplum: Ne, Nerede, Ne Zaman, Kim?” Gelenek, Vol: 68, October 
2001.     
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The journal Saçak stood as the most influential journal echoing arguments 
against civil society (“sivil toplumculuk”). The journal was designed as a legal 
instrument of post-coup era belonging to Aydınlık21 movement. Saçak defined its 
primary mission as responding to the needs of those who did not want to surrender 
to liberalism, looking for an intellectual revival.
22
  In its first issue, the journal set 
its target as being on the side of progress and “using every opportunity to criticize 
pseudo-leftism which is bourgeois in essence.” 23  An important part of this 
proposal was to reinstate the concept of “being pro-progress,” a term believed to 
be being excluded from the leftist jargon.
24
 
Ironically, a significant group from this circle, in later years, adopted a 
liberal-democratic position.
25
 In fact, the split in Saçak manifested the beginnings 
in Aydınlık of earlier left-liberal, liberal-democrat and democrat political 
                                                 
21Aydınlık Movement: It takes its name by the monthly periodical which started to be published on 
November 1968. This early version of the journal was published under the editorial leadership of 
Doğu Perinçek and Vahap Erdoğdu. The journal covered the articles of a wide range of political 
figures including Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and Mihri Belli. In the shaping process of National 
Democratic Revolution strategy in Turkey it played significant role. By the January 1970 volume 
15, the journal was divided into two opposing groups namely “Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık-PDA” 
ve “Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi.” The former one, PDA, just before March 12 coup, evolved into a 
weekly periodical advocating the views of Maoist TĠĠKP (Turkey‟s Workers‟ and Peasants‟ Party).  
Banned several times, it appeared as daily Aydınlık newspaper by March 1978. Upon 1980 coup 
detat it was once again banned. (For further information, see: Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler 
Ansiklopedisi – STMA, Vol.7, pp:2186-2187, Ġstanbul:ĠletiĢim, 1990; Oral ÇalıĢlar, “Türkiye 
Ġhtilalci ĠĢçi Köylü Partisi (TĠĠKP),” STMA, Vol.7, pp.2194-2195). Today, it represents 
Kemalist/nationalist wing in Turkish socialist movement  and is being published via internet.  
22
 See, Editorial, “Okurlarla”, Vol.1, February 1984, p.2.  
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Prominent among these were Halil Berktay, Oral ÇalıĢlar, Alper GörmüĢ, ġahin Alpay. Prof. 
Halil Berktay who is one of the outstanding historians of Turkey took part in the Maoist Aydınlık 
movement until early 1990s. Between1989-93 he was the history consultant of AnaBritanica 
Encylopedia. Currently he holds an acadermic position in Sabancı University and is one of the 
founding members of TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı). Oral ÇalıĢlar 
Journalist, writer was the editor of daily Aydınlık published in 1978. He was in the presidential 
board of the Revolutionary Workers‟ and Peasants‟ Party of Turkey (TĠĠKP). He was arrested 
again upon the military coup of September 12th, 1980. After days as fugitive or prisoner, he was 
released in August 1988. He worked for the daily Cumhuriyet in the period of 1992-2008.  He was 
involved in the development of various TV programmes. He then became a columnist in daily 
Radikal starting from 15 June 2008. ġahin Alpay: One of the leaders of the Revolutionary 
Workers‟ and Peasants‟ Party of Turkey (TĠĠKP). Starting from 1982, he wrote for the daily 
Cumhuriyet and then was a columnist in the daily papers Sabah and Milliyet. Having his doctorate 
in political sciences, Alpay is presently a columnist in the daily Zaman. 
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orientations: Just before the launching of Saçak, a small group within this 
Marxist-Maoist movement broke away, considering themselves as opposed to the 
centre of the movement. Called “Kaleciler”, this group included the following 
leading figures:  Metin and Gülay Göktürk, Dilek Yılmaz, Veysel Yılmaz, 
Erdoğan Kahyaoğlu, Cem Kızılgeç, Alper GörmüĢ, Hüseyin Ġmik (Zileli, 2003: 
20). Some of the figures in the group would later show up as the leading liberals 
and/or democrats of Turkish political life including, for example, Metin Göktürk, 
Gülay Göktürk 26  and Alper GörmüĢ 27 . The reason behind their coinage as 
“Kaleciler” is as follows: In response to a polemic essay by Gün Zileli defending 
Leninist party model, the group with liberal tendency prepared a text titled “The 
Fortress to be Destroyed,” pledging other signatories. The term “fortress” (“kale”) 
in this text was a metaphor for Leninist/oppressive/bureaucratic party model 
                                                 
26
 Gülay Göktürk (b. 1949, Istanbul): Graduating from Fatih Girls‟ High School, she was in the US 
for a year upon AFS scholarship. Returning to Turkey, she attended the Middle East Technical 
University (METU) and became a member of the Socialist Thinking Club of the school. Shortly 
after she joined the Aydınlık movement and became a leading figure there. She was the editor of 
the workers‟ page in Aydınlık, writing articles in her column titled “Anvil and Hammer”. Shortly 
before the closure of Aydınlık by the military coup of September 12th 1980, she worked for the 
daily Güneş and then for the weekly Nokta. In 1990, together with her husband Metin Göktürk she 
joined the team to launch the periodic Aktüel. She was a columnist in the daily Yeni Yüzyıl starting 
from the late 1994 before transferring to the daily Güneş. Presently she is writing for Bugün. 
Göktürk is one of the prominent figures of liberal line in Turkey. She explained her political stance 
as follows: “I have always been the target of those readers who think with the concepts and 
political confrontations belonging to 30 years ago. But looking at the process since 1994, we are 
on a liberal line. That is a new line; it was once there but made forgotten. There is no liberal line in 
the near past of Turkey, it was covered. My writings followed a line which applied liberal thinking 
to all spheres of life, from private life to the state, from politics to love and marriage and to 
mother-child relations.” See: Cemal A. Kalyoncu, “Fadime Dillerde, Fadime Gönüllerde,” 
Aksiyon, March 10, 2001, Vol. 327.  
27
Alper GörmüĢ (b. 21 November 1952, Kars):Journalist, editor of now closed weekly Nokta.  He 
worked in Aydınlık from 1977 to 1980. When the journal was closed after the military coup in 
1980, GörmüĢ did various jobs until 1986. He was among the editors of the encyclopaedia 
AnaBritannica and transferred to Nokta in 1986 and then to Aktüel 3-4 years after. In 1995 he 
spent 3 months in jail on a sentence given for news feature in the journal which was considered as 
“propagating for the terrorist organization.” He had a short experience in the daily Güneş during 
Ahmet Altan‟s editorship. Later he prepared the column “Medyakronik” in Yeni Şafak together 
with KürĢat Bumin. In July 2006, he accepted the invitation and became the editor of weekly 
Nokta. On 11 April 2008 he was acquitted from a defamation case brought by retired admiral 
Özden Örnek for the news feature “Coup Chronicles” published in Nokta. GörmüĢ is presently 
writing media critiques in daily Taraf. 
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(Zileli, 2003:20).
28
 Ironically, such figures as Gün Zileli, Oral ÇalıĢlar and Halil 
Berktay who then defended the “fortress”, that is, the Leninist party model and 
directed harsh criticisms towards its liberal critics, much later became leading 
opinion producers supporting an anti-Marxist, democratic perspective in Turkish 
politics.   
The journal Saçak was launched in 1984. Since the September 12th 
military regime had introduced a series of legal constraints and procedures that 
made publishing journals more difficult, it seemed reasonable to take over a 
journal that was already being published. Saçak was a literary journal and its non-
political title was thought to provide camouflage against government scrutiny 
(Zileli, 2003: 16). The core writers‟ team in the journal was as follows: Gün 
Zileli, Oral ÇalıĢlar, Halil Berktay, Aydoğan Büyüközden and Feyza Zileli. The 
bulk of articles in the journal consisted of essays and book critiques written by 
Gün Zileli mostly under the pseudonym “Mehmet Gündüz” as well as some other 
names. Other important articles in the journal were by Halil Berktay on “the 
temptation of civil society” and by Aydoğan Büyüközden on the “Enlightment” 
thinkers in the history of Turkey as well as other articles criticizing such figures as 
Murat Belge and Yalçın Küçük. Articles by Zileli mostly targeted the neo-liberal 
orientations of intellectuals, the influence of Erich Fromm and the pro-civil 
society discourse (Zileli, 2003: 15). Berktay, on his part, preferred to criticize civil 
society proponents from a more theoretical perspective.  
                                                 
28
In his memoirs Zileli mentions: “Looking back, they were right. Indeed, this bureaucratic 
institution should be destroyed like all other bourgeois institutions. However, many of these 
friends who wanted to demolish the “fortress” had no intention to destroy all other bourgeois 
institutions as proven today by their salaried employment by these very institutions.” (See: Zileli, 
2003:  20).    
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Published by the core team for a period of longer than one year, the journal 
was left to Doğu Perinçek in 1985 after issue 15, who was just released from 
prison (Zileli, 2003: 23).
29
 According to Zileli, the first 15 issues of the journal 
stood for a serious reckoning with civil society proponents and “neo-liberalism, 
which constituted one of the main currents of the post-1980 period” – and thus, 
albeit for a short time, Saçak brought the Aydınlık movement closer to Marxist 
and revolutionary sources, which was otherwise getting more and more closer to 
Kemalism (2003: 32). Analyses in Saçak largely bore the imprint of a progressive, 
Kemalist perspective. Zileli states that articles in the journal, including those 
written by him, “could not avoid falling prey to the progressive perspective.” 
(2003: 34).  
Another circle who defined settling accounts with left-liberalism or 
“proponents of civil society” as a priority item in their agenda consisted of 
Marxists gathering around the journal Gelenek. Launched in 1986, Gelenek 
brought together figures originated from Sosyalist İktidar, an oppositional group 
within the Workers Party of Turkey (TĠP). This group advocated “socialist 
revolution” during the debate against the proponents of “national democratic 
revolution” in the 1970s.30  Starting from its early issues, Gelenek allocated a 
rather large space to the criticism of civil society arguments. Just like Saçak, 
Gelenek too regarded civil society arguments as a kind of deviation that had “bad” 
influences the socialist left.  
                                                 
29
 While in prison, Perinçek‟s articles were published in the journal under the name “Emre 
Adıgüzel” See: Zileli, 2003:24.  
30
 The political circle Gelenek established the Party for Socialist Turkey (STP) in 1992. The party 
was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1993 for “targeting the voluntary togetherness of 
Turkish and Kurdish peoples” as stated in its programme and re-established in the same years as 
Party for Socialist Power (SİP). During an extraordinary congress held on 11 November 2001, the 
SĠP took the name “Communist Party of Turkey (TKP).” The journal Gelenek is the official organ 
of the party.  See: http://www.tkp.org.tr/tkp-programi.   
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The third circle that applied a rather comprehensive Marxist criticism to 
the left-liberal approach consisted of Marxist academics and political figures 
gathering around the journal 11. Tez. The journal was published in regular 
intervals from its first issue dated November 1985 to the twelfth issue in January 
1992. It was a journal of theory and politics with articles focusing on topics like 
anti-capitalism, real socialism, democracy, nationalism, unionism, organization of 
workers, and so on. The main purpose of the journal was defined as theoretical 
intervention from a Marxist point of view to against the neo-liberal tendencies that 
had started to influence the socialist left.  As stated by Savran, one of the leading 
figures of the publication, “it was the struggle against civil society arguments and 
left-liberalism that determined the main course of the journal” (Savran, 2008: 19). 
4.2.2. Major Criticisms by Leading Marxist Journals 
The criticism of orthodox Marxists had a common ground despite some 
political-ideological differences. The common themes in the criticism of pro-civil 
society positions are still used today in Marxist circles in analyzing liberal and 
democratic opinions. 
4.2.2.1. “Rejection of Historical Materialism”  
 The first main position that orthodox Marxists share in their contention 
against civil society arguments holds that such arguments fail to utilize the 
methodological arsenal of historical materialism. Stating more plainly, pro-civil 
society / left-liberal arguments are not “class-based.” Looking at history and 
society from the prism of civil society, it is argued, is tantamount to refuting class 
analysis from the very beginning. Civil society arguments move away from 
historical materialism by replacing class analysis with such dualisms like “people 
  
62 
 
vs elites” or “civil society vs political society.” The orthodox Marxist criticism 
stated that class-based cleavages experienced in Turkey since the 1920s were 
ignored by such dualisms. Civil society arguments were said to focus exclusively 
on such phenomena as institutional continuity and persistence of an oppressive 
state apparatus.
31
 Looking at the recent history of Turkey from the lens of such 
phenomena led to the mistake of attempting to derive a “democratic” and 
“progressive” core from the internal struggles of propertied classes (Gelenek, 
1989).  
It was further argued that civil society arguments were trapped in 
imagining a democracy above classes which could exist on paper. According to 
Gelenek writer Aydemir Güler, KürĢat Bumin, as a civil society proponent, is 
exemplary of a liberal, replacing class formations with institutions and forms: 
Bumin depicted a Turkish bourgeois class that “fell short” in democratization, and 
by doing that, he completely ignored the role of the State in the transition to 
capitalism in Turkey (1987).    
According to Marxists, the abandonment of a “historical materialist 
analysis” leads to conceiving concepts and models as idealistic, deprived of their 
historicity. This is the very reason why civil society based analyses could only 
remain superficial (Güler, 1987). The pattern of “western type” democracy that 
civil society proponents wished to see in Turkey, according to Marxists, was 
merely a speculation separated from historicity.
32
 The “pattern” mentioned by 
civil society proponents consists merely of motifs that could find existence only in 
the ideological discourse of a specific period in the history of capitalism: “The 
                                                 
31
 See, for instance: Aydın Giritli, “Türkiye‟de Sivil Toplumculuk (1981-1986),” Gelenek, Vol.3, 
January 1987; Halil Berktay, “Türkiye Tarihinin Liberal-Burjuva Yorumu,” Saçak, Vol.1, 
February 1984.  
32
 See, for instance: Oğuz Ertem, “ATÜT,” Saçak, Vol.21, October 1985. 
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civil society that they find missing in Turkey is nothing more than a portrait of 
happiness drawn by the ideologists of free-competition liberalism” (Güler, 1987).   
An example of the abandonment of historical materialist analysis is also 
given with reference to Murat Belge. In his article on the emergence of 
democratic traditions in historical process, Belge mentions the cases of the Soviet 
Union and China while arguing that socialism cannot find ground in societies 
where democratic traditions are not well-established.
33
 This analysis by Belge is 
criticized for abandoning “class” and “relations of production” as the main 
concepts of historical materialism. According to this criticism, Belge ignores such 
issues as change in political power and changes in the systems of ownership and 
production relations and prefers to define social change in terms of changes in 
personal lives and habits as well as in cultural formation itself (Giritli, 1987).   
In his article addressing civil society arguments comprehensively from a 
“historical materialist” standpoint, Sungur Savran reminds that “class struggle” 
appears nowhere in this theoretical model (1986). Ignoring social classes in these 
analyses brings along some question marks about the nature of the domain called 
“civil society.” Class struggles, which are attributed central role in historical 
materialism as the driving force of history, are exchanged with struggles between 
civil society and state (Savran, 1986: 23).  
In the 1990s, it can be said that Marxist criticisms of “proponents of civil 
society” become relatively more sophisticated. This can be partly attributed to the 
Turkish translation of the book Civil Society and the State: New European 
Perspectives (1993), edited by John Keane.
34
 Thanks to the translation of this 
                                                 
33
 See: Murat Belge, “Muhalefetten Ġktidara Demokrasi,” Zemin, Vol.3, p.6.  
34
 Editor: Tuncay Birkan. Translated by: Ahmet Çiğdem, Aksu Bora, AyĢe Nur MenekĢe, Erkan 
Akın, Levent Köker, Mehmet Küçük. Ayrıntı: Ġstanbul, 1993 (Original name: Civil Society and the 
State: New European Perspectives, John Keane (ed.), Verso, 1988). Shortly after, another book by 
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book, Turkish readers could access the most competent examples of civil society 
arguments, and thus more rigorous defenses and criticisms had to be formulated. 
Again, beginning with the 1990s, many books in Turkish published particularly 
by ĠletiĢim and Ayrıntı publishing houses, contributed to the enrichment of 
debates over civil society-state relations. Nonetheless, the edited volume by 
Keane remained a primary source of reference.
35
 Consequently, orthodox 
Marxists considered it as their major task to “settle the score” with Keane in their 
criticisms of civil society arguments.
36
  
Specifically in the case of Keane, the major criticism raised against the 
civil society perspective is that he does not use the term civil society in the sense 
Marx did. While the term “civil society” is not unique to Marx, it was given a new 
content and used as such by him (Çulhaoğlu and Soyer, 2000: 10). In Marx, civil 
society directly corresponds to the domain of production and constitutes a level at 
which individuals seek their personal interests including property ownership. In 
short, Marx defines civil society as the domain of activities carried out in order to 
respond to material needs. In this sense, civil society is the foundation of the State 
rather than its adversary.
37
 Hence, arguing for a conflict between civil society and 
                                                                                                                                     
Keane was translated into Turkish and published again by Ayrıntı in 1994: Demokrasi ve Sivil 
Toplum: Avrupa Sosyalizminin Açmazları, Toplumsal ve Siyasal İktidarın Denetlenmesi Sorunu ve 
Demokrasi Beklentileri Üzerine, translated by: Necmi Erdoğan, Ġstanbul, Ayrıntı, 1994 
(Democracy and Civil Society on the Predicaments of Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling 
Social and Political Power, Verso, 1988)  
35
In this regard, the article of Savran may be referred as exception in terms of the most 
comprehensive first analysis of civil society (1986). He mentions about John Keane and David 
Held as European representatives of "left liberalism" in the article he had written in 1986 and 
develops his analysis referring these two social scientists. For the passage Savran based, see: 
David Held and John Keane, “In a Fit State,” New Socialist, March-April 1984 (Savran, 1986:16).  
36
 See: Metin Çulhaoğlu, “Devlet, Sivil Toplum ve DemokratikleĢme,” in Sivil Toplum: Devletin 
Büyümesi, Ġlker Maga (ed.), Ġstanbul:YGS Yayınları, 2001, pp.44-45; Metin Çulhaoğlu,“Devlete 
Yıkılan Siyaset,” Sosyalist Politika, Vol.2, September 1994. (The journal, Sosyalist Politika, was 
established by a group of socialists who left SĠP/Gelenek in 1993, therefore shared the same 
political assumptions with the former).  
37
 These comments are based on Marx‟s statements about civil society found in “On the Jewish 
Question” and “German Ideology.” See, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx-Engels, Collected 
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state, as many civil society proponents do, runs counter to the methodology of 
Marx. Furthermore, in civil society approach, while this domain is considered as a 
realm for social relations, the State is considered merely as an apparatus. Since the 
class nature of the State is not included in the analysis, it is conceptualized 
superficially and the nature of the State as a social totality comprising class 
relations is not examined (Savran, 1986: 16, 24). Hence proponents of civil 
society conceptualize the State as an independent and supra-class apparatus that 
oppresses all social groups (Savran, 1986: 24).  
The same ambiguity can be observed when it comes to the nature and 
essence of civil society as well. Savran explains the case as follows:  
 
Since Hegel, the concept has been used to express a society which has 
been founded on commodity (market) relations and established between 
the individuals who are free to pursue their own interests and have private 
property. Left liberals, however, coming from a historical materialist 
background, cannot explain civil society as such without feeling uneasy 
but they still falter about the necessity of such an alternative definition 
(1986: 16).   
 
According to Savran, there are representatives in Turkey as well of an 
approach that is free from ambiguities in relation to the nature of civil society 
(1986: 17). Contrary to the stance of these representatives who define civil society 
directly on the basis of market relations, opinion producers sharing the left-liberal 
framework fail to come up with a clear definition as is the case with the traditional 
political thought.
38
 Analyses launched without any reference to the concept of 
class are based merely on the opposition of the concepts of civil society and state, 
                                                                                                                                     
Works, Progress Moscow, 1975, Vol.3, p.163; Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” 
Collected Works, Vol.5, p.50, 53, 89, 90.  
38
 Savran lists the following names as the representatives of this line: Asaf SavaĢ Akat, ġafak 
Alpay, Seyfettin Gürsel. For Asaf SavaĢ Akat‟s statement on this issue see, A.S. Akat, in panel 
discussion “Ġktisat Politikaları, Büyüme ve Demokrasi” (Economic Policies, Growth and 
Democracy), Yeni Gündem, Vol.13, 3-15 January 1985, p.14 (Savran, 1986: 17).  
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whose definitions remain unclear. Then, this dichotomized opposition leads to the 
attribution of some absolute properties to each of these two (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 37). 
Absence of any reference to the concept of class which is the fundamental 
category of the historical materialist approach leads to the omission of deep social 
differences and divisions within civil society as well as resultant contradictions 
and struggles (Savran, 1986: 23). It is because the State is conceptualized only 
with reference to its oppressive nature while civil society is exalted as a realm 
where individual freedoms can materialize without any reference to demarcations 
and divides within (Savran, 1986: 25). Eventually, placing civil society and the 
State at dichotomized ends means neglecting major processes that bring along 
mutual interaction and transactions between these two.   
Göran Therborn‟s methodological criticism of the civil society paradigm 
from a Marxist perspective was also inspirational for Marxist circles in Turkey 
within the last decade.
39
 Based on Therborn, it is stressed that the paradigm 
mentioned, running counter to Marxist analysis, addressed the two realms in a 
dichotomized opposition. The paradigm is said to be lamed with a culturalist 
aspect by building social and political analysis on religious or other value systems 
(Therborn, 1997; Çulhaoğlu, 2001). Moreover, by placing the citizen against the 
State, the civil society paradigm does more than missing class divisions, it 
actually conceals them (GüneĢli, 2001).  Adding up all these dimensions, the civil 
society paradigm is deemed as an anti-Marxist orientation, not an approach based 
on Marxism and historical materialism. 
 
                                                 
39
 See, Göran Therborn, “Beyond Civil Society: Democratic Experiences and Their Relevance to 
the Middle East,” in Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune 
Persson (eds.), Ġstanbul: Swedish Research Institute and Curzon Press, 1997. For Metin 
Çulhaoğlu‟s analysis developed on the basis of Therborn‟s ideas, see: Çulhaoğlu, “Devlet, Sivil 
Toplum ve DemokratikleĢme,” 2001: 36-37.  
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4.2.2.2. “Reducing class struggle to struggle for democracy and refutation of 
the perspective of political power”                
 The meaning attributed to democracy by the approach which sees the 
development of civil society as the prerequisite of democracy has been the main 
target of attack by Marxist circles. Leaving the content of civil society vague, the 
civil society paradigm seems to have a consensus on the point that the proper 
operation of market economy is a sine qua non for democracy. Moving ahead 
from this point, the concept of “democracy” they focus on is “bourgeois 
democracy” which has emerged as the dominant form of State in many capitalist 
societies (Savran, 1986: 27). The bourgeoisie, once waging a democratic-oriented 
struggle against absolutist states in the era of classical bourgeois revolutions, 
today tended to abandon this democratic orientation once it has consolidated its 
political power (Savran, 1986: 27). The civil society paradigm refers to a 
historical experience while making market the absolute precondition for 
democracy. This proposition, which can be defended only on the basis of an 
empiricist theory of knowledge, excludes the possibility of democratic 
experiences other than those already given. When “democracy is taken not as a 
static model but a domain of social relations developing and unfolding in 
historical process” the earlier empiricist proposition will lose its full value 
(Savran, 1986: 28).  
According to Marxists, seeing the “democrat” and “socialist” as identical 
is one of the major mistakes attributable to the socialist left in Turkey. After all, it 
is argued, democracy is important for socialists in a tactical context rather than 
being a goal in itself. What socialists actually need is to separate the socialist and 
the democrat, contrary to the efforts of such periodicals as Yeni Gündem and 
Zemin seeking provide a ground for unrefined unity of democrats and socialists 
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(Giritli, 1987).
40
 Democracy would but turn into an empty category when freed 
from its class foundations.  Democracy is ultimately a historical category whose 
essence and form is determined by existing class relations. Socialist democracy 
and bourgeois democracy have their respective forms and contents. Any universal 
definition of democracy can be made only when all classes have disappeared 
(Giritli, 1987). It is in this sense possible to talk about a contradiction between 
socialism and democracy:  
 
The changing importance of democracy as a category is the proof that it is 
mainly conjectural and tactical, that it can never be the primary target. The 
primary objective of socialism is not to build democracy. (…) The 
essential element is socialism‟s own social project and political power that 
paves the way for this project (Giritli, 1987).   
 
It is argued that the focus of the civil society paradigm on democracy 
shows its being devoid of any perspective for political power. What is meant by 
“power perspective” here is the change in political power through revolution. 
Hence, the idealistic insistence of the proponents of civil society / left-liberals in 
democracy is interpreted by Marxists as the abandonment of any claim for 
revolution. While it is recognized that emphasis on democracy can be found at the 
historical roots of the socialist movement and that democratic ideals took shape in 
early socialist struggles as a response to the bourgeoisie‟s abandonment of its 
revolutionary character, it is also added that socialism gradually demarcated itself 
from democracy to fulfill its own course (Giritli, 1987).
41
 Hence, Murat Belge, 
who says “there was civil society first” and Mehmet Ali Aybar, who emphasizes 
the prominence of “democracy”, represent the false perspective that fails to see 
the historical relation between socialism and democracy (Giritli, 1987).  
                                                 
40
 See, Aydın Giritli, “Demokrasicilik Tutkusu ve Zemin Dergisi,” Gelenek, Vol:4, February 1987.  
41
 The European Left and New Left Movements are referred to as cases where this separation is yet 
not complete. See, Giritli, 1987.  
  
69 
 
 The theme of democracy has brought along a debate on methodology as 
well. The point made by Murat Belge that reducing democracy to a secondary 
issue would not be “Marxist”42 is explained, by orthodox Marxists, in reference to 
Belge‟s failure to grasp the foundations of Marxism. According to the journal 
Gelenek, Belge authorizes himself with the right to reduce the criteria for “being a 
Marxist” to “being a democrat” (Giritli, 1987). The explanation why this 
reduction is wrong is given by referring to Marxist classics: Class Struggles in 
France and Critique of the Gotha Programme. Based on these texts that present 
the most realistic analyses of the political picture emerging as a result of the 
revolutions of 1848, it is argued that the bourgeoisie loses its democratic character 
and turns reactionary once the working classes actively appear in the political 
arena (Hekimoğlu, 1987). This point is read out as a warning against any intention 
of prioritizing the task of “improving bourgeois democracy” (Hekimoğlu, 1987).43  
According to Marxists, while Yeni Gündem is engaged in the “civil society 
paradigm”, the journal Zemin is out for representing a political line which may be 
called “extensive democracy.” Criticisms of bureaucratic dictatorship, leadership 
and Leninism bring both journals together in the same political position. Such 
platforms criticized for “injecting” liberalism to the socialist movement in Turkey 
are also blamed for undermining revolutionary thinking – as these journals are 
considered to abandon a vision for political power.  
                                                 
42
 For Murat Belge‟s article on this, see: Belge, Murat, “Muhalefetten Ġktidara Demokrasi,” Zemin, 
Vol.3, p.6.  
43
 Cemal Hekimoğlu refers to an interview with former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel by 
Haluk Gerger, Aziz Nesin and Uğur Mumcu published in weekly Yeni Gündem. According to 
Hekimoğlu, response given by Demirel to Mumcu, Nesin and Gerger who tried to “squeeze” him 
on the issues of freedom of expression and organization is much more realistic since he said the 
left could not, by definition, suffice with bourgeois values and institutions and would target greater 
upheavals, without which it cannot be described as “left.” (Cited by Hekimoğlu, Cemal, “Burjuva 
Demokrasisi: Nereye Kadar?” Gelenek, Vol:5, March 1987.  
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 Another theme that Marxists in Turkey more or less share is the idea that 
those stressing the importance of struggle for “democracy” are actually giving up 
Jacobinism. In fact, any unreserved refutation of Jacobinism is one of the most 
palpable indicators of giving up the cause of revolution. For civil society 
proponents, Jacobinism is a “devil.” 44  According to the orthodox Marxist 
criticism, civil society proponents stand on a kind of populism that identifies 
Jacobinism with elitism and hostility to masses. According to Marxist perspective, 
on the other hand, Jacobinism is exactly what is defined as perspective for 
political power. Accordingly, Jacobinism meant transcending beyond the horizons 
and status quo tendencies of bourgeoisie: 
 
Jacobinism tells about a type of man, the psychology of a revolutionary. 
Each revolutionary process embodies this type and psychology, but not 
each and every revolutionary leader can be a Jacobin. Not in each and 
every bourgeois revolution can democrat leaders transcend beyond 
bourgeois horizons by catching the wave created by equalitarian and 
humanistic ideas and agitated radical social sections of population (Giritli, 
1987).  
 
It must be added that there is some divergence of opinion about 
Jacobinism among Marxists. According to Marxists around Gelenek, Jacobinism 
should, by definition, go beyond the outlook of the bourgeoisie as a class. As 
such, Jacobinism would be a spiritual mood, a form of action attributable to a 
socialist revolutionary. Saçak considered Kemalism as a kind of Jacobinism 
unique to circumstances in Turkey.
45
 According to Saçak, Jacobinism is a 
revolutionary movement emerging in the ascending phase of bourgeois 
                                                 
44
 See, Giritli, 1987; Halil Berktay, “Yeni Gündem‟e ĠliĢkin Bazı Gözlem ve DüĢünceler,” Saçak, 
Vol.9, October 1984, p.11; Editorial, “Tarih, Devrim, „Sivil Toplum‟culuk,” Saçak, Vol.3, April 
1984, pp.3-7; Salih Ural, “Murat Belge‟nin GeçmiĢ ArayıĢı,” Saçak, Vol.3, April 1984, p. 29; 
Emre Adıgüzel (Doğu Perinçek), “Politik Toplum ve Sivil Toplum,” Saçak, Vol.8, September 
1984,  p.15. 
45
An important point that needs to be stressed is that both the Saçak circle and liberal writers agree 
that Kemalism is Jacobinism with only one difference: “Jacobinism is a devil for civil society 
proponents and a heritage to be owned for Sacak.” See: Giritli, 1987.  
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revolutions.
46
 Hence, the “civil society paradigm,” defending civil society from 
Jacobinism, actually represents a reactionary movement. For example, when the 
domain autonomous from the political domain is always ascribed positive 
characteristics, then it becomes inevitable to protect dervish lodges and 
hermitages as well as theocratic teaching from the Jacobin encroachments of 
Kemalism (Adıgüzel, 1984: 17). Yet, it was only natural that Jacobins (or 
Kemalists) “sharpened their swords” in their fight against the reactionary Ottoman 
state since “it was swords that established democracy” (Adıgüzel, 1984: 17).  
In conclusion, the concept “Jacobinism,” rejected by civil society 
proponents raising their voices in such journals as Yeni Gündem and Zemin, is 
generally praised by Marxist circles though after giving it different connotations. 
The criticism “being anti-political” used against civil society proponents is 
formulated mainly on the basis of this point: Civil society proponents identify 
Jacobinism with political violence, with the tyranny of an organized and 
voluntarist subject. It is exactly at this point where they start to negate or refute 
politics (Giritli, 1987). According to Marxism, on the other hand, Jacobinism was 
nothing else but a passion to change. Anti-Jacobinism and populism has 
historically been the manifestation of hostility towards organized political force, 
since the time of Robespierre (Gelenek, 1989). In this sense, Marxists argue, the 
Jacobin movement acquired a significance that went beyond the limited vision of 
the bourgeoisie. In fact, the revolutionary character of this class had expired with 
1789, and during bourgeois revolutions that ensued they sought the ways of 
coming to terms with the feudal remnants, seeing working class as their main 
enemy (Koçak, 1986; Giritli, 1987). Today, in the light of Lenin‟s warning, 
                                                 
46
 See: Editorial, “Tarih, Devrim, „Sivil Toplum‟culuk,” Saçak, Vol.3, April 1984.  
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socialists should see themselves as “genuine heirs of Jacobinism” (Giritli, 1987). 
After all, such characteristics as “revolution from above” or “substituting the class 
with the vanguard organization” attributed to Jacobinism are nothing more than 
„fictitious‟ criticisms since, according to Gelenek writers, “the Jacobin side of 
socialists means transcending beyond their own class, the working class” (Giritli, 
1987).  
4.2.2.3. “Anti-statism and anti-political posture”  
One of the major criticisms of civil society proponents by Marxists is that 
their theses consist merely of a series of reactions. Opposition to the State and 
state bureaucracy manifests itself in the usage of the dual concept of civil 
society/political society. According to Gelenek authors:  
 
While progressive forces in history are ascribed to civil society, the State 
emerges as a mechanism that continuously restrains and impedes the 
flourishing of many beauties embodied by civil society (Güler, 1987).  
 
While elaborating on the historical development of societies and our 
present day problems, the civil society perspective attributed key importance to 
civil society-State relations, assigning all positives to the former and all negatives 
to the latter. Savran explains the point that is common to all civil society based 
approaches as follows:  
 
In history, it has always been civil society that lays the ground for 
freedoms, democratization, struggle against oppression, economic 
development, etc; it is the autonomy of civil society against the State, the 
immense energy and vitality set free by this autonomy. On the other hand, 
the State has stopped or barred all these developments at the expense of 
condemning humanity to backwardness (1986: 18).  
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Perinçek too underlined that civil society proponents described civil 
society as the “land of God” while political society or the State opposing it was 
pictured as a “land ruled by the Devil” (Adıgüzel, 1984).  
Representatives of Marxist thought argue that this negation of the State by 
civil society proponents can only have the natural and logical consequence of 
negating politics itself. Hostility towards the State leads to the reduction of action 
to change life down to a philosophy of life and to the placement of struggle for 
political power on the same plane as daily targets. Yet, “spreading everywhere, 
politics become nowhere, losing its own habitat” (Güler, 1987).  Hence, defending 
civil society against the state is clearly the refutation of politics.
47
  
According to Savran, who approaches the issue in a more theoretical 
context, the distance that civil society discourse keeps with politics is related to 
the basic theoretical presuppositions of this approach. Defining the State and 
society as categorically opposed to each other makes the inherent relationship in-
between invisible. In case this relationship is given an extrinsic character, then 
political power, which is the manifestation of the irreconcilable contradiction 
within civil society, loses its importance and politics ceases to be a struggle for 
power (Savran, 1986:  25).   
At the level of reepolitik, the civil society paradigm, emerging from the 
political and cultural environment following the September 12
th
 coup, meant the 
refutation of all theoretical-practical heritage of socialist left. After all, it is 
argued, the suggestion made by this stance was nothing less than apoliticism 
(Giritli, 1987). By criticizing reel socialism (socialist practices in the USSR and in 
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While formulating his arguments, Gelenek writer Aydemir Güler refers to KürĢat Bumin‟s Sivil 
Toplum ve Devlet. See, Güler, 1987; KürĢat Bumin, Sivil Toplum ve Devlet, Istanbul: Yazko, 1981.  
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Eastern European Countries), dictatorship of the proletariat and Leninism, civil 
society proponents were actually targeting politics itself.
48
   
Marxists have spotted the theoretical linkage between ATÜT (Asiatic 
Mode of Production) debates and the civil society paradigm. Halil Berktay, one of 
the writers of Saçak, had provided heavy criticisms of “Asiatic theses” in his book 
titled Kabileden Feodalizme.
49
 Berktay argues that until the stage of transition to 
capitalism, the socio-economic evolution in the Ottoman-Turkish society was not 
different from that of Western Europe (1983). In a debate over ATÜT, Doğu 
Perinçek draws attention to a specific weakness of the civil society-based 
understanding of history.
50
 According to Perinçek:  
 
If one face of theses on the „Asiatic‟ character of Turkish history is the 
deification of the State, the other face is to see anything coming from the 
State as an „intervention from the land of the Devil to the land of the God‟ 
regardless of time and place” (1984: 17).  
 
While also underlying the continuity between the ATÜT debates of the 60s 
and the more recent civil society paradigm, Marxists around Gelenek pointed out 
to a difference: The 1960s stood for a period of “search” for socialists; the period 
after 1980 when the civil society paradigm manifested itself was that of 
demoralization and collapse. Eventually, search projects of this latter period 
reflected the spirit of the time (Giritli, 1987). Similarly, Sungur Savran stressed 
                                                 
48
Savran warns that the environment conducive to the worldwide ground gaining of left liberalism 
is related to the bureaucratic degeneration occurring in experiences of transition to socialism. 
According to Savran, this dynamic facilitating the spread of liberal tendencies in the world left 
needs to be addressed on the basis of historical materialism. (1986:13).   
49
 Berktay‟s argument can be briefly summarized as follows: The role played by the central 
bureaucracy in the Ottoman society does not make this society different from that in Western 
Europe in terms of the mode of production. Moreover, the absence of any experience of slave 
mode of production in Turkish society does not bar passage to feudalism. According to what is 
stressed by Berktay, slavery is not a universal mode of production. As long as defined on the basis 
of Marxism, it would be an historical error to claim that feudalism was never experienced in the 
Ottoman society. See, Halil Berktay, Kabileden Feodalizme, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983.  
50
 See, Emre Adıgüzel (Doğu Perinçek), “Politik Toplum ve Sivil Toplum,” Saçak, Vol.8, 
September, 1984.  
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that left liberalism mushrooming in the 1980s was in fact a “defeatist ideology” 
(2006: 3; 2008: 15). Its very emergence in the vacuum of the 1980s is an evidence 
of this ideology‟s fatalist nature. In Savran‟s opinion, too, the intellectual 
foundations of the pro-civil society ideological orientation were created in the 
debates of the 1960s and it was therefore possible to find the origins of this 
approach in the ATÜT debates (2006: 3). In sum, the ATÜT analysis was one of 
the intellectual starting points of left liberalism.  
4.2.2.4. “Reformism”  
Marxists share the view that the proponents of the civil society paradigm 
come together around a “liberal” reading of Gramsci (Gündüz, 1984: 16-17; 
Savran 1986; Çulhaoğlu, 1994: 17-18).51 According to this view, capitalizing on 
some ambiguities in Gramscian thought, the concept “civil society” was defined 
as apart from the mode of production and production relations, which led its 
advocators to a path outside the Marxist framework. While conceding that some 
vague points in Gramsci‟s thinking did allow for such reading52 it is added that it 
is virtually impossible to derive any “conciliatory” political line from a thinker 
who upheld Leninism (Berktay, 1984: 7; Gündüz, 1984: 19; Çulhaoğlu and Soyer, 
2000: 20). Neither is it a coincidence that the major reference of post-Marxists is 
Gramsci‟s ideas. Here, a reference is made to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
who re-interpreted Gramscian concept of hegemony by drawing attention to 
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The work of Jacques Textier developing a critical outlook to the liberal reading of Gramsci, 
which was translated into Turkish in 1985, has been a frequently referred source in related debates. 
See, Jacques Textier, Gramsci ve Felsefe, Kenan Somer (translated by), Ġstanbul: Birey ve Toplum 
Yay., 1985.  
52 Gülnur Savran‟ comments that Gramsci merely “assumes” the structure for the sake of 
constructing the superstructure is meaningful in this regard. See: Gülnur Savran, “Gramsci‟nin 
Çıkmazları,” Sınıf Bilinci, Vol.2, October, 1988, pp.161-162.  
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ideological struggle and non-class nature of ideologies in the process of building 
counter-hegemony (Çulhaoğlu and Soyer, 2000: 22-23).  
The relationship between Gramsci‟s thinking and Euro-communism is an 
issue frequently underlined in Marxist literature (Gündüz, 1984: 16). Mehmet 
Gündüz‟s criticism of an article by Murat Belge titled “Berlinguer‟s Questions are 
Still Valid for Turkey” is significant in that it outlines how Marxists approached 
the issue at that time.
53
 Upon the demise of Enrico Berlinguer, the leader of the 
Communist Party of Italy, Murat Belge had drawn some political conclusions for 
Turkey on the basis of Euro-communism.
54
 One point addressed by Belge in his 
article was related to “historical consensus.” According to Gramsci, working class 
and other classes of people should establish their „historical block‟ to confront the 
„power block‟ of the hegemonic class and its allies. The Communist Party of Italy 
had managed to come up with its consensus against the consensus of the ruling 
classes basing on this idea of Gramsci (Belge, 1984: 24). For instance, the CPI 
behaved carefully not to hurt the Catholic public opinion (Belge, 1984: 25). 
Hence, the strategy envisaged by Gramsci was based on a process rather than a 
moment of rupture as it was the case with the October Revolution in Russia 
(Belge, 1984: 25).  This Italian strategy that Belge tried to adopt for Turkey 
suggested that socialists could seek a historical consensus with those segments of 
population standing against the statist, Jacobin circles that maintained themselves 
by excluding masses throughout the period from the Ottoman era to the Republic 
(1984: 25). According to Gündüz, on the other hand, Belge was unequivocally 
suggesting a conciliatory political line with his approach and abandoning the 
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 For another article dealing with Murat Belge‟s stance and reformism, see: Salih Ural, “Murat 
Belge‟nin GeçmiĢ ArayıĢı,” Saçak, Vol:3, April, 1984.  
54
 See: Murat Belge, “Berlinguer‟in Soruları Türkiye Ġçin Geçerliliğini Koruyor,” Yeni Gündem, 
Vol.5, July 1984.   
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vision based on conquering political power through revolution (1984: 18-19). 
Moreover, Belge‟s position (and therefore of other civil society proponents) 
displayed the early indications of the reflection in political arena of a rightward 
ideological shift which had first started in ideology. Murat Belge “was trying to 
line up Turkish left behind the traditionalist, á la turca right of the country” 
(Gündüz, 1984: 19). Civil society proponents represented by Yeni Gündem not 
only accepted all theses put forward by the right, but were also trying recruit 
forces from the left to that side (Gündüz, 1984: 19). As a system of thinking that 
excludes radicalism and Leninism, Euro-communism was an approach that invited 
socialists to “concede” or actually to surrender. By adopting this approach, Murat 
Belge and other civil society proponents had come up to represent reformism in 
Turkish left (Gündüz, 1984: 20).   
A conciliatory political line and abandonment of the idea of revolution was 
the underlying tendency of the liberal left as manifested by Yeni Gündem. Halil 
Berktay maintained that the theory of “historical consensus” guided the political 
approach of this group (1984: 7).  According to Berktay, Murat Belge was trying 
to infer a “compromising” political line from Gramsci by interpreting his ideas 
from the right and ignoring the fact that an uncompromising struggle against 
hegemonic ideology is essential in Gramsci‟s thought (1984: 7). In short, the civil 
society paradigm envisages a significant compromise with bourgeois ideology and 
the theory of historical consensus lays the ground for an envisaged consensus 
between Yeni Gündem and the traditional right wing in Turkey (Berktay, 1984: 
8).
55
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It is considered as concrete manifestation of this approach that Yeni Gündem spared pages for 
articles of and interviews with the leading representatives of the Turkish right (See, Berktay, 1984: 
8-9).  
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The civil society paradigm as a compromising and reformist tendency 
adopts a critical position towards the State, but as dictated by its model based on 
dichotomy, it takes the State as always given and places it at the center of analysis 
(Çulhaoğlu, 2001; Savran 1986). Hence, this approach suffices with limiting the 
domain of the State rather than radically transforming or liquidating it. It is in this 
sense that the civil society discourse is actually reformist, compromising and even 
anti-revolutionary (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 37; Savran, 2006, 2008).  
As a corollary of historical consensus idea, the specific political 
manifestation of reformism and compromise seeking is the proposal to cooperate 
with right wing political entities in so far as they side with parliamentary 
democratic regime (Berktay, 1986). As a matter of fact, the writers of Yeni 
Gündem regarded the DYP as a partner in the struggle for democracy against the 
ANAP as the product of extraordinary circumstances created by the 12
th
 
September coup.
56
 According to Saçak writers, this approach of placing the 
socialist left behind the right was nothing else but submissiveness beyond 
reformism.
57
  
Marxists were engaged in an ardent debate on reformism. In the second 
half of the 80s, accusations of submissiveness, compromise, etc. had its weight in 
socialist politics. While Saçak accused Yeni Gündem of reformism and surrender, 
the Sovietic journal Gelenek maintained that Saçak writers were the leading 
representatives of reformism.
58
 Of course, all these debates bore the imprint of 
                                                 
56Especially see: Ahmet Ġnsel, “Militarizm ve Demokrasi,” Yeni Gündem, 24-30 March, 1986, 
Vol.3, pp.40-43; Murat Belge, “Ulusal Konsensüs,” Yeni Gündem, 24 Ocak-6 February 1986, 
Vol.39, p.1.  
57
See: Halil Berktay, “Yeni Gündem‟e ĠliĢkin Bazı Gözlem ve DüĢünceler,” p.9; Mehmet Gündüz, 
“Uzatılan Elma ġekeri ya da „Avrupa Komünizmi,‟” p.17.  
58For related polemics, see: Berktay, Halil, “Türkiye‟nin Özgürlükleri Üzerine Bazı DüĢünceler-I,” 
Saçak, Vol:41, June 1987. As a reply to Berktay, see: Giritli, Aydın, “Saçak: Bir Yazı ve Bir 
„Ahlak‟” Gelenek, Vol:9, July 1987. See, also: Koçak, Harun, “Perinçek‟ten Bir Tarih 
  
79 
 
discussions concerning the nature of the regime and the ANAP government that 
Saçak had focused on starting from 1986 (Zileli, 2003: 67).59  Against the Yeni 
Gündem group that envisaged a common front with DYP inspired by the 
“historical consensus” formula, Saçak tended to support ANAP as an “anti junta” 
force in line with the “national consensus” formula60 starting from 1986 (Zileli, 
2003: 68). The point that both groups share is that the bourgeoisie was clashing 
with the September 12
th
 regime and thus bearing a potential to play a democratic 
role.
61
 Debates went on around the question whether ANAP or DYP was the real 
representative of the bourgeoisie.
62
 In spite of some hot debates and divergences 
of opinion, the Saçak group eventually adopted the stance of Doğu Perinçek that 
ANAP was the parliamentary representative of this class. In the final analysis, it 
was a must to cooperate with the ANAP in order to “confront militarist initiatives 
with the widest parliamentary alliances possible” (Perinçek, 1987).   
Meanwhile, criticizing Saçak and Yeni Gündem for their compromising 
and submissive line, Gelenek made assessments on the premise that both lines 
defined the DYP as the “democratic face” of bourgeoisie.63 According to these 
assessments, compromising and submissive groups in the left regarded ANAP as 
                                                                                                                                     
Karikatürü,” Gelenek, Vol:1, November 1986; Hekimoğlu, Cemal, “Türkiye‟den Dünyaya 
Berktay‟ın Büyük Dönemeci,” Gelenek, Vol:19, November 1988.  
59 As stated by Gün Zileli, Doğu Perinçek, the leader of Aydınlık movement is one of the 
attendants of Taksim Meetings that Turgut Özal‟s team launched upon the initiative of big 
businessmen. These meetings are considered to be “producing policies so important to determine 
the destiny of Turkey” See, Zileli, p.67-68.   
60See: Doğu Perinçek, Osmanlı'dan Bugüne Toplum ve Devlet, Ġstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1986. 
61
For factors peculiar to the Turkish left and especially to Aydınlık circle that lead to this illusion 
see: Zileli, 2003:69-70.  
62
 There was a divergence of opinion by Gün Zileli and Doğu Perinçek over this issue. Against 
Perinçek who regarded ANAP as the real representative of the bourgeoisie, Mehmet Gündüz (Gün 
Zileli) believed that DYP was the “democratic” representative of “democratic” bourgeoisie. On the 
other hand, Oral ÇalıĢlar, another leading figure in Saçak circles, argued that the task imposed by 
the time was not to collaborate with parliamentary forces to defend the parliament against a 
possible coup but to wage a more courageous and radical struggle (Zileli, 2003:70). See also, 
Mehmet Gündüz, “Bonapartizm, Parlamentarizm ve Partiler,” Saçak, Vol:24, January 1986; Doğu 
Perinçek, “Sivil ANAP,” Saçak, Vol.44, October 25, 1987.  
63
 See: Koçak, 1986; see also: Editorial, “Doğu Perinçek: Kemalism, Kitlecilik ve Yorgunluk,” 
Gelenek, Vol: 19, December 1988.   
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the face of the bourgeoisie siding with militarism and DYP as an anti-militarist 
and parliamentary force (Koçak, 1986).  Yet, according to Gelenek, the seemingly 
anti-militarist stance of the cadres of this party (DYP) was not an important 
dimension of the issue. What really mattered in this context was the relationship 
with the military of classes and class segments that this party represented. In any 
case, once these class segments saw their interests guaranteed under a militarist 
regime, they can do nothing but support such a regime. Given this, it was clear 
that a party programme including some “anti-militarist” hints could not be taken 
seriously (Koçak, 1986).   
4.2.3. Concluding Remarks for the Early 90s  
Commonly coined as “civil society advocacy,” the liberal and democratic 
tendencies within left-wing opinion producers remained as a political and 
intellectual point of interest for Marxists throughout the 1980s. Although pointing 
out to some theoretical explorations particularly under the heading “State,” the 
overall mission and vision of this debate remained limited to exposing how a 
deviation from genuine Marxism this civil society paradigm was. Actually taking 
place as a kind of theoretical reckoning within Marxism, the eventual point 
reached was to underline that the adherence to the civil society paradigm was 
nothing more than an “inconstancy syndrome”.  
Following the 90s when the translated literature increased in volume, 
criticisms also gained some depth. The debates were then placed under the 
heading “left liberalism” and the theme of “imperialism” overlooked the 
discussions. The liberals and democrats of the left were now described as 
sometimes naive and sometimes firm defenders of the regional policies of 
imperialism or, used synonymously with it in Marxist jargon, of globalization. 
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The civil society paradigm was regarded as one of the system-maintaining tools of 
the bourgeoisie that was seeking to add a democratic, participatory and 
transparent “flavor” to the system in the form of civil society organizations and 
non-governmental organizations (GüneĢli, 2001). These CSOs and NGOs were 
blamed by Marxists to be often funded by agents of imperialism. They were, 
according to Marxists, serving the creation of a political atmosphere geared to 
concealing class conflicts by including middle classes in politics (GüneĢli, 2001).  
The claims of these organizations for democratization, anti-globalization or 
participation consisted of initiatives geared to perfecting the smoother operation 
of capitalism.  
In the 1990s, the start of the process of EU accession added a new 
dimension to the issue. In the lexicon of Marxists, the term “renegade leftists” of 
the 1980s was replaced in this period by “EU liberals.” These groups were 
explicitly accused of helping the policies of imperialism and were described as 
major agents in the process of EU accession that forced the Turkish left to 
reformism and liquidation.
64
  
Sungur Savran (1986; 1992), one of the first orthodox Marxist users of the 
category “left liberalism” (instead of “civil society proponents” which was the 
buzzword of the 1980s), construed the production of liberal and democratic 
opinions in the left as an ideological framework emerging as a reaction to 
Kemalism and official ideology (1992: 12). According to Savran, this approach 
that addressed Kemalism from the prism of liberalism spread amongst leftists to 
the extent that it became a kind of unofficial ideology (1992: 13). Savran reminds 
that in theoretical terms the basis of this approach consists of a categorical 
                                                 
64See, for instance, Ali Doğan GüneĢli, “Avrupa Birlikçi Liberalizm ve Solda Reformist Dalga,” 
Gelenek, Vol:64, June 2000.  
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opposition between the state and civil society. Looking at the modern history of 
Turkey from this perspective, the anti-democratic orientation in the country 
derives from the State, the military as its oppressive apparatus and Kemalism as 
their official ideology. This approach placing the bourgeoisie and hence ruling 
classes against the State, serves to conceal the class ties of bourgeoisie and its 
organic relations with the State (1992: 14). According to Savran, such a 
reductionism is based on an idealist ground. Just like the official ideology, left 
liberalism too interprets the whole historical process in Turkey as a simple 
reflection of a struggle waged by specific elites having no class ties:  
 
Here, material interests and social groups shaped up on the basis of these 
material interests (whether they are called “classes” or not) are merely the 
products of an intellectual transferring his ideas into practice, never the 
conditions or causes of it. For example, modern Turkey is the outcome of 
an intellectual passion to create a state, a nation (1992: 14).  
 
Savran explains the challenge of left liberalism in political domain by 
three tendencies: peaceful class relations, integration with imperialism and 
preserving the existing state by democratization (1992: 16). As an example to the 
search for class peace he points out to the attitude of the publication Yeni Gündem 
supporting Demirel against Özal‟s ruling party backed up by the military. 
Integration with imperialism becomes a fact through the process of EU accession. 
The last point, preserving the state through democratization is addressed as a 
typical manifestation of reformism (1992: 16).  
 The main points underlined by Savran are generally shared by Marxists in 
their stance vis-á-vis the civil society paradigm. Differing from many other 
Marxist critiques, Savran‟s approach does not suffice with a mere political and 
ideological reckoning but also seeks to address the emergence and development of 
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left liberalism. In fact, Savran himself underlines the need for a historical 
materialist revelation of left liberalism with its various dimensions rather than 
merely taking it as an “ideology of inconstancy” (1986). The definition made by 
Savran indicates that he has no tendency to stick to only one dimension of the 
issue:  
 
Left liberalism is of course not only a theory. It is an ideology looking at 
the world from a specific framework; a current that wants to engage in 
politics in a specific mode by bringing specific classes and categories 
together; a cultural orientation having its specific references, and beyond 
all these, a specific psychological state. But at the roots of all these there is 
a theory as well, geared to understand the world in a specific way (1986: 
15).   
 
According to Savran, first of all, left liberalism must be defined as a 
“current” since it does not correspond to a specific social dynamism, and instead 
of crystallizing in a single political movement, it may influence multiple political 
movements partly or totally (2006). 
As a matter of fact, in his more recent articles Savran states that the 
approach of Marxist or socialist left in Turkey to “liberal left” is weakened in the 
absence of scrupulous analysis (2006). Savran suggests that the theoretical 
foundations, ideological framework and political programme of liberal left should 
be addressed in more detail on the basis of sound and serious arguments (2006). 
Savran firstly seeks to grasp the evolution and anatomy of left liberalism. 
According to his argument, the theoretical origins of left liberal theses can be 
traced back to the ATÜT debates of the 60s and the “center-periphery model” as 
put forward particularly by ġerif Mardin. Nevertheless, the flourishing of this line 
is associated more with developments that followed 1980. In other words, the rise 
of left liberal line in the world and in Turkey as well coincides with some material 
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developments in a specific historical moment. The wave of crisis that fell upon the 
world starting from the mid-70s was followed by neo-liberal policies as solution, 
and mutilation of the welfare state model provided a ground conducive to the rise 
of left liberal approach. Further, at the end of the 80s and early 90s, the collapse 
of the USSR and other socialist states facilitated the acceptance of left liberal 
theses that placed free civil society against the authoritarian state (1986: 12-13). 
Coming to “domestic” factors, Savran points out to developments taking place 
following the 1980 military coup and Turkey‟s experience with neo-liberalism 
introduced by Özal (1986: 15). After all, just as left wing Kemalism (or 
“nationalism” as it called towards the end of the 90s) that is at the opposite side, 
left liberalism too is the ideology of an epoch in which the struggle of oppressed 
classes has lost momentum (2006).  
Still, it is not possible to say that left-liberal or democrat opinion producers 
are addressed in Savran‟s analysis by reference to concrete examples. Savran 
tends to explain this situation by referring to lack of any consistent and stable 
political attachment on the part of liberal and/or democratic opinion producers 
(2006). The emergence of this group is explained by a process through which a 
large part of opinion producers becoming more sensitive to the interests of the 
market and capital as a result of the transformation that Turkey underwent along 
with neo-liberal measures. The employment of opinion producers in those sectors 
that blend together with cultural activities such as the media, advertising, graphic 
design, publishing etc. is one of the main pillars of this explanation. However, 
Marxist analysis reserves no space to explaining the working mechanisms of this 
process. While it may be sufficient to give an account of objective developments 
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that laid the ground for the rise of the left-liberal ideology, this analysis omits the 
subjective motives of opinion producers defending this ideology.  
The debate around civil society and democratic and liberal opinions that I 
have summarized above raged on in the 1980s rather as a confined debate among 
socialists. Again as stated before, in spite of some weaknesses, the parties to the 
debate could develop their arguments on a specific theoretical and ideological 
base. Towards the end of the 1990s, however, debates over civil society, 
democracy and liberalism, despite the initial intellectual refinements supported by 
newly translated material, devolved into a bunch of reproachful polemics.  The 
heavy rhetoric used in these debates was adopted and reproduced especially by 
those sections of the left that were never fully detached from the political-
ideological influences of Kemalism. Meanwhile, since some Marxists no more 
regarded those opinion producers who declared their identity as „democrats‟ as 
parties to any debate within the left, they opted for polemic-loaded debates rather 
than theoretical-philosophical discussions.
65
 In this process, the debate over the 
influence of democratic and liberal opinions gained a new dimension – whether to 
support or stand against the process of EU accession.
66
 Here too, the weakened 
debates were limited to topics like “collaboration with imperialism” and 
“reformism”.  
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 For a recent example of a comprehensive assessment running counter to analyses narrowing 
down the issue to the confines of betrayal or “inconstancy” see, Foti Benlisoy, “Sol liberalizm Bir 
Komplo mu?” Birgün, September 12, 2010.  
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 One can refer to the following among many polemics and debates on the issue: Selim Karlı, “Sol 
liberalizm Gerçekle YüzleĢebilir mi?” İşçi Mücadelesi, November-December, 2004; 
(Anonymous), “Amerikan Örtüsü Olmadı AB ġapkası Verelim,” Sol Günlük Siyasi Gazete, 
No:656, March 4, 2008; Özgür Müftüoğlu, “AB‟yi Kim Neden Ġster?” Sol Günlük Siyasi Gazete, 
07.07.2009; (Anonymous), “Liberaller, AKP‟den Tam Boy AB‟cilik Ġstiyor,” Sol Günlük Siyasi 
Gazete, 03.03.2008; Can Semercioğlu, “Liberalizm ve Sosyalizm Sentezi,” Sol Günlük Siyasi 
Gazete, 23.09.2009.  
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The attempts of Marxists to account for liberal and democratic opinion 
production suffered from bad reductionism. Firstly, the primary motive was to 
exhibit why opinion producers taking their place at the stage with their 
“democrat” identities were “out of the left” or “anti-socialist.” This impeded an 
analytical understanding of the relationship between the social type under 
examination and transformations taking place in Turkey. Secondly, bad 
reductionism appeared to be explaining the stance of the liberal-democrat social 
type by referring to “class based” terms which were poorly operational.  And 
“neo-liberalism” was used as a kind of conceptual joker which absorbed all these 
attempts to bring rather superficial explanations.  
4.3. Nationalist Scapegoating Approach  
4.3.1. Kemalist-left as an opposition bloc against the September 12 Coup  
Leaving those sections of the socialist left with Kemalist leanings aside, 
the quarrel between those coming to the fore as representatives of left-wing 
Kemalism and liberal and democratic opinion producers started in the 90s. Left-
Kemalist or Kemalist columnists and academics presented their views to the 
public particularly with reference to debates on the Second Republic. According 
to their perspective, all proponent of civil society and other anti-Kemalist 
criticisms were nothing but supporters of the “Second Republic” or, which was 
the same thing, followers of Özal. Indeed, following 1991, when Mehmet Altan 
first used the term “Second Republic,” debates over this term occupied the 
political discourse. From the perspective of Kemalists, criticisms of secularist 
official ideology not sharing Özal‟s vision and all criticisms displaying sensitivity 
about ethnic and religious differences were all categorized as exemplary of 
“Second-Republicanist” ideology.  
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At the outset, Turgut Özal was considered by some leftist circles as the 
representative of the democratic fraction of the bourgeoisie.
67
 Many opinion 
producers who thought that Özalist discourse created an opportunity in breaking 
the long-lasting taboos of the country were associated, by Kemalist observers, 
with Second Republicanism.  
In the eyes of Kemalist opinion producers, Second Republicanism was a 
pejorative term operative in designating all individual opinion producers sharing a 
critical attitude towards the official ideology Kemalism, questioning the 
imposition of laicism and the social engineering practices of the early Republican 
elite and calling for a critical rethinking over the title of military tutelage. The 
ideological or political differences among those who emphasized either of the 
mentioned themes did not matter for the left Kemalist camp. Such that, whether 
they were raised by Islamist columnists or authors or by the socialist figures, these 
arguments implied a challenge to the revolutionary character of the Republic and 
thereby worked to strengthen the Özalist neo-liberal discourse. It was common 
among the left Kemalist camp to label those stances with the all-embracing 
notorious term “Ġkinci Cumhuriyetçilik” or “liboĢ” which appeared to be a 
synonym for the former.  
Strong criticisms of Second Republicanism came from Uğur Mumcu 
whose ideological stance remained very influential among the leftist audience of 
the concerned period of time. For Mumcu, given such themes and orientations as 
anti-imperialism, revolution and progress that it embodies, Kemalism stands for a 
system of thinking which should in essence be placed on the left. Notwithstanding 
his harsh criticism of the line of the USSR and radical socialist groups, Mumcu 
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considered himself as a Kemalist adhering to “libertarian socialism.” The left 
wing Kemalism as suggested and defended by Mumcu was quite different from 
“nationalism” (ulusalcılık) that influenced Turkish politics in the 2000s. Indeed, 
as stated by Savran, there are sharp contrasts between the current now referred to 
as “nationalism” and what was defined in the past as “left wing Kemalism”: 
 
It is necessary to discern the left Kemalism of Doğan Avcıoğlu from the 
utterly reactionary nationalism of our day. I want to say that the origins of 
the one can be found in the other to a certain extent, but the reactionary 
nature is the outcome of a historical process. At least for one reason: One 
of the underlying dynamics of nationalism today is hostility towards 
Kurds. Doğan Avcıoğlu had no such hostility. Although there were 
striking uprisings by the Kurds in the period between the two world wars, 
the Kurdish issue was not so heavy in the agenda of the Turkish left in the 
60s (2008: 19).   
 
The left wing Kemalism that maintained its place in the ideological 
spectrum of Turkey until the second half of the 90s used to be the ideological 
armor that was worn particularly by leftists in smaller cities and towns to protect 
from the authoritarian and fascist practices of the September 12
th
 coup. Having its 
early political manifestations with the periodicals Kadro (1932-1934) and Yön 
(1961-1967), the left wing Kemalism lost its position as a separate circle and 
rather turned into an ideological line defended by individual authors and 
columnists mostly in daily Cumhuriyet (Alpkaya, 2001: 479).
68
 Indeed, those 
circles of our day which can be coded as “national left” are this or that way the 
heirs of these two lines that can be considered as a synthesis of Marxism and 
Kemalism (Savran, 2006). As a matter of fact, Uğur Mumcu and Ġlhan Selçuk, 
both the leading figures of left wing Kemalism in Cumhuriyet earlier had their ties 
                                                 
68No additional information is needed here since the journals Kadro and Yön were addressed in 
detail in earlier chapters.  
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with the journals Yön and Devrim published by Avcıoğlu (Savran, 2006; Alpkaya, 
2001).   
The milestone of transformation in left wing Kemalism is picked as the 
“postmodern coup” of February 28th, 1997 (Savran, 2006, 2008). It is possible to 
read this transformation most vividly on daily Cumhuriyet. The shift of 
Cumhuriyet to the left in political spectrum took place in the second half of the 
60s that is, the rising period of leftist movements in Turkey (Günal, 2001: 484). 
While displaying an affirmative attitude towards a possible new coup just before 
September 12
th
, 1980, hoping to see the closure of a period of sharp ideological 
confrontations and violence in the country, the Cumhuriyet adopted an ideological 
line fully opposing to the military regime after the coup.
69
 As an intervention 
targeting to relocate the center of domestic politics to the right, the military 
regime pushed the Cumhuriyet and hence left Kemalists leftward. In this shift, the 
ever-widening gap between the underlying philosophy of the coup and the values 
of the Enlightenment had a major share. For the Yön-inspired sections of 
Kemalism who adopted the values of the Enlightenment as its basic philosophy, 
interpreted the “Six Arrows” of Mustafa Kemal from a leftist perspective and 
considered development and industrialization as the core issue in the country, it 
was impossible to come to terms with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis project and 
economic liberalism of the September 12
th
 regime. Given this, it is not surprising 
that it was those sections who considered themselves as real successors of 
Kemalism who were disturbed and moved most by the attempts of junta generals 
who had turned to new ideological and political arrangements on the name of 
“Atatürkism.” These circles assessing the ideology presented by the military 
                                                 
69
 An outcome of this sympathetic attitude towards the coup was Cumhuriyet‟s avoidance of any 
ban after (Günal, 2001: 484).  
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regime as “Atatürkism in deep freeze” (Alpkaya, 2001: 479, 498) re-construed 
Kemalism for defending the values of the Enlightenment against the reactionary 
stand of the military regime and, as a result of this opposing position, moved 
leftward in politics whether willingly or not. Starting from this point, the left wing 
Kemalism deemed Turgut Özal led ANAP that became the ruling party after the 
elections of 1983 as the successor of the September 12
th
 regime and coined it as 
the vanguard of neo-liberal assault and hence the collaborator of imperialism.  
Summing up, criticisms against the 2
nd
 Republicans were based on two 
major factors: the fear of Sharia and the fear of separatism. These two fears were 
associated with anti-imperialism as a theme and consequently all counter 
comments were tied up with the theme “collaboration with imperialism.”70  It 
must nevertheless be added that the problems of the labor, trade union rights and 
right to organize covered a significant space in left-Kemalist critiques starting 
from the 80s to the mid-90s.  
4.3.1.1. Left Kemalism as Defender of Labor Rights against the Neo-
liberalism of Second Republicans 
Left wing Kemalists whose intellectual world was shaped by the 
development and etatism discourses of the 60s consolidated their positions on the 
left by siding with the labor against those articles of the 1982 Constitution 
restricting trade union activities and right to organize as well as the frontal attack 
of capital to labor during the ANAP rule. During this period when liberalism was 
identified with Özal‟s line with its full connotations, civil society discourses, as 
well as liberally inspired theses on individualism and liberalization in political 
domain were all regarded as degenerated outcomes of the earlier coup. The Özal 
                                                 
70
 See, for instance, Emre Kongar, 28 Şubat ve Demokrasi, Remzi Kitabevi, Ġstanbul: 2000, p: 19, 
35, and 112.  
  
91 
 
period with its “á la turca capitalism”, “arabesque liberalism” and Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis was construed as a blatant assault on the achievements of the Republic 
and Enlightenment philosophy and the project for a Second Republic was 
declared as the manifestation of Özalism in intellectual domain (Günal, 2001: 
484).  Uğur Mumcu, one of the leading figures of left wing Kemalism tells the 
following about the case:  
 
1982 Constitution was used as an instrument of force against trade union 
movements. Collective bargaining was prohibited by the new laws of the 
1982 Constitution. Collective bargaining system had lost its power and 
rural union movements had almost vanished (Cumhuriyet, September 12, 
1992).  
 
According to Mumcu, the Özalism which successfully implemented the 
anti-union and anti-labour IMF programme of January 24th on the one side and 
the Project for a Second Republic on the other complemented each other. Hence, 
the issue is not to give numbers to the republic but to take steps for ensuring the 
state of law:  
 
Republic means the sovereignty of the people. Are the people sovereign or 
not? For example, do workers enjoy their trade union rights? Do 
government employees have the right to go to strike? Can working people 
take part in government through their unions and parties? Are freedoms of 
opinion and assembly guaranteed? Is the judiciary independent and the 
University is autonomous? These are all important points and if these have 
not existed, are not existing and will not exist, there will be no solution by 
giving numbers to the republic as 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and so on! (Cumhuriyet, June 
28, 1992) 
 
Uğur Mumcu underlines that while enhancing the positions of capital, the 
September 12
th
 coup served a serious blow to working people and he points to the 
need to rectify this situation along with Western norms that is, ILO standards 
(1992, November 28). This is absolutely necessary since lifting all bans and 
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constraints on trade unions and entitling government employees the right to 
collective bargaining and strike are all sine qua non for western democracies. Yet, 
2
nd
 Republicans who keep talking about Turkey‟s need for a western type of 
democratic system prefer to keep silent on these issues (1992, November 28). 
Reminding that Mehmet Moğultay, the social democrat Minister of Labor and 
Social Security from the SHP, has been waging efforts to bring in ILO standards 
to Turkey, Mumcu interprets the silence of so called “democrats” or “liberals” as 
the proof of their siding with capital against labor (1992, November 28).  
According to Mumcu: 
 
Those who are today accused as Kemalists are the defenders of liberal and 
pluralist democracy. Look who is for the ILO Convention no. 159 that 
provides job security to workers. The same as those who once defended 
the abolishment of article 163 in the Turkish Penal Code: The followers of 
Atatürk, Kemalists! (Cumhuriyet, December 29, 1992) 
 
According to Mumcu, no country with free market economy is completely 
immune from state intervention and each economic system has its intervention 
component (1991, October 13).
71
 Hence, contrary to the arguments of 2
nd
 
Republicans, doing away with interventionism in Turkey would worsen the 
situation rather than ameliorating it. What actually matters is not to fully abandon 
intervention but to delineate its domain and set relevant criteria for intervention. 
(1991, October 13). Those who applaud the Özal period as a transition to free 
market economy and liberalism were mistaken; the model introduced by Özal was 
based on IMF recipes applied by the military and it was, as coined by Mumcu, the 
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 “„Free market‟ exists nowhere in the world, to the contrary „competition‟ is restricted in western 
countries that we take as a model” (Mumcu, 1991, October 13, Cumhuriyet). “There is no single 
capitalist economy in the world where market is completely left free to operate without any State 
„interference‟ al all. Is Kemalism the opponent of free market economy? No, market economy is 
fully excluded only in the Leninist system.” (Mumcu, “Yeni McCarticilik,” Cumhuriyet, 
November 2, 1991).   
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“militarization of economies” or merely a “junta model” (1991, October 13). 
Unlike the case in western countries, „free market‟ in Turkey was transformed 
into a crude and primitive mechanism of exploitation through which big business 
circles get stronger and make more profit with the support of the State whereas 
wages were pushed down by the oppressive interventions of the State. „Is this the 
way civil society will flourish?‟ „Is this the way of ensuring industrial peace?‟ „Is 
this how free market is going to work?‟” (Mumcu, 1992, April 28, Milliyet).72  
According to Mumcu, workers‟ rights including trade union rights to 
which 2
nd
 Republicans, civil society proponents and liberals close their eyes are 
actually preconditions for plurality. In fact, “Plurality, civil society and pluralist 
democracy are systems in which trade unions and social democratic parties are 
interwoven.” (1992, May 16, Cumhuriyet). 
 The position of 2
nd
 Republicans defending free market economy against 
the “Statist fetishism” that they claim to be dominant in the leftist tradition does 
not seem plausible to Mumcu.  First of all, it is quite doubtful to Mumcu whether 
highly welcomed Özal liberalism is liberalism indeed (Cumhuriyet, January 2, 
1991).  From an elitist perspective which is adopted widely by left wing 
Kemalists, Mumcu qualifies Özal‟s liberalism as “á la turca” and argues that 
“statist fetishism” is actually attributable to the ANAP period (Cumhuriyet, 
January 2, 1991). According to this view, the ANAP liberalism is nothing but the 
„militarization of economy‟, which is the „most degenerated form of state 
interventionism‟ (January 2, 1991). Mumcu gives the following example:  
 
ANAP phases in courts in working life instead of seeking consensus. 
While doing this, it invokes „state fetishism‟. The ANAP joining the 
                                                 
72See also: Mumcu, “Serbestlik Kime?” Cumhuriyet, August 16, 1991; “Aldatmaca,” Cumhuriyet, 
October 13, 1991.   
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political life from the military regime of September 12
th
 now upholds 
military barrack methods in industrial relations (Jan 2, 1991).  
 
While introducing “arabesque liberalism”, offering the degraded and crude 
form of state interventionism as “free market economy”, the ANAP created a state 
supported underground capital and some “lumpenbusinessmen” (Mumcu, 
Cumhuriyet, May 30, 1991). The reason for calling the model “arabesque” is that 
it leaves clientelism and corruption free in penetrating the whole society. 
According to Mumcu, the way Özal perceives free market economy is associated 
not with “freedom” but favoring of certain privileged companies and capital 
holdings (Cumhuriyet, June 4, 1991).
73
   
Mumcu gives hints about his understanding of liberalism while stressing 
that the model of “militarizing economies” based on „depressed wages‟ and 
„oppressive government‟ is a pseudo-liberalism aligned with the „politicization of 
religion‟ (January 8, 1991). He sees liberalism as a stance which should have its 
reflection not only in economic policies but in political domain as well. 
Otherwise, ANAP‟s version of liberalism consisting of profiteering remains as 
pseudo-liberalism.
74
 If Özal‟s liberals were liberals indeed, they would have tried 
to stop fundamentalists within the ANAP:  
 
Islamists, sect people and Nakshis have made their present status with the 
support of „volatile‟ and „floating‟ teams within the ANAP. If they could 
manage to gain ground from laicism, it is with the help of these „pseudo-
liberals.‟ They are the two faces of a coin! (Cumhuriyet, February 22, 
1991)  
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 For similar emphasis, see also: Mumcu, Uğur, “Serbestlik Kime?” Cumhuriyet, August 16, 
1991.  
74For similar arguments, see also: Mumcu, Uğur, “Liberal Kongre,” Cumhuriyet, March 5, 1991; 
“ġerif Efe Borsada,” Cumhuriyet, March 10, 1991; “LiboĢ…NaksoĢ…FaĢoz…” Cumhuriyet, 
March 17, 1991.  
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By his criticism of “á la turca liberalism”, Mumcu has in fact attempted a 
critique of “new right” without using this term. According to Mumcu, the “strong 
executive” dimension of the neo-liberal approach based on the formula “strong 
government, weaker State” is in contrast with liberalism. It can be said that left 
wing Kemalists, as in the specific case of Mumcu, had difficulty in understanding 
the fact that in other than advanced capitalist countries, in Turkey for example, the 
neo-liberal process brings along a series of irregularities and breaches due to its 
very nature and working.    
4.3.1.2. Left Kemalism as Defender of Laicism against the Pluralism of 
Second Republicans  
One of the major grounds of left wing Kemalists as they stand against 2
nd
 
Republicans and left liberal opinion producers whom they classify as „civil 
society proponents‟, is the criticism that the latter brings against the way 
secularism is adopted and applied in Turkey. The stance of Kemalists in this 
respect bears the imprint of a “fear” that the achievements of the Republic could 
be lost and Sharia Law would dominate the country. After all, the Second 
Republicans are convinced that there can be a modus vivendi with the followers of 
religious sects and Islamic fundamentalists. The neo-liberal of the Second 
Republic, while asserting to welcome multiculturalism, claimed to tolerate ethnic 
and religious identities (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002). Since the criticism of 
Kemalist laicism occupied a pivotal status in Second Republican understanding, 
the left-Kemalists tended to see this attitude as an attack directed towards the 
foundations of the Republic.  
 It is possible to speak about a series of historical events that further 
encouraged left-wing Kemalists to falsely see Second Republicanists and civil 
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society proponents in a kind of alliance with fundamentalists opposing laicism 
and to be particularly sensitive about the latter. First, the ideology of Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis which the military coup cherished particularly as a bulwark 
against the left led left-wing Kemalists to reinforce their defense of the principles 
and values of Enlightenment and the Republic, foremost their defense of laicism. 
The fact that Turgut Özal was connected to the Nakshibendi network and the 
influence of the members of this sect on government greatly disturbed left 
Kemalists. Again during the Özal governments, open relations with Saudi capital 
became another point of concern that what was dear to the Republic was being 
lost. 
However, none of these developments were as shocking as successive 
assassinations of some leading intellectual figures known for their secular 
identities. The first target in this series of unresolved murders was Prof. Muammer 
Aksoy, President of the Association for Promoting Atatürk‟s Ideas (ADD), who 
was shot to death on 31 January 1990. This was the first incident placing Islamist 
violence into the political debates. Then, on 7 March 1990, Çetin Emeç, the Editor 
in Chief of Hürriyet, was killed. It was followed by the assassination of writer 
Turan Dursun, known for his radical critiques of Islam, on 4 September 1990. A 
month later, Assistant Professor Bahriye Üçok, an academic in the field of 
theology, was shot on 6 October 1990. These killings in 1990 caused secular 
circles to perceive the threat of Islamist violence as the most pressing problem in 
Turkey.
75
 Although no immediate conclusive evidence was collected, the 
assasinations were publicly credited to the “Islamic Movement Organization” 
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allegedly supported by Iran. Islamism thriving in the 1980s was now on top of the 
agenda of left-wing Kemalists as the primary threat, after these murders.  
None of the murders of 1990 were able to create an atmosphere of rage, 
compared to the assassination of the secular (one could say, left-Kemalist) 
journalist Uğur Mumcu on 24 January 1993. His funeral on 27 January 1993 can 
be described as one of the biggest demonstrations after 1980. The funeral was 
marked by slogans praising laicism and blaming Iran and Hizbullah. Including the 
case of Mumcu in the first place, all unresolved assassinations attributed to 
Islamist organizations further intensified the laicist concerns of left wing 
Kemalists and brought this problem above all others. Eventually, individual 
opinion producers that were labeled as Second Republicanists, liberals or 
democrats, were accused in the second half of the 1990s for being anti-laicist and 
for collaborating with Islamists. This reactionary sensitivity about laicism and 
related charges against Second Republicanists (“being in bed with Islamists”) had 
almost the same weight with other charges related to the liberals‟ silence in 
matters like bans and restrictions on the rights of labour, freedom of opinion and 
assembly. In the period beginning with the killing of Mumcu to the military 
memorandum of 28 February 1997, the subject of laicism suppressed all other 
subjects and became the principal theme that characterizes left-wing Kemalists. 
Starting from this point, criticisms of Second Republicanist opinion producers 
were locked in a rather unrefined debate over “being laicist / anti-laicist.”  
In the same year Mumcu was killed, the massacre of 33 left-wing Alevis 
(among them artists, intellectuals) in Sivas, by a mob chanting Islamist slogans, 
on 2 July 1993, constituted a landmark in polarizing the society as laic vs anti-
laic. After 28 February 1997, as Savran states, it was no more possible to speak 
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about a left-Kemalism maintaining its earlier leftist concerns. In sum, starting 
from the turning point mentioned above, Kemalists adopted a narrower position 
where nationalism was elevated particularly vis-á-vis the Kurdish issue while the 
emphasis on laicism overshadowed all other themes.   
4.3.1.3. Left Kemalism against the Criticism of Military Tutelage  
The issue of “military tutelage” is another topic that left wing Kemalists 
felt the need to settle with the Second Republicanist opinion producers and other 
“proponents of civil society.” The approach adopted by Second Republicanists, or 
“inconstant Marxists” 76  as coined by Mumcu, in relation to limiting military 
tutelage and promoting civilianization seems extremely vague. Mumcu is 
convinced that the issues of “military tutelage” and “becoming civilian” are 
distorted by Second Republicanists. It is quite ironic, according to Mumcu, that 
Özal is regarded as a vanguard figure in doing away with military tutelage since 
Özal himself is the leader of a party that could manage to hold power thanks to the 
military coup and he actually served as Deputy Prime Minister during the military 
rule (August 2, 1992, Cumhuriyet).
77
 Owing the political support he enjoys to the 
military coup of September 12
th, Özal cannot be a political figure that leadership 
in demilitarization and civil society promotion could possibly be attributed 
(Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, February 17, 1991). Mumcu reminds that during Özal‟s 
rule, undersecretaries of MĠT (National Intelligence Agency) were selected from 
among generals and the latest three undersecretaries to this post were personally 
assigned by Özal while he was the Prime Minister (August 2, 1992).  
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 See:  Mumcu, “ANAP Planı,” Cumhuriyet, October 11, 1991.  
77
 See: Mumcu, “SivilleĢme,” Cumhuriyet, August 2, 1992. 
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Also, ANAP, which cherishes hopes of demilitarization, is in fact the 
“extension of the military regime of September 12th disguised as „civilian‟” 
(Mumcu, 1991, June 11, Cumhuriyet).
78
 Furthermore, contrary to the expectations 
of Second Republicanist or left liberals, the process of “becoming more civilian” 
cannot be brought about by putting the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Defence. According to Mumcu:  
 
There are many preconditions for demilitarization. Pluralist democracy, 
autonomous organizations, trade unions are the key factors in the process 
of civilianization. It cannot be ensured just by placing the General Staff 
under the Ministry of Defence. To the contrary, it is probable that this 
arrangement makes Armed Forces more vulnerable to the influence of 
political parties (Cumhuriyet, June 4, 1992).  
 
The first step in appraising Özal as the “champion of demilitarization” 
was, according to Mumcu, the appointment of the Deputy Chief of General Staff 
as the Chief of General Staff instead of Necdet Öztorun, who was then the Army 
Commander. Though not referred to as “Second Republicanists” at that time, 
opinion producers siding with Özal applauded this disposal as a step towards 
“becoming civilian.” Yet, for Mumcu, this was a mistaken gesture:  
 
Prime Minister Özal had offered Üruğ, the Chief of General Staff, to 
extend his term of duty to avoid Öztorun‟s rise to this position. Had Ürüğ 
accepted this suggestion, there would have been no artificial scenarios like 
„becoming civilian‟ (…) (August 2, 1992).  
 
The issue of demilitarization again turned out as a hot debate in the 1990s 
upon a specific occasion. The episode that was regarded by Second Republicanists 
as another step towards demilitarization was labeled (in the media) as “MĠT 
becoming more civilian.” Regarding this episode, Mumcu tried to reveal the 
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 See also:  Mumcu, “Güney,” Cumhuriyet, May 26, 1991; “BekleyiĢ,” Cumhuriyet, May 30, 
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mistakes of Second Republicanist demilitarization claims. In 1992, upon the 
departure of MĠT Undersecretary General Teoman Koman and his Deputy 
General Ömer Uruk, Doğan GüreĢ (Chief of General Staff) informed the 
government that they did not want generals from the army appointed to these 
vacant posts. In this process, advantages of having a non-military bureaucrat as 
the Undersecretary of MĠT were explained as follows by the Second 
Republicanists: In case there was a civilian at the head of MĠT, the government 
can be informed about any impending military coup. By citing some historical 
cases, Mumcu tried to falsify this argument: When the military coup of May 1960 
took place, there was a civilian as the head of the National Intelligence and he was 
of no use in informing the government in advance (Mumcu, August 2, 1992). 
According to Mumcu: 
 
In this respect, it does not matter that much whether there is a military or 
civilian bureaucrat as the Undersecretary of MĠT. What is really important 
is to have MĠT doing things as specified in its official mission statement 
and re-oriented to services „required by the security of the State‟. What 
really matters is to prevent the emergence of conditions for any coup or 
take over (August 2, 1992, Cumhuriyet).  
 
Mumcu state that with their discourses on “becoming civilian,” Second 
Republicanists are in fact approving an oppressive and authoritarian working of 
things (1992, August 2). Yet, real demilitarization can be possible only with the 
consolidation of democratic rights and freedoms: 
 
Becoming more civilian must be pursued in freedom of expression and 
assembly, in trade union rights, rights of public servants to strike, in 
general strike, in autonomous organizations and the social democratic 
nature of the state; demilitarization must be pursued through mature and 
competent civil institutions of pluralist democracy. It must be sought in 
social groups getting organized in parties, trade unions and associations to 
have their weight in State mechanisms (August 2, 1992).  
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It is appropriate to assess the thinking of left-wing Kemalists in regard to 
military tutelage in the context of what they attribute to the Armed Forces in 
general. Besides considering the War of Independence as an anti-imperialist 
struggle, the left-Kemalist position also deems the cadres that waged this war and 
then founded the republic as “being above all classes.” The extension of this 
thinking is that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), as the ideological-political heir 
of these cadres, should also be regarded as being above all classes (Savran, 2006). 
Once TSK is regarded this way, then it is also considered as the defender not of a 
specific class but of “overall interests” in line with the Republican revolution. As 
such they regard any out-of-line engagement of the Army, as it was the case with 
the coup of March 1971 and September 1980, as “exceptional deviations.” For 
example, the coup of 1980 is the most extreme of these deviations since the 
military regime offered masses an artificial “Atatürkism” injected with “Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis” instead of keeping true to the achievements of the Republic 
(Mumcu, 1992, December 29).
79
  
The mission of the army as a founder is not something unique to Turkey 
and in fact such cases can be observed in many other countries. For example, 
according to ToktamıĢ AteĢ,  
 
Historically, we can observe that all states were established by the military 
around the world, as was the case in England, France, and United States 
(August 22, 1991, Cumhuriyet).  
 
In this vein, the left Kemalists, believing that the Turkish Republic was not 
formed by the military but by the will of the people epitomized in the military 
never attempt to categorically deny the role of the military in the political realm. 
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Furthermore, the military is also accepted as an agent in accomplishing economic 
development. A point stressed again by ToktamıĢ AteĢ and shared by almost all 
left Kemalists is that the coup in 1960 was a “progressive intervention” (AteĢ, 
1991, August 22, Cumhuriyet). 
4.3.1.4. „The Kurdish problem as a manipulation by imperialists‟  
Criticisms addressed to liberal, democratic and “Second Republicanist” 
opinion producers also include those associated with the Kurdish issue. As the 
Kurdish movement gained momentum, left-wing Kemalists became more and 
more alarmed about issues like national security, which further diminished their 
“leftist” identities. Meanwhile, the daily Cumhuriyet, a focal point where left-
Kemalists could make their voices heard, gradually moved closer to the nationalist 
positions of ruling governments from the early 1990s on, as the Kurdish issue 
became more problematic. Parallel to this, approaches that were not in line with 
official ideology regarding the Kurdish were readily associated with imperialism. 
Most aspects of the issue were reduced to “imperialist games played on Turkey.” 
According to Ġlhan Selçuk, one of the leading uncompromising upholders of this 
line, Second Republicanists are “Özalist inconstant Marxists or leftists now 
aligning with Sharia advocates and Kurdists” (December 6, 1994). 80  Selçuk 
associates Kurdish and Islamist terror with neo-liberalism. The neo-liberal system 
based on the hegemony of financial capital over society also laid the ground for 
transforming terror into an instrument of politics (1994).
81
 According to Selçuk, 
“Özalist” opinion producers were accomplices to this project as its intellectual 
representatives.  
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For Uğur Mumcu, the Kurdish issue is a case manipulated and aggravated 
by imperialists. Nevertheless, the State is also blamed for its oppressive policies 
which make the situation even worse: 
 
For years, the Kurdish problem was kept within a circle of oppressive 
measures. As a result, the issue could not be addressed with its root causes 
(…) Is it not this oppressive mentality one of the many reasons that made 
this issue so complicated? (Milliyet, March 1, 1992).
82
  
 
Citing some historical documents, Mumcu addresses the relationship 
between the Kurdish problem and imperialist policies. He reminds Article 21 in 
the 1921 Constitution which envisaged autonomy for local governments. 
According to Mumcu, this constitutional approach which envisioned a democratic 
model, albeit still within the confines of a unitary state, was abandoned later after 
the Sheikh Sait Uprising instigated by the British.
83
 As for the Second 
Republicanist or left-liberal opinion producers, they line up, Mumcu thinks, with 
religious reactionaries and Kurdish nationalists in the name of democracy and 
multi-culturalism. Hence, they play into the hands of those wishing to be ruled by 
the foreign powers (Mumcu, 1992).
84
 In Mumcu‟s words:  
 
Those who today back up imperialism‟s Middle East strategy to the extent 
that they make White House speakers jealous, are all but renegade 
Marxists who once agitated the youth out to the streets for fighting against 
„American imperialism and its domestic collaborators‟! (1992)85  
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 See: Uğur Mumcu, “Kürtlere Özerklik!” Milliyet, March 1, 1992; “LübnanlaĢma,” Cumhuriyet, 
August 26, 1992; “Terör ve Gazetecilik,” Cumhuriyet, August 27, 1992.  
83For similar remarks, see also: Uğur Mumcu, “Kürtlere Özerklik!” Milliyet, March 1, 1992; 
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On the other hand, Mumcu underlines that the Kurdish problem is far too 
complex to be reduced to terrorism and maintains that the problem can be 
resolved through democracy:  
 
Kurds must be entitled to all rights and freedoms necessary to promote 
their cultural identity. It is one of the obligations introduced by the „Paris 
Charter‟ that Turkey is a party to. The Government of the Republic of 
Turkey can have no other choice in the CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) process. In our age, no problem can be solved by 
denying such rights (August 22, 1992, Cumhuriyet).
86
 
 
Mumcu blames imperialist countries and Kurds who collaborated with 
them for Kemalist regime‟s denial of democratic rights and autonomy of Kurds.87 
Had Kurds not risen up as manipulated by the British, Mustafa Kemal and his 
circle would not have any concern about a split and the provision about autonomy 
which had existed in the 1921 constitution  would have remained in the 1924 
constitution as well.
88
 Given these historical facts, as understood by Mumcu, the 
recent interest of the US and the west in the Kurdish problem is related with the 
interests of imperialists, not with any desire for democratization as left-liberal and 
Second Republicanist figures think. As a matter of fact, those who provide guns to 
the PKK are “NATO countries that make money from the terror market” (Mumcu, 
1992).
89
  
4.3.2. The Second Failed Attempt to “Explain” the Social Type  
 Consistent with their mindset, left-Kemalists tended to regard other 
opinion producers labeled as “Second Republicanists” as domestic collaborators 
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See: Uğur Mumcu, “Tersine,” Cumhuriyet, August 22, 1992.  
87
 See: Uğur Mumcu, “ABD ve HEP,” Cumhuriyet, August 23, 1992; “Hangisi CaĢ?” Cumhuriyet, 
October 1992.   
88
 See: Uğur Mumcu, “ABD ve HEP,” Cumhuriyet, August 23, 1992.  
89
 See: Uğur Mumcu, “LübnanlaĢma,” Cumhur,yet, August 26, 1992; “PKK Terörü ve Silah,” 
Milliyet, March 1, 1992; “Yeni Değil,” Milliyet, March 28, 1992; “Kürt Kadastrosu,” Cumhuriyet, 
October 6, 1992.  
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of imperialism and preferred to call them “liboĢ” as a sexist/discriminatory slur 
for “liberal.” As stated earlier, this theme of “collaborating with imperialism” 
accompanied almost every single intellectual debate against Second 
Republicanists. “Anti-imperialism,” regarded as a core principle of Kemalism, has 
been a point of reference in the approaches of left-Kemalists to all kinds of 
political-ideological perspectives. For the left-Kemalist opinion producers of the 
time, Kemalism was a melting pot for Enlightenment and nationalism. 
Nationalism was claimed to be re-defined on the basis of laicism and anti-
imperialism, and they used this blend, particularly its anti-imperialist component, 
to justify their claim for “socialism.” According to these writers, almost all 
criticisms of the present Republic were attempts that could lead to the resurrection 
of the Sevres Treaty which had envisaged the division of the country.
90
  
Earlier, I have stated that the left-Kemalist approach grew even more apart 
from the socialist left especially after February 2007, and shifted to the right of 
the political axis. The determining dynamic in this process was the Kurdish 
movement that made its political impact strongly after 1988-1989. The issue of 
laicism, which had never been a matter of dispute between the Kemalist and 
socialist left (and even served as a common cause), did not necessitate an entirely 
different political stance in the face of rising political Islam. However, this was 
not the case with the rise of the Kurdish movement and dividing lines were drawn.  
The military memorandum of 28 February 1997 should be regarded as a milestone 
for left-Kemalism in terms of losing its leftist characteristics and moving deeper 
into nationalism.  
                                                 
90
 For debates on this issue see: Mustafa AltıntaĢ, “Numaracı Cumhuriyetçilerin Ġçyüzü Ortaya 
Çıkmıyor mu?” in Misâk-ı Milli, Ulusal Birlik, Tam Bağımsızlık İçin 2.Cumhuriyet‟e Hayır, Türk 
Devrim Kurumu Sam Yayınları, Ankara:1996, pp.40-41; Bahri Savcı, “Savulun Ġkinci Cumhuriyet 
Geliyor,” ibid. pp.75-78.  
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In understanding the evolution of left-Kemalism, the funeral of Uğur 
Mumcu, the leading figure of this ideological-political line, could be seen as a 
symbolic turning point, a turn politically completed by the February 1997 
intervention. Paradoxically, the funeral, which in appearance was a manifestation 
of public support for Kemalism, was in fact heralding the demise of this ideology. 
Representing the pillar left-Kemalism, Mumcu defended a position which was 
unequivocally on the left, defined as “libertarian” or “democratic” socialism. 
According to Mumcu, these terms stood for a socialism which was not guided by 
the USSR and kept a critical distance from Leninism. Yet between 1993-1997, 
left-Kemalism quickly moved to the right of the political spectrum and eventually 
assumed the form of nationalist chauvinism. It is possible to find telling signs of 
this shift in Ġlhan Selçuk, the lead writer of daily Cumhuriyet. Exalted by his 
followers as the “wise man of enlightenment,” Ġlhan Selçuk, especially in his 
writings after 1995, reduced „being on the left” to a moralistic position defined by 
laicism and nationalism. In this latter period, the discourse of accusing Arabs and 
the peoples of Middle East with “backwardness” and “fanaticism” became more 
pronounced in his writings.
91
 The aggressive style used against liberal and 
democratic opinions is another feature of his discourse in the same period. 
Besides the sexist term “liboĢ intellectual”, “mandacı” (favouring mandate) and 
“turncoat” are frequently used in his polemical writings: 
 
Once they were wearing Moscow-made uniforms, now they use garments 
from Washington. Those rogues whom we call turncoats get mad when 
leftists say “the wheel of history does not turn backwards.92  
                                                 
91
 In his writings Ġlhan Selçuk frequently places Anatolian Islam against “reactionary”, “bigot” and 
“Arabian” Islam. For an article exhibiting this stance neatly, see:  Ġlhan Selçuk, “Yobazın En 
Büyük DüĢmanı,” Cumhuriyet, June 28, 1996.  
92
 See: Ġlhan Selçuk, “Tarihin Tekerleği,” Cumhuriyet, May 6, 1996. It may be remembered that 
the same sexist expression can be found in Uğur Mumcu‟s articles. See: Mumcu, “Liberal 
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In short, as left-Kemalism assumed a nationalist and reactionary character, 
criticisms against Second Republicanist, liberal and democratic opinion producers 
gradually lost intellectual integrity. Criticisms that had once been developed from 
a more leftist perspective were replaced by a chauvinistic discourse of 
slandering.
93
 Another manifestation of the superficial nature of polemics in this 
period is conspiracy-theorizing with some blend of anti-Semitism.
94
 Such 
approaches where the Kurdish issue is reduced to a game that imperialism plays to 
divide the country, also have traces of an implicit hostility towards Kurds. From 
the scornful and excluding attitude towards Arabs and other Middle Eastern 
peoples, Kurds too get their share of slander, described as a people “devoid of the 
values of civilization and Enlightenment.” According to this point of view, using 
alternative lenses to analyze the Kurdish issue, political Islam, forced migration of 
Armenians and the Cyprus question, succumbs to being a collaborator of 
imperialism or serving the interests of the US and Israel.  
Upon Turkey‟s entry into the Customs Union (1996) and acceleration of 
the process of EU membership, criticisms against liberal and democratic opinion 
producers started to make more frequent references to the EU accession and the 
term “EU-loving intellectual” came to the fore as a pejorative. Those opinion 
producers who supported Turkey‟s EU membership and believed that Turkey‟s 
accession would help the democratization in the country were said to be wishful 
                                                                                                                                     
Kongre,” Cumhuriyet, March 5, 1991; “ġerif Efe Borsada,” Cumhuriyet, March 10, 1991; 
“LiboĢ…NaksoĢ…FaĢoz…” Cumhuriyet, March 17, 1991.  
93
 In this context, an article by Ġlhan Selçuk published in the 2000s, saying he has forgiven his 
torturers is quite meaningful. See, Ġlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, June 26, 2007. Also see, Özdemir 
Ġnce, “Otuz Sekiz Ġmzalı Bildiri,” Hürriyet, August 8, 2006.   
94
 As an example in the context of anti-Semitism see: Talât Turhan, Çeteleşme, Kontrgerilla, 
Gladio, Susurluk-Telekulak, Akyüz Yay., Ġstanbul: 1999, p.15. With its introduction written by 
Ġlhan Selçuk, this book about author‟s suffering of torture in Ziverbey Manor during the March 
12
th
 regime in 1971, is dedicated to „Saturday Mothers‟ in a manner reflecting the contradictory 
worlds of left-Kemalists besides rather conspiracy approach it has.  
  
108 
 
thinkers “consoling themselves with such concepts as globalization, market 
reforms, democratization and human rights.” 95  The “liberal intelligentsia,” 
blindfolded by wishes of EU membership, liberal democracy and individual 
freedoms tends to wage its struggle for democracy against the “oppressive State” 
by ignoring neo-liberalism and imperialism (Yıldızoğlu, 2008:416).  
The publications of Aydınlık, which drifted apart from Marxism in the 
1990s and fully engaged in a nationalistic discourse,
96
 gives blatant examples of 
the slandering discourse directed to those who support the EU accession process 
and who adopt a critical stance against the memorandum of February 1997.
 97
 In 
these publications, democratic and liberal opinions are declared as belonging to 
“traitors serving the US.”98 Furthermore, with their attitude regarding the question 
of veiling and regarding the ethnic rights of Kurds, these “cosmopolitan 
intellectuals” are thought to be working to revitalize the Sevres Treaty (Perinçek, 
August 31, 1997; Zileli Ümit, 2003:19-20). From this perspective, all who work 
for foundations and organizations known to be supported by EU funds or George 
Soros‟ Open Society Institute are seen as “collaborators.”99 Soros is seen as one of 
the leading advocates of imperialism‟s New World Order and the architect of the 
project geared to mobilize opinion producers in underdeveloped or developing 
countries for the interests of imperialism through foundations, institutes and 
organizations.
100
 With this conspiratorial connection, liberals and democrats  are 
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 See: Ergin Yıldızoğlu, Emperyalizmle Siyasal İslam Arasında Türkiye, Siyah Beyaz Yay., 
Ġstanbul: 2008, p.12, 24, 25; see also: Emre Kongar, 28 Şubat ve Demokrasi, Remzi Kitabevi, 
Ġstanbul: 2000 p.34, 35.  
96
 In existence today as “Workers‟ Party”  
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 See, for instance: Hasan Yalçın, Dönekler, Kaynak Yay., Ġstanbul: 2003; Neoliberal Sol, Kaynak 
Yay., Ġstanbul: 2005; Aydın Rantı, Kaynak Yay., Ġstanbul: 2004.  
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 See: Doğu Perinçek, “Küreselci ile Tarikatçı Ġttifakı,” Aydınlık, February 9, 1997.  
99
For some foundations and institutions mentioned, see: TESEV, Open Radio, Bianet, Helsinki 
Citizens Association, European Foundation.  
100
 For a relevant article, see Ġlhan Selçuk, “Soros Neden Bağırıyor?” Cumhuriyet, September 18, 
1998.  
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believed to constitute a group supported by the US and EU imperialism, global 
finance capital, and religious sects.
101
 
In summary, liberal and/or democratic opinion producers stereotyped by 
Kemalist and nationalist circles as “Second Republicanists,” or “Children of 
Soros” represent, in very broad terms, a group that adopts a libertarian stance in 
political issues and a critical approach to the Kemalist tradition.  This group is 
heterogeneous, includes figures with a socialist background and also with right-
wing backgrounds. The Kemalist and nationalist reaction to this group points at a 
common ground, that of anti-Kemalism. The reactionary discourse against them 
regards concerns like “democratization” and “individual freedoms” as cover 
stories of a conspiring group who really serves “imperialism, the new world order 
and international capitalism.” While the aggressiveness and discriminatory nature 
of this discourse is not the subject matter of this study, the way this discourse 
attempts to locate and explain liberal and democratic opinions and to categorize 
“bad” and “good” intellectuals is noteworthy. The emergence, beginning with the 
1980s, a social type of democratic opinion producers that are distinguished from 
traditional socialist, Kemalist or conservative positions has created an impact – 
thus Kemalists, like socialists, have attempted to assimilate this social type into 
their interpretations, albeit in a hostile manner.  
The reactionary opinion production of nationalist rhetoricians is thus 
exemplary of an attempt to properly “understand” and “respond to” the emerging 
social type. However, since this attempt does not intend to produce political-
scientific knowledge, and is not even a fair portrayal, it fails to explain the 
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 For a relevant article, see Özdemir Ġnce, “Avrupa Birliği‟nin Vesayeti Altında,” Hürriyet, 
October 3, 2007.  
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phenomenon of the Democrat and its prevailing characteristics as an opinion 
producer.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
 
 THE FIRST MOMENT IN THE EMERGENCE OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC OPINION PRODUCERS IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
During the early 1980s, a specific circle of political opinion producers 
gathered around the journal Yeni Gündem, determined to give a central place to 
the critique of official ideology and to problematize the democracy within the 
Turkish context. It would be correct to claim that it was the left-oriented opinion 
producers who for the first time constructed the conceptual framework and 
theoretical tools of the debates revolving around the topics of democracy and the 
state. The journal Yeni Gündem deserves to be analyzed since it provided some 
early theoretical reflections about the theme of democracy and a call for a 
systematic thinking practice over the critique of the regime‟s ideology.  
The first journal which carried the debates around the issues of democracy 
and democratization into the agenda of Turkey‟s socialist and left-leaning figures 
was Birikim, which stood as a theoretical and political source that introduced the 
fashionable scholars of Western Marxism, like Althusser, Poulantzas and Laclau. 
The history of the journal might be examined in two phases. The first phase 
covered the period of March 1975 and April 1980, when the junta put an end to its 
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publication. The second phase of Birikim started in March 1989 and the journal is 
being published interruptedly since then. The journal, when it first came out, can 
be regarded as providing novel theoretical contributions to the mostly barren 
intellectual soil of the Turkish socialist left. It had a clearly defined socialist 
identity and the discussions presented within the journal were confined to a 
socialist outlook.  
In contrast, Yeni Gündem (first issue in 1984) never claimed to be 
theoretical but instead emerged as a weekly magazine focusing on issues 
concerned with democracy and democratization. It sought to construct a leftist 
perspective in the analysis of the existing course of politics. Therefore, it is 
difficult to mention about any sort of complete overlap between Birikim and this 
journal. Despite the fact that Yeni Gündem was published between the years 
during which Birikim had to leave the scene, it never claimed to substitute the 
place left empty by the former. Still, it might be argued that Yeni Gündem served 
as a platform for socialists who were formerly associated with Birikim. Perhaps 
the foremost figure of Birikim, Murat Belge, was also one of the chief editorials of 
Yeni Gündem.  
The most important factor preparing the ground for the emergence of a 
left-wing discourse on democratization and on the critique of the regime‟s 
ideology was the 1980 Coup. The coup paved the way towards a total process of 
political and ideological restructuring. The Turkish version of the new right 
ideology, which is called Özalizm (named after the former prime minister and 
President Turgut Özal), was one consequence of this restructuring process which 
then contributed to the change within the conceptual framework of the left-leaning 
political opinion producers in Turkey.  
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5.2. An Overview of September 12 Coup  
With the 1980 coup, the contours of the ideological climate and the 
political realm have been sharply re-drawn. This transformation and restructuring 
within the ideological and political realms were built on the export-oriented 
capital accumulation model adopted at the outset of the 1980s. In contrast to the 
state-led character of the import-substitution strategy that reigned during the 
sixties and seventies, the new model celebrated free market forces and thereby 
necessitated an ideological and political restructuring. Without question, this 
ideological and political atmosphere shaped the frames of references of Turkish 
political opinion suppliers, such that, they either raised their voices as opponents 
to the newly established ideological framework or adopted the new agenda 
partially or totally.  
The primary task of the September coup was stated as suppressing terror 
and anarchy. Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren defined the purpose of 
the coup as 
 
to preserve the integrity of the country, to restore national unity and 
togetherness, to avert a possible civil war and fratricide, to reestablish the 
authority and existence of the State and to eliminate all factors that prevent 
the normal functioning of the democratic order.
102
 
 
Nevzat Bölügiray, an active-duty general during the coup, states in his 
memoirs that after the coup, terror within the country was suppressed at the 
expense of democracy (1991).
103
 The “determined combat against anarchy and 
terror” prevented violent incidents to a certain degree. Still, in contrast to its 
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 For the original version of the speech, see:  Towards A Sound Democracy, (Ankara: Prime 
Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, Date Unknown). 
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 Nevzat Bölügiray was commander of the 6th Army Corps before the coup. After the coup he 
commanded the state of emergency areas of Adana, KahramanmaraĢ, Mersin, Gaziantep, Hatay 
and Adıyaman. Between 1981-1983 he served as the Chief Director of the State of Emergency Co-
ordinate. For detailed information, see: Sokaktaki Askerin Dönüşü, 12 Eylül Yönetimi Dönemi, 
(Ankara: Tekin Yay., 1991). 
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ambition the coup was unable to eradicate “anarchy and terror”: “By establishing 
a huge system of suppression and security, the coup reduced terror for only a 
certain period of time.”104 The primary justification of the coup was “to combat 
terror in order to create the grounds for the normal functioning of democratic 
order.” Still, Belge argues that, paradoxically, its major target appeared as 
democracy itself and the reduction of the terror provided the basis for the 
legitimation of an authoritarian state structure (1992:37). 
In many speeches, public addresses and commentaries of the Chief of 
General Staff General Kenan Evren, democracy was presented as a basis 
facilitating the growth of anarchy and terror.
105
 
One explanation for the loss of democracy as a vision for the September 
12 regime was the fact that the coup-makers accepted a perception of society 
which was conservative in its essence. Evren‟s speeches explicitly addressed such 
kind of a conservative construct. Evren frequently focused on the issues of 
thriftiness, prudence, traditional values of family, morality and religion.
106
  
Moreover, with the coup, the center in Turkish politics has shifted 
rightwards. The architects of the military regime partially adopted a version of 
Turkish nationalism supported by radical nationalist National Action Party (NAC, 
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 Ibid. 5. The numbers are as follows:  
Incidents 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Total No  23.841 5.789 1.170 555 
Armed Conflict 7.010 610 132 27 
Usurpation and 
robbery 
2.209 1.084 426 102 
Murders 2.921 456 125 33 
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 Press Conference held on September 16, 1980 is a perfect exemplary of this attitude. See, 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren‟in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 
1980-12 Eylül 1981, (Ankara: BaĢbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 29-36. 
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 For instance, see Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren‟in Söylev ve 
Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981, (Ankara: BaĢbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 73, 74, 99, 100. 
Particularly the stress on „tightening the belts‟ gave the hints that the economic stabilization 
programme launched by Demirel‟s government on 24 January, just before the coup, would impose 
severe burdens for the laboring classes, see, pages 99 and 100.  
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henceforth in its Turkish acronym MHP). The regime shared, with the likes of 
MHP, a primordialist, ethnocentric understanding of the nation, as well as an 
organic integration between the state and society, engrafted in the infamous 
concept of “army- nation”(ordu-millet). This understanding of nationalism was 
articulated to the official ideology and determined its content to a large extent. In 
the words of deputy-chairman of the MHP, Agâh Oktay Güner, there was a visible 
overlap between the ideology of MHP and the ideology of the state during post-
coup period: “We are in prison but our thoughts are in power” (Bora and Can, 
1991:88). Yet, National Security Council (NSC)
107
 that took over the 
administration on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forced (TAF), frequently declared 
that it was above politics and stood at equal distance either to left and to the 
right.
108
 Nevertheless, it was clear that the coup symbolized a rightward turn in 
Turkish politics: Indeed, the composition of the Council proved the ideological 
preferences of the architects of the coup. The majority of members of the Council 
had conservative-nationalist ideological orientations,
109
 which reflects the anti-
communist core of the ideology and the institutions of the coup (ÇalıĢlar, 
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 NSC is the unconstitutional ruling junta between 1980 and 1983. NSC is also the abbreviation 
of Millî Güvenlik Kurulu, a constitutional council, formed in 1962, composed of the Prime 
Minister, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of National Defense, 
Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transportation and Labor as well as Chief of Staff and 
Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Forces and Gendarmerie under the chairmanship of the 
President of the Republic. 
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 General Kenan Evren declared that, the general conviction that the coup particularly targeted 
the left was a result of the fact that when compared with the right, the left had involved in 
terrorism to a large extent. See, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenan Evren‟in 
Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Eylül 1981, (Ankara: BaĢbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), 237. 
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 Besides, Bölügiray mentions about a number of reasons while explaining the rightward 
tendency adopted by the architects of the coup. For him, the harsh criticisms of the left-leaning 
intelligentsia towards the coup, led the generals to regard the terrorists and the critics of the coup 
regime on the same basis and this reactionism, in consequence, made it easy for the members of 
Council to adopt a rightwards tendency (Bölügiray, 1991:49). Secondly, Bölügiray asserts that 
NSC was under the pressure of the powerful foreign and national circles which were sharing a 
rightist ideology in common. For Bölügiray, the third reason behind the rightist preferences of the 
members of the Council stemmed from the contention that Turkey‟s electorate in the main always 
preferred to vote for rightist political parties (Bölügiray, 1991: 49). Bölügiray also gives very 
specific examples concerning those arguments (1991: 49-52). Nevertheless, it should be added 
that, Bölügiray does not attach particular significance to structural factors and thereby fails to 
analyze the real dynamics behind the coup. 
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1989:118). Since the complete reorganization of the state apparatus necessitated 
the pruning of the extended branches of radical right, the generals did not hesitate 
to attack radical rightists, and particularly the MHP. In order to gain the full 
support of the society, the generals had to present a neutral image in the eyes of 
the public. As ÇalıĢlar argues, the attack on the members of MHP and the 
Ülkücüler110 was a means to achieve this end: the generals made sure that the 
military courts gave sentences against the members of MHP (who were 
responsible of murders, assassinations, and massacres just before the coup), which 
ensured public support for the junta (1989:118).  
The ambivalent attitudes of the architects of the coup towards MHP were 
unable to change the fact that there stood a radical affinity between the ideologies 
of both (ÇalıĢlar, 1989:119). During the rule of the junta, the attitude of the state 
towards the right differed considerably from the attitude towards the left. The 
balance sheet of the regime was full of abolition of human rights: about 500 
people, majority of whom were leftists, lost their lives in custody, thousands of 
people were left disabled, subjected to torture and 6,353 people were tried with 
capital punishment. In Ahmad‟s account,  
 
Around the country, there were about 8,000 in detention and thousands 
more if one counted those taken in custody for the 90-day period, beaten, 
intimidated, and released without being charged. In January 1981, an EEC 
committee estimated that 30,000 were in detention. The use of torture, 
never uncommon, now became widespread and systematic, with a number 
of suspects and prisoners dying in suspicious circumstances. The regime 
never denied the existence of torture; it merely claimed that it was the 
work of rogue policemen and not policy, and that all charges were 
investigated and the guilty punished (1993:184-185).  
 
                                                 
110
 Literally,‟ Idealists‟. They were more commonly known as the Grey Wolves which was the 
paramilitary branch of the MHP.  
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Yet, unfair treatment against the left was evident once the numbers of the 
executed capital punishments were compared: among the executions held during 
the years of 1980 and 1985, eighteen were from the revolutionary left, and only 
nine were from the radical right (Bora and Can, 1991:123; TuĢalp, 1985:254). 
Leaving aside the issue of unfair treatment against the left, there have 
existed several structural factors that gave the coup its rightist character.
111
 First 
and foremost, with the coup, trade unions and democratic rights were abolished 
and this came to mean a severe assault against the working class and the left. As 
stated previously, in accordance with the new policies of the multilateral lending 
agencies and developed capitalist nations and the consensual accumulation 
strategies of big capital inside the country, Turkey adopted free market capitalism 
that necessitated a reversal of the state-led import-substitution capital 
accumulation model and the re-integration through liberalized foreign trade 
(Gülalp, 1994:159).  To this end, export-oriented capital accumulation model was 
put into practice by the government led by Süleyman Demirel with the “January 
24 Decisions” in 1980, in alliance with the capitalist class, just six months before 
the coup. The major architect of the Decisions was Turgut Özal, who was then 
appointed as the vice prime minister and minister of economy and finance by the 
September 12 regime.  
In its most simplified version, export-oriented capital accumulation model 
might be defined with one sole principal: liberalization of foreign trade and 
integration with the foreign markets. The model assumes that, the principal means 
to reach to that end is to increase the exports. In practice that means, lifting the 
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 Needless to say, those structural factors should not be seen the sole reason behind the coup. The 
peculiarities of Turkish historical context have shaped the nature of the coups within the country. 
Therefore, without falling into the trap of reductionism, those structural factors need to be 
elaborated in order to reveal the dynamics constituting the rightist core of the September 12.  
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legal sanctions and quotas on foreign trade in order to freely integrate with world 
capitalist system. As it is well known, any increase in exports necessitates the 
reduction in domestic consumption that requires a general cut in the level of 
national income and therefore involves privatization of state run industries, 
devaluating the currency, removing price controls and reducing the budget deficit 
by plummeting the role of government in the economy (Boratav, 1995: 119-138; 
Aren, 1989:85-88). Thus, in order to operate perfectly, export-led model 
necessitates a politically inactive and a docile society. In Turkish context, the 
basis for such vision of society was ensured with September 12 coup (2004: 66-
68). As Keyder notes, “under the military NSC regime, a radical makeover of the 
economy could be embarked upon with minimum resistance” (2004: 68). The 
representatives of the capital within the country welcomed the coup with great 
enthusiasm since the channels for the opposition of the working classes were 
unconditionally closed with the decrees that suspended the workers‟ right to strike 
and bargain and that guaranteed the freeze in the wages and salaries. For instance, 
 
On 14 September, strikes were proscribed and striking workers were 
ordered back to work. This measure was welcomed by Halit Narin, the 
president of the Confederation of Employers‟ Unions of Turkey, who 
noted that the end of strikes would be an important step forward in the 
development of Turkey‟s economy (Ahmad, 1993: 182). 
 
To recapitulate, the coup was a rightwards onslaught on Turkish 
democracy with all its institutions and practices. In Belge‟s words, it was the most 
gruesome oppression that the Turkish society experienced in its history (1992: 9). 
For the first time, democracy, with all of institutions, was the main target. The 
constitution was suspended, the parliament was dissolved, the political parties 
were closed down and their leaders were detained. The leaders of the coup 
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proposed an inversely defined relationship with the democracy on the one hand, 
and the discipline and order on the other, and they did not hesitate to sacrifice the 
former for the sake of the latter. This rightwards and anti-democratic turn within 
politics was also a turning point for the intellectual life within the country. 
5.3. Özalizm: Turkish Version of the New Right  
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the first stage of the changing 
nature of Turkish democratic opinion producers was opened up by the September 
12, 1980 military coup. The coup was equated with outright oppression, 
censorship, and consequently with “state repression.” This led to a paradoxical 
development in terms of the trajectory of political opinions in Turkey. On the one 
hand, politically engaged figures, majority of whom were located on the left of 
political spectrum, were either sent to prison or at least pacified by other means. 
On the other hand, the oppressive environment of the post-coup years caused 
topics like “state-society relations”, “democratization”, “demilitarization” to be 
prioritized in the intellectual agenda.  
As I have emphasized before, the coup was decisive in terms of the 
changing agenda of the Turkish political opinion producers who took stance either 
on the left or right of the political spectrum. It provided the solid grounds for the 
debates centering on the topics of state repression and democratization. Yet, the 
effort of problematizing the state and attributing foremost importance to the theme 
of democracy was not specific to Turkish conjuncture. The operating ideology 
during the eighties, that of the “New Right,” was one major factor that contributed 
to the debates around the state and offered even a hostile attitude to every specific 
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issue related with that topic. The New Right
112
 might be defined as the 
ideological/political dimension of the global restructuring process of capitalism 
via the practice of neo-liberal policies. More precisely, it is the ideological base 
that supported the enforcement of the neo-liberal policies and the solutions 
offered for overcoming the crisis that the capitalism experienced in the late-70s. 
This ideological project rests on one core premise: superiority of the market. 
Since the enlargement of the area for the market pre-conditions a significant 
reduction in the area of the activity of the state, state intervention is completely 
disapproved and condemned as collectivist and socialist. This inevitably led to a 
strong anti-statist impulse. 
Such anti-statist impulse found its expression in the Turkish version of 
New Right ideology, namely Özalizm. This was a new hegemonic project put into 
practice under the leadership of Turgut Özal, during his role as the leader of 
ANAP and prime minister of two consecutive ANAP cabinets. Parallel to the 
developments throughout the advanced capitalist countries, Turkey‟s route to new 
right project was drawn by the necessities imposed by the newly adopted capital 
accumulation model, that of export-oriented capital accumulation, as an 
alternative to the import-substitution strategy. With the 24th January decisions the 
cornerstones of the new route was laid down. As discussed earlier, in contrast to 
the state-led development strategy of import-substitution model, export-oriented 
capital accumulation required the reduction of state intervention and the limitation 
                                                 
112„Neo-liberalism‟ and „New Right‟ are frequently used interchangeably to refer to the similar 
processes and developments. For instance, while offering a definition, Held proposes that, “The 
New Right (or neo-liberalism, or neo-conservatism, as it is sometimes called) is, in general 
committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of 
individual freedom and initiative” (Held, 1991: 243). Still, for our part, some sort of demarcation 
line might well be drawn between the two. Despite the risk of simplification, the policies and 
economic reform packages offered as the solutions for the second great crisis of capitalism that 
manifested itself during the seventies might be described under the heading of „neo-liberalism‟. 
Besides, the ideological backbone of these policies might be characterized as the „New Right‟.  
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of state power. Needless to say, this new strategy would bring about severe 
burdens for the life standards of the masses and thereby would lead to severe 
legitimization problems. Therefore, the restructuring of the economy and the 
politics in line with the imperatives of the newly adopted capital accumulation 
strategy signaled the need for an effectively functioning ideological model. The 
remedy was the Turkish version of the new right ideology, that of Özalizm, which 
presented an amalgam of the elements of liberalism, conservatism, nationalism 
and social justice within its own body. Obviously, as a new right ideology, 
Özalizm, echoed the rhetoric of free market and open economy and emphasized 
the instrumentality of market ideology. While doing this, it contributed to the 
overall erosion within the statist discourse and thereby appeared to be a perfect 
anti-statist impulse.  
The state repression of the 1980 coup and the anti-statist impulse of 
Özalizm together paved the way towards the attempts of problematizing the 
“state” on theoretical and ideological levels and reflection upon the theme of 
“democracy” as a counterpart of that critical endeavor. Certainly, the official and 
long-lasting ideology of the Turkish Republic, Kemalism, was not immune to 
such lines of questioning.  From that moment on, Kemalism suffered a severe 
crisis of legitimacy and began to lose its once pivotal role.  
Kemalism, has always served as the basis that provided the legitimacy of 
the coups in Turkish history. In each coup, the military has referred to the official 
ideology as the legitimate ground of its intervention. Turkish Armed Forces 
(TAF), as the main agent of the official and founding ideology of the regime, has 
ensured its „neutral‟ and „over-politics‟ image with its reference, Kemalism 
(Cizre, 2002: 156). Nevertheless, in each and every coup, the content of the 
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official ideology has been re-defined while its core has been left untouched 
(Cizre, 2002). New ideological elements and aspects have been articulated to this 
core, delineated as “modernization, secularism and the goal of reaching to the 
level of modern civilization” (Cizre, 2002: 158). To put it differently, the 
requirements and impositions of each conjuncture have brought about a revision 
of the official ideology and that task has been performed under the supervision of 
the military. The existing ideological elements of the official ideology has been 
revised, reconsidered, or substituted by new ideological elements. Needless to say, 
September 12 coup was not an exception in this route. The official ideology 
pointed out as the main reference point and utilized as the sole justification 
mechanism by the military, was defined with a conservative content (TaĢkın, 
2002:570). In accordance with the conservative social design of the architects of 
the coup, conservative ideological elements were either injected to the official 
ideology, or the conservative components of the official ideology were given 
priority. In this context, it was not a coincidence that religion as a mechanism of 
social control was re-discovered by the agents of the coup.
113
 This ideological 
design was transmitted to the whole tissue of the social fabric via the educational 
system and other means and became increasingly successful in the process of 
creating a docile society. In its earlier phase, the opposition against the official 
ideology was not immune to the ideological motifs of the ruling ideology. They 
either combined or articulated the elements of the official ideology to their own 
body and raised their opposition on this basis. In other words, Kemalism remained 
                                                 
113
 The implications of re-discovery of the function of religion as a social control mechanism is 
manifest in Kenan Evren‟s speeches. See, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Başkanı Orgeneral Kenn 
Evren‟in Söylev ve Demeçleri (12 Eylül 1980-12 Elül 1981), (Ankara: BaĢbakanlık Basımevi, 
1981). It should also be noted that, the formulation of Turkish Islamic Synthesis served as the 
ideological basis exemplifying the societal vision adopted by the architects of the coup. This topic 
will be elaborated in the subsequent sections.  
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to be the major reference point of the opposition as well. Attempts of questioning 
the essentials of the ruling ideology were relatively weak in this earlier phase and 
therefore were underestimated by the architects of the military regime. Yet, after a 
short period of time, the official ideology lost its once sacred status in the eyes of 
certain segments of the intelligentsia and opened to severe criticisms. In that 
respect, not only the September 12 version of Kemalism, namely Atatürkçülük, 
but also the main pillars of this ideological construct were challenged on 
ideological and political grounds. Several developments contributed to the erosion 
of the official ideology.  
Foremost among the factors that contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the 
official ideology was the Kurdish issue that gradually occupied the agenda of 
Turkish politics since the beginnings of the eighties. The Kurdish issue presented 
a litmus test to analyze the weak points of the official ideology. It challenged the 
core assumption of the official nationalist doctrine that took for granted the 
Turkish nationality as the sole marker of the national identity within the borders 
of the country.  
Another major factor that contributed to the erosion of the official 
ideology was of course the increasing public visibility of Islam within the country. 
After the coup, Islam found fertile grounds to flourish since the generals of the 
coup tended to use religion as a strategic tool in their struggle against the left, 
accepting Islam as an effective antidote against communism. In addition to the 
political considerations and strategic preferences of the political elite, the 
increased integration of the country with the world opened the space for the 
flourishing of new demands. Parallel to the developments throughout the world, 
ideas and arguments in favor of identity politics began to occupy the intellectual 
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baggage of the differing segments of political spectrum. Unfortunately, this 
scenario left Turkish politics with a dilemma. On the one hand, dissemination and 
the flourishing of the new ideas extended the scope of political realm. On the 
other, since the political class and institutions were unable to meet the 
requirements of the ongoing process and tended to work against the dynamics of 
the mentioned process (Cizre, 1998:  75). In that vein, the rise of Islam appeared 
as a challenge against the self-evident supremacy of the official ideology. In the 
words of Cizre, 
 
Kemalism, as a strategy of controlled modernization, failed to cope with 
the newly emerging politico-social complexity and to provide as 
meaningful framework as it did in the past (1998:118). 
 
 To recapitulate, as the outset of a long-lasting period of oppression and 
state violence, September 12 coup determined its mission as proposing an entirely 
different identity for the society. For the architects of the coup, the ideal model for 
the new identity was a disciplined and hierarchical order inspired from the 
military (Belge, 1989: 9). However the process yielded its own handicaps. As a 
result of the combined effects of the inner and external dynamics, during the post-
September 12 coup period, the minds of the Turkish political opinion producers 
either from the left or right of the political spectrum were engaged with the 
headings of „democracy,‟ „democratization‟ and „state oppression.‟ Without 
ignoring the impact of external dynamics that contributed to the process, it might 
be claimed that the distinctive character of the military regime was decisive in 
terms of the emergence and flourishing of the „democratization‟ issue on the 
intellectual and political agenda.  
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   I should once again emphasize that for the first time in Turkish intellectual 
history, the issue of “democracy” overshadowed other political and ideological 
issues and determined the content and essence of political opinions. The question 
of democratization replaced ideological priorities that existed in the intellectual 
and political landscape of the sixties and seventies, when debates were 
predominantly shaped by issues like “strategies of revolution,” “independence” or 
“economic development.” This shift of conceptual axis was bound to the 
distinctive character of the September 12 coup that rendered its outcomes entirely 
different from the former military interventions. In contrast to the coups of 1960 
and 1971, 1980 coup did not put the blame on any specific political actor or 
institution but targeted the entire political structure. The architects of the 1980 
coup accused the whole democratic system with its political parties, legislation, 
social and political organizations and elections. Needless to say, the outcomes of 
such lines of developments were prone to generate different implications for the 
intellectual agendas of the right-wing opinion-producers and the left-oriented 
„intellectuals.‟ For the first time in its history, Turkish radical right114 experienced 
state oppression. When compared with the coup of 1971, the violence and 
oppression of the September 12 regime was considerably severe.
115
 Yet, as 
ÇalıĢlar notes, Turkish left, in the main, was not exposed to a devastating surprise 
since it had the experience of the former coup (1989). It was immune to state 
oppression at least to some certain degree. On the contrary, in the eyes of the 
radical right, the coup came to mean a complete frustration. Up to that moment, 
activists of radical right had defined themselves as the „main owners and the 
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 Here, the phrase „Turkish radical right‟ connotes to Ülkücü Movement.  
115
 For a detailed analysis comparing the extent of the oppression and violence practiced within the 
coups of 1971 and 1980, see, ÇalıĢlar, 1989. ÇalıĢlar argues that, one distinctive feature of the 
1980 coup was the existence of harder conditions and a severe violence against the women (1989: 
112).   
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guardians of the Turkish state‟. Once they realized that the state sacrificed them, 
they were extremely shocked and discouraged (Bora and Can, 1991: 87). Needless 
to say, when compared with the radical left, state oppression, either in the sense of 
physical or ideological means, they faced was milder. But still, the outcomes and 
effects of this experience was devastating and demoralizing (Bora and Can, 1991: 
91).  In that respect, due to the identity crisis it experienced within the conditions 
of the coup and the reaction against the oppression of the September 12 regime, 
there emerged the seeds of questioning the existing system within its discourse 
and their self-claimed mission of „guardianship of the state‟ eroded to a certain 
degree and even challenged by its some most radical sections (Bora and Can, 
1991: 39). 
In these circumstances, the traditional right wing intelligentsia began to 
question its once unchallengeable and sacred relation to the „state‟ and the 
heading of „democracy‟ occupied their agenda. The leftist political opinion 
producers, who had once appropriated most of the aspects of the official ideology, 
took pains to define the basis upon which they legitimized their reason of 
existence. The love/hatred metaphor which might be utilized to understand the 
relation between the left and the state took the form of a definite hatred relation. 
The state violence of the September 12 coup did not only intend to gather 
information about the illegal and marginal activities but it also aimed a total 
destruction and extermination of the Turkish left. In that respect, compared to the 
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oppressive practices of the other coups, it displayed an incredible cruelty towards 
the left.
116
  
5.4. Changing Agenda of the Turkish Left: Rethinking the Left under the 
Heading of „Democracy‟ and the Foundation of the Yeni Gündem 
Journal  
  Throughout the period beginning with September 12, coup Turkish left 
experienced a shift of emphasis in terms of its theoretical and ideological 
priorities. The debates around the strategies of revolution that defined the period 
before the coup left its place to the discussions focused upon the headings of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. More fundamentally, different fractions of 
Turkish left located the issues concerned with the heading of fundamental rights 
and freedoms to the top of their political agenda. In this manner, „democracy‟ 
entered into the lexicon of the left and became the chief marker to identify 
differing fractions. In other words, it replaced the prominent place once occupied 
by the theme of strategies of revolution.  
  The period just after the September 12 coup connoted to a process within 
which the entire political system of the country was exposed to a tremendous 
change in favor of authoritarian practices and policies (Alkan, 1986: 11-12, 33; 
Arcayürek, 1990: 198; Cemal, 2000; TuĢalp, 1988). In this atmosphere, the most 
urgent task of Turkish left was to capture the distinctive features of this new 
conjuncture and develop new strategies to cope with the impositions and pressures 
it brought about.  
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 The existence of the practice of torture was firstly officially admitted by the state authorities in 
a declaration given to the Belgium RTBF TV. The declaration was given by Nevzat Bölügiray. 
Within the declaration, Turkish authorities confirmed that the practice of torture was a fact in the 
country; they nevertheless claimed that this was not a state policy. Figures were also given 
concerning some particular cases (Bölügiray, 1991: 150-151). For the oppression and violence 
practiced against the leftist activists in the prisons, see, ÇalıĢlar, 1991: 20-32; 36-39, 55-56, 66-71. 
See also: (Kutlu, 1989:  20-30, 48-54, 69-73, 102).   
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 The leftist and/or socialist circles which were able to survive during the 
authoritarian climate that started with the coup manifested three major reactions to 
this political atmosphere.  
 The first reaction might be defined as a defense strategy. In order to 
protect their own well-being from the violence and the oppressive policies of the 
military junta, some fractions of Turkish socialist-left adopting a classical 
orthodox interpretation of Marxism, pursued a strategy of withdrawal and removal 
from the realm of real politics.
117
 They tended to strengthen the organizational 
bonds of their cadres and suspended any sort of open political activity and 
confined themselves with a process of ideological consolidation. For those groups, 
within the extraordinary environment that the coup brought about, adopting a 
politically active strategy would retain the danger of destroying the whole web of 
their political organizations that had been already rendered powerless by the 
authoritarian practices of the military junta. Those groups devoted themselves to 
their own organizational recovery and built their whole project to a deliberate 
strategy of retreat. Within the conditions of the period, this strategy, without 
doubt, made it impossible to involve into the risky enterprises that aimed to 
redefine the relationship between the Turkish left and the democracy. Many of 
those political groups completed their self-recovery and restructuring processes 
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 The strategy of withdrawal was particularly adopted by a political circle that left Workers‟ 
Party of Turkey (Türkiye ĠĢçi Partisi – TĠP/refounded in 1974) in 1978 and began to publish a 
monthly journal Socialist Power (Sosyalist Ġktidar). This political circle defined their mission as 
the ideological and theoretical reproduction of Leninism in Turkish context and attached due 
significance to the topic of „socialist power.‟ During the conditions of military regime, after a short 
period of recovery, some former cadres of Socialist Power began to publish the theoretical journal 
Gelenek (Tradition) in 1986. In 1992, the cadres gathered around the theoretical journal Gelenek 
founded Party for Socialist Turkey (Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi – STP). STP was banned by the 
Constitutional Court upon an article in its program regarding the Kurdish issue and was 
reestablished in 1993 with the name of Party for Socialist Power (Sosyalist Ġktidar Partisi – SĠP). 
In 2001, the name „Party for Socialist Power‟ changed to „Communist Party of Turkey‟ (TKP). For 
additional information, see: Chapter 4.   
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and located the theme of socialist revolution at the heart of their political 
programmes.
118
  
The second sort of reaction, which was adopted by the socialist cadres 
gathered around the journal Aydınlık, 119  included the efforts of building the 
grounds for political legitimacy for their activities. In that respect, the whole 
strategy was based on pragmatism to a large extent and defined its major aim as 
creating the available grounds for viable political activity. In the early days of the 
coup, Aydınlık group tended to explain the military regime of September 12, as a 
progressive step of vigorous and nationalist forces towards independence (Zileli, 
2003a: 500-504). In the same vein, in the following years, as they thought that the 
specific conditions that gave rise to the coup disappeared, the cadres of Aydınlık 
defined ANAP government as an agent retaining the mission of restructuring of 
the status quo towards democratic means (Zileli, 2003b: 71). Gün Zileli, who was 
one of the central cadres of the Aydınlık group, and who had a reputation as the 
„second man‟ of the organization after the leader Doğu Perinçek, expresses the 
political perspectives of the group as such,  
 
(According to us), ANAP was a parliamentary force and within the 
struggle of defending the parliamentary democracy, it was a part to 
collaborate with. Cooperation with ANAP was essential in order to cope 
with militarism of the junta with the widest parliamentary alliances, that is, 
in order to defend today‟s prevailing parliamentary system  ( 2003b: 71). 
  
This pragmatist strategy pioneered by Aydınlık circle was an outcome of 
the attempts to re-include Turkish left to the realm of reel politics within the 
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  Bölügiray mentions about the change in the strategies and tactics of the radical activist groups 
after the coup. He states that, “(These groups), in order to overcome the outcomes of the 
unexpected attack of the coup with the minimum damage, adopted a deliberate policy of 
dispersion and retreat. In this end, they veiled and disguised themselves, dispersed into the rural 
areas or left the country and became refugees. Therefore, just after the coup, there emerged the 
belief that terror within the country was absolutely terminated. In fact, this belief was only the 
result of the change in the strategies and tactics of the political organizations” (1991: 20). 
119
 For detailed information, see: Chapter 4.  
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conditions of post-September 12 period. Nevertheless, those efforts were hard to 
indicate that this pragmatist strategy brought about a conscious and systematic 
thinking about the issues of democracy and freedom within the ranks of Turkish 
left. The strategy was based on the ambition of deriving temporary allies and 
forms of legitimacy from the prevailing conjuncture. In that respect, its scope was 
not broad enough to shoulder the mission of redefining the content and agenda of 
Turkish left on philosophical, theoretical and ethical grounds.  
 The third version of the reaction that emerged within the political 
atmosphere of the coup purported a reconsideration and reassessment of the 
traditional premises of the Turkish left and emphasized the need for a rethinking 
over the relationship between the ideas of „the left‟ and the „democracy.‟ The 
supporters of this approach analyzed the September coup and the defeat of 
Turkish left in the light of problem of democratization and maintained that in 
order to act as the agents of the new conjuncture, Turkish socialists should inject 
the premises of freedom and liberty into their projects and analyses. Undoubtedly, 
the call for a rethinking over the theme of democracy and freedom denoted to an 
exception within the general amount of Turkish left. This exceptional voice was 
represented by the weekly and later bimonthly journal Yeni Gündem published 
under the intellectual leadership of socialist political opinion producers such as 
Murat Belge and Aydın Köymen. 
 The problem of how to reconcile Turkish left with democracy and the 
problematic concerning the articulation of liberty/freedom to the major premises 
of socialism were the leading theoretical concerns of the socialist political opinion 
producers gathered around Yeni Gündem journal. The chief rationale of the 
journal and the mission it purported to shoulder were formulated under the 
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headings encapsulating the major theoretical ambition: freedom and democracy. 
Undoubtedly, such sort of maneuver calling for a rethinking over the relationship 
between Turkish left and democracy could not be reduced to a temporary 
strategical move. It rather envisaged a much more comprehensive change within 
the agenda of the left-leaning political opinion producers. Yeni Gündem circle 
hold that any attempt suggesting a redefinition of Turkish left under the 
problematic of freedom would bring about a transformation within the established 
political culture and categorically acknowledged practices and commonly adopted 
language of Turkish left. According to the political opinion producers around the 
journal the failure of Turkish left in maintaining the support of the masses and its 
inability to act as a major agent within the realm of Turkish politics was not 
simply an outcome of the anti-democratic practices of the state instrument that 
limited the activities of the left to a considerable extent. Beside this and even 
much more important than that was the failure of the Turkish left to incorporate 
the principles of democracy and rights and freedoms to its lexicon. Therefore, 
Turkish left generated a culture that conveyed the shortcomings and deficiencies 
that arose as a result of this lack of incorporation and recognition. Furthermore, 
this lack of recognition was not only a failure characterizing the Turkish left. It 
also stood as a major factor behind the weaknesses of already existing socialist 
practices throughout the world (Belge, 1985). It was an urgent and considerably 
vital task to locate the problematic of democracy into the first rank of the 
intellectual agenda in order to create a leftist culture that adopted the virtues of 
rights and freedoms and in order to transform the existing oppressive political 
atmosphere. The socialist movement of the country destined to a process of 
marginalization could embrace the masses and retain a prominent role in Turkish 
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politics only if it rescued itself from its hierarchical autocracy and conservative 
orthodoxy (Belge, 1985). Thus, it had to give initiative to the root dynamics and 
consider the maneuver in favor of a libertarian approach as an indispensable 
component of the organizational activity of socialism. In the words of Belge,  
 
Now, the left, in the main, has to reconsider its doctrine as a whole and 
reconstruct the theory that will enable it to capture the changing (realities 
of the) world. Besides, it has to think over and constitute the organizational 
units that will keep pace with the imperatives of this new order. Unless this 
has been accomplished, the left will not only rescue itself from a 
conservative self-evaluation but will fall behind the affairs and events 
prevailing throughout the world (1987a). 
 
To conclude, for the opinion producers gathered around the journal Yeni 
Gündem, the political culture and vernacular which would associate Turkish left 
with the masses could only be constructed through such an understanding that 
locates the freedom at its center. The political agent that internalized the norms of 
at least the bourgeois democracy would be able to transmit this vernacular to the 
Turkish society. It was indispensable to locate the issue of democracy at the top of 
the agenda for both the progressive transformation of the political atmosphere of 
Turkey and the Turkish left itself. In this way, both the socialist agent and the 
structure upon which it acted would be exposed to a radical transformation.  
 Resting upon those premises, Yeni Gündem undertook the role of acting as 
an intellectual source injecting the issue of democracy into the agenda of Turkish 
politics. The journal did not confine its mission with this limited ambition but it 
also called for a systematical and thorough thinking activity on democracy. In 
accordance with this, within the articles that took place in the journal, even most 
of the popular events that occupied Turkey‟s agenda within the concerned period 
of time were associated with the issue of democracy or elaborated through the 
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lenses of a democratic outlook that assigned foremost significance to the principle 
of liberty.
120
 The finest expression of this tendency might be found in Köymen‟s 
words: 
 
In my opinion, the primary problem of the Turkey‟s agenda in all spheres 
is democracy. Doubtlessly, the primary problem of politics is democracy. 
The primary problem of economic, cultural and social spheres is 
democracy. Of course, you should not get the impression that I regard 
democracy as a panacea or cure-all. It certainly is not. What I want to say 
is that, democracy is the necessary but certainly not the sufficient 
condition for the solution of all of the problems that Turkey and Turkish 
people have been experiencing (1985:10). 
 
5.4.1. İdris Küçükömer‟s Theses on State-Society Relations and Their 
Adoption by Yeni Gündem  
The conceptions of democracy and freedom/liberty offered by the opinion 
producers gathered around Yeni Gündem were constructed upon two interrelated 
tenets. The former one echoed the classical liberal postulation that state 
intervention would undermine individual initiative and offend against basic 
liberty.
121
 It argued that the realization of freedom necessitated a realm fully 
independent and autonomous from the state. The latter stood as a central argument 
claiming that the realm which was defined as independent and autonomous from 
the state should be set aside for the components of civil society. To put it more 
clearly, the question of democracy and freedom were constructed upon the tenets 
which contended that state power should be confined to a certain extent allowing 
free space for individual initiative and freedom.  
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 For instance, Yeni Gündem, regarded the ban on the transsexual singer Bülent Ersoy as a 
problem of democracy and as an assault on the rights and freedoms of the individual.  
121
 The conception of liberty constitutes the heart of liberal thought. In its classical formulation, 
liberty implies being free from something and therefore it retains a negative content. In that sense, 
the freedom of the individual implies the situation of being neither under coercion or restraint. See, 
among others,Gray:1995, Vincent: 1992. 
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 The theoretical attempt of the opinion producers gathered around Yeni 
Gündem signaled a fresh voice within the choir of Turkish left. Until the 1980s, 
the general trend was to analyze Turkish capitalism through the lenses of the 
conceptual tools of capital/labor and imperialism/patriotism. In contrast, the fresh 
voice symbolized by the Yeni Gündem circle preferred to construct their analysis 
upon the axes of the relations of the state/society and state/individual. Doubtless, 
such lines of reading determined the nature and character of the political project 
and strategy that they proposed. For instance, before the 1980 coup, Turkish 
socialist left, in the main, tended to define its political adversary as „bourgeoisie‟, 
„imperialism‟ and/or „USA.‟ Yet, for the Yeni Gündem, the counter-front was 
constituted by the state and by the forces operating in favor of its anti-democratic 
preferences and maneuvers. In accordance with that ideological and political 
perspective, it was emphasized that, Turkish left-leaning and socialist opinion 
producers should raise their voices even to the oppressive practices and violence 
of the state that did not directly target the leftists and/or socialists. As Belge 
clearly proposed, without considering the questions of „for whom‟ and „for what,‟ 
the enlargement and improvement of the democratic rights and freedoms was a 
sine qua non of the struggle of building the material bases of socialism (Belge, 
1985: 1).
122
  
 On the theoretical level, the analysis of democracy through the lenses of 
conceptual pairs of the relations of state/society and state/individual necessitated 
the definition of a new transformative agent. This new agent was discovered 
within the terrain that which was beyond the control of state power. Put another 
way, the agent was the organized society from below. Since the state was posited 
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 For similar emphasis, see also, Belge, “Muhalif Bir Dergi,” Yeni Gündem; Aydın Köymen, 
“Radikal Solun Gerekliliği,” Yeni Gündem, September 15, 1985, No:29, 7-8; Belge, “Yine 
Demokrasi,” Yeni Gündem, No:84, March 18-25, 1987. 
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as the sole enemy, it was no longer sufficient to design the political strategy with 
reference to one specific segment of society. For instance, working-class could no 
longer be defined as the sole privileged agent of socialism. The new agent was the 
society itself as a whole which was simply defined as the antithetical of the state 
(Köymen, 1985b: 7-8). 
 It might well be claimed that, via the publication of Yeni Gündem, the 
notion of civil society could disseminate within the ideological and cultural 
atmosphere of Turkish left. Such theoretical and ideological move was inspired 
from the theoretical model whose parameters were set by Ġdris Küçükömer. It 
could also be maintained that, the ideological enterprise of Yeni Gündem was an 
extension of the specific understanding of politics bearing the mark of 
Küçükömer‟s original and influential analysis. This specific understanding was 
rested upon a basis that called for the reversal of the traditionally accepted 
definitions of the categories of political left and political right within the country. 
It maintained that, it was a mistake to regard the pro-Westernization elite, secular 
and bureaucratic intelligentsia within the category of left and the social forces 
resting upon ages-long Islamic tradition within the category of right but the 
reverse.   
The early formulation of this idiosyncratic analysis of Prof. Küçükömer 
made a remarkable entry into the Turkish intellectual realm with the publication 
of his influential book Düzenin Yabancılaşması (The Alienation of the Status 
Quo, AS for short) in 1969
123
. Although he was a Professor of Economics, 
Küçükömer became well-known in the late-1960s when he published several 
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political articles in the Yön124 (Direction) journal. Still he achieved substantial 
fame with the articles he regularly wrote in Ant,
125
 the semi-official weekly 
journal of Turkish Worker‟s Party (TWP) during the late 1960s, which were the 
early seeds of his opus magnum, AS. The book sparked fierce debates among 
Turkish left-leaning academics and political circles and served to challenge the 
major parameters of the Turkish left.  
It should be noted that one particular source of inspiration behind 
Küçükömer‟s work was the newly formulated rhetoric of the Republican People‟s 
Party (RPP) about being “left-of-centre.” The new ideological inclination was 
designed by two leading figures of RPP, Bülent Ecevit and Turhan Feyzioğlu, 
seemingly as a response to the opposition of WPT from a socialist basis. Indeed, it 
was Ġsmet Ġnönü, former president of Turkish Republic and leader of the RPP, 
who for the first time pronounced the maxim “left of center” in a speech on 28 
July (Zürcher, 1998: 265). In the hands of the two leading ideologues of the Party, 
the maxim was utilized in order to promote a rather milder alternative for the 
                                                 
124Yön was a weekly periodical founded in December, 1961 with a publication of a declaration 
signed by over prominent figures. The chief editor of the periodical and the leading figure of Yön 
movement was Doğan Avcıoğlu, an influential columnist of the period, who also contributed to the 
1961 Constitution as a member of the constitutional parliament. Calling for a synthesis of Third 
World socialism and Kemalist nationalism Yön had deep impact on the political and ideological 
climate of the post-1960s. It had extremely high circulation figures in a short time which were 
almost inconceivable for a leftist publication in Turkey (Samim, 1981:68). Alongside Avcıoğlu, 
Mümtaz Soysal, Ġlhan Selçuk and Ġlhami Soysal appeared as the major writers of Yön. The 
periodical was financed by Cemal Eyüboğlu. Since it also served as an open platform for the 
whole left within the country, throughout the pages of Yön, not only the defenders of Kemalist-
socialism but also the figures associated with different versions of socialism could find place. 
Küçükömer was one of them. The journal was discontinued in 1967. 
125
 Ant was published during the years of 1967 and 1971. The founders of the weekly were: the 
novelist YaĢar Kemal, literary critic Fethi Naci and Doğan Özgüden. Editorial board included Aziz 
Nesin, Nadir Nadi, Abidin Dino, Selahattin Hilâv, Çetin Altan, Mehmet Kemal and many 
prominent figures of Turkish Workers Party. Within a short time, Ant appeared to be the semi-
official journal of TWP and represented the ideological disposition retained by Mehmet Ali Aybar 
and Behice Boran within the party. In that respect, within the pages of the journal, the strategy of 
National Democratic Revolution (Turkish acronym, MDD), was sharply criticized and the 
argument that the military and progressive in accordance with the Marxist premises  it was argued 
that the working class was the transformative agent within the course of socialist revolution. 
Küçükömer‟s AS was published by Ant publications, which was established by the Ant journal 
circle.  
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working classes. To this end, the left-of-center strategy called for an agrarian 
reform, opening of credit lines for small producers and the improvement of the 
social and economic situation of the workers in order to compete with its main 
rival, TWP, in the struggle for left-leaning voters (Lipovsky, 1992: 42). Therefore, 
Küçükömer‟s AS was a political response to RPP‟s “left-of-center” rhetoric. The 
main argument of the book asserted the following: the socialist movement in 
Turkey has to oppose the RPP-Turkish Armed Forces-Kemalism trinity in order to 
develop and establish a mass support base. With this opposition, according to the 
argument, the socialist left would become a viable political alternative.     
Needless to say, Küçükömer‟s arguments were positioned as the radical 
criticism of the style of politics adopted by left-leaning and socialist political 
actors of Turkey. In that respect, Küçükömer proposed a brand new definition for 
the categories of “political left” and “political right” and proposed the concept of 
“cultural alienation” as the major criterion for understanding those categories. For 
Küçükömer, the political tradition represented and adopted by the Westernizing-
secular-bureaucratic elite would be located towards the right of the political 
spectrum, since the figures within this tradition were deemed as “culturally 
alienated” from the people, that is, they were far from representing people‟s 
interests.  
The progenitor of the political tradition now calling itself “left-of-center” 
was the group that emerged as a “modernizing bureaucracy” throughout the 
Ottoman Modernization process. These elites, proponents of modernization and 
Westernization, were culturally alienated from the society. Küçükömer observed 
that the historical, social and political problems haunting the Republic were all 
caused by this “modernizing tradition.” By arguing this, Küçükömer, in a way, 
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repeated the criticisms of the religious-conservative right against modernization; 
however, he tried to integrate his approach into a form of Marxian historical and 
structural criticism. In that respect, he analyzed the historical role of the 
Western/modernizer bureaucrats using a Marxist framework and argued that the 
Westernizing/laicist tradition was an impediment to the development of means of 
production in the overall course of Ottoman/Turkish history. The aim of their 
modernizing efforts was to „save the state.‟ However, according to Küçükömer, 
the outcome this effort was to modernize/Westernize most of the superstructural 
forms in the country while failing to create a similar developmental effect on the 
means and forces of production (i.e., the “infrastructure”). This failure created a 
vast chasm between the modernizing elite and the masses. Since the true 
advancement of capitalism in Turkey would jeopardize the power positions of the 
bureaucratic elite, according the Küçükömer, they effectively hindered the 
historical development of the means of production. Furthermore, Küçükömer 
claimed that the adoption of Western superstructural institutions actually made 
imperialism easier to penetrate Turkish society. It was for this reason that the 
populist-Islamist circles felt more at home in supporting political groups that were 
perceived as embracing and protecting authentic Ottoman values (Mert, 2000). 
Since it was “cultural politics” which distanced the people from the bureaucratic 
elite, most political conflicts in Turkey were determined by “superstructural, 
ideological” institutions rather than by class struggle. As an outcome of this 
effect, the society, since the beginning of the Ottoman modernization process, was 
pushed towards political alliances which were against its interests. Küçükömer 
claimed that the masses, in order to defend against the threat posed by the state‟s 
“cultural politics,” tended to embrace the pre-modern, conservative value system.  
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Therefore, the tradition wrongly associated with the political left, which 
was actually more rooted in the political right, was represented by the Jacobin, 
elitist line of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and RPP. This CUP-
RPP tradition that could never culturally identify itself with the masses was 
opposed by the long line of “people‟s front” represented by figures like Prince 
Sabahattin and organizations like Freedom and Unity Party, Democratic Party and 
Justice Party. Küçükömer accepted this opposition as part of the political left 
because it was populist and represented the “pre-modern” values of the people, 
even though it might not actually further the interests of the people.   
Within the framework suggested by Küçükömer, the conceptions of left 
and right were reduced to a question of representation. This approach was 
methodologically problematic and its claimed “Marxist” content was 
questionable. However, Küçükömer‟s original and creative critique encouraged 
the socialist movement in Turkey to reevaluate the problem of mass support and 
introduced the concept of “civil society” to the political vocabulary of the 
movement.  
Küçükömer utilized the concept of civil society more frequently in his 
writings during the 1980s. Especially in his Yeni Gündem articles there were 
many references to the concept. The crux of the argument concerning the 
utilization of the concept of civil society was the following: In the Ottoman-
Turkish history, where the state tradition was deeply rooted and all-embracing, 
civil society was not autonomous compared to its Western counterparts. 
Nevertheless, in order to strengthen the democratic tradition in Turkey, civil 
society had to be empowered and gain its full autonomy from the state.    
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This analysis centered on the explanatory concept of civil society was 
inspired by what Marx called “Asiatic Mode of Production” (AMP) in his 
explanation of the uniqueness of Oriental societies. According to Küçükömer‟s 
adaptation of Marx‟s half-developed conception, the AMP could explain the 
Ottoman social structure where there was no private property and landownership 
was concentrated in the hands of the state. For Küçükömer, the Ottoman regime 
was a different form of feudalism than its Western counterparts, where the state 
owned all land and the military and religious elite managed the land in the name 
of the state. Therefore, according to Küçükömer, there was no feudal class which 
appropriated the social surplus independent of the state. State officials who did 
appropriate the surplus continued to exist in Republican Turkey under different 
titles but the same function. In this picture of state-society relations it was difficult 
to talk about advanced individuality and autonomy. Furthermore, the 
strengthening of civil society in Turkey was desired neither by the laicist-
bureaucratic-modernizing elite nor by the capitalists. Both groups preferred to rule 
over a pacified society. 
This conceptual framework utilized by Küçükömer in order to explain 
Ottoman-Turkish society turned out to be the main reference of Yeni Gündem 
contributors. They continued to expand Küçükömer‟s theses and moved on to 
redefine the relationship between political left and democracy following his 
footsteps. Küçükömer‟s critique of the modernizing bureaucratic elite was 
repeated by Yeni Gündem and opposition to the Westernizing cultural policies of 
the Kemalist rank-and-file was associated with a pro-civil society and pro-
democratic position.
126
  
                                                 
126From this moment on, Yeni Gündem‟s association, within the field of left-leaning political 
opinion production was denunciated with the negative label “Sivil Toplumculuk” in Turkish.  
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Following the 1980 coup, Küçükömer‟s framework served as a new source 
of political criticism within the Yeni Gündem circle. His critique of modernizing-
Westernizing bureaucratic elite was re-contextualized as the critique of the 
military junta and became a new reference for left-leaning democratic politics.  
5.4.2. Yeni Gündem‟s Utilization of Küçükömer‟s Theses to Analyze the 
Coup and its Aftermath  
 
This original political position on the relationship between the left and 
democracy adopted by Yeni Gündem had directly influenced their way of 
interpreting the contemporary political dynamics and agents of the Turkish 
society. Doubtlessly, in line with the oppositional socialist politics, the journal had 
a certain distance towards the dominant political figures of the post-coup era. Still, 
rather than rejecting the possible contributions of these figures to the 
strengthening of rights and liberties they accepted such limited initiatives as part 
of the democratization process of Turkey.  
For instance, the journal‟s assessment of the governing party ANAP 
conceived the party as an outcome of the extraordinary conditions created by the 
coup. Accordingly, the journal continuously questioned the legitimacy of ANAP 
considering the number of banned politicians (Belge, 1985c: 16). On the one 
hand, ANAP‟s political victory against the junta-backed MDP (Milli Demokrasi 
Partisi- National Democracy Party) was celebrated as a sign of the 
demilitarization of society and politics. On the other hand, ANAP‟s power meant 
that the party owed its existence and hegemony to the extraordinary conditions 
prepared by the coup. In the words of Murat Belge, Prime Minister Turgut Özal 
ruled in a political atmosphere within which all meaningful opposition was 
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silenced (1985d: 21). Thus, Yeni Gündem emphasized that ANAP did not much of 
a “real” political party:   
 
In order to assess the results of November 6 elections, I think above all, we 
have to remember that the society clearly entered an era of 
demilitarization. Within the limited framework of that time, it is a fact that 
only ANAP could give a satisfactory response. Moreover, it is also a fact 
that ANAP was not a political synthesis that Özal never really meant to 
have such a synthesis. He thought that gathering a technocratic cadre 
composed of different ideologies and a liberal economic programme were 
enough to consolidate the party and make it a success (Köymen, 1985c: 3).   
 
Hence Yeni Gündem was quite skeptical of the direction that ANAP‟s 
politics would take.  Despite the party‟s liberal discourse the journal perceived 
ANAP as an actor allied with the army, as a technocratic agent of the political 
demilitarization and economic liberalization process. Since ANAP was not a 
product of ordinary democratic politics and was not a party which legitimately 
prevailed against its political opponents, its power of popular representation was 
questionable. In this respect, the RPP of early Republican era and the ANAP of 
the post-coup era were similar in terms of imagining a Jacobin “model of society 
without politics” (in Murat Belge‟s words): 
 
In this model of depoliticized society, Özal‟s position was close to that of 
his allies. The difference was the following: In Özal‟s model, the 
“economic-technocratic” discourse was prioritized, whereas in the other 
model “administrative commands” were prioritized. These two models had 
different rhetorical styles. In Özal‟s model the ideology is rationalized 
faith and religion (adapted to capitalism; in the other model the ideology is 
Kemalism made into a religion (1985c: 17). 
 Yeni Gündem defined ANAP, within the logic described, as a political 
party which continued the show of the Army in civilian clothes (1987: 10). On the 
other hand, the journal did not hesitate to see DYP, whose leader Süleyman 
Demirel was a “victim” of the September 12 prohibitions, as a party which can 
potentially disrupt this show. Assuming that ANAP‟s ties with the masses were 
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weak, DYP was defined as the only political player which could represent 
society‟s demands (Ġnsel, 1986a: 40-43; Belge, 1986a: 1).  According to Yeni 
Gündem authors, DYP was the inheritor of DP as the “representative of the 
periphery;” it carried the limited, but genuine tradition of democracy. DYP was 
seen in a very different position than ANAP in terms of its relation to the military 
and the September 12 regime; it was taken to be a potential representative of the 
groups excluded from the political field. According to Yeni Gündem, this special 
position of DYP could help expose ANAP‟s militarism masked in civilian clothes 
and discredit its apolitical technocratic identity. 
Of course Yeni Gündem did not treat DYP as the constitutive agent of 
democratic rights and liberties. The journal‟s authors claimed that DYP‟s political 
advances did not prove that the party defended freedoms in principle, but it was 
forced to be “democratic” in order to get rid of its victimized status in front of the 
September 12 regime (1987: 10).  In short, defending democracy was a necessity 
for DYP‟s existence and strengthening. The journal‟s authors often accepted that 
there is not a single right-liberal party in Turkey which could go beyond the 
oppressive state tradition. It was clear that despite its stress on liberty and 
democracy, DYP was not such a party either. 
 
5.4.3. Limits of Yeni Gündem‟s Positions  
The conception of democracy and liberties advanced by Yeni Gündem 
carried two central problems from the perspective of socialism. First, this 
conception of freedom blurred the concept of equality in a classless society free 
from exploitation, a project which the journal claimed to support. Second, the 
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adoption of such a conception of democracy in Turkey is ridden with an 
orientalist core.  
Yeni Gündem‟s call for autonomy from state and the strengthening of civil 
society is in tension with the principle of public equality which is central motto of 
socialist politics. On the one hand, their analysis on the “de-statization of society” 
was positive and meaningful in terms of opening up political channels for socialist 
politics. However, this “de-statization” was also problematic for socialist politics 
as far as it supported the removal of a number of public responsibilities of the 
state. Hence the real problem was to realize the principle of equality while 
implementing a conception of freedom that was “ree from the state.”127  
 In order to better understand this tension, it is necessary to focus on 
practical political implications. More concretely, the call for “freeing the society 
and the individual from the state”, on the one hand, may mean the autonomization 
of workers‟ unions and political parties from the interventions of the state. Yet on 
the other hand, it could also mean that through policies like privatization, 
workers‟ rights could be denied. Hence, in order to keep true to the principle of 
“democracy which is autonomous from the state”, supporting privatization 
policies went against the principle of equality, a principle which was a distinctive 
property of socialist politics. Moreover, this kind of support would also weaken 
the links between left-wing politics and the working classes, who the Left claims 
to authentically represent. Thus Yeni Gündem, making the emphasis on “reaching 
and organizing society” central to its publishing policy, faced with political-
practical aporias.  
                                                 
127
The theoretical implications of this tension between equality and liberty still haunt the left. For 
some philosophical discussions, see: Bobbio,1999; Turner, 1997: 92-94; Birikim, Vol. 239, 2000. 
On the integrity between equality and liberty, see: Callinicos, 2000:22-26.  
  
 
  
145 
 
 The second problem with Yeni Gündem‟s position concerning the Left and 
liberties is related with the journal‟s orientalist assumptions (and policy proposals 
based on these assumptions) on the historical reasons of the rejection of 
democratic norms in Turkish politics. Most the authors of the journal explained 
the autocratic structure of the post-1980 regime in terms of the “oppressive state 
tradition” and political culture reminiscent of the late-Ottoman and early-
Republican era. Murat Belge‟s statement below is exemplary of this position: 
 
Because the same top-down hierarchical mentality showed itself in 
Turkey‟s government in certain periods again and again, our history is 
indeed in “repetition”. Thus nowadays we are in a new struggle for the 
throne (1987a: 15). 
 
In some of the texts, this state mentality which “undermines the 
individual” is analyzed as a cultural characteristic of Eastern societies (Belge, 
1987b: 17), contrasted by the European (Western) culture which is deemed to be 
more individualistic and libertarian. Ġdris Küçükömer‟s analysis is another 
example of this approach which understands the East as a “collection of lacks” in 
Turner‟s terminology (2001: 129-130): 
 
In the Greco-Roman world and the Western world born from it, power was 
always divided, was always open for division (segmanter)... This division 
is embedded in the deep structure, despite historical changes, this structure 
remains. In the East, the opposite is true, division of power is not structural 
but temporary, and the fundamental tendency is singularity in power! 
There is no symmetry, but the organic totality; all ideological and mental 
levels are embedded in this context. In short, the political society is either 
very narrow or made up of one person; there is no opening for civil 
initiatives. The ideology of this situation heavily leans on culture 
(Küçükömer, 1985a: 34-35). 
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This approach is in line with a dominant paradigm in Turkish social 
sciences, which is about the duality between an oppressive and strong “center” 
and an oppressed and passive “periphery”.128 This essentialist approach moved 
Yeni Gündem authors towards the idea that Turkey, in order to be free from its 
oppressive political culture, should follow Western libertarian values and 
practices (Küçükömer, 1985a: 35). According to his logic, Turkey‟s 
democratization according to Western norms would help the development of civil 
society through which society or the “periphery” could organize and express its 
demands, resulting with the dissolution of the oppressive state tradition. 
This conclusion, reached through a number of orientalist arguments, 
defined the true medium in which the social order could be progressively 
transformed as the classless “civil society”. In that sense this approach defines a 
move away from class-centered Marxist analysis and raised the tension between 
the journal and socialist theory and practice. Moreover, this approach intersected 
with the modernizing, civilizing Kemalist paradigm as far as it moved towards 
affirming ideal bourgeois-democratic processes of European societies. 
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 See, for instance: Belge 1986: 1. The theoretical forerunners of the center-periphery perspective 
and Küçükömer‟s approach have many commonalities. In that sense, Turner has also emphasized 
the similarities between this approach which explains Ottoman society in a Weberian framework 
using the concept of “patrimonial society” and the Marxist concept of Asian Mode of Production. 
See: Turner: 2001:  9-10.  
  
147 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
 
THE SECOND MOMENT: RESURGENCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
AND RE-EMERGENCE OF KURDISH QUESTION 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The historical context which might be stated as the second constitutive 
moment of the suppliers of democratic opinions connotes the resurgence of 
political Islam and Kurdish activism during the 1980s. As the topic of 
„democracy‟ has dominated the agenda for those that are cast in the mold of the 
Democrat as a social type, in the previous section we have discussed the relation 
of the issue of democracy with the post-1980 coup context. As we have 
underlined, the title of democracy and democratization, were paradoxically the 
outcomes of the post-coup authoritarian and antidemocratic implementations and 
practices. At that moment, Ġdris Küçükömer‟s civil society/state opposition as an 
analytical tool in analyzing Turkish context was adopted as the main theoretical 
model in understanding the socio-political dynamics of Turkey. Then, the 
adoption of this analytical tool which then became the chief marker of the liberal-
democratic opinion makers was bound to the specific conditions of a specific 
socio-historical context. Similarly, two major developments led to the adoption of 
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another significant analytical perspective that became one of the major defining 
characteristics of the liberal-democratic opinion makers. It might well be argued 
that, the center/periphery analysis rose to the status of a classical paradigm 
parallel to the two significant developments: resurgence of political Islam and the 
rising Kurdish activism during the post-coup period.       
In the words of a social scientist, “political climate that prevailed in the 
1980s and early 1990s opened up the Kemalist Pandora‟s box out of which have 
emerged multiple identities making reference to the different sects of Islam and 
the Kurds” (Çetinsaya, 1999: 350). Many prominent scholars have underlined that 
Republican Turkey was to experience an „identity crisis‟ which manifested itself 
with the Islamic revivalism and Kurdish resurgence.
129
  
The late-1980s and early-1990s implied the beginning of a new period not 
only for Turkey but for almost every nation throughout the world. The demise of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar system had given rise to new regional 
and ethnic conflicts and thereby created new national security problems. In the 
words of Cizre, 
The Kurdish problem and the tide of political Islam have raised 
fundamental questions about the basic assumptions of the Turkish national 
state and its identity. Confronted with the post cold war forces of 
fragmentation threatening to undermine her unity and Western-oriented 
national identity, Turkish elites have been propelled toward securing a 
place within Europe (Cizre, 1998a:3).  
 
6.2. Return of the Repressed: Revival of Political Islam and Kurdish 
Activism in Contemporary Turkey  
 
                                                 
129
See for example: S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity 
in Turkey (Seattle, 1997); M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The rise 
of Neo-Ottomanism,” Critique, 12 (Spring 1998), 19-41; Ümit Cizre Sakalloğlu, “Rethinking the 
connections between Turkey‟s „Western‟ Identity versus Islam, ibid., 3-18.  
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6.2.1. Overview of Political Islam in Post-Coup Turkey: Nationalism 
Blended with Islamism or vice versa  
 
 Beginning with its proclamation, the Turkish Republic had to cope with 
two fragile spheres of conflict: political Islam and the Kurdish issue. Within the 
conditions of the post-1980 period these two emerged as the top two security 
issues. They have also prepared the grounds in which the political opinion 
producers exemplary of the Democrat have socialized.  
Shortly after the 1980 coup, Islamism in Turkey began to be perceived as a 
„threat‟ to the unity and integrity of the nation (Mert, 2008).130 Initially, the coup 
marked a turning point in the change of state policy toward Islam and assigned a 
significant role for Sunni Islam within the functioning of the system in general. In 
that respect, the official ideology of the regime, that of Kemalism, was revised 
and reorganized in order to incorporate the Islamic elements that were dismissed 
before the coup (Cizre, 1996a).  For the architects of the post-coup regime, the 
revolutionary aspects of the existing version of the official ideology were to be 
weeded out and religious elements had to be reintegrated into its body in order to 
detach Kemalism from revolutionary sentiments. The restructuring of the 
state/society interaction during the 1980 coup necessitated a reorganization of the 
official ideology and thereby a redefinition of the „modern‟ Turkish identity. 
Accordingly, the ethno-centric aspect within this national identity definition was 
strengthened and its Sunni Islam aspect was articulated into the definition (Cizre, 
1998a:14). In that respect, Islam, defined on the basis of national culture by the 
                                                 
130The coup makers denounced the radical Islamism within the discourse of Necmettin Erbakan‟s 
National Salvation Party (NSP) as one of the major reasons behind their military intervention. The 
secretary general of the National Security Council (NSC), General Haydar Saltık, stated at a press 
conference held in October 29, 1980 that the Kudüs Meeting organized by National Salvation 
Party in Konya, on 6
th
 of September was the final event which forced the coup decision (Hale, 
1994:244).  
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conservative elites of the Intellectuals‟ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı)131 was seen by 
the generals as a means to undermine ideological confrontation and provide the 
necessary basis for consensus and unification (Yavuz, 2003:50). Indeed, the 
Intellectuals‟ Hearth was established in 1970 with the aim of uniting Islamists and 
nationalists in the war waged against communism (Çetinsaya, 1999: 374; Bora 
and Can, 1991: 147; Atacan, 2006: 45-59). Still, it was just after the September 
coup that the ideas articulated by the influential figures of the Hearth could more 
easily be disseminated.
132
 The reason for this was that the coup makers regarded 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as the best alternative ideology that would justify the 
imperatives of the regime they aspired to construct. That is, the Synthesis could be 
more effectively politicized and established itself as a popular-hegemonic 
ideology within the historical context shaped by the conditions of the coup 
(Çetinsaya, 1999:374; Yavuz 1990: 10-15). In the minds of the coup makers, the 
new strategy would also eradicate the oppositional and revolutionary voices 
among the Kurdish population by appealing to the traditional and conservative 
attitude of the Kurdish tribes (Yavuz, 2003:50):    
 
By encouraging the fusing of Sunni Islamic ideas with national goals, the 
military government planned to foster a co-opted and less political Islam to 
confront a much exaggerated “leftist threat.” Military leaders believed that 
this officially determined “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” potentially could 
diffuse the growing conflict between Sunnis and Alevis on the one hand 
and Kurdish nationalists and the Turkish State on the other (Yavuz, 2003: 
69-70).  
 
                                                 
131Intellectuals‟ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) was established by Prof. Ġbrahim Kafesoğlu who then 
became the first President of the Hearth. Prominent members were Prof. Muharrem Ergin and 
Prof. Nevzat YalçıntaĢ (Bora and Can, 1991: 128, 132, 137, 147; Atacan, 2006: 45-59).  For some 
of the works of Intellectuals‟ Hearth members, see: Ġbrahim Kafesoğlu (1985), Türk İslam Sentezi, 
Ġstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı Yayınları,; Muharrem Ergin (1975), Türkiye‟nin Bugünkü Mesleleri, 
Güryay Matbaası: Ġstanbul.  
132
 Çetinsaya notes that, “This new emphasis on Islam has remained a key component of 
nationalist ideology in the 1980s” (1999:373).  
  
151 
 
Since the generals regarded religiosity as the best instrument to control 
society, under the rule of National Security Committee Islam gained a 
considerable influence in Turkish politics (Ahmad, 1993: 149). To this end, in the 
1982 constitution, prepared under the by the junta led by the Chief of the General 
Staff Kenan Evren, the courses on religion was made mandatory in primary and 
secondary schools and the religious orders were allowed to open unofficial Qur‟an 
courses (Cizre, 1996a; Yavuz 2003: 69). Many more mosques were built; the 
number of State Directorate of Religious Affairs employees had dramatically 
increased; and parallel to these developments, the influence of “tarikat-controlled 
communities” expanded, both politically and economically (Ayata, 1997: 69). 
Through these policies, the state tried to increase the level of religiosity in Turkish 
society. In line with such policies, in order to control and suppress the rising 
Kurdish movement in southeastern Anatolia, a new Department of Propagation 
(ĠrĢad Dairesi) within the body of the State Directorate of Religious Affairs was 
established in 1981. The department utilized a religious terminology while 
combating the radical Kurdish sentiments and organized conferences and lectures 
to „protect‟ the people in the region from the indoctrination of the “Marxist, 
nationalist and separatist” organization, PKK (Yavuz, 2003: 70).  
In addition to these dynamics, the conservative tendencies in international 
politics merged with the neo-liberal restructuring of capitalist economies provided 
a fertile ground for the practical implementations of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
(Cizre, 1998a: 14). Some commentators drew attention to the convergence 
between this process of rearrangement of the official ideology and the ideological 
dictates of the „Green Belt Strategy‟ launched by USA within the mentioned 
period of time. For instance, according to Elly Karmon,  
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On the foreign front, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis was supposed to help 
contain southward Soviet expansion and combat Iran‟s radical Islam by 
constructing a coalition of Us-backed moderate Islamic states. Closer 
relations with Saudi Arabia were favored in order to gain big loans for the 
weak Turkish economy (2003: 42).  
 
The strategy was originally formulated by US National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, to create an Islamic bulwark by making use of Islamic 
countries against the expanding influence of Soviet Union specifically around its 
southern borders.
133
 Towards this end, the growing Islamic movements within the 
countries surrounding Soviet Union were supported financially and by military 
means in order to help the development of Islamic, but of course pro-US, regimes 
throughout the region. The US and their European allies aided Islamic 
fundamentalists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the rising Shiite opposition in 
Iran. According to „Green Belt Strategy‟, Islamism appeared to be an alternative 
ideological framework countering Marxism and the growing influence of left-
leaning socialist ideas in Muslim dominated countries.
134
 With its second largest 
standing army within NATO and with Incirlik, Adana, as an extremely strategic 
military base, Turkey was an inexpendable player in the southern border of 
NATO. In that respect, in the eyes of the US officials, the 1980 coup in Turkey 
offered an alternative to the growing left-leaning and socialist revolutionary 
opposition in Turkey and thereby it would secure the NATO-friendly status of the 
                                                 
133Within the phrase „green belt,‟ green connoted to Islam. 
134
 It should be reminded that at the outset of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Carter administration 
interpreted this sudden development as providing an alternative to a left-leaning and pro-Sovietic 
movement and in order to show its affinity to Ayetullah Khomeni‟s rising opposition within the 
country, lifted a 1978 ban on arms sales to Tehran. Furthermore, President Carter‟s rejection of 
exiled Shah‟s visa application to US for medical treatment was also a manifestation of the US 
sympathy for the mullahs as a strategic ally to USA. It was believed that, Iran‟s Islamic regime 
would continue the strategic relationship with US against Soviet threat (Blanchard, 1996: 31-32).   
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Turkish state.
135
 The phrase used in regard to the 1980 coup, by the US National 
Security Council adviser and head of the CIA Turkish desk, Paul Henze was the 
clearest manifestation of US support for the intervention in Turkey: “Our boys 
have done it”  (Birand, 1987: 124, 185; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005: 137).  
Finally, as a secular Muslim country within the region, once Islam as an ideology 
replaced and countered competing leftist and Marxist ideologies, Turkey could 
play a major role in establishing the alliance of NATO-friendly Muslim states. 
Besides, since secularism was to be defined as the fundamental character of the 
Turkish state, the state would also be able to confine the definition of Islam and 
offer its own version and thereby control and manipulate fundamentalist Islam 
within its own jurisdiction. Then, within this framework, Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis appeared as the best alternative in concordance with the policy priorities 
of „Green Belt Strategy.‟ 
It should also be noted that the unexpected hostility of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran proclaimed after the 1979 revolution, pushed US authorities to 
strengthen the relations with other allies in the region. In contrast to the 
expectations of the USA administration, newly established Islamist Iran appeared 
as an anti-American and anti-Western state, with its potential to export its 
revolutionary Islamic ideology throughout the region. Having lost its once utmost 
ally in the Middle Eastern region, USA administration sought to strengthen the 
loyal regimes in the already existent allies and proceed with its policy of 
encircling the Soviet Union, and ensuring the stability in terms of the oil-rich 
Persian Gulf. Hence, facing the threats posed by the Islamic regime in Iran against 
the Western interests in the region, the USA-backed moderate Islamic and/or 
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 Along with Turkey, as a strongly anti-communist state, Pakistan was a natural ally of the West 
in the struggle to contain communism. 
  
154 
 
conservative governments would definitely be preferable. Such “friendly” regimes 
would secure the construction of a bulwark alliance against potential Soviet 
southward expansion and against the theocracy ruling in Iran.
136
 USA, while 
trying to penetrate Middle Asian Republics using Islam, attempted to develop „the 
green antidote‟ against the „red menace.‟ Unfortunately, this initiative to support 
radical Islam for the destabilization of the Soviet Union backfired: USA‟s 
political, logistical, financial support for extremist Islamist groups prepared the 
way for these groups‟ far more radicalization in the region.  
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Iranian Islamic Revolution 
of 1979 was, until the CIA recognized it was too late, also considered to be part of 
the Green Belt Strategy: US foreign policy-makers at that time (in the early days 
of the regime change) thought that the new Islamic government was primarily 
anti-Sovietic and at least sympathetic to the West. However, not only that the 
mullahs quickly steered Iran towards radical anti-Americanism but also, from the 
perspective of the development of political Islam in Turkey, the Iranian 
Revolution led to disagreements among groups close to the „Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis‟ position.  
The Islamic Revolution in Iran raised sympathies in certain Islamic circles 
in Turkey and gave rise to a radical-critical Islamic discourse that emphasized 
anti-imperialism, unification of Islamic sects and rejected nationalism (Mert, 
2004:415). Through this discourse, some Islamic groups detached themselves 
from the center-right interpretations of Islam (in line with the official Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis ideology) and thus part of the Islamic movement gained a 
unique, independent political character  (Bora, 1999). As Çetinsaya also notes,  
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 The basis of such an approach were laid out in 1983 Heritage Foundation Report which saw 
merit in preserving a “protective Islamic belt” in the countries facing “the danger of communism.”  
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While all groups among the Turkists came closer to Islam in varying 
degrees, some groups in the Islamic movement distanced themselves from 
those in the main and criticized nationalism as being contrary to Islam. 
These were not conservative „ulama‟ of the 1910s, but were „new Islamic 
intellectuals.‟ The new Islamic intellectuals‟ once powerful influence 
among the Islamist youth in the 1980s, however, has been marginalized in 
the „90s. (1999: 375)  
 
 The roots of this mentioned trend were to be found at the beginning of the 
70s. Those were the years when nationalism for the first time began to be 
transformed into the umma. The Islamist movements in Egypt (particularly the 
Muslim Brotherhood), Pakistan and later in Iran were influential on this 
transformation. The translation of the works by prominent Islamists from these 
foreign movements into Turkish led some Turkish Islamists to think about Islam 
in an internationalist rather than nationalist way (Çaha, 2004: 477).137 Especially 
the writings of Ali ġeriati had a crucial impact on Turkish Islamist youth that 
tended to develop a critical stance against the official Islam of the state. These 
young Islamist figures also aspired to develop authentic answers to questions of 
“Westernization, independence, sovereignty, women‟s rights, and the distribution 
of power within the state” (Cizre, 1996a: 283).  
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Among those translations works of Hasan El Benna, Seyyid Kutup and Ali Sheriati were 
prominent: Hasan El Benna, Risaleler, Hasan Karakaya and H. Ġbrahim Kutlay (trans.), Hikmet 
NeĢriyat, Ġstanbul, 1984; Seyyid Kutub, İslam‟da Sosyal Adalet, YaĢar Tunagür and Dr. M. Adnan 
Mansur (trans.), Cağaloğlu Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1962; Seyyid Kutub, İslam‟da Sosyal Adalet, Bir 
Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1986; Seyyid Kutub, Kur‟an Işığında Kültür ve Medeniyet, Ġsmail Hakkı 
ġengüler (Ed.), Hikmet NeĢriyat, Ġstanbul, 1988; Seyyid Kutub, Yoldaki İşaretler, Ġsmail Nuri 
(trans.), Ġhya Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1980; Seyyid Kutub, İslam ve Emperyalizm,Ramazan Nazlı 
(trans.), ġelale Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1983 (Second edition); Seyyid Kutub, İslam ve Kapitalizm 
Çatışması,YaĢar Nuri Öztürk (trans.), DüĢünce Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1981 (Second edition); Ali 
ġeriati, Aşk ve Tevhid, Ali Rehavi (trans.), Tebliğ Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1986;  Ali ġeriati, Biz ve 
İkbal, Ergin Kılıçtutan (trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, Ġstanbul, 1988; Ali ġeriati, Fatma Fatma‟dır, 
Ġsmail Babacan (trans.), Dünya Yayıncılık, Ġstanbul,1990 ; Ali ġeriati, Yarının Tarihine Bakış, 
Orhan Bekin (trans.), Akabe Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1988; Ali ġeriati, Toplum Bilim Üzerine, Kenan 
Sökmen (trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, Ġstanbul, 1988; Ali ġeriati, Ne Yapmalı?, Muhammed Hizbullah 
(trans.), Bir Yayıncılık, Ġstanbul, 1990; Ali ġeriati, İnsanın Dört Zindanı, Hüseyin Hatemi (trans.), 
Bir Yayıncılık, Ġstanbul,  1984; Ali ġeriati, Muhammed‟i Tanıyalım, Fecr Yayınları, Ankara, 1988; 
Ali ġeriati, Hacc, DüĢünce Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1980; Ali ġeriati, Aydın, Dünya Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 
1990.  
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 Moreover, in this move from Turkish nationalism to the Islamic idea of 
internationalism, NSP (National Salvation Party) had also a significant role 
(Sarıbay, 1985).  While the party emphasized a “national” outlook, it also pushed 
the discourse of an “Islamic common market” and thus reinforced the idea of a 
unified Islamic world (Çaha, 2004: 477).138 
The impact of the Iranian Revolution on Turkish Islamist groups was 
limited. The „new Muslim intellectuals‟ 139  of Turkey inspired by the regime 
change in Iran were not much influential. Although their ideas were respected, 
these ideas were not powerful enough to change the general trajectory of the 
Islamist movement in Turkey. As Çetinsaya also reminds us (1999: 375), 
Islamists who rejected Turkish nationalism (which was intrinsic both to the 
official Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and to the mainstream Islamism of the National 
Outlook (Milli Görüş) Movement) were marginalized in the 1990s and remained 
so until today. The largest and strongest Sunni communities in Turkey never 
supported Iran and their politics had always been predominantly Turkish-
nationalist and statist (Mert, 2004: 415).    
Consequently, during the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism in Turkey, despite its 
political gains, unsuccessfully tried to resolve its inner conflicts emanating from 
its relation to Turkish nationalism. The Islamist movement was influenced from 
global trends that have increased the power of center-right parties especially in 
                                                 
138 The Turkish word “millî” used by NSP actually is meant to stand for “religious” (dinî) 
according to the early Arabic uses of the word. The word in Arabic also means “related to 
religious law, shari‟a” (Doğan, Mehmet, 2001, Büyük Türkçe Sözlük, Vadi Yay.) For a similar 
emphasis, see, Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” 
Comparative Politics, Vol.30, No.1, (Oct., 1997), p:74.  
139“There is a growing literature in English on the “new Islamic intellectuals”. For instance, see: 
Michael Meeker, “The Muslim Intellectual and his Audience: A new configuration of Writer and 
Reader among Believers in the Republic of Turkey,” Cultural Transitions in the Middle East, ġerif 
Mardin (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1994. Meeker argues that, the Muslim intellectuals appeared on the 
scene during the 1980 which also signaled the “wake of a period of ideological exhaustion 
precisely because Islam is perceived as an alternative to the conflicting constructions of 
modernity” (Meeker, 1994: 216). 
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Europe and Latin America. Turkish center-right parties started to borrow the 
topics and themes that were highly fashionable within the policy debates of 1980s 
in the West. Foremost among these was the topic of „civil society,‟ conceived 
within the confines of „minimal state‟ bias of the neo-liberal policy agenda 
(Howell and Pearce,  2002: 63-64).  
Islamism of the 1980s shared some core motifs with mainstream center-
right political parties in Turkey. Yet, it retained one distinctive characteristic: It 
was critical of the official ideology. As it has been mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs, the “new Islamist intellectuals” or the “Muslim intellectuals” shaped 
the cultural aura of the period to a certain extent and “attracted a considerable 
audience among Turkish believers” (Meeker, 1994: 189). However, they became 
marginalized during the 1990s and Islamism of this period began to lose its 
radical critical and reflective character gradually.  
By the 1990s, nationalism once again took its once privileged status within 
Turkish Islamism. This development might also be observed in the political 
discourse of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP in its Turkish acronym). As 
Çetinsaya notes, “in the 1990s, partly after the emergence of independent Turkish 
states in the former Soviet south and partly after becoming a mass party in 
Turkish politics, the RP began to put more emphasis on the presence of 
nationalism” (1999: 374).  
 All in all, as Cizre aptly states, the post-coup period might be called as the 
“Islamization of secularism” in Turkey, that with that period, “the form, substance 
and power base and more importantly, state policy toward it have changed 
radically” (1996a: 245). In order to secure its popular support, the regime had 
abandoned “the radical secularism of the early republic” (Birtek and Toprak, 
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1993: 197). However, this new strategy was in conformity with the overall 
tendency of the establishment in terms of controlling and setting the limits of the 
religious realm. The “Islamization of secularism” meant also the opening up of 
the domestic market to Islamic capital (Cizre, 1996a). However, the political 
priorities of the post-1980 military regime had unintended consequences. In the 
1983 general elections, the military-backed MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party) 
lost to Turgut Özal‟s Motherland Party, ANAP (Keyman, 1995: 112).   
The era of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) governments 
(1983-1989) gave an impetus to the development of political Islam in Turkey. 
Economic liberalism and Özal‟s version of new right encouraged the foundation 
of Islamic financial institutions. ANAP was based on a hybrid ideology 
combining the elements of liberalism, nationalism and conservatism with strong 
Islamist emphasis (ÖniĢ, 2004: 113–134). The opening up of the domestic market 
to the Islamist capital was a reflection of the Islamist emphasis found in the hybrid 
ideology of ANAP. The Islamic financial institutions flourished in time and they 
opened vakıfs (foundations) in order to disseminate their ideology (Cizre, 1996a: 
246). These foundations organized meetings to celebrate religious holidays, 
organized Koran courses, gave scholarships for poor students having religious 
education and built dormitories for the young students coming to the big cities in 
order to have education.
140
 In time, those religious orders and communities turned 
out to be powerful networks in business, media and education and they facilitated 
the social mobility of their members (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 120). It was through 
those Islamic financial institutions and companies that Arabic (chiefly Saudi-
Gulf) capital could flow into the domestic market (Cizre 1996a). For instance, the 
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 For a detailed analysis of the connections between the political Islam and Islamic sub-economy 
in Turkey, see:  Clement and Wilson, 2004:  224-225. 
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first-interest free banks of Turkey were founded by Saudi Arabian businesses in 
1985 (Clement and Wilson, 2004: 224). According to Birtek and Toprak, opening 
up of the domestic market to Islamic capital and the abandonment of the “radical 
secularism of the early republic” implied the weakening of the conditions of 
Kemalist nationalism and the republican state (1983: 197).   
As a result of these developments, as the mainstream Sunni interpretation 
of Islam began to emerge as a source of politicization, the connection between 
religion and politics also began to be introduced into discussions of 
democratization.   
 
6.2.2. 1990s: Re-emergence of Political Islam in the Political and Social 
Scene   
 
As stated earlier, during the MP (ANAP) governments (1983-1991) Islam 
has gained gross momentum in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, it was by the late-
1990s that its magnitude and strength have been regarded as crucial threat to the 
operation of the secular system. The perception of threat against political Islam 
was strengthened by two crucial developments: the electoral successes of the pro-
Islamic Welfare Party  in the mayoral elections of 1994 and general elections of 
1995; and the increasing visibility of veiled Islamist women on the public sphere. 
By the early-1990s, the issue of women‟s head covering has put its mark on 
Turkey‟s political agenda which quickly acquired a politicized character and led 
to a polarization between secular groups acting on Kemalist lines and the Islamists 
(Kadıoğlu, 1994: 645). The reactions and protests of religious female students 
against the regulation of Higher Education Council issued in 1987, that forbade 
entrance into universities with headscarves, did not only provoke political debates 
concerning the role of religion in public life, but also underlined the urban 
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character of the Islamism which was to be a new shock for the secular elite of the 
country. This contentious episode, which began to be called the „Headscarf Issue‟ 
in Turkey, was crucial since highly educated, urban, religiously pious women 
were involved – in contrast to the generally held laicist misconception political 
Islam was linked to ignorance, illiteracy and rural orientations. The 
demonstrations of young Muslim student women against the headscarf ban have 
also challenged the mainstream patriarchal convictions that women were to be 
defined as docile, dominated humanbeings within the sphere of religion. 
In addition to the „Headscarf controversy,‟ a major incident that alarmed 
the Turkish secular establishment was the results of the municipal elections held 
in 1994. Welfare Party, founded in 1983, had won 19.7 percent of the national 
vote in the local elections and took control of the twenty-nine big cities, including 
Ġstanbul and the capital city of the Republic, Ankara (Yavuz, 1997: 72). 
Furthermore, national elections of December 24, 1995 indicated a landslide 
electoral victory for the Welfare Party. With the 21.38 percent of the general vote, 
it gathered 158 parliamentary seats and emerged as the largest party in the Turkish 
parliament (Yavuz, 1997: 72). Unlike its predecessor in the 1970s, National 
Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP)
141
, Welfare Party had huge 
popularity especially in the metropolitan regions of Turkey. Furthermore, the 
party, with its “official” ideology of the “Just Order System,” aimed to appeal not 
only to a conservative constituency, but also to the laboring classes living in big 
cities under the deteriorating conditions of neo-liberal practices.   
                                                 
141
National Salvation Party, (MSP-Milli Selamet Partisi) was founded on October 11, 1972 as a 
successor of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), which had been established on 
January 26, 1970 as the first pro-Islamist political party of Turkey. After the closure of MNP with 
the March 12 memorandum in 1971, some cadres of the MNP founded MSP. Necmettin Erbakan 
became the official leader of the party on October 20, 1973. MSP was banned with the military 
coup of September 12, 1980 (Çakır, 1994). 
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Alarmed with the results of the 1994 and 1995 elections, the secular 
establishment of Turkey tended to interpret the rising electoral support for 
political Islam as a revolt against Kemalism – as a “counter-revolution” against 
the secular basis of the regime (Yavuz, 1997: 76).  
Needless to say, the visibility of Islam in the public sphere and the 
electoral successes of Welfare Party gave a special impetus to political opinions 
produced in academic and journalistic spheres. On the secular camp, the threat 
posed by political Islam against the secular state appeared as a constant theme of 
political works. Much of the literature by the radical secularists concentrated on 
the reasons behind the rise of the political Islam and began to put more emphasis 
on the power base of the Islamic movement. However, some figures that define 
their political posture as liberal-democrat, or democrat tended to question the state 
policy toward Islam, the commonly held definition of secularism practiced since 
the proclamation of the Republic, and state‟s general attitude towards the parts of 
the society seen as threatening its power. In general, this intellectual and political 
effort have led to a questioning of the state/society relations in Turkish history 
which in turn further shaped the circumstances that helped the emergence of the 
Democrat as a social type.  
The „revival‟ or „resurgence‟ of political Islam during the nineties rested 
upon the socio-economic heritage inherited from the post-coup political 
environment and Turgut Özal‟s neo-liberal project. Özal‟s liberal reforms were 
not only confined within the economic realm. The neo-liberal policies introduced 
by Özal and pursued by ANAP governments were responsible for the social 
discontent among the laboring classes due to increasing social inequalities. Yet, 
Özal‟s liberal agenda towards religion also rested upon a relaxation of the 
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Kemalist dogmas of the state (Zubadia, 1996). The deregulation of broadcasting 
and the legalization of private broadcasting have also opened the channels for the 
Islamists to disseminate and expand their ideas. Still, neither the questioning of 
the Kemalist official ideology nor the inspirations of the Iran Islamic Revolution 
in 1979 were sufficient to weaken the nationalist tone in the Turkish Islamic 
movement.  
 Despite the fact that political Islam, after the early 1990s, was unable (or 
unwilling) to break ties with ethnic Turkish nationalist ideology,
142
 the 
significance of the (still unfolding) contentious episode summarized in this section 
should be reiterated: The politicization of Sunni Islam provided another major 
source of problematization and criticism of, from a democratic point of view, the 
state‟s (especially the military‟s) control over politics. The tendency represented 
by Welfare Party, despite its own problems of reactionary politics and lack of 
internal democracy, gave an opportunity to the liberal-democratic opinion 
producers to discuss the emergence of an autonomous movement which gained 
momentum despite the Kemalist state‟s policies to contain and control the 
representations of Islam in Turkey. Furthermore, the politicization of Islam also 
brought forward “democratic public sphere” debates, problematizing the official 
interpretations of secularism concerning issues like veiling, the use of religious 
symbols, freedom of religious expression and education, and so on. 
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 As Keyman states, nationalism “has  become the dominant ideology of the reorganization of 
civil society in the 1990s” (1995: 116).  
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6.2.3. The Kurdish Question   
6.2.3.1.Introduction  
 
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the re-emergence of the 
Kurdish issue on political field determined the general assumptions of the liberal 
democratic opinion makers. This significant conjuncture has also been vital for 
the political dispositions adopted by the actors defining their dispositions in 
liberal-democratic lines.  
Although its roots date back to late-Ottoman period, Kurdish problem has 
become a significant aspect of the political and intellectual agenda as for 1980s. 
At the outset, Kurdish insurrection was seen as a work of “a bunch of bandits” but 
in a short time it lasted for over thirty five years with mass support.  The official 
discourse has reduced the issue to simply a question of terrorism. Sharing the 
central tenets of the official lines of explanation, the mainstream political analyses 
regarded the issue through the lenses of economic backwardness or 
underdevelopment.  The topic, especially for liberal democratic opinion holders, 
has prompted many other crucial topics besides the ethnic dimension and has 
retained multidimensional character which calls for a multidimensional analysis. 
In fact, the definition of the question and the solutions offered has become catalyst 
in categorizing the general dispositions within the political arena. For instance, the 
appearance of the topics such as „rule of law,‟ „state based on rule of law and 
human rights,‟ on political agenda has been the outcome of the significant 
attempts to analyze the underlying dynamics and multidimensional character of 
the Kurdish problem.  
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At the academic level, the great majority of scholars, in their efforts of 
finding out the theoretical tools to conceptualize and contextualize the Kurdish 
issue, have assigned a central role to the center-periphery approach. The works 
which claimed to challenge the mainstream thinking on the topic have relied 
extensively on the methodological advantages provided by the theoretical claims 
of the center/periphery model. Benefiting from this re-discovered explanatory 
framework, a significant portion of the social scientists and opinion-holders 
constructed the theoretical basis underlying their assumptions critical of the 
ongoing dominant Kemalist view. The analytical tools derived from 
center/periphery model have been perfectly utilized in the course of an intense 
questioning of the central tenets of Turkish modernization project. The social 
scientists and/or opinion holders using the sociologically based center/periphery 
model suggested that, the roots of the contemporary challenges faced by the 
Turkish Republic, were to be found in the authoritarian, ethno-nationalist and top-
down nature of Turkish modernization experiment. At the core of this analysis, 
there was the assumption that, the modernizing/Westernizing secularist Kemalist 
elite comprising the „center‟ of the society,  resorted to an authoritarian 
„civilizing‟ strategy, which in turn, brought about a further alienation on the side 
of the religious rural masses of the „periphery.‟ In this vein, the wide series of 
ethnic and religious rebellions during the early periods of the Republic were 
considered to be the responses of the masses which had become increasingly 
resentful of the top-down practices of the ruling elite.  
Most of the social scientists sharing this perspective maintained that, the 
re-emergence of the two „repressed‟ dynamics (that of political Islam and the 
Kurdish challenge) throughout the 1990s were to be the manifest indicators of the 
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operational weakness of the official ideology to serve as a dominant paradigm in 
the concerned period of time. Given the challenges posed by the process of 
globalization, the statist and nationalist pillars of Kemalism, as the official 
ideology of the Republic, could no longer stand as viable policy alternatives. 
Implicitly or explicitly, the rises of the Islamist movement and the Kurdish 
insurgency have been explained with the demise of the enduring strength of 
Kemalism as an inherently authoritarian and ethno-nationalist modernizing 
strategy.
143
 As Bozdoğan and Kasaba put, during the late-eighties, people started 
to “publicly debate and criticize the Kemalist doctrine as a patriarchal and 
antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural 
experience of the people in Turkey” (1997:4).  
On the theoretical level, the relativist push of postmodernist assumptions, 
prioritizing difference and diversity over homogenization and unity, at least to 
some extent, shaped the content of the debates over Kemalist modernizing 
strategy. Post-structuralist emphasis on pluralism and difference contributed to a 
critical rethinking of Kemalism claiming to represent the sole truth. Some 
prominent scholars (though they did not share the postmodernist approach), while 
on the one hand insisting on the emancipating dimension of modernity, agreed 
upon the fact that during 1980s and 1990s since “all the institutions, values and 
ideals of modernity have come under siege” indicating “a time of momentous 
change for Turkish society” (Kasaba, 1997: 15). It is ironical that, in that 
conjuncture, questioning of Turkish modernization was based on a specific branch 
of the modernization paradigm that of center/periphery approach. Within a short 
period time, the center/periphery model has acquired unexpected popularity that it 
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 For a presentation of this kind of reasoning, see: (Gülalp, 2001: 433-448).  
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has become, in the words of Tanıl Bora, the „classical‟ paradigm of the political 
science throughout the country (2006). 
Some major international events that occurred in the first half of the 1990s 
in diverse places such as former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, former Soviet Union and 
East Timor, have also contributed to the newly emerging political and academic 
interest in the questions of ethnicity, nationalism, ethnic conflicts and ethnic 
rights. Especially after the mid-1990s, in order devise systematic approaches for 
the understanding of the rise of ethno-nationalist contentious politics all around 
the world, research topics like ethnicity and migration studies became important. 
Ethnicity and nationalism have not only attracted scholarly attention, but these 
topics have also remained as the constant themes of political debates within leftist 
circles.
144
  
In contrast to the expectations related to the democratic potentials of 
globalization, the resurgence of ethnic conflicts resulting in civil wars, conflicts 
and even large-scale massacres, generated gross disappointment. It was generally 
assumed that the “democratizing nature” of globalization would exert significant 
pressure upon nationalists, thereby leading to a weakening of the national forms 
of identity and belonging  (Held, 1995).  
In that respect, not only the dynamics of the domestic political landscape, 
but also the events taking place in the international scale have permanently 
introduced the topic of „ethnicity‟ into the lexicon of Turkish scholars and other 
producers of political opinions. As it has been previously mentioned, in political 
and academic circles, particularly in those with Kemalist/nationalist convictions, 
the Kurdish Question was basically framed as an issue of economic backwardness 
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See for instance: Öngider, 1994.  
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and terrorism. Those explanations stemming from modernist premises not only 
ignored the “ethnic rights” character of the problem but also failed to 
problematize the state‟s relation to the issue. Not surprisingly, the ideological and 
theoretical challenges against the modernization theory have also reduced the 
strength of the modernization-based Kemalist accounts.  
The fact that the Turkish Left, historically speaking, underemphasized (if 
not ignored) the recognition demands of Turkey‟s Kurds can be explained by two 
concomitant political processes: First, the positions of the official ideology with 
regard to the Kurdish question appears to have hegemonized the discourses of the 
left on this affair. Secondly, classical Marxism has always been weak in terms of 
having a coherent politics of oppressed ethnicities: Marxism‟s political-practical 
priority was “class,” that is, the liquidation of capitalism‟s class structures and 
inequalities, rather than ethnic emancipation (Stavenhagen, 1996: 7). Although 
official Marxism-Leninism recognized, at least on paper, the right of nations to 
self-determination, in general, Marxist inspired movements in Turkey were unable 
to settle their accounts with Kemalist nationalism. Thus, they could not develop a 
political vision which would negate the oppression of Turkey‟s Kurds.  Despite 
this political shortcoming of the Turkish Left, minor nationalisms and ethnic 
rights were imposed upon Turkey‟s agenda in close connection to the post-1980 
developments all over the world. Especially the breakdown of the Soviet regime 
after 1989 led to a long term rise of anti-systemic nationalist movements. The 
already-mobilized PKK, in a period where Marxist movements were 
delegitimized, used this global dynamic to its advantage by reinforcing its 
nationalist discourse. In light of all these developments, the Kurdish insurgency 
could neither be consistently integrated into the politics of the Turkish Left, nor, 
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obviously, Kemalist politics could ever be its ally. For that reason, framing the 
insurgency within “terrorism” remained the only politically viable option for 
mainstream actors.     
All in all, according to the strategy analysts and mainstream political 
scientists sharing the official paradigm of Turkish state that defined the Kurdish 
issue within the parameters of terrorism, the „problem‟ starts with the first military 
attack of the separatist Kurdish organization PKK on military guardhouses in 
Eruh and ġemdinli, in 1984. Yet, a thorough analysis of the Kurdish issue 
necessitates a multidimensional approach which delineates all facets of the 
problem that does not simply perceive the 1984 attack as a landmark.   
6.2.3.2.Historical Dimension  
The historical roots of the Kurdish issue, dating back to the pre-Republican 
years, gained a new impetus with the intense military campaign initiated by PKK 
in 1984. When PKK began its organized attacks in August 1984, the 
representatives of the Turkish political establishment tended to call the incident as 
the work of “a bunch of bandits” (Özcan, 2006).  
In the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire period, the traditional approach in 
handling the destabilizing effects of the Kurdish tribes was to benefit from the 
potential conflicts among the prominent rival tribal groups and thus maintain the 
balance of power (Bruinessen, 1992: 164-5). With the early modernization efforts, 
the last period of the Empire witnessed series of Kurdish uprisings. These early 
movements did hardly display any sign of organized ethnic challenges, but they 
rather retained religious and/or tribal features (Bruinessen, 1992; Romano, 2006; 
Jwaideh, 2006). The sporadic revolts during the early decades of the nineteenth 
century were more or less the manifestations of resentment and discontent arising 
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from the modernizing reforms imposed by the Ottoman elite.
145
 The insurrections 
of 1826, 1834, 1853-55 and 1880, were struggles against the centralization efforts 
of the state aiming to ensure the complete control over its domains (Chaliand, 
1993: 5). The uprising of 1880 led by Sheik Ubeydullah indicated an exception in 
the sense that it embodied national sentiments. With the Sheik Ubeydullah revolt, 
following the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, Kurds raised ethnic-national 
demands in favor of an autonomous Kurdish region under the authority of the 
Ottoman Empire (Jwaideh, 2006: 16; 78). The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 
was a major turning point in the Empire‟s political history promising 
constitutional reform and representative government. The 1908 episode not only 
planted the seeds of a more liberal environment conducive to the flourishing of 
relatively free intellectual debate, but also paved the way for the development of 
the Kurdish press.
146
 The newly born Kurdish press played an increasingly crucial 
role in bringing into ground the question of national independence for the 
Kurds.
147
 Yet, the Young Turks‟ radical positivist attitude towards the caliphate 
and Islam emerged as one of the serious causes of resentment in the face of pious 
Sunni Muslim Kurds.
148
 Besides, the two essential aspects of the Young Turk 
regime, that of administrative centralization and Turkification, led to aggravation 
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For a detailed account of the 19th century Kurdish uprisings, see, Chailand (eds.), 1993.  
146“The Kurdish press first emerged in 1898. Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, this 
pres began to develop and contributed to the debate on national problems” (Chaliand, 1993: 5).   
147
Kurdish intellectuals began to gather around journals and society clubs after the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908. Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Society for Support and Progress of the 
Kurds) was founded in 1909, and a society with more definite nationalist ambitions, Hevi (Hope) 
was founded in 1912 (Zurher, 2003: 169).  
148
In this regard it should be reminded that Kurds occupied prestigious positions in Hamdiye 
Regiments, established under Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1891.The  duty of  the regiments were 
stated as guarding the Eastern Anatolian frontiers of the Empire against foreign incursions, 
representing a parallel system of the outside the command structure of the regular army. By 
integrating Kurdish tribes to military regiments, Abdülhamid II thought to contain the political 
opposition of the Kurdish tribal elite. Although the majority of the regiments were composed of 
Sunni Kurds, Circassians and some Arab tribes also took part within the body of the organization.  
For a detailed account, see, Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State: the Social and 
Political Structures of Kurdistan, London: Zed Books, 1992.  
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and thereby contributed to the emergence of national reaction as an expression of 
general discontent by the Kurds (Jwaideh, 2006: 108). The Treaty of Sévres149 
(1920) signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies at the end of World 
War I, allowing proclamation of an independent Kurdistan provided favorable 
circumstances for the Kurdish nationalist elite (Romano, 2006: 28). 
Unfortunately, for the majority of Kurdish nationalists the Treaty has indicated a 
missed opportunity for the creation of an independent Kurdish state or an 
autonomous region. Some Kurdish groups aiming to take advantage of this 
opportunity broke into revolt in the Dersim (Tunceli) region of eastern Turkey. 
The uprising, organized by the Koçgiri Kurdish tribe in March 1921, consisting of 
Alevi Kurds, raised demands all in Kurdish nationalist nature (Romano, 2006: 
29).
150
 The Kemalist government in Ankara already waging Independence War on 
many fronts, tried to prevent the rebellion from spreading to other Kurdish tribes 
playing the card of Alevi-Sunni sect division hostility.
151
 Mustafa Kemal, defining 
the national independence war “as a contest between the infidel Western powers 
who support the Armenians and Greeks, and Muslim-Ottoman Turks and Kurds 
fighting to save the Sultan, Caliph, and homeland”(Romano, 2006:29), 
stigmatized the rebels as the traitors to the Muslim lands.  
Given the general support by the majority of the Kurdish tribes to the 
national independence struggle led by the Kemalists, Koçgiri uprising stood as an 
                                                 
149Treaty of Sévres, signed in August 10, 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious 
Allied Powers, was rejected by the nationalist government of Mustafa Kemal and never adopted. 
The treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 after the nationalists‟ victory in the 
National Independence War (1919-1923). (Zurcher,  2003: 170).   
150
 Some researchers regard the Koçgiri Uprising as the first formal Kurdish uprising against the 
early signs of Turkification by the Kemalists. See, for example, Hari S. Vasudevan,  Shri Prakash, 
Mujib Alam (eds.), The Global Politics of the Iraq Crisis and India‟s Options, Akaar Books:Delhi, 
2004, pp.184-186.   
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The rebellion was quickly suppressed. However, the role played by the Alevite/Sunnite cleavage 
in this insurgency would later have implications for future Kurdish rebellions: “Koçgiris didn‟t 
support the later Kurdish uprisings (most notably the Sheikh Said uprising in 1925, even Dersim in 
1937-1938)” (Romano, 2006:  29-30).    
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exception. Kemalists, portraying their struggle as a holy war against the infidels, 
easily gained the support of the Kurds at large (Zurcher, 2003: 177). The Treaty of 
Lausanne and the foundation of the Turkish Republic implied a total 
disappointment for the Kurdish population: Leaving aside the promises of 
autonomy, in the Lausanne Treaty Kurds were not even mentioned (Zurcher, 
2003: 170). Furthermore, the pillars of the newly established regime were 
secularism and nationalism. In that respect,    
 
Those Kurds who thought they had been fighting to save the sultanate, 
caliphate, and the Ottoman-Muslim legacy were rudely awakened. Those 
who aspired to Kurdish autonomy or independence came to face to face 
with a state that would deny the very existence of a Kurdish people, 
language, and culture. The newly instutionalized political system would 
only accept those who, in public, set aside their Kurdishness. Kurds had to 
become Turks (Romano, 2006: 32).  
 
Inheriting the vision of the Young Turk movement, the Kemalist 
government pursued a policy based on the denial and suppression of the Kurdish 
identity. In the official parlance, any demands regarding any identity other than 
Turkishness indicated a threat to national identity constructed via the 
Turkification policies. In contrast to the provisions of 1920 Constitution asserting 
the common citizenship for Turks and Kurds under law, the proclamation of the 
1923 Republican regime indicated disappointment for the Kurdish population. 
The War of National Independence which was declared to be fought for the 
salvation of the umma against the infidels did hardly retain any sign of 
nationalistic claims defined solely on Turkish ethnic identity. For the Kurdish 
tribes willingly took part in the Independence War, the abolition of the Sultanate 
in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924 by the newly established Republican state, 
symbolized the beginning of  a regime which an explicitly Turkish identity 
  
172 
 
defined along European lines stood at its core (McDowall, 2000: 18). The 
combined effect of disappointment arising out of the Lausanne Treaty and the 
secularization and Turkification policies of the Kemalist government, a large-
scale rebellion bearing a nationalist mark was organized in 1925. Organized by 
the nationalist circle Kurdish Independent Society, Azadi,
152
 and led by the Sheikh 
Said of Piran, the rebellion appealed to religious symbols and propaganda and 
thereby mentioned with regards to its religious character (Olson, 1989: 39-40, van 
Bruinessen 1978: 447). Although the motivations for joining the revolt included 
religious or at least anti-secular and tribal elements, the rebellion was definitely 
Kurdish and nationalist (White,  2000).  
The suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion with bloodshed provided the 
Kemalist ruling elite with ample opportunity to adopt stronger authoritarian 
mechanisms for silencing all sorts of oppositional voices and to consolidate their 
power (White, 2000; van Bruinessen, 1992: 281).
153
 As van Bruinessen suggests, 
“Due to the government‟s dictatorial powers, Kemalist reforms could be carried 
through with increasing speed and ever less regard for the opposition” (1992: 
282).  
The oppressive measures adopted by the government during and after the 
Sheikh Said rebellion offers significant clues about the future (assimilationist, 
exclusionary, politically violent) policies of the Turkish state regarding the 
containment of the Kurdish population. As Olson contends,  
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Azadi was a clandestine nationalist organization of educated Kurds. The organization was found 
in 1923 by the former militia officers of the Hamidian regiments (Zurcher, 2003: 181; Romano, 
2006: 34). 
153
Similar emphasis might also be found in Metin Toker, Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı, Second Edition, 
Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, Temmuz 1994.  For a detailed analysis of the consequences of the 
rebellion, see, Olson, 1989.   
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The struggle against Kurdish nationalism, in which certain patterns of 
policies were implemented and against which certain nationalist, 
ideological, and psychological premises and attitudes were initially 
adopted in 1925, continued to play an important role in Turkey's policy 
decisions more than fifty years after the Sheikh Said rebellion (1989: 97).  
 
The Turkification campaign of the governing elite proceeded throughout 
the 1930s during which the Republican regime entered into a phase of political 
consolidation. In June 1930 the Kurdish rebellion of Mount Ararat, (Ağrı Dağı) 
involving the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq broke out.
154
The rebellion was 
initiated by the Khoyboun
155
 (Independence) organization, formed by a group of 
Kurdish tribal leaders and intellectuals under the leadership of General Ġhsan Nuri 
Pasha of Bitlis (Gunter, 2008: 5; Yavuz, 2005: 237-238).
156
 The uprising was 
completely crushed with a massive military campaign organized in cooperation 
with Iranian forces.   
The last largest Kurdish uprising of the early republican period took place 
in 1937 in Dersim (Tunceli province).
157
 The rebellion was led by the local 
traditional elites under the leadership of Seyyit Rıza (Bozarslan, 1986:104). In 
fact, in the eyes of the Turkish authorities Dersim was always a source of 
nuisance. Thus the Kemalist government decided to “resolve” this problem by any 
means necessary. A 1926 report prepared by the Interior Ministry and presented to 
the parliament openly declared as follows: “Dersim is an abscess on the Turkish 
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The dates during which the actual fighting took place cover the period between the Spring 1929 
to September of 1930. For further information, see, Robert W. Olson, Imperial Meanderings and 
Republican By-Ways: Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of 
Turkey, Isis Press, 1996, 336 pages. (p.142).  
155
Khoyboun (Independence) was formed by the Kurdish émigrés in Syria in 1927. The primary 
aim of the organization was declared to promote the Kurdish national cause. For further 
information, see: David McDowall, 2000: 145.  
156
For a detailed examination of the Ararat Rebellion, see, White, Paul, J. Primitive Rebels or 
Revolutionary Modernizers?The Kurdish National …pp.77-79; van Bruinessen, 1978, p. 393.  
157The phrase „Dersim uprising‟ denotes two separate uprisings that took place in the Dersim area. 
The first contentious event covered the episode between March 1937 and November 1937. The 
latter sparked in April 1938 and lasted until December 1938 (White, 2000: 80).     
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Republic and it must be removed, for the sake of the country's well-being” 
(BeĢikçi, 1991: 29). According to this text, the people living in Dersim could not 
be won through ordinary socio-economic measures, like developing the city‟s 
infrastructure or investing in its local economy – the Ministry thought that Dersim 
would understand only the language of violence (BeĢikçi, 1991: 29).  
Therefore, the Kemalist government‟s policy towards the Kurdish rebels 
was once again comprised of “naked violence,” just like the cases of the previous 
two Kurdish uprisings prior to the Dersim event. The consequent massacres of the 
rebels in Dersim in 1937
158
 can be interpreted as consolidating an institutionalized 
policy of absolute violence against Kurds, which would also guide future state 
policy towards the region. As the suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion left a 
traumatic scar on Sunnite Kurds, the suppression of the Dersim rebellion had a 
similar permanent effect on the perception of the Turkish state by Alevite Kurds. 
That is to say, these Kurdish defeats were framed solely as “absolute state 
tyranny” in Kurdish historiography throughout the following decades.           
One of the turning points of the historical Kurdish movement has been the 
period following the 1960 coup. In Bozarslan‟s view, the coup refers to a 
“dualistic development” in terms of the movement. The actors of the coup went 
on denying the Kurdish reality in accordance with the nationalistic logic of the 
Republic. One of the best manifestations of this oppressive attitude of the military 
regime was the arrest of the 55 Kurdish tribal leaders and their exile (Bozarslan, 
2008a: 853). Again, the arrest of 23 Kurdish nationalist opinion leaders 
exemplifies the approach of the coup makers on the issue. Yet, the democratic 
content of the 1961 Constitution opened up newer avenues before freedom of 
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For the historical details of these massacres performed by the Turkish army, see: White, 2000: 
82; BeĢikçi, 1991; Dersimi, 1988: 287; Romano, 2006: 38; McDowall, 2000: 198. 
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expression and of organization. In that respect, like Turkish socialist movement, 
the Kurdish movement found widened space for politics and organizations. The 
problematization of the Kurdish issue under the name „Eastern Question‟ (Doğu 
Sorunu) on the pages of one prominent journal of the period, Barış Dünyası 
(World of Peace), and of the bi-monthly periodical Yön (Direction) were 
significant developments: One of the major taboos of the Republican public 
sphere was being broken (Bozarslan, 2008a: 853).
 159
 In the final years of 1960s, 
the Kurdish issue became a topic intensively discussed in the pages of other 
widely-circulated left-wing political periodicals such as Ant, Türk Solu, and 
Aydınlık.  
The Kurdish youth in Turkey in the 1960s became highly political, 
encouraged by the Kurdish insurgency in Northern Iraq and the rise of leftist 
movements in the rest of the world. Thus this new Kurdish politics was 
channelized into the new Turkish Workers Party (TĠP) and found a political voice 
there. The socialist Kurds active in TĠP tended to identify the Kurdish question as 
a social problem (Bozarslan, 2008a: 854). With the help of the leftist discourse of 
the period, this political issue could be placed beyond an “ethnic question.” 
According to this approach, the issue was foremost based on socio-economic 
inequalities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey; political tensions with an 
“ethnic” face were actually rooted in the underdevelopment of the Kurdish 
provinces. That is to say, the politics of ethnic inequality was integrated into class 
politics: Kurdish and Turkish workers would together organize and liberate 
themselves, thus also erasing ethnic hierarchies (Bruinessen, 1984: 9). 
Nevertheless, the socialist discourse recognized that the problems were also 
                                                 
159Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Kürt Meselesi,” in Yön (Direction), 16 December 1966; “Doğu Davamız. 
Doğunun Kalkınması Türkiye‟nin Kalkınması Demektir. Barış Dünyası, (The World of Peace), 
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related to cultural rights issues. Kurds‟ right to speak their own language was not 
recognized as a constitutional liberty and this was problematized within the 
socialist discourse of the period.
160
 To put it briefly, the politics of Turkish 
socialists understood the Kurdish question in terms of revolutionary strategies 
(Ekinci, 2004: 290-291).    
The practical integration of Kurdish politics with the general Turkish 
leftist politics occurred with the 1967 Eastern Meetings organized in 7 Kurdish 
provinces.
161
 This series of demonstrations were organized inside TWP, in 
collaboration with clandestine socialist and nationalist Kurdish groups, chiefly 
with the participation of the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan.
162
  
As Bozarslan also mentions, an important focus for the Kurdish movement 
in Turkey was the Barzani revolt in Iraqi which began in 1959. A lot of politicized 
Kurds in Turkey have identified themselves with that insurgency. Along with the 
influence and “patronage” of the Turkish socialist movement, it was not until the 
beginning of the 1970s that the Kurdish movement started to become autonomous 
from these two dynamics (Bozarslan, 2008a: 348). The movement gained a new 
momentum as the Cultural Hearths of Revolutionary East (DDKO) was 
established in 1970, and many Kurdish political groups began to sympathize with 
the strategies of armed struggle (Bozarslan, 2008a: 856).
163
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 See for instance: Sadun Aren, TİP Olayı, 1961-1971, (Ġstanbul: Cem, 1993), p.70. 
161
 For an excellent account of the Eastern Meetings, see: Azat Zana Gündoğan, “The Kurdish 
Political Mobilization in the 1960s: the Case of the „Eastern Meetings‟” Master Thesis Submitted 
to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, July 2005, Ankara. 
For a comprehensive analysis, see also: Ġsmail BeĢikçi, Doğu Mitinglerinin Analizi, (Ankara, Yurt 
Yayınları, 1992).  
162 For a comprehensive account of the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan, see: ġakir 
Epözdemir, Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi (TKDP),1908/235 Antalya Davası Savunması 
(Ġstanbul: Pêrî Yayınları, 2005).  
163For further information on DDKO, see, Ümit Fırat, “Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları,” in 
Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, Ertuğrul Kürkçü (ed). vol.7 (Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları, 1988), p.2119. 
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The military intervention of March 1971 caused fragmentation of the 
Kurdish movement: Repressive measures were implemented in the Southeast 
against Kurdish political groups (McDowall, 2008: 20). On the other hand, in 
Iraq, Barzani decided to cease his faction‟s struggle and the Kurdish movement in 
Turkey lost an important reference.  Yet, the most important impact of the coup 
was the estrangement of Kurdish political groups that had previously decided to 
struggle within legal boundaries: As a result of the campaign of oppression after 
the coup, most of these groups were convinced that legal party politics was unable 
to provide the necessary ground for their goals. Many Kurdish intellectuals and 
politically active figures were detained and sent to prison, a process which was 
interpreted as the end of mainstream politics and the necessity of continuing the 
struggle in the “underground”. Illegal means of political struggle thus began to be 
placed in the center of Kurdish politics (Bozarslan, 2008b: 347). The seventies 
also witnessed the emergence of pro-Kurdish political organizations that refrain 
from resorting to violence but supported civil activities instead. For instance, 
Kurdish Socialist Party-Turkey (KSP-T)
164
 supported the leading Kurdish public 
figure Mehdi Zana in local elections of 1977. Zana was elected as the Mayor of 
Diyarbakır, the largest urban center in the Kurdish populated region, and 
remained at this post until his arrest by the military junta twelve days after the 
1980 coup (Bozarslan, 2008b: 348).  
The 1980 coup caught the Turkish Left unawares and resulted with its 
near-destruction and demobilization. But radical Kurdish groups had a relatively 
advantageous position: Many of them had already fled to Syria just before and 
after the coup (McDowall, 2000:414; Romano, 2006:49). Thus, leading cadres of 
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KSP-T (Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan Tirkiye / Kurdistan Socialist Party –Turkey) was founded 
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Kurdish political groups, unlike those of Turkish groups whose leaders were 
either in Europe or in prison, had the opportunity to organize in Syria and 
Lebanon, within PKK (Romano, 2006:50). Several factors contributed to the 
emergence of PKK, a founded in 1974 by a group of university students,
165
 as the 
major leading organization of the Kurdish insurgency. External support, 
particularly the Syrian support to a significant extent contributed to the success of 
PKK‟s armed struggle (Bozarslan, 2008b:351). On the other hand, the suffering of 
the Kurdish population, the systematic torture and abuse against Kurds under the 
junta rule contributed to PKK‟s empowerment after 1980 (Romano, 2006:51; 
Bozarslan, 2008b:351; Laçiner, 1991). The coup was revengeful against 
everything Kurdish: As Bozarslan emphasized the harsh measures implemented 
by the junta against the cultural and political representations of Kurdishness 
played crucial role in the radicalization and massification of the Kurdish 
population (2001:46-47). In that respect, the notorious Act No. 2932, imposed by 
the junta in 1983, prohibiting the use of Kurdish in public and private spheres, in 
reverse, contributed to the ethno-nationalist politicization.  
PKK, in a short period of time, united and politicized Kurds on a much 
more ethno-nationalist platform (non-tribal, non-religious) compared to the 
Kurdish politics of the 1970s. This new episode of the PKK in Kurdish radical 
politics opens with the 1984 Eruh attack. As Sohrab comments, “The general 
trend of identity in Kurdish society has thereby been a move from one with strong 
religious components in the 1920s-30s, to one with strong class components in the 
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1960s -70s to one with ethnicity as the core layer in the 1990s” (2004: 184). PKK 
adapted guerrilla warfare as its chief political strategy, and the armed conflict 
initiated in 1984 still continues today. The human cost of the conflict between 
PKK and the Turkish state as of 2010 is almost 40,000 deaths and the internal 
displacement of more than 3 million people. 
PKK‟s “threat” was initially framed as coming from “a bunch of bandits”, 
but soon as the daily events of armed clashes and the death toll increased the 
problem became one of “low intensity warfare”. The state‟s non-recognition of 
rights demands by the Kurds (which were at the root of the PKK insurgency), for 
many years throughout the conflict; along with the alienating impact of the 
oppressive “state of emergency regime” established in the Southeast can be said to 
have made the issue inseparable from Turkey‟s “problem of democratization”. It 
should be reminded that following the coup, “Kurds” had almost no presence in 
mainstream politics, being totally excluded (BeĢikçi, 1990a, 1990b).  
Thus the rise of PKK with a radical program aiming too purge feudal 
elements from Kurdish society and establish a separate socialist state resulted with 
further oppression of all elements of Kurdish popular culture and the association 
of the ordinary Kurd with terrorism (Berkey-Fuller, 1998: 133-156). As the “state 
of emergency” regime began with full force and special legislative, judiciary and 
security powers in the region by 1987 (which lasted until 1999), Kurdish villagers 
began to be forced out of their homes, in order to “starve” PKK. Organized state 
violence in the region also gave the Turkish Army a perfect opportunity to 
consolidate its own authoritarian version of nationalism in the region. Along with 
issues of democratic rights of Kurdish citizens, the impact of military tutelage and 
Army‟s control over civilian politics would also be problematized by the liberal-
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democratic discourse of the 1990s. That is to say, as the Kurdish conflict 
strengthened the hold of the Army over politics, discussing the “Kurdish 
Problem” naturally became a proxy for criticizing the autonomous nature of the 
military and its negative impact on democracy in Turkey.  
6.2.3.3.Concluding Remarks on the Kurdish Question  
The first “opportunity” for the consolidation of the political discourse in 
which the social type of the Democrat flourished (especially in terms of the 
criticism of Kemalism) emerged during the “Turgut Özal years” of late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Özal‟s version of conservative-liberal politics was somewhat 
distanced from the militarist discourse framing the Kurdish issue. Although his 
approach never aimed to be hegemonic over the hold of the Army over the 
civilian politics, he was one of the few influential politicians of the time who 
talked about “re-integration” of Turks and Kurds, about non-military solutions 
and about “rights”. His rise to presidency further encouraged, however marginal, 
the reinforcement of liberal-democratic positions with regard to the resolution of 
the Kurdish problem (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002).  
As the official discourse framed, “the struggle against PKK terrorism” 
raged on even more violently after early 1990s. The military‟s implementation of 
counter-guerrilla strategies (comparable to South American examples) against 
PKK incursions, along with the increasing numbers of political murders by “death 
squads” financed by the state, pushed the “Kurdish Question” more towards a 
question of security to be resolved through military measures. Throughout the 
1990s, up until the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the negative impact of the 
“State of Emergency” regime in the social life of the residents of eastern and 
southeastern regions continued. This and the problematization of counter-guerrilla 
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activities with the controversial “Susurluk Accident” of November 1996 together 
held the liberal-democratic debates around the issue on the intellectual agenda. 
The criticism of the so-called “deep state, state within state”, orchestrated by the 
military as part of the operations against PKK got even more intense after 1999, 
as the violent clashes relatively diminished and there were more public debates 
(especially on TV) on the failures of the state in resolving the issue. 
 
6.3. Şerif Mardin‟s Center-Periphery Analysis: Major Theoretical 
Inspiration 
6.3.1. 1990s: Re-emergence of Political Islam on the Political and Social 
Scene   
These two subjects, re-emergence of Islam during the late-1980s and the 
Kurdish issue, have been analyzed from different theoretical positions and 
political perspectives. Foremost among them were the perspectives relying 
extensively upon the premises of the Modernization Theory. Nevertheless, by the 
1990s, the center/periphery analysis of ġerif Mardin (1973), emerged as the 
„dominant paradigm‟ (Bora, 2006) that has been employed to better understand 
the major dynamics of Turkish society and polity.
166
 Center-periphery analysis of 
Mardin has been the source of majority of works that appeared on the academic 
terrain during the late-1980s and thereby much of the literature on political Islam 
and Kurdish problem utilized or at least referred to this unique analysis.
167
 In 
addition to its scientific value in offering a plausible perspective for understanding 
the operation of the state/society mechanism in Turkey, this theoretical attempt 
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owed its popularity to the political and sociological developments within the 
country. As liberalism appeared to be the most favorable ideology of the late-
1980s in Turkey, this specific development naturally found its reflections in the 
Turkish academia. All in all, the figures who most effectively utilize the 
center/periphery approach are the liberal-democratic opinion holders (the main 
subject of this dissertation) and Islamist writers (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997: 
4).
168
 According to these observers who have raised substantial criticisms against 
Mustafa Kemal and his modernization project in the post-1980 period, Kemalist 
doctrine, “as a patriarchal and antidemocratic imposition from  above that has 
negated the historical  and cultural experience of the people in Turkey” (1997: 4).  
In closer look, the process through which the center-periphery analysis, 
after 1980s, assumed a paradigmatic position can be evaluated under four main 
headings (Açıkel, 2006:34). The first development behind the popularization and 
widespread application of the paradigm was the process of democratization, 
which made way for new opportunities of mobilization and participation. For 
example, Açıkel claims that the inclusion of new actors in the public sphere 
enabled by democratization and the rise of the center-periphery paradigm are 
related (2006:34). Another factor preparing the grounds for the proliferation of the 
usage of the paradigm was the discrediting of Marxism as a source of social-
scientific explanation in the 1990s and the relative dissipation of the “leftist” 
dominance, which continued until 1980s, within the intellectual and academic 
world. For Açıkel, this “decline” corresponds to the “rise” of right-wing 
intelligentsia, which has always been closer to Weberian frameworks:  
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Since Mardin‟s scheme enabled the criticism of radical modernization 
strategies and, based on a Shilsian notion of „central value system‟ the 
imagination of Islamic traditions as an excluded, but nevetheless 
constitutive element; (...) [and since that scheme] could present an 
alternative to Marxism‟s base-superstructure distinction and class struggle 
emphasis, it was (by the right-wing intelligentsia) embraced as a tool for 
culturel struggle (2006: 35).  
 
Moreover, the center-periphery model made it theoretically and politically 
possible, for the right-wing (conservative) opinion holders, to criticize anti-
religious state elites who were seen as alienated from religion, whereas religion 
was taken to be central to society‟s culture and values (YaĢlı, 2009: 96).  
Another contributing factor to the rise of the center-periphery paradigm 
was the popularization of criticisms of positivism in academic circles, beginning 
with mid-to-late 1980s.
169
 Such criticisms included the problematization of 
classical Marxist assumptions as being a direct extension of Enlightenment, and 
this critical discourse can be referenced as the main contrinution of post-
structuralist and post-Marxist approaches. By late 1980s, these academic 
discourses made their impact on social scientists in Turkey. For example, some 
Gramscian left-wing intellectuals were engaged in the adaptation of the post-
Marxist framework suggested by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) 
criticizing the more “authoritarian” or “orthodox” positions within the Left, and 
actively utilizing the concept of “civil society” for discussions of Turkey‟s 
democratization (and the necessity for de-militarization). The criticism of 
positivism as a vital element of Kemalism also corresponds to this period, being 
another reason for preferring to explain the dynamics of modern Turkish politics 
with the centre-periphert model (Açıkel, 2006: 35). 
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While this model became the prominent analytical tool for right-wing 
opinion leaders, as mentioned before, it was also embraced by scholars on the left 
and became almost the “trademark” of left-liberal opinion holders. These 
intellectuals on the left, deeply questioning their positions vis-à-vis the state, 
adopted the center-periphery approach especially for the criticism of the Kemalist-
corporatist imagination of society and of the Jacobin top-down modernization 
practices (Açıkel, 2006: 35).170  
The rise of the academic and intellectual interest towards the center-
periphery approch as an alternative model to understand the major dynamics of 
Turkish politics indicated an ironical situation. It was ironical because the newly 
adopted fashionable theoretical model was a classical variant of the modernization 
theory which sought to explain the major dynamics of Turkish politics with the 
conceptual opportunities provided by the dichotomy asserted to have existed 
between center and the periphery. Within this alternative approach, the central 
premise of classical modernization theory that of the dichotomy between Islam 
and modernity, was replaced with the dichotomy between the ruling modernizing 
elite (center) and the masses (periphery). Due their methodological priorities, 
neither of these approaches has failed to grasp “the contingent nature of the 
relationship between identity and politics of integration with the West that is a 
part of a larger pattern of state and societal relationships” (Cizre, 1998a:7).  
Modernization literature, to a large extent, have taken for granted that, the 
primary causes of the rise of Islamism in Turkey included structural factors, such 
as poverty and the uneducated masses due to the socioeconomic factors. This 
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literature has focused on the migration of the masses from rural areas to the large 
cities and the economic deprivation they have practiced. The studies that 
contributed to the Modernization literature in Turkish academia have emphasized 
the varoş (“slums”), as the main support base of political Islam in Turkey. 
Resurgence of political Islam, in their view, was a defensive response to the 
economic and social deprivation which became harsher as the outcome of the neo-
liberal policies. According to Binnaz Toprak, similar to the 1970s, during which 
religious groups emerged in the political and social scene in Turkey, the political 
Islam of late-1980s could be regarded as “a response to the life in the metropolis” 
(1989)
171
. In contrast to the 1970s, during which Islam represented a marginalized 
portion of the society, during the late-1990s and early-1990s it emerged with a 
growing electoral strength and popularity and thereby conceived as a threat to the 
functioning of the secularism within the country. Toprak stated that the change in 
the capital accumulation model of Turkey from import-substitution to export-
orientation was largely responsible for the growing popular strength of Islam 
(2005: 180-181). The neo-liberal policies pursued in accordance with the dictates 
of the new capital accumulation model gave rise to further impoverishing of the 
urban poor and stimulated discontent among the poor. Within the political 
environment the Left was incapable of promoting alternative policies; this 
discontent was to find expression in the support for the Islamist Welfare Party. 
Against the anti-statist rhetoric and policies of the neo-liberal agenda, the Islamist 
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political party Refah could provide highly organized support facilities and 
networks (Toprak, 2005:181). Through this perspective, the discontent among the 
lower segments of the population due to the increasing discrepancy among social 
classes was translated into electoral success by the pro-Islamist Welfare Party 
(Ayata, 1997).
172
  
Rise of the „identity politics‟ by the 1990s have also been underlined as a 
crucial factor contributing to the re-emergence of Islam in Turkish context. Most 
commentators agreed on the fact that, for significant portions of the social fabric, 
identity politics have constituted the means of expressing their demands, reactions 
and discontent due to the exclusion they were exposed to (Ayata, 1997:60). Some 
social scientists interpreted the emergence of Islamism as a part of a broad picture 
consisting of anti-systemic movements, such as feminism, environmentalism, and 
with “new „isms‟” and regarded the rise of contemporary Islamism, 
 
(as) both an outcome and a criticism of endogenous forms of modernity 
that engender new class divisions on cultural cleavages between those who 
acquire access to Westernized forms of education, speaking and living and 
those who remain alien to this cultural setting (Göle, Nilüfer, 1989:61).  
 
A common attitude shared by most of the theoretical attempts articulated 
to understand the rise and nature of political Islam in Turkey was to pinpoint an 
indirectly proportional equation between the foundational ethos of Turkish 
Republic, that of Kemalism, and the rise of Islam. It has been argued that, the 
crisis of Kemalism has led to the increasing strength of political Islam. In this 
vein, one prominent social scientist has contended that, political Islam was a 
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postmodern reaction to Turkish modernization.
173
 Nevertheless, the postmodern 
reaction argument which was built upon the binary opposition between the rise of 
political Islam and the fall of the official ideology, shared the common 
methodological basis with the classical modernization approach and its center-
periphery variant. That is, rather than seeing the contingent nature of the 
relationship between the dynamics it tended to regard the entire picture through 
the lenses of a dichotomous relationship asserted to exist between the two.  
Kurdish issue has long been examined solely as an outcome of structural 
deficiencies arising from the uneven economic development or 
underdevelopment. According to this perspective, the enhancement of the social 
and economic development has been underlined to provide peaceful solution to 
the problem.
174
 The alternative approach adopted in the early nineties claiming to 
overcome the reductionism of the former approach, tended to analyze the Kurdish 
problem as a reaction to the Ottoman/Turkish modernization that brought about a 
cultural cleavage between the traditional masses and the modernizing elite.   
6.3.2. The Main Arguments of the Center-Periphery Model  
As it has been previously mentioned, the center-periphery perspective was 
introduced to the Turkish context by ġerif Mardin in his classic "Center-Periphery 
Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," an article published in Daedalus (1973). 
Mardin basically borrowed the model from Edward Shils
175
and operationalized it 
for explaining Ottoman-Turkish modernization and the relations between the 
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(central) rulers and their (peripheral) adversaries. According to Mardin, the 
fundamental polarization within modern Turkish society rages between 
modernizing elites and religious-conservative masses resisting modernization. At 
the roots of this polarization lies the early historical process by which a minority 
of elites dictated a top-down Ottoman-Turkish modernization to the whole 
society. Mardin basically assumes the following: In the West, a centralization 
process was initiated as a result of the establishment of the modern state. This 
process brought forward a number of encounters, confrontations and integrations 
between the center and the periphery and ultimately a commond ground was 
reached as the periphery was integrated into the center. In his own words,  
The forces that shaped the state in the West seem to vary significantly 
from those that shaped the Ottoman state before modernization set in. 
Because of its feudal antcedents, the process of centralization that created 
the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to 
compromises with what may be called the forces of the preiphery: the 
feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor. The 
consequence of these compromises was that Leviathan and the nation-state 
were relatively well articulated structures.Each time a compromise –or 
even a one-sided victory- was obtained, some integration of the peripheral 
force into the center was achieved. Thus the feudal estates, or the 
“privilégies,” or the workers become integrated into the poltiy while, at the 
same time, obtaining some recognition of their autonomous status 
(Mardin, 1973:170).  
In contrast with the West, in the Ottoman society the encounter between 
the center and periphery was not in the form of deliberation and integration, but in 
the form of conflict and confontation: 
In the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century these characteristics 
of multiple confrontation and integration seem to be missing. Rather, the 
major confrontation was unidimensional, always a clash between the 
center and the periphery. In addition, the autonomy of peripheral forces 
was more than anything de facto, an important difference from the 
institutional recognition accorded, for example, to estates in Western 
Europe, which were “dependent corporations (Mardin, 1973:170).  
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As Mardin states, the principal axis of tension in Ottoman society are 
expressed in the form of divisions such as urban/rural, urban native/migrant, state 
official/merchant, soldier/civilian. In every confrontation between the center and 
periphery this conflict axis is reproduced. 
Mardin adds that as the center and the periphery confont each other, they 
develop certain states of mind. For example, the definitive characteristic of the 
worldview of the center is “suspicion towards the peripheral elements” 
(1973:171). Whereas the periphery‟s characteristic worldview, in connection to its 
heterogeneity, is devoid of being compact (1973: 173). Mardin explains this 
cultural separation between the center and periphery as follows: 
Rulers and officials were heavily influenced in the cities by the culture of 
earlier, succesful, urban cultures such as the Iranian. Iranian bureaucratic 
culture in particular was diffused into Ottoman institutions. For example, 
the rulers adopted languages –Persian and Arabc- that were foreign to the 
lower classes and worked these into the official culture. The periphery 
only benefited from one of the educational institutions. Not suprisingly, 
the periphery developed its own extremely varied counter-culture, but it 
was well aware of its secondary cultural status, an awareness best 
ilustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite culture (1973: 173).  
 
As the Empire entered a path of Westernization and the modernization of 
Ottoman institutions was initiated, the distance and estrangement between the 
center and periphery was deepened. For this, Mardin gives the example of the 
Patrona Revolt which ended the “Tulip Period.” The revolt was different than 
those before in the sense that it created a new pattern. With the Patrona Revolt, 
peripheral elements with discontents about the center‟s performance and who 
believe that the center has become distant to them, began to express their 
disgruntlements with uprisings. In this respect, the Patrona Revolt is a precursor to 
the March 31
st
 Revolt and the Menement Incident; 
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was the first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an 
effort to Westernize military and administrative organization propounded 
by a section of the official elite, accompanied by some aping of Western 
manners, and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against 
Westernization (1973: 175).   
 
One of the most central tenets of the center-periphery model is the 
“continuity” relation between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. 
The modernization/Westernization initiatives of the late Ottoman period were 
continued in a similar mindset during the early Republican era, and the center‟s 
skepticism, distrutfulness towards the periphery, its perception of the periphery as 
a space to be controlled, was further exacerbated. 
It is obvious that there is high level of correspondence between this model 
and Ġdris Küçükömer‟s perspective developed around the notion of “cultural 
alieanation”.176 According to Küçükömer, the anti-Kemalist “Second Group” of 
the early TGNA, the later Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and the Free 
Republican Party (SCF), being positioned in opposition to the modernizing elites 
who were alienated from their social base, were representing the periphery in 
confrontation with the center (1973: 181). The center, represented by the Palace 
during the Ottoman Empire era, was occupied by the Kemalists in the new 
Republican era. Most concretely, CHP, the state bureaucracy and the military 
constituted the center and these actors insisted the elimination of potential 
“intermediate” groups between the center and periphery. For example, the 
banning of TCF was related to the state‟s perception of the existence of two main 
“dangerous” elements against the center, namely Islam and Kurdishness (the 
latter, along with the fresh threat of the Sheikh Said Revolt, was seen as a 
challenge against the top-down ethno-national identity). According to Mardin, 
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When an opposition aprty was formed whose activities coincided with a 
Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed 
giving the government wide powers for the new opposition did represent 
decentralist aspirations. It was suppressed the same year because of what 
were said to be its links wit “religious reaction,” and indeed this, more 
than “Kurdsihness,” had been the central theme of the revolt (1973: 182).   
 
The confrontation between the positivist, Jacobin and elitist center with the 
periphery constituted by small businessmen, ordinary citizens and religious 
leaders was carried to a new level after the transition to the multi-party system in 
1946. The center represented by CHP was chiefly opposed by DP (Democrat 
Party), seen as a threat against secularization and anti-reformist, emerging from 
the countryside. DP was on the rise as the principal agent of the integreation 
between the small town and the village. By many people, DP was seen as an 
alternative to the state bureaucracy which was disliked for its clumsiness and 
harshness. Many thought that their interests could more freely be expressed within 
DP. Above all, DP  
 
promised it would bring services to the peasants, take his daily problems 
as a legitimate concern of politics, debureaucratize Turkey and liberalize 
religious practices. Finally, private enterprise, equally hampered by 
bureaucratic controls and angered by its dependence on political influence, 
was also promised greater  freedom (1973: 184).     
 
Among DP‟s founders were former CHP members and bureaucrats and 
despite that, ironically, the party could become a political platform representing 
the periphery and the culture associated with the periphery. As the party moved 
against the power of the central bureaucracy, the periphery embraced it even more 
strongly, and in time, the party came to  identify itself with the periphery (1973: 
185).   
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One of the problematics that the model promises to explain is how 
Republican elites positioned themselves in the new political configuration of the 
multi-party system, their divisions and conflicts (Açıkel, 2006: 35). The model, 
which is built upon the interpretation of government-opposition relations, from 
the Ottoman to the Republican era, within the process of modernization, posits the 
continuation of fundamental impasses of Turkish modernization. Mardin suggests 
that Turkish modernization should be explained within the context of this 
“continuity”, as against the Kemalist history-writing which claims that a 
“dislocation” occurs with the dissolution of the Empire (Çiğdem, 2005).  
6.3.3. The Model‟s Strengths and Weaknesses  
One basic assumption of the center-periphery model casts light on its 
relation with democracy and democratization: Different from the Western 
European experience, the center-periphery relation in the Ottoman era is practised 
as a dichotomy, polarization, confrontation. And because of the dominance and 
control of the center, the development of private property, market economy and 
civil society was impossible. Here a weakness can be observed: The Eurocentric 
attempt to identify similar Western processes in a non-Western geography, and 
than the judgment of the non-Western geography based on the absence of such 
processes. The center-periphery model compares the West and the East based on 
Western assumptions of development and modernization, which accept that 
democratization unfolds through deliberation and consensus between center and 
periphery. According to this story, the Eastern democratization process is 
suppressed as a result of the control exercised over the periphery. The East is 
framed as the West‟s “other,” which invites criticisms of Orientalism (Aydın, 
2006). Since democracy could “more easily” be instituted in the West, with its 
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“deliberating” center and periphery, this was impossible in the East, as the 
“home” of the periphery, “civil society”, was unable to develop. Then, a Western-
style democracy in the East comes to be seen as improbable to develop (Aydın, 
2006; YaĢlı, 2009). Most analyses which place the model at the core of their 
frameworks can be observed to abide by this assumption. 
Another social scientist using the model, Metin Heper, also describes 
Ottoman Empire as “patrimonial,” using the Weberian terminology: The Empire 
is a bureucratic state and the center is strong enough to reject sharing its power 
with rival forces. For this reason, Heper states that in the Ottoman Empire the 
relation between the center and the periphery is never open to dialogue but is 
defined by conflict (Heper, 1985; 2000). On the other hand, historians like Halil 
Ġnalcık and Ömer Lütfi Barkan discuss the Empire in terms of multi-level systems 
where many centers are in contact with the dominant power, rather than a simple 
center-periphery model (Aydın, 2006: 80). The Empire was a vast geography and 
the channels of communication and transportation were weak. This resulted with 
the emergence of more than one center, in connection to the distance of the local 
powers from Istanbul. The advantages of the system of foundations reinforced the 
hegemony of local powers and helped them benefit from tax exemptions (Aydın, 
2006: 80-81). In this historical context, the classical center-periphery model‟s 
story of “separation” becomes problematic. 
Another problem with the model is its explanatory power. It can be said to 
be capable of explaining Turkish politics up until 1950s; but as politics became 
largely socialized and the “distance” between the center and periphery 
diminished, the model‟s explanatory power in analyzing more recent periods of 
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Turkish politics is put to question.
177
  It can be argued that this model assumes 
that the institutions and political processes which shaped Turkey from 1920s to 
1950s continue their unchanging existence. This, then, portrays Turkish 
modernization as frozen, static, close to changes of other forms outisde the 
“center-periphery” framework (Açıkel, 2006: 33). The assumption that the 
conflict between the state and society is almost beyond history; that the culture 
codes and values of conflicting political actors are unchanging is problematic. In 
this model, the elitist “center” remain the center whether it is the ruling 
government or not; and the “periphery,” even if it comes to power, continues to be 
the “periphery” (Açıkel, 2006: 31-32).   
ġerif Mardin presents a culture-centered analysis of Turkish political 
history with his model. The cultural codes of the state elites and popular masses 
are in constant conflict (YaĢlı, 2009: 106). To recall, the center is basically 
defined in terms of values and beliefs, around which the society is to be 
integrated. However, the two spheres described ahistorically (e.g., Kemalism as 
the center and Islam as the periphery), actually resemble each other rather than be 
separate (Çınar, 2006). The model‟s “cultural alienation” thesis rather lumps the 
complex dynamic of Turkish politics into the axis of culture and creates problems 
of cultural reductionism. According to Çınar, such an approach does not present a 
full picture of the problems of democratization in Turkey; and if the analysis is 
flawed and misleading, it might even aggravate the problems and hinder 
possibilities of opening in the political opportunity structure (2006: 153).
178
 The 
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“flaw” here is to ascribe an almost homogeneous, “Islamic essence” to society in 
Turkey and argue that the source of the democratic deficit is the suppression of 
that essence by the center.   
As Çınar also argues, if Turkish politics is seen only from the lens of the 
cultural alienation thesis, the history of the Republican era is reduced to the power 
struggle between “secular” and “Islamist” ideologies (Çınar, 2006; Açıkel, 2006). 
In such a case, Turkish political life can only be portrayed as a sphere under the 
monopoly of an exclusionist elite. However, as discussed above, some Ottoman 
historians focusing on local powers argued that Ottoman rulers have developed 
diverse strategies, trying to address the sensitivities of different localities, when 
they dealt with local rulers (Aydın, 2006). Moreover, “politics” is something 
much more than the thing defined by the culture-centric model. Cultural 
reductionism tends to de-emphasize international dynamics: 
 
Especially when modernization is the issue, this deficiency is more 
expressed. Both the development of state apparatuses (from the army to 
the bureaucracy, from education to communication and transportation 
networks) and how such apparatuses relate to people are directly 
dependent on what kind of a position these local-national units have inside 
the world system (Açıkel, 2006: 43).   
 
It is quite possible to assess Turkish political life through a framework 
which makes politics itself its center. For example, it can be argued that dualisms 
and tensions created by modernization initiatives essentially lead to political 
reactions, and when such reactions cannot be properly expressed within the 
political sphere, they can be channelized into the field of culture. Considering that 
in Turkish politics, superstructural factors are highly influential, it is acceptable to 
claim that cultural and identity-based dualities are essentially shaped by politics. 
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Recast in this alternative manner, the culture-centered approach of the center-
periphery model can be problematized.   
6.3.4. Conclusions and Political Implications  
The center-periphery approach, as it carried the themes of the strong state, 
modernization from above, Jacobin and positivist Kemalism to the agenda, 
contributed to the shaping of a certain political position. According to this posture 
we can call “liberal-democrat,” the following needed to be done in order to 
accomplish the democratization of Turkey: The authoritarian state had to be 
transformed, the official Kemalist ideology needed to be dismantled, civil society 
needed to be strengthened and the heavy hand of bureacracy was to be removed. 
For such political targets, from the perspective of the left-wing liberals, the center-
periphery model provided important theoretical tools.
179
 For the conservative-
democratic observers using the model, it provided a good analytical tool to 
challenge the Kemalist ideology (YaĢlı, 2009:97).  
Politically speaking, the following observation of scholars applying the 
model to Turkish politics is critical: Because of the dominance of the center, it is 
commonly argued that “civil society” in Turkey was underdeveloped. With its 
emphasis on the analytical and essentialist separation between the state and 
society, the model implied heavy political investment in civil society initiative and 
organizations. For example, Heper (1985) observes that central bureaucracy in 
Republican Turkey prevented the full maturing of local social and economic 
forces and thus limited individiual and economic liberties.
180
 Intermediary 
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structures that would integrate the center and the periphery (estates, local 
councils, urban management structures etc.) did not develop autonomously 
(Mardin, 1988; Ġnsel, 1996: 73). In relation to this analysis, another political 
implication of the center-periphery assumptions concerns the organization of the 
economy. Observers utilizing the model also make a political investment in the 
proper (i.e., autonomous) development of free market relations in the process of 
Turkey‟s democratization. According to the analysis, the hold of the state over 
society also constrains, culturally speaking, the maturing of the bourgeoisie and 
capital accumulation. The Turkish capitalists are thought to be unable to 
internalize the same values as their Western (“universal”) counterparts. It can be 
argued that this analysis takes the subscribers of the center-periphery model to 
seek an “idealized bourgeoisie” and explain Turkey‟s democratic deficits using 
the argument of a “dominated, underdeveloped” bourgeoisie (Dinler, 2009: 25). 
This stance almost brings the left-wing or right-wing subscribers to the model 
close to a classical “economic liberal” understanding.  
  Along with the moments of “civil society” and “autonomous economic 
development”, the third emphasis with political implications is the analysis of the 
relations between politics and the military. The liberal-democratic criticism of the 
“relative autonomy” and “unaccountability” of the military owes a lot to the 
center-periphery approach. The Turkish Armed Forces, as the chief representative 
of the bureaucratic, dominant “center”, is described as an obstacle before the 
deepening of democracy in Turkey, because of its overt and covert interventions 
in parliamentary politics throughout the Republican era. When unchallenged, the 
liberal-democratic discourse states, these interventions (successful and attempted 
                                                                                                                                     
Science Review 1 (1980): 81-105; “The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of 
Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared,” Comparative Political Studies, 25(2), 169-194.  
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coups, threats, covert operations, etc.) debilitate the civil society. The 1960, 1971, 
1980 and 1997 coups, through the lens of the center-periphery model, are all 
explained as attempts of the militaristic “center” to reassert itself upon society and 
consolidate its hold.  
 A fourth moment which shapes the political opinions of liberal and 
democratic observers through the lens of the center-periphery model concerns the 
“rule of law” in Turkey. Logically, if the analysis of a “strong state” constraining 
the development of “society” holds, this also would have negative implications for 
the properly democratic legal design and implementation of laws. The sphere of 
rights and liberties then, as criticized commonly, would remain underdevelop as 
the Turkish state would rather protect its bureaucratic interests rather than 
reinforce “open society”. 
 According to the center-periphery analysis, the location of the resolution 
of social problems has always been the state. The state hindered the development 
of peripheral mechanisms for social and political maturity, as it has historically 
been suspicious of social groups (like the Kurds or Islamists) which had the 
potential to challenge its authoritarian rule. As the center was suspicious and 
fearful of the periphery, it used any means necessary to maintain its power, 
usually acting outside the boundaries of the rule of law. On this note, the 
proliferation of the critical literature against the “deep state,” against clandestine 
operations of the military and of the Ministry of the Interior can be reminded. In 
regard to both the “Kurdish Question” and “political Islam” the violation of rule 
of law for the sake of “containing” unruly elements of the periphery, was 
commonly problematized. Therefore, within this moment, the political call was 
clear: Let the social and political problems of the country be resolved through 
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multi-party deliberation, including civil society. Remove the influence of the 
military on political, juridical and economic decisions. Render the military 
accountable on all fields, in service of the parliament.
181
 
 Consequently, the center-periphery approach, in the sense that it inspired 
the formulation of political opinions on topics related to the  four main “moments” 
summarized above, contributed a lot to the emergence of the liberal and 
democratic opinion producer as a social type. 
  
                                                 
181 See: Ümit KardaĢ, “UzlaĢma ya da Gerilim,” Radikal 2, 25/06/2006; “Devletçi Seçkinler 
Çevreyi Hep DıĢladı,” Zaman, 17/11/2006; “Demokraside Hükümet Askere Hesap Vermez,” Yeni 
Şafak, 11/12/2006.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
 
THE DEMOCRAT AS A SOCIAL TYPE 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
Reminding once more the definition of „liberal democrat‟ that we use 
throughout this thesis, the point which has to be emphasized firstly is that the 
conceptualization „liberal democrat‟ denotes specific differences from such 
concepts as left-liberal or liberal-left. These stances which have some commons in 
genealogical terms differ at specific historical moments and in some key issues. 
As stated in earlier chapters, the term “liberal” in the conceptualization „liberal 
democrat‟ denotes the priority given by liberal thinking to the protection of 
individual rights and freedoms rather than adherence to liberalism as a doctrine or 
ideology. Hence the emphasis in the definition of liberal-democrat on individual 
liberties defines the category „liberal‟ and the emphasis on an ethical approach to 
democracy, that is, an understanding of democracy based on the dismantling of 
military tutelage, reinforcement of civilian rule, of rule of law and on a strong 
civil society define the category „democratic.‟ 
In fact it is quite difficult to say that qualifications such as „left liberal‟, 
„liberal left‟ or even „civil society advocate‟ correspond to specific stances which 
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have serious differences in-between. In the political culture of Turkey, the 
qualification „liberal‟ has been frequently used for slandering by both the left and 
right, particularly by nationalist and/or Kemalist circles.
182
 Given this, the 
portrayal „liberal left‟ or „left liberal,‟ for instance, is an attribution made by 
others rather than being a qualification preferred by some sections.
183
 For 
example, those who adopt an understanding of socialism that places emphasis on 
individual rights and freedoms rather prefer to define their stances with such 
qualifications as “libertarian socialism,” “libertarian left” and “democratic 
socialism.” Such opinion producers like Murat Belge, Ahmet Ġnsel, Fuat Keyman, 
Baskın Oran and Roni Margulies (described within the “liberal left”), on the other 
hand, mostly refute this qualification.
184
 For instance, in a newspaper article 
written as a reply to Sungur Savran, Fuat Keyman accepts the relationship 
between his frame of thinking and political liberalism, but underlines that 
understanding and changing Turkey is not possible through a liberal-left stance 
which symbolizes an articulation of free market (liberal) and social justice 
(left).
185
 According to Keyman “we need politically liberal principles as much as 
we need the ghosts of Marx, and these two political theories and discourses can be 
matched.” 186  This position signifies the desire to build a bridge between 
“equality” which has its dominant place in socialist political thinking and 
“freedom” which classical liberalism emphasizes at the level of individuals. The 
difficulty inherent in the labeling of this position with such categories as “left 
                                                 
182
 For a comprehensive work on this issue see: Tanıl Bora, “Sol, Liberalizm ve Sinizm,” Birikim, 
No:234, November 2008.    
183
 E.g. see: Ümit Kurt, “AKP ve Sol-Liberal Entelektüeller,” Radikal, 15.02.2008; Sungur Savran, 
“Marksizmle TartıĢma Çağrısı,” Radikal 2, May 11, 2008; Sungur Savran, “Baskın Oran, Roni 
Margulies ve Mahmut Mutman‟a Yanıt,” Radikal 2, June 15, 2008.    
184
 For a discussion on “left-liberal” in Turkey, See: Sungur Savran, “Marksizmle TartıĢma 
Çağrısı,” Radikal 2, May 11, 2008; Sungur Savran, “Baskın Oran, Roni Margulies ve Mahmut 
Mutman‟a Yanıt,” Radikal 2, June 15, 2008.    
185
 Fuat Keyman, “Marx‟ın Hayaletleri ve Türkiye,” Radikal 2, May 25, 2008.  
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liberal” can be reconsidered just in the context of practical troubles and dead-ends 
of this association. The demands for equality and freedom unsupported by strong 
social movements for a long period of time after 1980 have therefore been 
addressed on paper by opinion producers who were disconnected from political 
activism.  
Hence, the qualification “left-liberal” (or “liberal left”) describes those 
who are related to Marxism in some way and insist on defending certain socialist 
principles albeit with some reservations whether they themselves adopt the term 
or just face it as an attribution by others. This approach based on the premise that 
the importance attributed by Marxism to class relations has lost its validity in our 
day was justified by interpretations of the writings of Poulantzas, who was 
thought to argue that class relations were superseded by political power 
relations.
187
 According to Ahmet Ġnsel, one of the leading representatives of this 
stance, transformations taking place in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries caused the 
working class to lose its status as “emancipating class embodying the germs of a 
promising future.” Hence, class based discourses must be dropped and an 
understanding of a non-sexist socialism based on “libertarianism, de-
centralization, internationalism, democratic planning and anti-militarism, 
redefining human-nature relations” must be insistently defended.188 According to 
Ġnsel, it is absolutely necessary to go beyond that classical left-socialist analysis 
                                                 
187
 While discussing the relative autonomy of many specific state policies from class interests, 
Poulantzas‟ structural Marxism did not reduce analysis to the contention between “state and 
society”. Nevertheless, it was Murat Belge, Ahmet Ġnsel and others around the journal Birikim 
who first introduced to Turkish readers their interpretation of the leading figures of structural 
Marxism including Louis Althusser and Nikos Poulantzas and used their theoretical framework to 
explain the case of Turkey. They later placed this “state-society opposition” at the centre of their 
political opinion building efforts. (Poulantzas‟ Fascism and Dictatorship was translated into 
Turkish by Ahmet Ġnsel in 2004). The theme “relative autonomy of the State” was then stripped 
off from its more rigid class content and frequently used to discuss the State in Turkey which is 
said to encroach upon the domain of individual liberties while isolating itself from social demands. 
For a detailed analysis, see: Savran, 1987.   
188
 Interview with Ahmet İnsel, NeĢe Düzel, Taraf, January 18, 2008.  
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that “reduces the way of imagining society merely as reduced to class struggles, 
neglecting individualization, regarding the society essentially as a domain of 
clashing economic interests and reducing human beings to positions taken in these 
clashes”. 189  Hence, while not refuting class-based determinations, left-liberal 
opinion producers believe that class relations should be seen as at the same level 
with all other determinations. Contrary to class-based reductionism of classical 
socialism, this approach envisages the design of an economic order where the 
principle of freedom is not sacrificed for equality and where equality and freedom 
are both equally upheld. In Ġnsel‟s words:  
 
In the 20
th
 century we witnessed socialist regimes in which freedoms are 
withheld for the sake of equality. You can establish equality in poverty, 
you can introduce equality in some rights, but equality achieved at the 
expense of freedoms is not a lasting achievement. If you ask the citizens of 
the former German Democratic Republic old enough to remember the 60s 
whether they want to go back to those years I think nobody would really 
want that (2010).  
 
 Eventually it is safe to say that left liberalism or liberal left, while inspired 
by Marxism this or that way, takes “center-periphery” approach as basis in their 
social analyses and rests on an understanding that conceptualizes civil society and 
the State as in binary opposition.
190
 Left liberalism, reading political 
developments as outcomes of a clash between the State and civil society, is 
convinced that a libertarian and democratic socialism is feasible in Turkey in case 
civil society is accorded a space to flourish and grow. From this perspective it is 
also argued the process of globalization, believed to be destined to weaken the 
oppressive state apparatus, will present an opportunity for Turkey to be integrated 
with the world. And this integration lies, it is believed, in its most concrete form, 
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 Interview with Ahmet İnsel, Cihan Erdal, Turnusol Haber, January 17, 2010.  
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 Note the comprehensive discussion on theoretical and political approaches concerned in earlier 
chapters (Chapters 5 and 6).  
  
204 
 
in Turkey‟s EU accession. 191  For example, according to Keyman, relations 
between Turkey and EU are of a kind that requires democratization, transparency 
and more responsible acts of the State in Turkey (2004).  Hence, the process of 
EU accession will contribute to the transformation of state-society/individual 
relations in the country in a way favoring the individual. These relations will also 
ensure the widening of the domain of fundamental rights and freedoms and lay the 
foundations of a new concept of citizenship (Keyman, 2004). Baskın Oran has 
similar views: The EU process may contribute to the institutionalization of an 
understanding of citizenship that is not „compulsory‟ but „voluntary‟ where 
citizens are attached to their state not forcefully but for being happy to live in a 
specific country (2009).
192
 
 While mostly agreeing with these positions, Tanıl Bora underlines a 
difference between the concepts “liberal left” and “left liberal” (2008). Bora 
argues that socialism and liberalism both derive from the same origin and Marx‟s 
own understanding of socialism amounts to the sublimation of liberalism 
(2008).
193
 Hence, the critique of liberalism has a foundational value for Marx‟s 
socialism, a critique which has/should have continuity (2008). The common 
denominator for liberalism and socialism is of course the realm of rights and 
freedoms. However, the demarcation line is drawn with the socialist critique that 
liberalism‟s promises of freedom can but remain abstract, without any chance of 
full materialization. According to Bora,  
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 For example see: Fuat Keyman, “Niye Avrupa Birliği?” Radikal 2, April 20, 2003. Also see: 
Ahmet Ġnsel, “Avrupa Birliği: Nasıl Bir KurumsallaĢma?” Birikim, No:157, May 2002. For an 
alternative and critical approach on the EU see: Tanıl Bora, “Hangi Avrupa Birliği? Hangi 
Müktesebat?” Birikim, No:157, May 2002.  
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For a comprehensive discussion see: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi, January 5, 2009, Interview 
with Baskın Oran.  
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 For a similar evaluation see: Ömer Laçiner, “Yolun sonu/baĢlangıcı,” Birikim, No: 232/233, 
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Socialism is distinct from liberalism in its questioning of the dictum, „all 
are equal but some are more equal‟ and by its focus on the positive content 
of rights and freedoms and material-objective conditions of their 
realization (2008). 
 
 Bora stresses that in spite of this distinction socialism still needs to learn 
from the challenge of liberalism. Indeed,  
 
The criticism offered by liberalism contains a warning against the risk of 
the transformation of objectivism and voluntarist intervention to human 
processes into a positivist attitude – we know from the history of socialism 
that such a risk does exist (2008).  
 
 After pointing to kinship in-between and common denominator of 
socialism and liberalism, Bora argues that the following demarcation line is 
necessary between „left liberal‟ and „liberal leftist‟:  
 
Left liberals are those liberals who are relatively more sensitive to such 
issues as equality and social justice. Liberal leftists on the other hand are 
leftists who are passionately committed to issues related to negative rights 
and freedoms and whose dedication to socialism and social democracy is 
coextensive with this commitment (2008).   
 
 In this conceptualization suggested by Bora, while “liberal left” 
corresponds to a position which has more affinity with socialism, the “left liberal” 
stance has some distance from it, adopting an ideological line closer to liberalism. 
From the perspective of my main argument in this dissertation, it must be said 
once more that this classification is not of vital importance. Moreover, the debate 
concerning such categorizations is over-theorized and destined to remain on 
paper. For example, when one argues that socialism can be reinforced by political 
liberalism, one might be referring theoretically to Habermas, Kant or Bobbio. 
However, whatever label we prefer, whether „left liberal‟ or „liberal left,‟ in 
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describing a specific group of opinion producers, the main point is whether we are 
diligent enough to account for the circumstances that bring about the liberal or 
democratic opinions that are defended. In other words, the more insightful plain of 
analysis lies in connecting the dots between individual Democrats (as 
representative of a social type) and socio-political events (national and 
international) in which their opinion production is embedded. My basic contention 
is not to engage in an abstract discussion focusing on concepts but to expose what 
kinds of meanings concepts assume in relation to political and social 
developments taking place in Turkey after the 80s. Consequently, it is not much 
of an interest for me whether “liberal-democrat”, “left liberal” or “liberal leftist” 
is the truest theoretical label.  
Social type analysis allows us to analyze the group in focus in the context 
of their intellectual life-worlds, relations they establish, alliances they join and 
positions they take before the public as part of the reality they experience. 
Assuming that the very act of conceptualization is built within this relational 
network, a reflexive perspective is necessary. One of the reasons why opinion 
producers who are distracted by theoretical categorizations are hesitant to position 
themselves in one of these categories is their lack of self-reflexivity: They cannot 
self-analyze their own work of opinion production as part of the general “game” 
being played. The Democrat almost always fails to acknowledge and understand 
the fact that he himself is embedded in the social-political world that enables him 
to generate opinions.  
A fundamental point must be underlined once more: In the usage of the 
concept „liberal democrat,‟ the term „liberal‟ mainly refers to the category of 
individual freedoms, while „democrat‟ refers to an ethical approach to democracy, 
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elimination of military tutelage, “becoming civilian” and the dominance of rule of 
law. Therefore, t he Democrat, as representative of a social type, occupies a 
position sensitive to both dimensions. The whole point of my social type analysis 
is to how these „liberal‟ and „democratic‟ plains of opinion production are 
contextualized as the Democrat connects with Turkish politics.  
The Democrat firstly distinguishes himself or herself from socialism and 
Kemalism as understood in Turkey. The major rationale for this demarcation is 
the Democrat‟s perception that both of these ideologies support an image of a 
collectivist-authoritarian society. The Democrat argues that that socialism, 
especially as it is understood in Turkey, is an authoritarian initiative geared to 
social engineering. Developments taking place in Eastern Europe after 1989, 
collapse of the Soviet Union and serious loss of prestige suffered by socialism in 
this period meant to liberal and democrat opinion producers confirmation of their 
outlook to socialism and as such it contributed to the consolidation of their earlier 
judgments about socialism.  
In this chapter, three figures are examined as cases that exemplify the 
Democrat as a social type: KürĢat Bumin, Etyen Mahçupyan and Ali Bayramoğlu. 
To construct each of these case studies, a historical and discursive analysis was 
completed, reinforced by in-depth interviews with each figure. Their works were 
analyzed, their biographies were explored and political and social factors building 
the social type were investigated. The emergence of the social type addressed over 
these three cases will be shown in two dimensions.  
In the first dimension, the evolution of the social type is addressed through 
the relations of these three opinion producers with intellectual structures. In other 
words, the relation of the three cases to such politically influential Turkish 
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discourses as Kemalism, conservatism, post-modernism, political liberalism or 
social democracy will be examined as the first level in the consolidation of the 
liberal and democrat social type. 
 In the second dimension, the formation of the social type as the Democrat 
will be shown in relation to some Turkey-specific and international key socio-
political developments through three cases that will be examined. In other words, 
assuming that relations that these three opinion producers have established with 
social structures are common and/or comparable, the formation of the social type 
examined in this second dimension will be addressed. The liberal and democratic 
opinion production is, first of all, directly associated with the “criticism of 
military tutelage” which has experienced various turning points in its course. This 
relationship can be observed, for example, during the rule of ANAP led by Turgut 
Özal, liberal stances taken in relation to the Kurdish issue or democratization 
debates emerging with the “28 February process.”         
7.2. Crossroads: Second Republicanism and New Democracy Movement 
(YDH)  
The visibility in political arena of liberal and democratic opinion producers 
essentially began with their engagement with the New Democracy Movement 
(YDH) launched under the leadership of Cem Boyner,
194
 the former president of 
TÜSĠAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen). Having its 
foundations laid in 1992 and being active in 1993 as a civil society organization, 
the YDH was a kind of institutional focus of the debates around the “Second 
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Cem Boyner: He was the leader of the New Democracy Movement (YDH) when it organized as 
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Hüseyin Ergün was the leader of the party which, after getting 0.48% of total ballot in the general 
elections of 1995, joined the Party for Peace (BarıĢ Partisi) led by Ali Haydar Veziroğlu in 1997 
(In-depth interview with Hüseyin Ergün, August 5, 2011).  
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Republic” 195 getting hot in 1991. Indeed, the leading figures of the movement are 
mostly akin to arguments for a Second Republic. A similar overlapping is also 
valid for the cadres that constitute the YDH and opinion leaders known as Second 
Republicans. Including Mehmet Altan in the first place as the leading 
representative of the Second Republic idea, Cengiz Çandar and Asaf SavaĢ Akat 
assumed key positions in the YDH.
196
  
The Second Republican opinion producers fuelled by the civil society 
discourse
197
 suggested a far-reaching criticism of the authoritarian, militarist, 
bureaucratic and top-to-down (Jacobin) characteristics of the Republic with their 
theoretical approaches with references to Küçükömer and/or Mardin. 198  Their 
argument is that the Second Republic which is to replace the first one which is 
alien to pluralism, based not on the sovereignty of people but bureaucracy and the 
army reflects the desire of change cherished by all layers of society except the 
allied parties of military-civilian bureaucracy and pseudo-bourgeois making 
wealth with the support of the former. With the Second Republic, “the oppressive 
state structure will be destroyed and the power which was once withdrawn from 
the Ottoman dynasty but not given to people will thus find its real owner” (Altan, 
1992). According to Mehmet Altan who first came up with the Second Republic 
project, this radical project envisages the elimination of military tutelage and 
bureaucratic character of the regime and making the rule of law operate (1992).  
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The project for a Second Republic foresees a state structure whose weight 
in economy is reduced, a transparent state where taxpayers can trace for what 
purposes taxes they paid are spent. According to this idea, the Kemalist concept of 
state which consolidates the hegemony of bureaucracy will be abandoned and 
economy will be allowed to operate fully in line with the rules of free market. 
Further, tax base will be expanded by reducing tax rates and Kemalist statism 
which has degenerated into a system of plunder will be terminated through 
privatizations (Altan, 1992). In fact, the basic motive behind the opposition of the 
Kemalist elite, military-civilian bureaucracy to the idea of shrinking state is their 
unwillingness to give up their patronage over the economy (Altan, 1992). The 
argument follows that the transfer to people of economic power held by the 
military and civilian bureaucracy will undermine this elite‟s hegemony over 
political life and then it will be easier to thwart military tutelage. In any case, 
 
the mission of the army is not to act as an institution keeping civilian 
power under threat but to protect the country from external foes and 
assume duties in line with the foreign policy of the country (Çandar, 
1993:109).  
 
 The “rule of law” is of course the heading that the project for a Second 
Republic focuses on in the first place. They say bringing in the rule of law 
presupposes the termination of military tutelage. In the first republic, this 
principle was not translated into life as civilian-military bureaucracy was always 
favored (Altan, 1993: 37). The establishment of the rule of law and ensuring 
people‟s sovereignty is possible only when there is no institutional structure over 
and above the parliament. Yet, as stressed by Altan,  
 
The National Security Council (MGK) is a constitutional organ above the 
parliament even today. It directs or even controls people‟s sovereignty. No 
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claim of corruption can be investigated if persons with uniforms are 
involved. Nothing can be investigated in such cases including secret 
counter-guerrilla organizations (….) the military who forced villagers to 
eat faeces was promoted let aside being penalized. Would the case be so if 
it were villagers who forced the colonel to eat that? Then, the rule of law is 
not applicable to the state elite, to armed bureaucracy (1993:37).  
 
The immediate demand of Second Republicans for ensuring the 
sovereignty of people and rule of law is the drafting of a new and civilian 
constitution. This new constitution would put an end to the position of the MGK 
over and above the parliament and further enlarge and guarantee the rights and 
freedoms of citizens.
199
 Another heading in envisaged new constitution is related 
to presidential system. In fact, presidential system is not an issue on which all 
second republican opinion leaders share the same view. For example, while 
Cengiz Çandar is an ardent defender of this system, Mehmet Altan raises serious 
objections to transition to the presidential system (Sever and Dizdar, 1993: 55, 
108). According to Çandar who asserts that the society does have tendencies in 
accord with this system deriving from the tradition of Ottoman Sultans, 
presidential system may offer a more democratic structure open to mutual 
checking given that it is maintained at a specific balance (Sever and Dizdar, 
1993:108). Contrary to Çandar, Mehmet Altan warns that the very same tradition 
of the Ottoman era may end up in our day with the suppression of democratic 
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 The campaign “I want my constitution” launched in the early 2000 by a group called “Civilian 
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tendencies and he firmly stands against the idea of transition to presidential 
system (Sever and Dizdar, 1993: 55).  
While presenting their arguments, the heading that Second Republicans 
frequently make reference to is of course what they call “globalization.” This 
process of globalization which has led to the dissolution of monolithic identities 
by pressing over the nation-state brought along a rising demand for new identities 
and made it possible for identities that the Turkish Republic suppressed since its 
inception to be visible in the public sphere together with new demands related to 
identity. Hence, in a globalized world it will not be as easy as it once was to 
suppress and silence Kurdish and Moslem identities that started to be raised more 
loudly in the 80s. Rising identity claims and emergence of a new area of struggle 
over this is considered as one of the major indicators that Kemalism cannot 
operate anymore; it is an ideology built upon a monolithic mentality rejecting all 
other identities (Altan, 1993: 56). Indeed, the very existence of an official 
Presidency for Religious Affairs is the most concrete indicator of the State control 
over religion. While financed by taxes paid also by non-Moslems and Moslems 
not from the “Sunni” sect, this institution represents only one approach of Sunni 
Islam, Hanefilik. Turkey‟s integration with the global world or “transition from 
agricultural to informational society” as Mehmet Altan puts it presupposes state‟s 
withdrawal from almost all areas from economy to education (1993: 43). For 
example, laicism in its true sense can be established when the state no more 
extends its hands to the domain of faith. According to Altan,  
 
There is a Kurdish problem in Turkey, which is considered non-existing by 
the official ideology. There is the problem of Islam in Turkey; that means 
Islam is rejected culturally. Kemalism is not fond of other ideologies. Now 
the country is trying to get rid of these tight clothes with Turgut Özal‟s 
initiatives, by integrating with free market and radically changing world. 
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Turkey is discovering Islam, not as a religion but as a culture, it is 
discovering the Kurdish problem. This dynamism deriving from our rich 
pieces of mosaic will make this society much more democratic and 
productive (1993: 56-57).  
 
The “neo-ottomanism” project is another way that the Second Republican 
circles find plausible in responding to claims for identity. This project entailing 
the idea that an approach focusing on the multi-cultural nature of the Ottoman can 
respond to requests for change emanating from searches for identity can be seen, 
in essence, as a new foreign policy approach coinciding with Turkey‟s search for 
a new position immediately after the Gulf War. The neo-ottomanism which was 
promoted by Cengiz Çandar,200 then known as an unofficial advisor to Turgut 
Özal, in response to a new conjuncture in the region envisages Turkey as a 
country following an active policy in the region, acting with an “imperial vision.” 
In other words, the project is based on the idea that given the upheaval in the 
Caucasus and Turkic Republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Turkey can gain an upper hand in the process as the successor of the Ottoman 
Empire. In the same process, the First Gulf War and upheaval in the Balkans 
further triggered imperial ambitions and consequently it became more plausible 
that instead of remaining merely as a border post for NATO Turkey could well 
establish herself as a tutelar in the region. Throughout the period of cold war 
Turkey enjoyed an important position in NATO mainly for geo-politics. The end 
of this period meant for Turkey the loss of this advantage and consequently 
Turkey started to design a new foreign policy based on new ambitions and 
assertions derived from her earlier imperial experiences in areas facing instability 
                                                 
200
 Çandar served as special adviser to Turkish president Turgut Özal between 1991 and 1993. See: 
Author biography at Ġz Publications. For further information, see: 
http://www.iz.com.tr/?git=yazsab&kod=cengizcandar.  
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and newly emerging clashes. In short, neo-ottomanism as a project is based on 
Turkey‟s potential for raising imperial claims as the heir of an empire that ruled 
the Middle East and Balkans for centuries and as an actor that can guide her kin in 
the Caucasus.  Çandar describes the situation as follows:  
 
Circumstances placed Turkey in a position where she can control the most 
important pathways in a large free trade area of the world. It is because 
immense areas and markets that had hitherto closed themselves to the 
outer world suddenly unfolded. Central Asia, Siberia, Ukraine...They have 
been on trade routes for centuries. Also, upon the dissolution of Socialist 
Bloc Balkan countries came out with their new identities… In this sense, 
Turkey caught the chance of representing one of the critical balances 
altogether forming the balance in a unipolar world indexed to the 
international free trade regime called as the New World Order (1993: 104).  
 
Then, since it would not be possible to assign a meaning to imperial 
desires and claims inspired by the neo-ottomanism within the confines of misak-ı 
milli (national oath), it is a must to consider the former Ottoman geography as a 
kind of “natural space for moving” (Çandar, 1993: 104). Hence,  
 
All countries around are heirs to the Ottoman; but Turkey is the only 
country where the Ottoman estate remains and this geography is her 
natural space of movement. It can be said that even pre-ottoman geography 
is now open to her (Çandar, 1993: 104).  
 
 
Meanwhile, the neo-ottomanism related approaches of other Second 
Republican opinion leaders manifested themselves as implicit support or 
acceptance with some reservations. Mehmet Altan, for instance, tends to question 
the operability of the project addressing the issue in normative terms or from a 
political ground. Altan thinks that the defensive strength of the Turkish army, 
Turkey‟s share in total world trade and the present state of her productive capacity 
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are the factors that do not allow Turkey to turn out as an imperial power (Altan, 
1993: 53). In his words:  
 
If you are still unable to send to Turkic countries 10,000 typing machines 
that you promised how will you do what you have been saying? With 
which army are you going to do it? You can‟t even catch Russian planes 
departing from Batumi... (1993: 53)  
 
While agreeing Altan in broad terms, Hikmet Özdemir is convinced that 
the new-ottomanism will provide a historical opportunity for making it up with 
history, hence with Islam which is an inseparable part of our culture (1993: 79). 
According to Özdemir, a neo-ottoman perspective will also facilitate solution in 
the Kurdish issue; by reviving an Ottoman type of multi-culturalism and through 
religious communities, civil society can gain life in the Kurdish issue too 
(Özdemir, 1993: 80).  
The most serious objection to the neo-ottoman perspective was raised by 
Asaf SavaĢ Akat. Akat stated he was never fond of this perspective which is 
destined to bring along a new nationalist discourse and the project could be no 
solution to identity problems in Turkey (1993: 127). According to Akat, the only 
way that Turkey can get out of this impasse is to develop an identity with 
reference to „democracy‟ instead of Islam, being a Turk or Ottoman (1993: 128). 
Nevertheless, almost all figures, including Akat, who criticize the neo-ottoman 
perspective agree that the foreign policy approach of Turkey is shallow, passive 
and “without vision” as in the well-known expression of Özal. This wide-based 
agreement indicates that an „imperial‟ vision is in fact internalized however 
implicit it may be.
201
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 For Akat‟s criticism of the trajectory of the foreign policy adopted by Turkey, see: Akat, 
1993:128-129.  
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To wrap up, according to the Second Republican opinion leaders, devoid 
of democratic essence indispensible for a true people‟s sovereignty the Republic 
declared in 1923 ended up not in a „democratic‟ but merely „laic‟ republic and by 
refuting class dynamics it eliminated the bases of social development (Altan, 1993: 
47-48). This specific republican philosophy consolidated in the course of time by 
military-tutelary bureaucracy, sweeping away elements of democracy, is the main 
reason behind the presently ongoing anti-democratic structure (Altan, 1993: 49).  
Ways leading to a democratic Turkey can be opened by ensuring civilianization 
and dismantling military-tutelary regime and oppressive state, transferring power 
to the people which was one taken away from the Ottoman dynasty.  
From the angle of economics, it can be stated that the Second Republic 
project describes civil society on neo-liberal grounds and envisages the shrinking 
of the State in line with neo-liberal restructuring (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002). As 
a matter of fact, as stated earlier, given the overlapping of Özal‟s neo-liberal 
policies and changes envisaged by the Second Republic project, many circles 
regard Özal as the architect of the Second Republic project (Dizdar and Sever, 
1993: 11).
202
 Indeed, statements by Özal on Turkey‟s advent to information age 
and “jumping a century forward” almost fully coincide, in both content and 
discourse, with recipes suggested by Second Republican opinion leaders for 
reaching the “information age.” 203  Moreover, almost all Second Republican 
opinion leaders agree that all obstacles to free market should be removed and 
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 Mehmet Altan regards Turgut Özal as the catalyst of mentality change in Turkey See: Altan, 
1993:59.  
203
 See: “Turgut Özal‟s speeches at the 3rd Ġzmir Economics Congress, June 4, 1992, Ġzmir,” Sever 
and Dizdar, 1993: 15. According to Mehmet Altan, the pillars of the system of degraded statism 
include state banks, state economic enterprises, state incentives, customs funds and private 
foundations enmeshed with Government ministries. No politician or political institution could do 
away with this system of pillage. Deprived of their economic freedom, the people too are unable to 
break it down. See: Altan, 1992.  For Mehmet Altan‟s views concerning Özal, see: Altan, 2008: 
138.  
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Turkey should integrate with the liberal free market system. For example, 
Mehmet Altan summarizes the most fundamental problem in Turkey as failure to 
realize the transition from political to liberal state (1993: 42). According to this 
view, as the State becomes liberal and is reduced to a mere technical apparatus, 
domains such as religion, education, press etc will be transferred to civil society  
while the State will suffice with such functions as mintage, tax collection and 
diplomacy.
204
 As a result of principles underlying the Second Republic, economy 
will assume a character allowing for pluralism rather than being the single center 
of command and Turkey will reach the status of information society leaving 
behind the dominance of agriculture (Altan, 1993: 43).  
In spite of all their political emphases, it seems much sounder to regard 
Second Republicanism as a current just like left wing liberalism rather than 
defining it as a political movement (Savran, 2006). Eventually, Second 
Republicanism, left wing liberalism or civil society advocacy as combining the 
earlier two have assumed a function of being a point of reference for demarcations 
and position definitions on both political-ideological plane and in academic 
domain (Savran, 2006).
205
 The representatives of this current maintained their 
political assertions and suggestions in different political threads rather than getting 
together in a single political party and made efforts for depicting a liberal-
democrat or liberal political line in the longer term.
206
 The case where the current 
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 According to this conceptualization the state is, of course, free from ideologies, neutral and an 
instrument serving the society.  
205
 Historians Mete Tunçay and Halil Berktay must be cited as representatives of critical-opposing 
and civil society approach in academia. With his criticisms of Kemalism, Asaf SavaĢ Akat is 
another figure providing significant support to the opposition in intellectual terms. See: Asaf SavaĢ 
Akat, “Kemalizm Türk Solunu Muhalefete Mahkum Ediyor,” in Resmi Tarih Sivil Arayış: Sosyal 
Demokratlarda İdeoloji ve Politika, RuĢen Çakır and Hıdır GöktaĢ (editors), Metis, Ġstanbul:1991.   
206
 Cengiz Çandar was for a long time the unofficial foreign policy advisor to Turgut Özal while 
Mehmet Altan was the advisor to Culture Minister Fikri Sağlar when the 49th Government was in 
office (Altan, 2008:214). Contributing to Yeni Gündem for some time, Asaf SavaĢ Akat was a 
member of the DSP (Democratic Left Party) and then SHP (Social-Democrat People‟s Party). See: 
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was represented by an independent political party occurred with the emergence of 
the New Democracy Movement (YDH). Joining the political arena with liberal-
democrat political assertions, the YDH took the party form afterwards, but failed 
to sustain itself in the face of the conservative-liberal blend of Turkish politics.
207
  
The YDH first emerged as a discussion group hosted by Cem Boyner. 
Then, upon increasing number of participants, it evolved into an intellectual 
discussion platform organized in Çeliktepe. The YDH‟s intention to directly take 
part and interfere in political domain led to some differences of opinion among 
liberal/democrat opinion producers that it had brought together (Altan, 2008: 220, 
Ergün, 2011). A group of opinion producers had the idea that the YDH should 
limit its mission to influencing political opinion making mainly through preparing 
reports on such major problems and issues as the Kurdish problem, military 
tutelage and political Islam. Upon the decision of others to get organized as a 
political party, this group distanced itself from the YDH preferring to support it 
from without.
208
 
The composition and member profile of the YDH gives a kind of a map of 
left wing liberalism/liberal left in Turkey: A group of people, may be called as 
                                                                                                                                     
“Bir Portre: Asaf SavaĢ Akat,” İktisat Dergisi, October 1992 in Akat:2004.  For Akat‟s criticism of 
the SHP programme, see: Sosyal Demokrasi Gündemi, Armoni Yay., Ġstanbul: 1991.  
207
 One of the founding members of the YDH, Prof. ġerif Mardin makes a similar assessment: “I 
was one of the founders of the New Democracy Movement. It was a movement bringing together 
wise persons with good faith, but lacking any understanding of how politics run in Turkey. We 
moved together with Kemal DerviĢ, but it soon became clear that it would not be much influential 
in political terms. There are some people saying that the YDH would be very influential today... I 
don‟t agree, liberal intellectualism is one thing and mobilizing voters is another thing completely 
different.” RuĢen Çakır‟s interview, Vatan, May 25, 2007.  
208
 Ali Bayramoğlu and KürĢat Bumin are opinion producers who left the YDH upon its decision 
to get organized as a party with the concern that established anti-democratic habits in Turkey 
would find their way in the YDH as well. Indeed, when the YDH engaged in talks of alliance with 
the ANAP before the elections of 1995, they considered this as a deviation from the original 
mission (Cited by Kürşat Bumin, in-depth interview on 6 June 2011; Ali Bayramoğlu, in-depth 
interview on 21 June 2011). In the organization of the YDH, specific tasks undertaken were as 
follows: Cem Boyner (speaker), Memduh Hacıoğlu (secretary general), Hüseyin Ergün (political 
affairs), Prof Asaf SavaĢ Akat (policy development), Cengiz Çandar (organizational affairs), and 
Zülfü Dicleli (strategy development). Cited by Hüseyin Ergün, in-depth interview on 5 August 
2011. Also see: Milliyet daily, September 10, 1994.    
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“brain team” who joined the YDH in discussion process were once involved in 
socialist movement and even assumed key positions in this movement during their 
earlier political lives.
209
 Besides Cengiz Çandar having his origin in Aydınlık 
movement, Zülfü Dicleli,210 one of the leading figures of the Communist Party of 
Turkey (TKP) and founder of TBKP
211
 had a central position in the YDH, shaping 
its ideological-political orientations. Another major component of the YDH 
consisted of Kurdish opinion producers and politicians with some distance to 
socialist left who had their roads crossed with the YDH while trying to organize in 
a political party. Editor Ümit Fırat, parliamentarians Hüsnü Okçuoğlu and Kamil 
AteĢoğulları who did not take part in the foundation of HEP together with 
deputies who resigned or were dispelled from the SHP were the leading figures in 
YDH‟s organization especially in Kurdish provinces. 212  Another figure giving 
hints about the composition of the YDH was Kemal Anadol who was the 
secretary general when the movement was organized as a political party. A CHP 
deputy from Zonguldak before the 1980 coup, Anadol was also the deputy 
                                                 
209Examples include the following: Hüseyin Ergün (TĠP), Zülfü Dicleli (TKP), Cengiz Çandar 
(Aydınlık movement).  
210
 According to Hüseyin Ergün, Zülfü Dicleli then working in the Ġstanbul branch of Mülkiyeliler 
Birliği (Association of the Graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences) came into contact with 
the YDH via Ergün and soon became one of the key figures of the movement. Dicleli, together 
with Ergün, was one of the 10 founding members of the YDH (In-depth interview with Hüseyin 
Ergün, August 5, 2011). 
211
 TBKP (United Communist Party of Turkey): It is the legal communist party declared on 4 June 
1990 by Nihat Sargın and Nabi Yağcı (Haydar Kutlu) who returned to Turkey in 1987. In broad 
sense, the TBKP is a political organization composed of the members of the TĠP and illegal TKP. 
On 16 July 1991, the Constitutional Court decided for the closure of the party and this decision 
was published in the Official Gazette dated 28 January 1992. The TBKP is considered as the 
predecessor of SBP (Socialist Union Party). For further information, see: Nihat Sargın, Dönüşten 
Özgürlüğe 900 Gün: Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi,‟TBKP Davası,‟ Tüstav Ġktisadi ĠĢletmesi, 
Ġstanbul: 2006.   
212
 Hüsnü Okçuoğlu and Kamil AteĢoğulları were two SHP deputies resigning from the party to 
support SHP deputies who were dispelled from the party on 16 November 1989 for participating to 
the Kurdish Conference held in Paris in October 1989 and to protest this act of the party. Before 
joining the YDH they were involved in the founding process of the Socialist Union Party (SBP). 
Others resigning took part in the process of founding the HEP together with SHP members from 
Diyarbakır and Urfa who had also resigned to protest the same act. Collaborating with the SHP in 
1991 elections, the HEP sent 18 deputies to the parliament and the party was closed down by the 
Constitutional Court on 14 July 1993.  
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president of the Peace Association.
213
 After the coup, Anadol continued his 
political career in SHP and later joined those deputies resigning from SHP to 
protest the expulsion of some deputies for taking part in a Kurdish conference 
abroad.
214
 After resigning from the SHP, Anadol joined the Socialist Union Party 
(SBP)
 215
 that brought together socialists from TKP, TĠP, TSĠP and other socialist 
groups and was, for a period of time, deputy-chair of the party led by Professor 
Sadun Aren.
216
 To sum up, it is possible to say that the YDH could manage to 
bring together specific groups inspired by left wing liberalism though at 
representation level.  
Arguing that with its ongoing „defects‟ and „limitations‟ democracy was 
not fully established in Turkey, the political assertion of the YDH consisted of 
defending a series of reforms that would bring a western type democracy to 
Turkey. The basic assumption behind this assertion was the idea that the defects 
of the present order could be eliminated only with democratic processes giving 
depth to and spreading democracy in the country (Boyner, 1994b: 34, 37). While 
acceding that reforms introduced by Turgut Özal in the 80s constituted an 
important turning point in Turkey‟s integration with the rest of the world and 
making market economy operational, the YDH stresses that still significant 
lacunae existed in some domains. That is, new values were not created for filling 
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 Kemal Anadol was tried as one of the leaders of the Peace Association and served one year in 
prison. For his memoirs see: Kartal Maltepe‟den Sağmalcılar‟a İnsan Manzaraları, 1988, 
Ġstanbul: Yalçın Yayınları.  
214
 Kemal Anadol was SHP‟s Ġzmir Deputy in the period 1989-1991.  
215
 The SBP was founded on 15 January 1991 by socialist circles from different backgrounds. The 
party defined its core mission as bringing the socialist left under the same roof. The party ran for 
the local elections of 24 March 1994 under the name BSA (United Socialist Alternative) with the 
participation of other socialist groups and had 80,000 votes. While under the threat of closure for 
its policies on the Kurdish issue, the BSA was transformed into a new party as United Socialist 
Party (BSP). The BSP is one of the key stepping stones of the ÖDP (Party for Freedom and 
Solidarity) which was founded in 1996.  
216
 Together with Kamil AteĢoğulları and Hüsnü Okçuoğlu, Kemal Anadol left the SBP and took 
part in the YDP process in 1994. Anadol is presently a CHP deputy from Ġzmir.  
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the space of taboos broken by Özal, which resulted in degeneration and abrasion 
in politics. As such, politics are defined not on the basis of respective interests but 
values and beliefs and evolve around the axis laicism/faith. According to Cem 
Boyner, the YDH had the mission of saving politics from this artificial axis of 
clash and giving it a new frame satisfying universal criteria (1994a: 7). The 
priority step to be taken along this mission was to minimize the functions of the 
State and eliminate barriers to the working of free market. In Boyner‟s words:  
 
Turkey needs a radical revolution in mentality. This time we have to 
change the places of the cart and horses (…) we have to change the places 
of individuals and the state. Our Constitution starts by declaring the state 
as holy. Not so! It is human beings that are to be exalted. Humans first! 
(1994: 10).  
 
 In short, the YDH is insistent that the function of the state should be 
limited to maintaining law and order since production is essentially an activity 
that must be taken up by society (Boyner, 1994b: 38). Putting an end to the 
idleness of the State requires a radical and rigid programme for privatization; 
“privatization is such an important concept to justify privatization just for being 
privatization per se” (Boyner, 1994a: 12). Hence, ensuring productivity in Turkey 
and improving political ethics depends upon the strict implementation of 
privatizations. Otherwise, statism as well as services and means held by the public 
sector pave the way for corruption, nepotism and plunder and thus serve to the 
further degeneration of politics (Boyner, 1994b: 39, Akat, 1994: 54). Meanwhile, 
the direct relationship between efficiency and market economy loses its validity 
when it comes to justice. The YDH discourse continuously insists that free market 
economy alone is not capable of ensuring social justice. Ensuring equal 
opportunities in education and creating solidarity networks for retirees and the 
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needy therefore have their important places in the political programme of the 
party: 
 
The New Democracy Movement is a solidarity initiative and we attach as 
much importance to social justice and equality as we attach to the other 
two (productivity and freedom). These are all complementary and 
mutually supportive (Boyner, 1994a: 21).  
 
 Under the liberal-democratic political project of the YDH, safeguarding 
religious freedoms too is one of the indispensible elements of the rule of law. The 
precondition to ensuring this is to build a solid wall between the State and the 
domain of faith; that is to leave religious affairs entirely to society and 
communities (Boyner, 1994a: 13, Akat, 1994: 53).  
 Perhaps the field that the YDH displays its most radical attitude is the 
Kurdish problem which they describe as the most actual and burning one in the 
country (Boyner, 1994a: 13). The YDH adopted a discourse that unequivocally 
rejects the reduction of the problem into an issue of terror and order and 
insistently advocated for „political solution‟ (Akat, 1994: 52). After all, 
recognition of Kurdish identity and enjoyment by Kurds of their fundamental 
rights and freedoms without any condition is a principle that the YDH upholds 
without debate. While stressing that the Kurdish problem does not merely consist 
of terror, the YDH reminds that in fighting out the PKK as an armed organization 
security forces should act lawfully in order to curb the popular base of terrorist 
acts (Akat, 1994: 52). According to the YDH, in case the Kurdish problem 
remains unsolved, economic problems of Turkey will become much graver and 
funds shifted from education to security will cause in near future to ever more 
burning manifestation of social problems (Boyner, 1994a:13). As the speaker for 
and leader of the YDH, Boyner‟s criticism of the army in the context of the 
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Kurdish problem can be considered as a concrete example of YDH‟s radical 
stance:  
 
You cannot show any other country that has been bombing her own land 
for ten years now. It is not usual at all; generally people bomb other 
countries. If a mule is decorated in that region there must be a serious 
mistake somewhere. While fighting out terrorism in a language that it can 
understand, we say we have to launch our social, economic and democratic 
reforms that are relevant to the country as a whole. Don‟t worry, not a 
reform only for Kurds; non-Kurds need the same reforms and democracy 
more than Kurds do (1994a: 14).  
 
Obviously, the YDH adopted a critical discourse in such issues as military 
tutelage and military‟s intervention to politics and asked for delineation of army‟s 
duties and authorities in line with rules and principles upheld in liberal-democratic 
countries (Boyner, 1994a: 17). That is, while the YDH agrees with the need to 
have a strong army given the geo-political position of the country, it stresses that 
the army‟s obligation is to defend the country against possible threats from 
without rather than acting with a mission to protect democracy or the regime 
versus their internal dynamics (Boyner, 1994a: 17).  
The YDH argued that the establishment of a liberal-democratic regime in 
Turkey could be possible only by fully translating the principle of rule of law into 
life. In this respect, the law of the citizen can take precedence over the law of the 
state by drafting a civilian, liberal-democratic constitution, not “for people in spite 
of people,” but with actual participation of the people (Boyner, 1994a: 20). 
According to the YDH leaders, the underlying factor that distinguishes the YDH 
from other political organizations and parties is the importance it attaches to social 
consent (Boyner, 1994a: 26; Ergün, indepth interview 2011). The YDH is 
convinced that popular consent can be obtained without falling into the trap of 
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populism and that in terms of mentality the people of Turkey are much ahead of 
politicians. This approach is articulated as follows by Boyner:  
 
With the YDH, we are not saying something novel; we are just bringing 
out what people are already thinking. Nothing in what we are saying is 
alien to this people (…) and we run for being the largest popular 
movement in Turkey after Democrat Party we run for being the largest 
civil society movement in this country (Boyner, 1994a: 29).  
 
It is true that democracy is attributed primary importance in YDH‟s main 
political texts, in speeches and press releases of Boyner and other leading figures 
and the party stresses that democratization will bring solution to many social and 
political problems. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the YDH regards 
democracy not as value or virtue by itself but a precondition or vehicle for 
„progress‟ or „westernization,‟ which denote the same, and reaching the level of 
advanced countries of the west. When taken in concrete terms, the genuine 
political emphasis and assertion of the YDH in such issues as democracy, human 
rights and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms may turn into an 
approach indexed to the perfect operation of free market conditions. Especially in 
the process of getting organized as a party, texts and press released prepared by 
Boyner and other leading figures include specific cases where the 
ethic/philosophical dimension of democracy was occasionally overshadowed by 
economic mindset or even forfeited for that.
217
 Even in the Kurdish issue that the 
YDH intervened with a quite radical discourse, it is not so hard to see the pre-
eminence of economic mind:  
 
You cannot solve problems in economy and education unless you solve the 
Kurdish problem. Not a single penny would go to education. Can you 
guess the budget fund allocated to tourism and promotion? 7 million 
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dollars...As a result of austerity measures, the fund that Turkey could 
allocate for keeping hotels full is only this” (Boyner, 1994a: 14).    
 
Moreover, on a political ground where economic liberalism can exist by its 
articulation with a rather deep nationalism or conservatism, the YDH as a political 
movement defending a kind of political liberalism deprived of its traditional 
ideological motifs may well be said to concur with Kemalism in terms of basic 
orientation despite its major criticism to that line of thought. The statements by 
the YDH with emphasis on „reaching the level of western democracies‟ overlaps 
with the motto of the Kemalism „reaching the level of contemporary civilization‟ 
and, even more, seems to have fallen into the same orientalist framework. The 
expression “first league countries” that frequently appears in YDH‟s main texts 
denotes liberal-democratic western countries that Turkey can catch up with 
through “democratization.” While the expression “first league countries” 
borrowed from Turgut Özal follows the password “travel from what is primitive 
to what is contemporary” belonging to Kemalist approach to progress and 
proposes a trajectory different from Özal‟s synthesis blended with conservative 
values, the YDH in fact laid the road leading to its political demise. It appears that 
sharing this common denominator with Kemalism which was harshly criticized 
for its Jacobin and anti-democratic orientations made the YDH, seeking itself a 
place in political arena with the claim of representing a pluralist and democratic 
political line in relation to Islam and Kurdish issues, incredible for its potential 
clients. The political discourse in which defects in public sector economy are to be 
removed “for being at par with the first league countries,”218 privatizations are to 
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 “The rate of saving in the first league countries of the world is 25 to 30% while it is only 15% 
in Turkey” (Boyner, 1994a: 11). 
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be made for “being in the first league,”219  restructuring of the country is reduced 
to a struggle for “catching up with the first league countries,”220  the solution of 
the Kurdish problem is conceived as a precondition for “having the mode of life 
prevailing in the first league countries”221 and the political assertion to do away 
with military tutelage is given content with reference to the “first league 
countries” 222  eventually left the abstract ideal for democratization under the 
shadow of westernization/liberalization dimension. The departure from the YDH 
of those opinion leaders who initially invested hopes in this movement must have 
its association with this tension which became crystallized after stepping into the 
political arena. 
The brief narrative above on the YDH movement allows us to introduce 
our case studies that would corroborate the emergence of the new social type of 
political opinion producers in Turkey. In the absence of a cohesive and promising 
left-wing response to the conservative nationalist and Kemalist political 
mainstream, along with the disliked authoritarianism of Islamists represented by 
Welfare Party, YDH offered a kind of intellectual sanctuary to our social type. For 
a brief time, it provided a reasonable platform upon which political opinions 
supporting the empowerment of a truly democratic political culture could be 
spread. 
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 “We need a very serious perestroika of our own. If we want to elevate to the first league then 
we have to solve our problems with approaches adopted by first league countries” (Boyner, 1994: 
20).  
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 “What we need to do is to restructure Turkey. If we fail, we will remain distant to the first 
league” (Boyner, 1994a: 12). 
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  “We think the place of the army in Turkey should be exactly the same with that in the first 
league countries, western democracies” (Boyner, 1994a: 17).  
  
227 
 
Let‟s now move on to the in-depth discussion of what positions and 
dispositions have come to be embedded into the social type of the liberal-
democratic opinion producer. 
7.3. Three Examples of Social Type Formation: Etyen Mahçupyan, Kürşat 
Bumin, Ali Bayramoğlu  
7.3.1. Etyen Mahçupyan as a Democrat   
7.3.1.1.First Phase in the Constitution of a Democratic Orientation: 
Mahçupyan‟s Political Positions in „Demokrasi için Toplumcu Düşün‟  
  The core question that guides the political thinking of Etyen Mahçupyan is 
related to the mentality and position required by a political/social functioning 
which envisages the coexistence of differences. Mahçupyan elaborates on this 
position and mentality under the heading “democrat.” Starting from the late 1990s, 
„democrat‟ and the „state of being democrat‟ constituted the main reference point 
of Mahçupyan‟s political and social analyses, and beyond their definitions in the 
political sphere, Mahçupyan assigned ethical content to these concepts.  
Available biographical information is limited for tracing the stages that we 
assume as constituting the sources of Mahçupyan propositions; nevertheless one 
can infer some meaningful clues from this limited information: Born in Istanbul, 
finished Robert College and the Department of Chemical Engineering in Boğaziçi 
University (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011). The period which can be 
considered as determinative in his intellectual trajectory is when he was engaged 
in post-graduate studies in Ankara Faculty of Political Sciences. Having his thesis 
in the field of international economics (1977-80) Mahçupyan was the assistant of 
Yahya Sezai Tezel in the Department of Economics of the same faculty. He was 
recruited to the circle around the journal Toplumcu Düşün via Tezel and 
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undertook the editorial responsibility of the journal. As he tells, Yahya Sezai 
Tezel, first his instructor and then a friend as well as Ġlkay Sunar were the leading 
figures influencing the development and moulding of his basic propositions 
(Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011, 2005: 61). Indeed, Mahçupyan relates his 
engagement in the subject of epistemology to the courses given by Sunar:  
 
(After following Sunar‟s courses) I developed interest in epistemology and 
I went through whatever existed in literature about epistemology within 
one or two years. I noticed that issues related to epistemology were at the 
roots of many other issues that we conceived as politics. I grasped that 
epistemological stances, assumptions and premises constitute a ground 
whose meaning in a person‟s life is not always noticed (in-depth interview 
2011). 
 
Indeed, the foundations of the thinking of Mahçupyan, moreover the early 
traces of his present political/ideological stance can be found in social relations he 
experienced while he was in the Faculty of Political Sciences.
223
 Sharing the same 
flat with Yahya Sezai Tezel in Ankara, Mahçupyan was quite influenced by 
Tezel‟s distant or even reactionary critical attitude to Marxism and built his 
political and intellectual position upon this critical approach to Marxism and 
socialist ideas inspired by Marxism. The intellectual focus which manifested this 
position was of course the journal Toplumcu Düşün. Starting as a monthly journal 
in June 1978, Toplumcu Düşün defined CHP, the victorious party of the 1977 
elections, as a potential area where „democrat-socialist‟ perspective could flourish 
and imbuing the CHP with a participatory, democratic and civil society based 
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 After having his application for assistantship to the desk of Latif Çakıcı in the Department of 
Management turned down for inadequacy in English language, Mahçupyan, together with his high 
school classmate ġevket Pamuk, started his academic career as an assistant in International 
Economics and Economic Development headed by Necdet Serin (2005: 61). Given his high school 
background in Robert College, the rejection for “inadequacy in English” was found questionable 
by Mahçupyan who thought that it was rather associated with his Armenian identity.  
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approach was adopted as the leading mission of the journal.
224
 Mahçupyan 
explains the mission and major orientation of the journal as follows:  
 
(Toplumcu Düşün) was defending a libertarian understanding of left, 
which remained out of authoritarian leftist tradition and opted for young 
Marx. The journal we were running with Yahya Sezai Tezel, Haluk 
Özdalga and Sinan Mutlu in those years revealing that the Ecevit 
movement was a typical blend of populism gave me the opportunity to turn 
to the works of western leftists with democratic mentality.” (2005: 62). 
 
According to what Mahçupyan tells Toplumcu Düşün started out from the 
existence of a circle that remained out of classical CHP mentality while engaged 
in politics in this party and that also kept a distance to any socialism of Marxist 
origin (in-depth interview 2011). In other words, Toplumcu Düşün was envisaged 
as an intellectual centre which could influence the overall political line of the 
CHP and channel the party to a democrat socialist line which was apart from 
Marxism. Mahçupyan goes on to say that while Ali Dinçer was the mayor of 
Çankaya they were in contact with CHP members in Ankara Municipality who 
were engaged in vivid debates in search for a truly democrat center; eventually, 
these contacts revealed there was a need for a journal focusing on these themes 
(in-depth interview 2011). In short, the journal Toplumcu Düşün emerged when 
the paths of social democrats not considering the political identity of the CHP 
sufficiently democrat and leftist crossed with young academic sharing similar 
concerns.
225
  
                                                 
224
 Having its full title as “Demokrasi İçin Toplumcu Düşün”, the journal ended its life with its 16th 
issue dated May-June 1980. The first editorial board of the journal included the following: Türker 
Alkan, Nilüfer Arıak, M. Kadri AtabaĢ, Etyen Mahçupyan and Yahya Sezai Tezel (Yılmaz, 2007: 
222).  
225
 Mahçupyan relates that the search for a wider understanding of left and democracy which goes 
beyond the political line proposed by the CHP was not limited to the group in Ankara Municipality 
and a group of young medical doctors from Hacettepe University established contact with his 
group, looking for a democratic environment of political debate (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 
2001).   
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Articles in the early issues of the journal give significant hints about its 
mission and intellectual/political challenge. For instance, criticisms of Leninism 
and Jacobinism frequently appear on the pages of the journal. Again in accord 
with the core theses of the journal, issues such as civil society, socialist humanism 
and roots of totalitarianism were addressed by various authors and assessments by 
such authors and thinkers as Eric Fromm, Korac and Kolakowski found spaces in 
the journal.
226
 It must be added here that the group around Toplumcu Düşün 
tended to use the term „communism‟ with negative content sounding like Cold 
War terminology in line with the international agenda of the time and moved from 
the assumption that there was a fundamental difference between socialism and 
Marxism/Leninism in terms of understandings of humanity, society, politics, 
knowledge and ethics.
227
 According to this idea, any notion of socialism inspired 
by Marxism embodied the possibility of turning into totalitarianism for its 
inherent dimensions of mysticism and teleology (Tezel, 1978a: 42). The argument 
goes on that the totalitarian outcomes of attempts to create the „new human being‟ 
in the USSR and Eastern European countries are closely associated with this 
mystic and teleological essence (Tezel, 1978a: 43). As one of the central figures 
of Toplumsal Düşün, Yahya S. Tezel argues that Marxism reduces man to a kind 
of homo economicus and thus falls into a fundamental contradiction with the idea 
of emancipation as its essential assertion. According to Tezel, 
 
It is of course true that in socialist society human beings will try to realize 
themselves in processes of individualization and socialization that differ 
from those in other social formations. But it is ungrounded to expect social 
institutions and structures in a socialist society to totally change the inner 
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 See, for instance: Eric Fromm, “Sosyalist Hümanizma‟ya GiriĢ,” Toplumcu Düşün,Vol:1, June 
1978; Veliko Korac, “Hümanist Toplumu Ararken,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol:1, June 1978; 
“Kolakowski‟yle SöyleĢi,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.5, December 1978.  
227
 For an assessment in the journal concerning this issue, see: Yahya Sezai Tezel, “Sivil Toplum, 
Siyasal Toplum ve Sosyalizm,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.1, June 1978.  
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world of people and to create a „new man‟ free of any inner conflict. It is 
also a daunting expectation (…) the total disappearance of disaccords that 
stem from the inner nature of human beings” should neither be expected 
from nor necessary in a socialist society (Tezel, 1978a: 40).  
 
According to this idea, the issue of democracy precedes the issue of 
socialism and thus the realization of socialism per se does not guarantee 
democracy. Tezel outlines the case as follows:  
 
The proposal for a socialist society and the act of founding such a society, 
socialist thought and practice should not forget that the need for decision 
making processes and mechanisms for settling disaccord among people 
will remain a socialist society as well. This need re-introduces the issue of 
democracy to the socialist worldview that seeks to eliminate obstacles to 
human being‟s realization of his individual and social existence as a free 
creature (1978a: 44).  
 
In addition to his editorial responsibility and many other articles, perhaps 
the most important contribution of Mahçupyan to Toplumcu Düşün is his critical 
articles on Jacobinism and Bolshevism addressing the political thought and 
politics in Russia.
228
 These articles argue that the Bolshevik approach to 
knowledge and history constitutes the climax of totalitarian and Jacobin line and 
that Marxism can be linked in no way whatsoever to the Leninist political line, 
leaving aside the provision of a legitimate framework for transforming 
Bolshevism into specific propositions (Mahçupyan 1978a, 1978b). According to 
Mahçupyan, Bolshevism is based on the assumption that the one who holds the 
monopoly of using political force also holds the monopoly of „what is right‟ and 
as such Bolshevism in fact has no need for Marx‟s doctrine (1978c: 217).229 
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 See: Etyen Mahçupyan, “BolĢevizme Doğru Rusya‟da DüĢünce ve Siyaset (1700-1825): 
Aydınlanma ve Jakobenizm,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.8, March 1979; “Rusya‟da DüĢünce ve 
Siyaset: 1825-1855,”Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.9, April 1979; “Rusya‟da DüĢünce ve Siyaset:1855-
1881,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.11, August 1979.  
229
 For a discussion on Marxism and Leninism, especially see: Mahçupyan, “Marksist EleĢtiri Ġçin 
Rehber,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.2, July-August 1978.  
  
232 
 
Consequently, Leninism has no meaning beyond being the manifestation of a 
radical-authoritarian quest of a group of Marxists following the Jacobin tradition 
(Mahçupyan, 1978c). Mahçupyan interprets the transformation of Lenin‟s radical 
democratism in the State and Revolution into sharp authoritarianism in Russia 
following the civil war; he adds that a scrupulous examination of Lenin‟s post 
civil war speeches suggests that his suggestions for the revitalization of 
proletarian democracy in the face of retarding Soviets were no more than 
manoeuvres concerning the party (1978c: 144).  
To wrap up, when Mahçupyan‟s critical and occasionally even hostile 
stance against Jacobinism and to Leninism as a more authoritarian follower of the 
former which can be easily traced in his writings starting from the 90s are taken, 
the roots of this stance can be found by referring back to the times of Toplumcu 
Düşün. In other words, this journal was an early intellectual focus presenting 
almost all initial propositions that later laid the ground for Mahçupyan‟s political 
ideas.  
Comparing Toplumcu Düşün which had started with the mission of 
advocating a civil society based, participatory and democrat political line to Yeni 
Gündem which was launched with similar motives after 1980 230  a very 
fundamental difference strikes attention.  While Yeni Gündem was an intellectual 
focal point defining itself in reference to left and mainly targeting socialist left, 
Toplumcu Düşün limited the range of its discourse to CHP, thus excluding the 
socialist/Marxist circles of the time on the ground that they were “against 
democracy.” The political perspective suggested by Toplumcu Düşün regards the 
socialist/Marxist groups of the time as vehicles of terror and violence and assumes 
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 For a detailed discussion on Yeni Gündem, see: Chapter 5.  
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that they are the representatives of totalitarianism in their leftist outfit. In one of 
the articles in the 13
th
 issue of the journal addressed to the CHP, a clear distinction 
is made between socialist and communist approaches whereby socialist left out of 
CHP is associated with communist-totalitarian stance:  
 
As can be guessed, socialist approach is closely associated with 
democratic interpretation and communist approach with anti-democratic 
one. If the CHP really wants to be a „democratic left‟ party, it should first 
get rid of conceptual chaos and make its choice clear with all relevant 
dimensions and extensions (….) And if the party wants sustain itself as a 
democratic-socialist organization, it should assert its transforming 
character and name the long-term objective of this transformation as 
transition from capitalist relations of proprietorship and production to 
socialized (not gathered under the state) production structures. For the 
CHP to succeed in turning into a democrat-socialist party, it is as 
necessary for it to remain distant from tendencies of identifying leftist 
stance with revolutionarism as declaring that its objective is to establish a 
de-centralized socialist society (1979: 609).
231
 
 
As can be inferred from the quotation above, totally different from the 
vision of political circles of the time who define themselves as socialist/Marxist, 
the „democrat socialist Turkey‟ imagination of Toplumcu Düşün is built upon a 
social democrat understanding that totally excludes revolutionarism and remains 
at a distance to Marxism though partly inspired by it. In the words of Haluk 
Özdalga, one of the contributors of the journal, Bolshevism is the “rise of dark 
ages from their graves in Russia” (1979: 393). According to Özdalga, the 
representatives in Turkey of Bolshevism or Leninism as the same represent a 
section who wants to replace the democratic-pluralist regime with a totalitarian 
one and therefore constitute a serious obstacle in the way of democrats in the 
country (1979: 398).  
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 The article mentioned was published anonymously under the title “CHP Yolunu Seçerken”. 
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 It is known that Mehmet Ali Aybar (1908-1995) is an important political 
and intellectual figure who, though indirectly, has its contribution to the formation 
of left-liberal opinions with his reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and 
particularly with his original analyses regarding the social formation in Turkey.
232
 
His main theses on the social formation of Turkey partly coincides with the 
ATÜT-centred approaches of Ġdris Küçükömer and Sencer Divitçioğlu. This 
original analysis where bureaucracy is defined as the hegemonic class also 
includes some points calling in the “centre-periphery” approach in some 
respects.
233
  
Aybar‟s interpretation of Marxism with the themes of alienation and 
emancipation at its heart and his criticism of exploitation-based Marx reading as 
reductionist seemed quite close to Toplumcu Düşün‟s libertarian and democrat 
conceptualisation of socialism. It was also in compliance with the overall 
perspective of Toplumcu Düşün when Aybar said the Soviet version of socialism 
signified a totalitarian order and led to the conception of socialism by wide 
masses as an oppressive and authoritarian regime. Moreover, the approach of 
libertarian socialism
234
 which was the main reference point of Aybar‟s analyses 
particularly after 1968 and his sharp criticisms against the USSR
235
 was 
considered by Toplumcu Düşün as a challenge against dogmatism.  
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 The three liberal democratic opinion producers we are investigating in this dissertation as 
examples of a social type, during the in-depth  interviews,  have all  mentioned the name of 
Mehmet Ali Aybar as the sole political figure in the socialist left who had the most influence on 
them. Especially KürĢat Bumin expressed that Aybar‟s political views had a significant role in the 
shaping of his own social and political convictions. Bumin recalled that for sometime he 
participated in the political meetings of a discussion group that followed Aybar‟s line (Bumin, in-
depth interview 2011).    
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 For the influence of Küçükömer‟s original analysis on liberal-democratic opinion production, 
see: Chapter 5, pp. 69-78. For the impact of center-periphery analysis of ġerif Mardin as a major 
theoretical inspiration for liberal-democratic opinion production, see: Chapter 5, pp. 111-127. 
Concerning the overlap between Aybar‟s theses and positions of Küçükömer and Diviçioğlu, see: 
Özman, 2007: 380-381; Belge, 1985: 2127.  
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 For a detailed analysis on the subject, see: Özman, 2002.  
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 See, Aybar, 1988: 144-153.  
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Nevertheless, it should be underlined that the main point of convergence 
between Aybar‟s thinking and the political line suggested by Toplumcu Düşün is 
the critical approach to Leninism and the issue of leadership. Aybar‟s book 
published in June 1979 ( “Marksizm‟de Örgüt Sorunu – Leninist Parti Burjuva 
Modelinde Bir Örgüttür [The Problem of Organization in Marxism- Leninist Party 
is an organization of Bourgeois Model]) was addressed in detail in the 12
th
 issue 
of Toplumcu Düşün and Mahçupyan contributed to this discussion with an article. 
Denying the Leninist type of party organization as bourgeois, this book ran the 
risk of denigration and condemnation by socialist circles; but it was appreciated 
by Toplumcu Düşün   as the manifestation of Aybar‟s independent and democrat 
stance and regarded as a stepping stone in struggle against dogmatism. Yet, 
Aybar‟s insistence in building his theses upon Marxist propositions and “his 
ideological stance still attached to the tutelage of Marxism-Leninism” is explained 
by his failure to break apart totally from dogmatism (Özdalga, 1979: 574). 
Özdalga reminds the following in this regard:  
 
It is interesting to note that while standing against the Leninist party model 
and asserting that it is a bourgeois model of organizing, Aybar employs a 
methodology that belongs to the Marxist-Leninist conception of history. 
(…) The only tool that Aybar employs to prove his thesis consists of the 
most dogmatic „laws‟ of Marxist-Leninist understanding of society (1979: 
574-575).  
 
 As Özdalga, Mahçupyan considers it as a weakness that Aybar could never 
drop the dogmatism that is inherent in Marxism and approaches the issue from a 
more philosophical stance, thus giving start to a debate about Marxism itself. 
According to Mahçupyan:  
 
A real criticism of Leninism becomes possible only by accepting that 
socialism is not an inevitable stage but a possibility, one in a set of 
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possibilities and therefore it embodies a problematic of preference. (For 
those who would assert that this very statement runs counter to Marxism, I 
suffice with saying that it does not run counter Marx as a man of science) 
(1979:  583). 
 
Toplumcu Düşün is a periodical that in the period 1978-80 frequently 
visited the “center-periphery model” 236  which unexpectedly spread after 1980 
and, in Bora‟s words, turned out as a classical paradigm in explaining politics in 
Turkey. As a matter of fact, ġerif Mardin and Metin Heper contributed to various 
issues of the journal with their articles.
237
 Here, Toplumcu Düşün‟s emphasis on 
civil society builds its meaning within the framework of the centre-periphery 
model and civil society is defined without any reference to Marx. According to 
this view, social injustice created by capitalism is a problem that could be 
eliminated by through opportunities provided by democracy, though in a longer 
term (1978: 8). Furthermore, the full operation of democracy with its institutions 
is regarded as the guarantee of a fairer and more participatory social life although 
not the full emancipation of humanity. Mahçupyan, as a figure contributing to 
most of the editorials of Toplumcu Düşün underlined the need for translating 
democrat and communitarian idea into life while warning that options other than 
democracy (i.e. revolution) would bring in authoritarian regimes in spite of their 
potential to introduce radical solutions.    
The introduction titled “As we start” in the first issue of Toplumcu Düşün 
includes some ideas that Mahçupyan would perhaps articulate similarly in the 90s 
too:  
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 See, Chapter 5, p.98 and pp.114-128.  
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 See, for instance: Metin Heper, “Patrimonyalizm ve Osmanlı Türk Toplumu,” Toplumcu 
Düşün, Vol. 7, March 1979; ġerif Mardin, “Sınıf, Grup ve KiĢilik,” Toplumcu Düşün, Vol.1, June 
1978.  
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The soundness of ideas is related to their competitiveness with others. 
Recognizing the existence of others and considering their criticisms in a 
healthy and sensitive manner (…) the existence of a democratic 
environment of debate is possible with the ease that different theses have 
access to this realm of debate. (…) One of the fundamental principles of 
Toplumcu Düşün is to avoid dogmatism. In both knowledge and 
methodology, it is highly probable for dogmatism to create vicious circles. 
All need to be debatable. Otherwise, ready blueprints may condition 
people in narrow and monolithic channels (…) if history has ever proven 
something; it is that the truth is only relative (1978: 11, 14).  
 
7.3.1.2.Engagement with More Proactive Political Opinion Production: 
Mahçupyan‟s Increasing Public Visibility  
 Following the military coup of 1980 and the closure of Toplumcu Düşün, 
Mahçupyan ceases his intellectual activities for a period of time. He relates 
experiencing a great disappointment and desperation in this period. (2007: 124). 
In this period Mahçupyan took part in business life and engaged in commercial 
activities. In his words, his “return” to philosophical/intellectual activities takes 
place starting from 1989 upon his engagement in institutional cultural change 
programmes with a consultancy firm (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011).238  
This counselling service covering such themes as personal perception as an 
individual, how it is perceived by others, associated reactions and cultural forms 
produced while with others, etc encourages Mahçupyan to think about issues in 
the domain of social psychology. He talks about the process as follows:  
 
After all, this counselling service targeted to bring about a change in the 
cultural structure of a group and was therefore closely associated with 
social psychology. I realized that this social psychological approach and 
the categorization underlying it perfectly coincided with what I was 
looking for in epistemology. I started thinking that the connection in-
between or its more generalized and expanded form could be told as what 
we call „mentality (in-depth interview 2011).  
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 Mahçupyan was working as a manager in EczacıbaĢı in this period (Mahçupyan, 2005: 63).  
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The institutional culture programme that Mahçupyan became a part of is a 
work that is built upon the question what kind of a manager/employee culture 
should be established in order to increase productivity in companies. During this 
process Mahçupyan had articles published in commentary pages of various daily 
papers and being noticed by the YDH he got in touch with this group. With this, 
he had the opportunity to consolidate his background in social psychology and 
more recent professional work through political-cultural-social-economic spheres 
and test it in practice (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011; 2007: 124; 2005: 
66).
239
  Hence, „being a democrat‟ which can be considered as the founding and 
central element in Mahçupyan‟s intellectual universe is the outcome of an 
intellectual process with social psychology and epistemology at its roots. 
The conceptualization of „democrat‟ and intellectual work on the „state of 
being democrat‟ can be taken as a dimension that made Mahçupyan distinct. 
Moreover, this intellectual endeavour reinforces our investigation on the social 
type of the Democrat.
240
  
 As stated earlier, one of the key concepts in Mahçupyan‟s system of 
thinking is “mentality.” This conceptualization bears the imprints of the 
framework suggested by Robert Blake
241
 whose approach Mahçupyan got 
acquainted with during his work focusing on institutional culture/company culture 
and leadership. As a matter of fact, Mahçupyan‟s analysis based on four major 
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 Mahçupyan‟s three articles sent to the page „Entelektüel BakıĢ‟ in Milliyet daily led to his 
invitation to the YDH (2007: 124; 2005: 65-66).  
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 For instance KürĢat Bumin says he does not see contemplating on the state of being a democrat 
as a part of his intellectual production (Bumin, in-depth interview 2011).  
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 Robert Blake (1918-2004) developed the Managerial Grid Theory together with Dr. Jane S. 
Mouton in 1964. The Managerial Grid Theory was based on the analysis of business leadership 
and the conditions that enhance human effectiveness in the given organization. The approach 
introduced by Blake and Mouton was based on the premise that employees were to be involved in 
organizational purpose and determining production needs. According to the approach, a business 
leadership which was able to create a team environment based on mutual trust and respect would 
in turn lead to higher productivity and satisfaction. 
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sets of mentality is developed by capitalizing on Blake‟s assumption that human 
beings can be defined in reference to seven basic patterns of behavior 
(Mahçupyan, 2007: 23-34). Mahçupyan follows the trace of Blake who argues 
that any singular behavior that a person adopts in the face of any singular situation 
in fact reflects a worldview that has its internal consistency and an adult displays 
at least two mental behaviors. Mahçupyan borrows the four of Blake‟s seven 
mental behavior models (Mahçupyan, 2007 25). For their nature as establishing 
connection with the outer world, these elements are called “founding modes” by 
Mahçupyan (Mahçupyan, 2007: 25). Using the terminology of Mahçupyan, these 
are authoritarian, patriarchal, relativist and democrat mentalities (Mahçupyan, 
2007: 26). In this framework, „mentality‟ expresses an outlook that can be 
considered „paradigmatic‟ which consists of assumptions and concepts emerging 
from human relations and adopted by people unconsciously in line with how they 
perceive outer world (Mahçupyan, 2007: 11, 13, 26, 36). The point which must be 
underlined here is that mentality, defined over relationalism has a nature 
transcending such dimensions as mind, intelligence, virtue or ethics. In 
Mahçupyan‟s narrative, for example, while a highly authoritarian person may be 
virtuous, a democrat, on the other hand, may be extremely lazy or deprived of any 
virtue. (2007: 27).  
Blending findings transferred from social psychology with epistemology, 
Mahçupyan considers authoritarian and relativist mentalities as outcomes of 
materialistic reflection theory while seeing patriarchal and democrat mentalities as 
products of idealist methodology (2007: 27-28). According to the table suggested 
by Mahçupyan, the authoritarian mentality is that of a subject who believes he has 
reached the knowledge of outer world and who has no doubt about the clarity and 
  
240 
 
uniqueness of his truths and this is what brings along an authoritarian perception 
of politics (2007: 28). An extremist example is Leninism which bears the imprints 
of a totally authoritarian mentality (Mahçupyan, 2007: 28). Just like the 
hierarchical and homogenous world perception of a single individual with an 
authoritarian mentality in social psychology terms, political approaches generated 
by authoritarian mentality too are based on imagination of a hierarchical and 
homogenous society (Mahçupyan, 2007: 28).  
The relativist mentality which can be seen as the outcome of transition 
from materialist reflection to mutualism, on the other hand, moves from the 
premise that a single truth has never existed and each may have his different truths 
(Mahçupyan, 207: 30). Addressing liberalism on the basis of relativist mentality, 
Mahçupyan argues that the relativist mentality foresees a social structure which is 
homogenous as well, but without any hierarchy and where nobody is compared to 
another (2007: 31). As a matter of fact, the imagination of a homogenous society 
by relativist mentality is a point that Mahçupyan stresses when settling accounts 
with liberalism and arguing that stances of being liberal and democrat are 
contradictory. For instance, Mahçupyan maintains that monist identification of 
citizenship in liberalism is the reflection of the image of a homogenous society 
deriving from relativist mentality (2007: 31). According to this point of view, the 
pluralistic tendency in liberalism is also related to objectivity attributed to the 
opinion of majority (2007:32).
242
  
Yet, patriarchal and democratic approaches that are developed on the basis 
of the assumption that epistemologically the truth is shaped, out of any materially 
based reflection, as a spiritual and moral essence reaching minds, are based on an 
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“other”  see: Mahçupyan, 2007: 107-115; 2005: 64-65.  
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heterogeneous design (Mahçupyan, 2007: 28). The idealistic stance of patriarchal 
mentality points out to the domain of religions including polytheism (Mahçupyan, 
2007: 29). The domain of religions as a system where none is equal to another has 
a both heterogeneous and hierarchical imagination (Mahçupyan, 2007: 29). 
Mahçupyan mentions the Ottoman social system as an example to the dominance 
of patriarchal mentality: 
 
The whole Ottoman system is a problematic of ensuring the coexistence of 
hierarchical, heterogonous, singular, incomparable and unique structures 
within a just mechanism. It is fully built upon patriarchal mentality since it 
stems from Islam and the major reference is religion. There is the matter of 
reflection here too. Here, however, the mind is defined not materially but 
as a part of what is spiritual. Hence, what is reflected in my mind is still 
true. Because it is the part of a godly creation (…) if there is reflection, 
then where do differences come from? Then the answer is „I understand 
what God says better than you do (2007: 27-28).  
 
As the key concept in Mahçupyan‟s original approach, “being democrat” 
or democratic mentality can be epistemologically traced back to Kant.
243
  In fact, 
Kant assumes that mind is not a tabula rasa but has its categories and 
methodology and argues that each person perceives the outer world differently 
and hence it is not possible to speak about a single authority in regard to outer 
reality. Consequently, shortcomings of the perception of a single individual can be 
overcome only by many subjectivities coming together to produce a common 
subjectivity (Mahçupyan, 2007: 33). And eventually, the nature of democrat 
mentality based on common subjectivity and diversity will make it possible to 
generate a „democrat‟ social environment where there is no oppression of the 
minority by majority and where minority ideas or even non-existing ones are 
entitled to seek majority. It is because what is meant by „common subjectivity‟ 
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 Mahçupyan states that in epistemological terms Hume, as well as Kant has his important place 
when it comes to the conceptualization „democrat.‟ (2007: 32). This suggestion seems quite 
meaningful given the intellectual exchange and philosophical transitivity between Hume and Kant.  
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when it is said to ensure principles of coexistence is in fact „common‟ ethics 
(Mahçupyan, 2007: 34). According to Mahçupyan, democrat mentality which 
makes it legitimate and meaningful for people to come together and look for their 
subjectivity will also make it possible to establish a common ethics (2007: 34). In 
any case, the basic difference between being democrat and liberalism emerges 
right at this point: While democrat stance makes it possible to produce common 
ethics over the coexistence of common subjectivities, liberalism cannot provide a 
ground conducive to generating common ethics because of its tendency for 
pluralism (Mahçupyan, 2007: 34). On the other hand, democrat mentality is built 
upon the assumption that the knowledge is ontologically relative and since it is in 
need of knowledge possessed by the „other‟ it has to be in accord with the „other‟ 
in the process of establishing a common ethics (Mahçupyan, 2005: 65). As stated 
earlier, relativism as the set of mentality which liberalism finds its ground reduces 
democracy to an issue of counting and measuring on the assumption of 
incomparability and conceptualizes democracy as a system that is defined through 
majority. The understanding of democracy, as Mahçupyan proposes, which is 
built on democrat mentality, on the other hand, foresees that “people interfere in 
decision making mechanisms in every area and issue that is of interest to them” 
(2005: 65). Hence, instead of being principles that may be of use in the 
implementation of democracy, participation and persuasion are sine qua non for 
the operability of democracy (Mahçupyan, 2005: 65).  
As a perspective based on the belief that human mind is only one of 
possible minds and that human being is bound by subjectivity, it is quite 
understandable that it attributes importance to mutualism, listening and 
understanding one another in the issues of norm, ethics and rule setting. For the 
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set of ethics or norms produced by democrat mind to be democrat as well, these 
have to be only temporary (Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011). In 
Mahçupyan‟s words:  
 
…it has to be temporary since a step further we may all reach different 
ideas; we are talking about a unity that has to be reconstructed upon the 
inclusion of one new person, birth of a child or each adolescent becoming 
an adult (in-depth interview, 2011).  
 
 In this case, the understanding in Mahçupyan‟s thinking concerning the 
coexistence of differences can be possible through the morality
244
 generated over 
the democrat mind. This idea purporting that a non-religious ethics defined over 
the concept of being democrat is the sine qua non of living together presupposes 
mutual listening and understanding. According to Mahçupyan, any ethics not 
defined on the ground of being democrat is bound to converge with religious 
grounds and follow a course that is open to oppression (in-depth interview 2011). 
Yet, the moral ground that makes coexistence possible should be able to gather 
individuals and the State at the same point and to produce a specific legitimacy in 
basing on a religious ground (Mahçupyan, 2007: 19, in-depth interview 2011). 
Social demands which gained visibility recently also point out to the necessity of 
such an understanding of ethics:  
 
You should have such a mentality that is capable of producing common 
ethics while not being religious. You should have such an ethics that is not 
discriminatory and that makes citizens the interferer to the nation-state 
with wider rights and more participatory mechanisms (Mahçupyan, 2007: 
20).  
 
 Politics based on „democrat mentality‟ as suggested by Mahçupyan can be 
defined roughly as the process of operating common decision making mechanisms 
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(Mahçupyan, in-depth interview 2011). In other words, politics is an issue of 
constituting and translating into life of decision making mechanisms of a given 
society covering momentary and prospective imaginations concerning a given 
problem (Mahçupyan, 2011). This understanding of politics that becomes 
operational over a range of mechanisms concerning mutual communication, 
listening and understanding so long as defined within the framework of 
„democratic mentality‟ can exist through participation and transparency 
(Mahçupyan, 2011). In reference to this definition, the concept „conflict‟ means 
being conscious of the existence of differences and implies a process of debate 
whereby parties try to understand each other rather than a confrontation on the 
basis of the use of naked force or resort violence (Mahçupyan, 2011).  
In understanding how Mahçupyan conceptualizes „politics‟ and „the 
political,‟ his opinion about and approach to the YDY seems quite illuminating. 
As stated in earlier chapters, Mahçupyan approached the party formation under 
the YDH with some reservations and considered politics as too important to be 
reduced to a political party (2011, 2007: 126). For Mahçupyan, politics is first of 
all an activity of influencing and changing people intellectually (2007: 126, 127). 
As a matter of fact, while conveying his views concerning the YDH he gives hints 
about how he attributes meaning to politics:  
 
Politics is doing what you have to do to influence people as much as 
possible. (…) Our thinking was as follows: There is such thing as the Law 
on Political Parties and once you are a political party you become like 
others and cannot say what you want to. You have to observe many 
concerns that would never come to your mind when you are (civil society) 
movement (Mahçupyan, 2007:126).  
 
As stated earlier, Mahçupyan approaches Jacobinism and reduction of 
politics to struggle for power with a sharp criticism and basing on the assumption 
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that the scope and content of politics would be different in a postmodern world he 
argues that a new understanding of politics need to be developed from an 
intellectual point of view (Mahçupyan, 2007: 130-131). According to this idea, 
the political philosophy of Jacobinism, an extension of totalitarian mentality, 
which excludes ethics and sacralises active force should be replaced by a 
perception of politics built upon democrat mentality and a perspective in line with 
present day‟s postmodern world (2008: 61; 2007: 130-131). To put it in more 
concrete terms, Mahçupyan stresses that for a country like Turkey, today there is 
no chance for a truly „democrat‟ party to take power and hence the priority 
mission of political activity should be influencing any representative party in 
power in line with democrat mentality through civil society organizations or 
think-tank circles (2007: 132). This line of political activity is suggested and 
justified on the ground that democrats in Turkey could not manage to come up 
with a political movement representing their stance
245
 and that democrats are 
presently dispersed to various political parties (1996: 108). In other words, 
Mahçupyan‟s suggestion of engagement in politics that cannot transform into a 
permanent political position envisages demarches that are intended to channelize 
existing political movement to the grounds of democracy until truly democrat 
political orientations complete their process of „fermentation‟ in political terms 
(1996: 110). This perception of politics which assigns a central place to the 
postmodern theme of uncertainty focuses on today instead of utopia based 
configurations for the future and suggests that change can take place only in the 
context of mentality-change (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 13).   
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 Excluding his short-lived involvement in the YDH from this assessment, thinks, as mentioned 
earlier, it is impossible under circumstances prevailing in Turkey to make the YDH functional as a 
political party.  
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The fact that Mahçupyan is an opinion producer visible in public sphere 
should be addressed in connection with issues having a central place in his 
intellectual activity. In this context we observe two headings coming to the fore in 
Mahçupyan‟s thinking: laicism and nationalism. Laicism which is addressed 
mainly in reference to political Islam and nationalism which is discussed 
specifically in the context of the Kurdish issue denote the problematic that 
constitutes the frame of his thinking. According to Mahçupyan, the military 
tutelage and statist political philosophy should be the major probing points to lead 
a more genuine debate over laicism and nationalism. Indeed, in his books and 
articles published in the period 1996-1999, Mahçupyan suggests addressing the 
issue of political Islam and Kurdish problem with democrat mentality and from a 
perspective that questions military tutelage.
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 In Mahçupyan, being a democrat is 
understood as a value, as a virtue rather than an instrument for building a system 
in which citizens enjoy equal rights and freedoms. This stance of being democrat 
cannot be translated into life so long as it is reduced to a mere instrument. From 
the perspective of this ideal, political Islam and Kurdish problem constitute both 
an opportunity and a hard challenge in ethical building of democrat stance. In fact, 
Mahçupyan‟s intellectual systematic that places the stance of being democrat at its 
center had its core process of development in a time period when, in 
Bayramoğlu‟s words, the “most burning and crucial phase” of the Kurdish 
problem was experienced and when the military tutelage regime of February 28
th
 
penetrated everywhere (Bayramoğlu, 2005:13). This phase in which “what is 
social became the captive of what is political and what is political became the 
captive of the state” in a sense marked the real dawn of “the democrat‟ as well 
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 See: Osmanlı‟dan Postmoderniteye (Bir Demokrat Manifestoya Doğru), Patika Yay., Ġstanbul; 
1996; Yönetemeyen Cumhuriyet, Patika Yay., Ġstanbul, 1999. Mahçupyan wrote a column for the 
daily Radikal during 1997-2000.  
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(Bayramoğlu, 2005:13). Starting from the mid-90s and until 2001, covering the 
period of column writing in Radikal (1997-2000),
247
 Mahçupyan‟s intellectual 
products consistently touched upon the military tutelage system and statism as 
spheres where both issues are interlinked. The point to underline here is that 
Mahçupyan‟s perspective of the „democrat‟ does not assign priority to some social 
problems. He assigns weight to these two specific issues since they have their 
central places in society or politics (Bayramoğlu, 2011; 2005: 14). In other words, 
social issues relating to historical moments which we can specifically consider as 
founding contexts of „the democrat‟ have their significance in Mahçupyan‟s 
perspective as determinants of mentality. Sharing a similar perspective, 
Bayramoğlu explains the situation as follows:  
 
Whichever problem was placed at the center of society, whatever issue 
used the lancet to the core mentality to become a criterion for being a 
democrat and democracy, Etyen Mahçupyan walked on to that problem; in 
other words he directed the lens of mentality analysis to that specific 
problem (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 14).   
 
In Mahçupyan‟s perspective, the full realization of democracy can be 
possible only by reflecting social demands to politics in a continuous manner 
(Mahçupyan, 1998a, 1998b). In Turkey, on the other hand, the army acts as a 
political actor and makes the functioning of democracy impossible by determining 
the direction and content of politics (1998b, 1999a, 1999b). In this situation, 
politics is reduced to an activity under the tutelage of the army and the 
depoliticised environment which is the inevitable consequence of the former 
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May 2001-2007 he wrote for Zaman. After the assassination of Hırant Dink, he was made the 
editor in chief of Agos (Armenian Turkish daily) until June 2010. He is currently the advisor and 
editor of Agos and still writes for Zaman and Today‟s Zaman.  
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further strengthens statist approaches (Mahçupyan, 1999d). In Mahçupyan‟s 
words:  
 
Statism is such a disease that it is the same person that inhibits his own 
possibilities of having a reference other than the State…In this period, both 
laicism and nationalism turns to their essence and merges within statism (2 
May 1999e). 
 
According to Mahçupyan, the Kurdish problem too denotes a major 
problem area which has emerged as a result of a statist mentality which does not 
take society as its counterpart and ignores social demands.  The State which does 
not regard Kurdish people as a social entity and conceives having society as its 
counterpart as wearing off of its rule addresses the issue through an approach that 
is dominated not by politics but violence and as such it causes the reduction of the 
Kurdish issue to the problem of terror and terrorism (Mahçupyan, 21 March 
1999h). Yet the State is obliged to provide an environment where social demands 
can be freely raised:  
 
Demands and choices of a social group can be understood only in dialogue 
with that group, when there is no explicit or implicit suppression of their 
freedom of expression (…) If there is ideological pressure on efforts to 
communicate with this group and if there is no systematic to take the 
group as a counterpart; if there are deterring sanctions for expressing their 
opinions freely, then the surrounding atmosphere is totalitarian (6 
December 1998).  
 
The statist stance which considers having society as it counterpart as 
weakness defines political Islam as a source of threat to its power. The 
codification of Islamic circles as “ignorant”, “uneducated” and “primitive” brings 
along the demeaning and disregard of their social demands. The process of 
February 28
th
 which represents the most concrete form of statist approach to 
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Islamic circles is, according to Mahçupyan, a specific moment in the history of 
the statist tradition.  
Mahçupyan‟s opinions concerning the political Islam have been criticized 
by other opinion producers who also define themselves on the democrat ground. 
One of the most significant of these criticisms is that the democrat concerns in 
Mahçupyan‟s thought are directed to a specific social section while being 
withheld from others. Fuat Keyman‟s criticisms in this regard, for example, 
provided an occasion for Mahçupyan to express the criteria by which he 
distinguishes the categories of the liberal and democrat and constituted the main 
frame of the conceptualization „post-liberal democrat‟ (Mahçupyan, 1999: 205).248 
Keyman‟s criticism asserts that Mahçupyan establishes the stance of the democrat 
as indexed exclusively to the Moslem identity and ignores the multi-dimensional 
character of identity (Mahçupyan, 1999:206). According to Keyman, Mahçupyan 
must re-construct the stance of being democrat by capitalizing on the fact that 
human rights and freedoms have been acquired as a result of struggles waged by 
the working class, women and anti-racist civil rights movements. Otherwise, a 
one-dimensional stance of the democrat constructed without taking into account 
transitivity and interaction between these identities and religious devotion, for 
example, will remain flawed and problematic (1999:206-207). In response to this 
warning, Mahçupyan argues that the debate waged by Keyman is bookish, distant 
from social reality and of a character that reproduces fears unique to liberalism 
(1999:204). In more concrete terms, demands raised by the Islamic groups and 
debate over the ban on head cover do not cover the issue of the legitimacy and 
lawfulness of demands for being different. Mahçupyan says the warning that in 
                                                 
248
  A polemic that occurred in Zaman, joined by Atilla Yayla and Etyen Mahçupyan, between 
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case demands for being different are automatically deemed legitimate, they may 
well articulate with radical political strategies in fact corresponds to a typical 
liberal fear and argues that the legitimacy of any social demand cannot be decided 
on by law (1999:205). Mahçupyan‟s response to the criticism that he builds a 
democrat stance indexed to Islamic identity is that specific identities may come to 
the fore in the process of politicization and that the demands by politicized 
identities may be top items in the agenda of democrats: 
 
First of all the stance of being a democrat is fully independent of „multi-
dimensionality‟ on paper. It is because this kind of multi-dimensionality 
creates a democratic stance that remains only on paper. (….) Politicization 
always disturbs the balance of identity and each demand for being 
different assigns weight to one of the identities (Mahçupyan, 1999: 207).  
 
While it is not possible to say that his stance for being democrat is 
constructed as indexed to Islamic identity, it must still be said that the leading 
texts by Mahçupyan addressing the issue give more weight to demands raised by 
Islamic circles compared to others. As stated by him, this situation arises from the 
fact that the state of being democrat which he conceptualized and adopted as an 
identity makes it obligatory to defend the rights and freedoms of those sections 
that politicized in a specific period and suffered oppression. Given this, it is 
consistent with his specific position that Mahçupyan produced texts that placed 
political Islam at the center and criticized military tutelage in the process of 
February 28
th
.  
However, the point that should be born in mind here is that Mahçupyan‟s 
outlook to religion in general and to Islam in particular can gain clarity through 
the mentality analysis that he adopted as an approach. As can be remembered, 
Mahçupyan thinks that each mentality is associated with a specific 
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epistemological stance or presupposition (2008: 18). At the basis of the patriarchal 
mentality that religions rely on too there is the idealist-reflectionist conception 
(Mahçupyan, 2008). Hence, the idealist-reflectionist conception embodies an 
assumption that provides ground for the fundamental proposition of the 
patriarchal mentality (and therefore religion is its bearer): Despite emanating from 
the same essence, the world has a hierarchical structure that is differentiated, that 
is, constituting a heterogeneous whole (Mahçupyan, 2008: 19). Heterogeneity and 
hierarchy as the substantive characters of the Ottoman world of meanings too are 
based on religion as the bearer of patriarchal mentality (Mahçupyan, 2008: 19). 
According to Mahçupyan, the legacy of patriarchal mentality is one of the major 
reasons why the society does not shift to totalitarianism/fascism despite 
occasionally getting closer to these (2008: 19). Mahçupyan argues that setting 
totalitarian structures at intellectual level by feeding on religions is not possible 
for the heterogeneous structure of religions. Religions may get closer to 
totalitarian approaches only if they are locked in authoritarian structures and their 
essential nature is disturbed (Mahçupyan, 1999: 212-213). In this narrative 
summarizing the outlook of Mahçupyan to religion and to Islam in specific, the 
key role falls upon religious communities. It is because the reflection of 
patriarchal intellectual acknowledgements on social life takes place via religious 
communities (1999: 213). By attributing identities to individuals, religious 
communities differentiate them and thus preclude their mobilization as the mass 
base of totalitarianism (Mahçupyan, 1999: 212). While acceding that it is not an 
ideal solution against totalitarianism, Mahçupyan still underlines that the religious 
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community outlook can serve in the traditions of this land as a safety valve against 
modern forms of oppression (1999: 213).
249
    
Assessing the left through mentality analysis, Mahçupyan does not find in 
materialist-reflectionist left thinking based on authoritarian mentality the 
protective shield against totalitarianism that he finds in patriarchal mentality 
(2008: 21). The materialist outlook which argues that reality perceived as essence 
is in fact the matter rests on the belief that knowledge are correct but incomplete 
replicates of reality (Mahçupyan, 2008: 21). This approach which has no doubt 
about the correctness of its limited knowledge neither feels any need to 
communicate with others. This is the reason why it has an authoritarian character 
(Mahçupyan, 2008: 21): 
 
This understanding makes up the vein that feeds authoritarian mentality. 
While it is asserted that reality is approached step by step thanks to 
knowledge, it is clear that this talent is not equally distributed to all. (…) 
The authoritarian mentality provides a criterion that man can test himself 
by defining basic knowledge at material level and making it accessible 
(2008: 21-22).  
 
According to Mahçupyan, the left emerging from within modernity as a 
composite of relativist and authoritarian mentalities embodied, in its historical 
process, relativism as well as authoritarianism (2007: 79). The distinguishing 
feature of left is its universalism (Mahçupyan, 2007: 80). The left that has been in 
the forefront of struggles for workers‟ and women‟s rights in many countries 
pointed out to a more democrat position in modernity and in this sense it 
committed itself to democracy (Mahçupyan, 2007: 81). Mahçupyan argues that 
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functions as a shield protecting from modern forms of oppression, Mahçupyan never suggests 
identity construction on the basis of “communities.”  To the contrary, besides taking a critical 
stance towards the state, a “genuine intellectual” should also be able to remain out of 
“communities” that give him his cultural identity (1999:  217).  
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Marxism is constructed in reference to authoritarian mentality; however covering 
subjectivity as well as a result of special meaning it attributed to will (2007: 82).  
7.3.1.3.The Prioritization of the Cultural over the Political   
As it has been mentioned in the previous sections, Erdoğan and Üstüner 
(2002) employ the term „post-political‟ in order to define the discourses that 
locate democracy into their core and identify politics mainly as a consensus 
seeking practice. In their view, second republicanism, civil Islamism, and the 
democratic discourse articulated specifically by Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu 
reduce the politics 
 
to a practice of recognizing the other and of reaching a consensus, reject 
the friend – enemy relations, regard „ideological‟ or antagonistic 
conceptions of politics as illegitimate, and limit the sphere of the political 
to a democratic play of differences and a plurality without antagonism 
(2002: 196).  
 
In Erdoğan and Üstüner‟s model, the discourse on democracy formulated 
by Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu has been categorized as „post-liberal‟ since it 
purports to transcend liberal democracy in favor of developing a democracy 
defined on the basis of multiculturalism, values of toleration and coexistence of 
cultural differences (2002: 203). In this respect, Mahçupyan‟s model of 
democracy resting upon the principle of recognition of differences in a pluralist 
manner stands within the confines of liberal democratic model. This model shares 
the same concerns with the liberal paradigm in terms of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual and therefore it does not offer a radical break with 
the liberal democratic paradigm.  
However, the democratic opinion producers, most specifically Mahçupyan, 
categorically deny any connection of democratic position to liberalism‟s 
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conception of the liberty and the individual (Mahçupyan, 2007). For Mahçupyan, 
the liberal conception of the individual, endowed with rationality, is preoccupied 
with maximizing his own interests and therefore, enters into contracts in order to 
achieve this end (2007: 109). This construction of the atomistic and solitary 
individual, who never needs to communicate with the others to verify his taken-
for-granted rational decisions, ignores different voices and thereby fails to 
recognize „the Other‟ (Mahçupyan, 2007: 109-110). Through the democratic 
perspective, ignorance about the demands of different sections of the society that 
fall outside the conception of the liberal order, has certain implications for the 
realization of the principle of liberty. That is, the self-sufficient, rational liberal 
individual exercises the right to liberty within his own private realm. Heavily 
preoccupied with protecting his liberty in his private realm, the liberal individual 
disregards the plurality and diversity of the demands of others. Yet, in 
Mahçupyan‟s formulation, the democratic position, calling for a simultaneous 
interaction with the Other, takes into consideration the perception and sensitivity 
of different voices. The liberal understanding of freedom of expression as the 
foundation of democratic rights draws on the values of the liberal individual who 
does not need to pay due attention to the values of those with whom he engages 
(Mahçupyan, 2007: 112). In Mahçupyan‟s understanding, the democratic position 
corresponds to establishing relations, negotiating and assimilating power relations 
into the fabric of interaction (Mahçupyan, 2009). Democrats retaining the belief in 
the identification of truth through tentative common subjectivities, in contrast to 
liberals, avoid authoritarian aspects of liberal thought. As mentioned above, those 
authoritarian aspects stem from liberalism‟s relativist epistemology (Mahçupyan, 
2005, 2007).  
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Mahçupyan, who is uncomfortable with the label „liberal-democrat,‟ has 
argued that liberal-democrats are people who merely defend free and fair elections 
as a political mechanism of regulation (2006).
250
 Liberals attribute significance to 
democracy as a sub-set of liberalism (Mahçupyan, 2006). On the contrary, for 
Mahçupyan, democrats believe that the democratic position is a very functional 
mechanism in comprehending external reality and they consider liberalism as a 
sub-set of the democrat mentality (Mahçupyan, 2006a). Furthermore, concepts 
like participation, transparency, accountability and persuasion are sine qua non for 
democrats. But for liberals, according to Mahçupyan, these concepts do not 
constitute a vital part of their positions.  
Whereas for Yayla, who challenges Mahçupyan from a liberal standpoint, 
Mahçupyan wrongly treats democracy, which Yayla regards a form of political 
mechanism, as a moral yardstick (2005a, December 4). For Yayla, democracy is 
meaningful and functional as long as it serves the virtue of liberty – which 
constitutes the focal point of liberal thought (2005a). That is, Yayla emphasizes 
that “being democratic” is not an end in itself. Furthermore, drawing upon the 
theoretical premises of Sartori and Hayek, Yayla suggests that liberalism forms 
the backbone of modern democracies, because it calls for limiting the government 
in favor of fundamental rights and liberties of the individual.  
It is noteworthy to mention that Yayla has a point: while Mahçupyan 
argues for a categorical distinction between being democratic and being liberal, 
and prioritizes the former, he actually works with premises that essentially belong 
to the liberal tradition (Yayla, 2005a). This criticism shares some common ground 
with Erdoğan and Üstüner‟s (2002) conceptualization of „post-liberal‟ when they 
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 To illustrate this point see the debate about liberalism and democracy that occurred between 
Mahçupyan and Atilla Yayla in 2006.  
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analyze figures like Mahçupyan who represent the social type of the Democrat. 
Furthermore, Mahçupyan is ambiguous about the procedural mechanisms that 
would help reinforce the position of being democratic.
251
 That is, Mahçupyan‟s 
formulation of being democratic does not seem viable without the legal and 
institutional assurances provided by a liberal democratic order.  
Indeed, what Mahçupyan‟s model envisages is a multicultural society that 
provides the conditions conducive for free exchange of ideas and that encourages 
the mutual recognition of identities. According to this model, interaction of 
different groups and communities would bring about the common values 
constituting the ethical basis for the peaceful coexistence of differences 
(Mahçupyan, 1998). Within this perceptive, the antagonisms inherent in the social 
and political fabric are deliberately overlooked and considered to correspond to 
totalitarian positions stemming from a conflictual understanding (Mahçupyan, 
1998: 231). In this respect, democratic politics deriving from a true deliberation 
and reflection denies the existence of antagonistic demands and takes for granted 
the possibility of an everlasting consensus. In the analysis of Erdoğan and Üstüner, 
consensus-seeking motivation of Mahçupyan‟s perspective, calling for the 
removal of conflict-ridden positions that are considered to impede the democratic 
functioning, serves the depolitization of the social (2002: 206).    
Leaving aside Erdoğan and Üstüner‟s criticism regarding the „post-
political‟ or „depoliticized‟ nature of Mahçupyan‟s formulation, a crucial point 
seems to be clear: In Mahçupyan‟s framework, culture is prioritized over politics. 
This privileged status of culture is manifest in his analysis trying to map out the 
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Turkish political landscape. In this analysis, Mahçupyan utilizes two criteria as 
the yardsticks with reference to which the identities of the political actors would 
be detected (1996: 91). The first criterion points out to the principle of legitimacy, 
understood in terms of the source of political power. In this axis, state and civil 
society are juxtaposed as main competitors of legitimate power. It should be 
reminded that, Mahçupyan believes that civil society is the terrain for the 
flourishing of true democracy. According to his second criterion, values define 
and determine the identities of the political actors. That is, values signal how the 
political actors perceive and present themselves and how they are perceived by 
their adversaries (Mahçupyan, 1996: 92). In this second axis of values, 
Mahçupyan places “universal” values in one pole, and the “traditional” in the 
opposite. In his understanding, the innately cultural contention between universal 
and traditional values in politics pits political actors against each other. In other 
words, Mahçupyan has a cultural- reductionist reading of Turkey‟s political scene 
through his perceived polarization between global and local values: 
 
The concept of values in itself is very complex. Because, for example, the 
concept includes both moral and political values and these values might 
not be congruent with each other. For today, from the perspective of 
Turkey, cultural-moral values are more emphasized, because since 
Tanzimat, the debate on Westernization focused essentially on whether 
cultural values of the West should be adopted or not (1996: 92).   
 
Mahçupyan‟s reading of Turkey‟s political map including the tentative 
location of political parties with respect to legitimacy and values can be traced 
from the following figure (1996: 99).  
Figure 1: Cartesian Coordinates of Turkish Political Landscape, According 
to Mahçupyan 
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Etyen Mahçupyan deepened his understanding of the democratic identity 
throughout the 1990s. In accordance with his conception of being democratic, he 
continued his political opinion production as a columnist and a TV commentator. 
After 1999, when he gained increased public visibility with his role as the co-
scenarist of the film Mrs. Salkım‟s Diamonds (Salkım Hanım‟ın Taneleri), 252 
Mahçupyan has become a figure whose Armenian identity (previously much less 
emphasized) has merged with his identity as a democrat (2005: 16-17). However 
the more recent episode (since early 2000s) in which Mahçupyan‟s Armenian 
identity and his public activism on the Armenian question became more 
emphasized falls outside the historical scope of this dissertation.      
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7.3.2. Ali Bayramoğlu as a Democrat   
7.3.2.1.Profile  
Born in 1956, Ali Bayramoğlu belongs to a younger generation in 
comparison to Mahçupyan (born 1950) and Bumin (born 1947). It should still be 
mentioned that belonging to a younger generation does not seem to generate 
significant differences in terms of political responses to different cultural and 
socio-political developments. In this respect, Bayramoğlu shared common 
concerns and a similar understanding of democracy with the other two prominent 
opinion producers that exemplify the Democrat as a social type.  
While Mahçupyan appears as the major contributor to the philosophical 
field in developing democratic perspective on ethical basis, Bayramoğlu stands as 
the sociologist of the perspective. He analyzes the recent developments in Turkey 
through the lenses of a sociological approach and insists upon the significance of 
a sociological understanding in social-scientific analysis (Bayramoğlu, in-depth 
interview 2011). In line with this sociological understanding, rather than defining 
himself as „an intellectual aspiring to transform the society‟ Bayramoğlu has 
preferred to identify himself just as an opinion producer sociologically inquiring 
into the roots of the society‟s culture (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). 
Therefore, in Bayramoğlu‟s sociological analysis, cultural cleavages have 
occupied substantial place. That is, retaining close affinity to Weberian 
perspective, and sharing the central premises of center-periphery analysis 
developed by ġerif Mardin to understand the history of Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization, Bayramoğlu has evaluated the major dynamics of Turkey‟s socio-
political landscape through the methodological pillars of center and periphery 
cleavage. Bayramoğlu, best known as a columnist specifically concerned with the 
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democratization and civilianization in Turkey, has been regarded as a military-
analyst challenging the mainstream explanations of military-civilian relations in 
the Turkish context.
253
 
Brief biographical information might provide fruitful insights in 
understanding the socio-political basis which helped to shape Bayramoğlu‟s 
future intellectual aspirations and positions. Born on 1956 in Gelibolu, Çanakkale, 
graduated from Iskenderun High School and completed his undergraduate 
education at Grenoble Institute of Political Studies in France. Bayramoğlu 
obtained his PhD from Ġstanbul University and during his academic career in 
Ġstanbul University and Marmara University (1981-1999) has focused on 
military‟s political role, Islamic movements and the sociology of the state 
(Bayramoğlu, 2011). He worked as a columnist in dailies Yeni Yüzyıl, Star, Yeni 
Binyıl and Sabah. He currently works as a columnist in Yeni ġafak and teaches at 
Ġstanbul Kültür University. Bayramoğlu has been conducting researches on the 
tension between religiosity-Islam and laicism in TESEV and together with Prof. 
Ahmet Ġnsel, he has been the advisor for TESEV democratization program policy 
report on security sector in Turkey (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011).254 
It is noteworthy here that Bayramoğlu is not satisfied with only being an 
opinion producer focused on democratic thinking but he is actively involved in 
pro-democratic activities, which further casts him in the mold of the social type of 
the Democrat. For instance, Bayramoğlu stood among the initiators of the 
“Forgive Us, Armenians” campaign launched in 2008 which was thought “to help 
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 Bayramoğlu has devoted his major works on the analysis of political Islam and the military-
civilian relations in Turkey. See: Türkiye‟deİslamiHareketeSosyolojikBirBakış, 1994-2000, Patika 
Yay., Ġstanbul: 2001; 28 Şubat/BirMüdahaleninGüncesi, Bir Yay., Ġstanbul: 2001.  
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 See: Hale Akay, “Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, Problems, and Solutions,” Advisors: 
Ali Bayramoğlu and Ahmet Ġnsel, TESEV Democratization Program Policy Report Series, 
Security Sector 1, Sena Ofset, Ġstanbul, December 2009.  
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overcome the Genocide related fear prevalent in the Turkish 
society.”255Furthermore, he is an intervener in the Dink murder case which has 
been going on for 4 years since the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007.  
Bayramoğlu believes that his early years in Ġskenderun have impacts in his 
intellectual search for a democratic leaning (in-depth interview 2011). In his view, 
meeting with the heterogeneous and multi-cultural social fabric of Ġskenderun in 
rather early ages, he has unintentionally learnt to recognize the social and cultural 
differences (in-depth interview 2011). Despite the existence of potential 
limitations associated with its social opportunities for academic intellectual and 
achievement, the heterogeneous, and in Bayramoğlu‟s words “pluralistic,” (in-
depth interview 2011) social characteristics of Ġskenderun enabled him to develop 
a sense of awareness about diverse traditions and customs and thereby facilitated 
the development of a strong sense of respect for “othered” identities.  
Nevertheless, the turning point for the development of an intellectual and 
theoretical awareness for disadvantaged social groups was triggered during his 
graduate study years in Grenoble Institute in France. When he studied in Grenoble, 
Bayramoğlu had the chance to read the works of leading post-structuralist thinkers. 
After this intellectual experience, the basic premises of post-structuralist thought 
started to guide his thinking. As he states, within a left-leaning academic 
atmosphere, he recognized that the borders of left-wing critical thought were not 
confined to Marxism and that he came across with the theoretical positions 
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 The introductory text for the campaign was introduced by Ali Bayramoğlu, Baskın Oran, 
Ahmet Ġnsel, and Cengiz Aktar and made publicly available online for signatures for about one 
year. The petition‟s signatories included thousands of Turkish citizens. The text simply said: “My 
conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the „Great Catastrophe‟ 
that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I 
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further information, see website: http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com/ 
 
  
262 
 
offering elegant criticisms of Marxism as well (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 
2011).  
Indeed, the impact of post-structuralism and particularly post-modernism 
might clearly be seen on Bayramoğlu‟s emphasis upon anti-essentialism, relativity, 
recognition of differences and plurality and his insistence on a an anti-Hegelian 
and anti-dialectical theoretical position (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). 
Bayramoğlu acknowledges that influence of Michel Foucault has been 
particularly evident in his social scientific investigation and socio-political 
analyses in-depth interview 2011). Having been a participant of Foucault‟s public 
lectures in France, he has been impressed by contemporary French critical theory. 
Yet, he also admits the heavy influence of a Weberian framework in his 
methodological priorities (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). Not 
unexpectedly, this methodological preference is in line with Bayramoğlu‟s 
insistence on the significance of the culture in social scientific analysis. As 
mentioned above, he seeks to explain the peculiarities of Turkish political 
landscape by putting particular emphasis on culture and cultural cleavages.  
Bayramoğlu pinpoints the post 1980 coup socio-political atmosphere as 
the real turning point for the development of democratic thinking he argues for 
(Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). As he underlines, the liberal epoch 
starting with the economic reforms initiated by successive governments under the 
leadership of Turgut Özal and the accompanying values putting emphasis on 
individualism has created the basis conducive for the flourishing of a liberal and 
democratic thought (Bayramoğlu, in-depth interview 2011). At that moment, 
Bayramoğlu recalls the story of liberal re-constructing in Turkey and its 
implications for intellectual field: Opinion producers, majority of whom belongs 
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to left-oriented tradition, adopting the basic premises of post-structuralist or post-
modernist thought, interpreted the ongoing socio-political developments as 
justification of their political and theoretical attachments. For instance the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence of micro-nationalisms and the 
proliferation of identity politics have all reinforced the beliefs in the end of class 
struggle, the death of ideologies and the bankruptcy of conception of politics as a 
struggle for power. Bayramoğlu argues that, all those developments have implied 
the call for a trans-historically defined democracy (in-depth interview 2011).  In 
the view of Bayramoğlu, the cumulative effects of the developments mentioned 
have strongly defined the whole period that began with late-1980s and ended at 
the end of the century (2007: 11). This episode spanning the two vast decades of 
the century, according to Bayramoğlu, has left its imprint on Turkish politics in 
two fundamental axis of contention – the Islamist and Kurdish movements. This 
point is significant in terms of the consolidation of the characteristics of our social 
type: as I already discussed, the maturation of the political dispositions that define 
the Democrat as social type is innately related to the responses given to the 
Islamist and Kurdish challenges.  
7.3.2.2.Bayramoğlu in the 1990s 
Bayramoğlu tells that the two primary political dynamics, throughout the 
1990s, have increasingly dominated politics: The Kurdish and Islamist 
movements. These two political challenges have also, according to him, made it 
easier to think about democracy and being democratic (in-depth interview 2011). 
Therefore, it can be argued that for Bayramoğlu, understanding the 1990s is key 
to understanding to conditions of existence of democratic sentimentalities.  
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According to Bayramoğlu, the sociological tale of the early 1980s and 
1990s covers the process of change regarding the socio-economic structures, 
political alliances, and politicization of cultural identities (2007: 11). Bayramoğlu 
contends that the most remarkable result of this process of change has been “the 
closing of the gap between the center and periphery – and this closing has been 
visible and active” (2007: 11).  
Bayramoğlu defines four basic characteristics distinctive of the 1990s 
(2007: 23). First, social demands changed in character; cultural demands, 
beginning with early 1990s, has become the carrier of economic demands (2007: 
23). Secondly, in this period Turkey had to deal with a crisis of representationthat 
emerged from the failure of the centre left and right parties in understanding the 
transformed nature of social demands (2007: 24). Qualitative changes in social 
demands were exluded by left and right-wing parties as “too localized” and these 
parties chose to dig deeper into the confines of the state instead of renewing 
themselves in terms of their representative base (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 24). Since 
political parties failed to change themselves, the sphere of politics has contracted 
and the state, principally the Armed Forces, has become the primary political 
actor.  
Thirdly, the crisis of representation experienced in Turkey, along with the 
newly emerging social demands, has hastened the delinking between the state and 
the society. During the episodes of contention created in this atmosphere of crisis, 
the ties holding social groups together has weakened and as a result, social groups 
have confined themselves within the borders of their own identities (Bayramoğlu, 
2007: 25). Fourthly, 1990s signify a period where negotiable interests in inter-
group and inter-individual relations became insignificant and communities 
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became more important (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25). Not unexpectedly, the 
weakening of rational negotiations between interests is a consequence of identities 
closing their boundaries to others. These “enclosures”, according to Bayramoğlu, 
led to the emergence of belief-based or identity-based claims that are very 
difficult to co-exist (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25). Under these circumstances, 
inevitably, new collectivities and groups have appeared in between the individual 
and the state, underlining the significance of communities (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 25).  
For Bayramoğlu, the transformation of Turkey in the 1990s can be 
explained by two basic intertwined processes: Differentiation in social 
stratification and changes in the structure of capital (2007: 26, 27). Differentiation 
in social stratification refers to the increasing diversification among social actors; 
and changes in the structure of capital refer to the diversification of economic 
actors. 
 According to Bayramoğlu, recent diverse social stratification in Turkey 
points at the significance of groups emphasizing cultural belonging, primarily 
Kurdish and Islamist movements (2007: 25, 26). On the other hand, the 
diversification among entrepreneurs has led to the emergence of new small and 
medium-sized economic actors working with flexible production schemes 
(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 26). As a result, two axes of contention, crosscutting and 
simultaneous, appeared: First, polarization of actors grouping around social ethics 
and lifestyle choices; second, polarization of actors occupying unequal economic 
positions (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 27). The unfolding of these two axes of contention 
had a reflection in politics: In the 1990s, demands voiced by new groups could not 
find opportunities of representation in a pluralist and non-competitive atmosphere 
(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 27).  
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To sum up, Bayramoğlu argues that the socio-political consequences of the 
changes experienced in the 1990s reduced the chasm between the centre and the 
periphery in Turkey (2007: 28). Politically speaking, exluded demands shook the 
system up and in response, the state dominated the political sphere (Bayramoğlu, 
2007: 28). Centre left and centre right parties have interpreted changing demands 
as “conservatism” and throughout the 1990s, focused on statist, protectionism and 
nationalism (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 35). These responses, though they tried to 
overcome the crisis of representation by attempting to include misperceived 
demands, have worsened the crisis and have reinforced ideological inclinations 
towards nationalism (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 36).  
In an article from 1995, Bayramoğlu states that as political parties become 
more conservative and statist, they cause something bad and something good at 
the same time: Their reaction to the changes in Turkey helps the deepening of the 
crisis, but on the other hand, it may lead to the opening up of new opportunities 
(2007: 37). Individuals may tend to keep to other like themselves and imprison 
themselves inside identities, thus rendering these identities totalitarian; but they 
may also transform their identities as a tool for democratic struggle (Bayramoğlu, 
2007: 41). In case a politics of denial of different identities becomes dominant, 
this encourages endangered identities to become even more conservative, and thus, 
reactionary (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 43). For example, the dominant politics of laicity 
in Turkey failed to democratically organized relations between citizens, state and 
society and on the contrary, gained a dysfunction of hindering the democratic 
constitution of citizenship (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 41). In the words of Bayramoğlu, 
 
In the name of liberalism or social democracy, in Southeastern Turkey, 
ignoring Islamically sensitive demands, challenging them and waging war 
against them damaged the already weakened ties in society. These policies 
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hastened the process in which those that challenged identities have 
strongly embraced alternative identities (2007: 43).  
 
Bayramoğlu underlines the results of the December 1995 elections, hailed 
as the great success of Political Islam, to justify his point about the consequences 
of identity politics in Turkey. This episode, for him, demonstrated that the 
questions of identity, after becoming prominent in the social system, has also 
dominated the political system (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 42). He claims that after the 
December 1995 elections, centrist left-wing and right-wing parties focusing on 
political projects based on atomized individuals have become smaller, while 
parties claiming to represent reactions againsts centrist have become stronger 
(2007: 42), 
More specifically, in his analysis of the December 1995 elections, 
Bayramoğlu states that the statist political logic that tried to exclude HADEP 
(People‟s Democracy Party, then representative of the political wing of the 
Kurdish movement) and RP (Welfare Party, leading Islamist party)failed (2007: 
51). The political approach that was based on ignoring changing social demands 
caused the growth of the gap between political and social structures and damaged 
the channels of communication between disadvantaged social groups (Kurds, 
Islamists, the poor living in slums, etc.) (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 51). Furthermore, 
Bayramoğlu notes that the reactionary post-election declaration that RP, despite 
securing about 40 % of the votes, should be considered a “marginal” party, 
deepens Turkey‟s political problems (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 53).  
As against this reactionary and exclusionist style of politics, for 
Bayramoğlu, being democratic necessitates understanding one‟s adversary and 
keeping the channels of communication open (in-depth interview 2011; 2007: 43). 
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The first step towards the consolidation of a politics of co-existence is the mutual 
understanding of the holders of different (even conflicting) claims. From this 
democratic perspective, it is a matter of principle to build dialogue with an 
Islamist party like RP. Fearing RP is irrational and anti-democratic (Bayramoğlu, 
2007: 53).
256
 
7.3.2.3.Depolitization and Military Tutelage 
The political atmosphere created after the 1995 general elections, 
according to Bayramoğlu, is an episode of increasing military influence where 
political issues are always-already attempted to be resolved by reducing them to 
the logic of national interests (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 59). In this time period, the 
field of politics has shrunk, “civilian” politics has been compromised. For 
Bayramoğlu, under these circumstances, the “ethics” of being democratic requires 
emphasizing the problem of military tutelage. His newspaper writings between 
1995 and 1998, unlike most columns being written during that time, 
problematized and challenged the anti-democratic impact of the Armed Forces in 
politics.
257
 
According to Bayramoğlu, the involvement of the military in politics leads 
to widespread depoliticization (2007: 236, 317). The Armed Forces, when they 
are involved in the affairs of Turkey politically, defines their activities as “supra-
political” and thus render their interventions undebatable, within the discourse of 
“national interests” (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 236, 317). This “supra-political” position 
of the military does not mean that their activities are “a-political” – on the 
contrary, this self-perception of the military points towards the fact that the role 
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that officers see fit for themselves is a disciplining one, which attempts to rule and 
regulate the political field (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 241). Bayramoğlu argues that what 
was witnessed in the February 1997 intervention was just this kind of “operation” 
that aimed to discipline and “correct” politics: With this intervention, the Armed 
Forces was trying to “sterilize” prominent political issues and to transform them 
into question of the “security of the national state” (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 241). This 
disciplinary role that the military was trying to play does not only include the 
issues of political Islam and the Kurdish movement, but also covers a wide range 
of topics on foreign relations (essentially with Iraq and Israel), EU membership, 
issues on education, economic and social reforms (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 242). The 
military‟s apparent posture as being above politics actually leads to its 
politicization even more strongly (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 317). In a column 
Bayramoğlu wrote on December 5, 1997, he argued that the most significant 
negative effect of the February 1997 intervention was the multi-dimensional 
depoliticization effect it created (2007: 244). Based on data from a study 
(supervised by Ferhat Kentel) on the profile of Istanbul voters, Bayramoğlu 
attempted to present evidence about this effect (2007: 244). According to the 
findings of the study, Bayramoğlu wrote, politics was perceived not in terms of 
social demands and innovative outlooks but in terms of dangers, threats and 
technocratic recipes to social problems (2007: 244). Moreover, the voters were 
expecting permanent solutions to their problems from stronger institutions, mainly 
the State and the Armed Forces (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 244). Such findings, 
Bayramoğlu argued, demonstrated the effects of depoliticization in society: the 
sphere of politics was subsumed under the sphere of the state and political 
suggestions were assimilated into the jargon of national interests (Bayramoğlu, 
  
270 
 
2007: 245). But when politics was crippled, social problems were reduced to 
merely national security matters and this in turn worsened those problems 
(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 246).  
As an example of depoliticization, Bayramoğlu argued that the state has 
rendered the Kurdish Question a problem of security that was beyond the reach of 
politics and handed over the “solution” to a platform in which only the military 
had a voice (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 246). The issue of Political Islam was framed in a 
similar manner: The dominance of the view that the military was the guardsman 
of laicism in Turkey made the political negotiation of matters related to the 
Islamist movement impossible – worse, the shadow cast by the military over this 
issue worsened the contentious relations between laicists and Islamists in Turkey 
(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 246). The contraction of the political sphere led to the 
militarization of the main actors of the system (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 247). By 
militarization, in addition to getting more nationalistic and aggressive, 
Bayramoğlu also meant that the playground of political actors in which they can 
compete, negotiate and conflict has narrowed and thus the overall level of 
political activity has diminished. With this diminishing came the effect of being 
politically dependent on the state, particularly, on the Armed Forces (Bayramoğlu, 
2007: 248). According to Bayramoğlu, within the context of this militarization, 
the purpose of the February 1997 intervention was to erase the public visibility of 
Islam and redesign the political spectrum (2007: 285).  
  Bayramoğlu clearly drew attention to three pillars of military oppression in 
contemporary Turkey: (a) The February 1997 intervention, (b) the Susurluk Affair, 
(c) the Kurdish Question (2007: 234). The Susurluk Affair, for him, was 
especially important in terms of the usage of unconstitutional means (Bayramoğlu, 
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2007: 234). The Kurdish Question, on the other hand, represents the issue by 
which the model of “rendering problems supra-political” was first developed 
(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 234). The February 1997 intervention, for Bayramoğlu, 
attempted to legitimize the handling of the other two issues (Susurluk and Kurds). 
With the Susurluk Affair, the military tutelage over the whole political system 
was reinforced: The controversy did not weaken the state but the political 
mechanism (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 97). On the other hand, the whole controversy 
surrounding the Susurluk event was based fundamentally upon the problem of 
rule of law: The Affair once again, but more overtly than ever, revealed that not 
everybody was equal before law, that the judges and prosecutors were not able to 
act independently (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 91).  
 All in all, Bayramoğlu‟s analyses during and after the February 1997 
intervention establishes the groundworks of his fundamental dispositions about 
being democratic. He wrote the following in a column dated May 1, 1997:   
 
The criterion for democracy and being democratic, under the 
circumstances we live in Turkey, is to defend not Welfare Party‟s politics, 
but its existence.We need to defend the existence of Islamic visibility, not 
its politicized forms. And above all, the criterion for being democratic is to 
invite the military to stay in its barracks (2007: 169).  
 
This political stance defended by Bayramoğlu is based upon his conviction that 
one has to be “civic” in order to be democratic: “Democracy is not a game of 
rentiers where every means used is legitimate, it is a compilation of rules that 
minimizes to distribution of rents” (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 144). For Bayramoğlu, 
democracy is not an issue of content, but of form and style (2007: 303). In other 
words, he believes that democracy is about how rulers govern, not about who says 
what or who governs (2007: 303). This perception of democracy is closely related 
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with his understanding of politics. The activity that is called politics cannot be 
reduced to a struggle of power in which all means are allowed, it is rather the 
perfect reflection of social demands and social mobilizations in the mechanisms 
of decision-making. The achievement of a common ground among social actors 
can only be possible through this “strong representation” understanding of politics 
(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 83).  
7.3.2.4.The Cultural over the Political according to Bayramoğlu 
 Bayramoğlu fits the social type of the Democrat basically with his 
position-takings around the historical episode of the February 1997 intervention. 
He emphasizes that despite the fact that he problematized the problem of military 
tutelage around two basic axis of contention, Islamist and Kurdish movement, the 
topic of Political Islam was more significant in the consolidation of his democratic 
convictions (in-depth interview 2011). The Kurdish Question, in his own words, 
“is an issue that defines itself; it has historical, ethnic roots” (Bayramoğlu in-
depth interview 2011). Thus for Bayramoğlu, Political Islam has been the main 
platform through which he found opportunities to expand his democratic views of 
laicism, modernity and Kemalism (in-depth interview 2011).  
As mentioned before, Bayramoğlu was part of the inner circle of the YDH 
and later distanced himself from the organization once it has become a political 
party. This political behavior of Bayramoğlu should be explained by his 
perception of being democratic. According to him, in order to be a democrat, 
instead of leading people, one should search newer way to help the society 
transform itself (in-depth interview 2011). Compared to this formulation, YDH, in 
a short period of time, associated itself with a Jacobin conception of politics and 
surrendered to positions that wholly contradicted its initial mission (Bayramoğlu, 
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in-depth interview 2011).
258
 Therefore, as an exemplary to the social type of the 
Democrat, Bayramoğlu prefers to stand on a ground distanced from actual politics 
and to serve democratization from the outside, using his public opinions.  
Perhaps the most significant characteristic that exemplifies  Bayramoğlu‟s 
distinction as a Democrat is his ethical valuation of democracy without directly 
referring to the term “morality.” He states that he dislikes the concept of “morality” 
and that he defines himself as a sceptic; this disposition is related to his reluctance 
to speculate about the future (in-depth interview 2011). Following postmodernist 
thought, Bayramoğlu‟s scepticism is based upon his emphasis on “uncertainty”, 
i.e., the unpredictability of tomorrow. According to him, all problems that concern 
humans, especially the problem of democracy, should be resolved within the 
confines of the “now,” of “today;” solutions should not be postponed (in-depth 
interview 2011).  
For Bayramoğlu, a given society‟s history, roots and memories are most 
significant for understanding that particular society‟s contemporary problems and 
its socio-political structures (in-depth interview 2011). Especially when it comes 
to Turkey, all indications point towards the fact that the cultural determines the 
historical (in-depth interview 2011). Therefore, for Bayramoğlu, democrats 
cannot come up with realistic and reasonable analyses about the society they live 
in if they cannot undertsand the significance of cultural determinations and 
cultural continuities (in-depth interview 2011). Bayramoğlu argues that the 
fundamental mistake of the Left in Turkey is its lack of understanding this 
significance (in-depth interview, 2011). 
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elections. He claimed that after becoming a political party, YDH had abandoned its ideals and sold 
out to the owners of those ideals (2007: 38).  
  
274 
 
In compliance with the characteristics of the social type of the Democrat, 
Bayramoğlu‟s conception of politics is built upon the determinism of the cultural. 
Guided by cultural determinations, Bayramoğlu‟s definition of the political 
includes the necessity of being dependent on a hierarchy of problems: at the top of 
the problems sits the State, below it the political spectrum and next comes state-
society and state-politics relations (in-depth interview 2011). Hence, the more a 
given problem, on a certain scale, occupies a large space, the more it is worth 
spending time on, for Bayramoğlu. With this understanding of “problem 
hierarchies,” Bayramoğlu tries to justify why he does not much delve upon issues 
like gender or poverty (in-depth interview 2011).  
7.3.3. Kürşat Bumin as a Democrat   
7.3.3.1. Bumin as a “Proponent of Civil Society” 
KürĢat Bumin, another prominent figure that we investigate through the 
methodological advantages provided by social type analysis, ironically refuses to 
be identified under the category of the „democratic‟ opinion producer. Although 
this attitude might be regarded as a reflection of humility, Bumin has a certain 
explanation for it: In his view, the democrat can only flourish within truly 
democratic circumstances (in-depth interview 2011). Such that, neither in his 
journalistic articles nor in more theoretical works, it is possible to find any 
discussion on democrats. He does not see contemplating on the state of being a 
democrat as a part of his intellectual production.  
 Bumin‟s intellectual popularity dates back to early 80s. The publication of 
his Sivil Toplum ve Devlet (Civil Society and the State) (1981) has sparked a 
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lively debate within the political and intellectual circles of the time.
259
 Bumin was 
also awarded 1982 Yazko Prize with Sivil Toplum ve Devlet. He was often the 
target of harsh criticisms and somehow a reference point for the discussions 
revolving around civil society, reformism and left liberalism.
260
 Major Marxist 
circles of the period, Saçak, Gelenek and 11.Tez, addressed the issue of civil 
society and its proponents mainly over the writings of Murat Belge and to some 
extent over Bumin‟s Sivil Toplum ve Devlet. Among the Marxist or nationalist 
circles Bumin‟s name has been mentioned in a pejorative manner and his early 
work has been regarded as a theoretical intervention from liberal grounds to 
socialist and Marxist thinking. In the lexicon of Marxists, Bumin, as a civil 
society proponent, exemplified the conceptualization of democracy which ignored 
class inequalities and overlooked the role of the State in transition to capitalism 
(Güler, 1987). Then, in Marxist circles, Bumin became one of the primary 
scapegoats representing mainstream liberalism in the Turkish political and 
intellectual field.  
 Bumin (b. 1947) received his BA from philosophy department in Faculty 
of Language, History and Geography Faculty (Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, 
DTCF) Ankara. He spent his post-graduate years in France where he stayed with 
his wife Tülin Bumin.  During his years in France (1972-1980), he attended 
several lectures on political philosophy in Sorbonne-Paris I. Bumin and his wife 
returned to Turkey in 1980 and taught in the department of philosophy in Ege 
University for ten years. Mostly known for his media criticism, Bumin‟s other 
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works include books on city planning
261
 and criticism of the educational system 
and the official ideology in Turkey.
262
  
7.3.3.2.Sources of Bumin‟s Social and Political Opinions 
 When we investigate the intellectual sources and motivations that have 
shaped the standing of KürĢat Bumin as a social type as „the Democrat,‟ we come 
across some names and social networks that have been mentioned in previous 
sections. First of all, it should once more be mentioned that, the intellectual 
trajectories of Bumin, Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu have intersected at several 
crossroads. Like Mahçupyan, Bumin contributed to Toplumcu Düşün. As he lived 
in Ġzmir, he was not a member of the inner circle of this social network. Still, he 
wrote influential articles for the journal.
263
 In accordance with the ideological 
preferences and political orientation of the journal, Bumin‟s articles focused on 
the issues concerned with the authoritarian nature of the Soviet version of 
socialism and Leninism particularly with reference to Soviet invasion of Prague in 
1968. In a similar vein, topics like vulgar materialism, the Jacobin character of 
Leninism, Soviet-style socialism appeared as recurring themes of Bumin‟s early 
writings. Again, displaying a clear parallelism with the theoretical baggage and 
missions of Toplumcu Düşün, totalitarianism was a subject frequently discussed in 
Bumin‟s articles. 
As mentioned previously, Mehmet Ali Aybar‟s politics, though indirectly, 
greatly influenced the formation of left-liberal opinions. In that respect, Aybar‟s 
exceptional opposition against dogmatism and his rejection of the Leninist model 
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as a socialist organization made him an intellectually attractive figure for a 
minority of the left leaning youngsters who were uneasy with the authoritarian 
aspects of Marxism. In that respect, Aybar, notably with his reaction to the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia and his original theses on the social formation of 
Turkey, underlying the bureaucracy as the hegemonic class, had a considerable 
impact in the shaping of Bumin‟s own social and political convictions. 
Throughout the in-depth interview, Bumin has emphasized the significance of 
Aybar as a political figure in his intellectual and political development (in-depth 
interview 2011). Furthermore, Bumin was a member of the loose discussion group 
following the teachings of Aybar during his undergraduate years. He participated 
in several discussion sessions organized by the group adopting Aybar‟s 
interpretation of Marxism. From early 70s to his death in 1995, Aybar was a 
mentor and a close friend of Bumin (in-depth interview 2011). Aybar never 
hesitated to accuse Soviet socialism as a totalitarian and oppressive regime, at the 
risk of being excluded by other Marxist circles of his period. In that respect, his 
position as an independent democrat later on continued to be a symbol of 
inspiration for Bumin (in-depth interview 2011). Yet, in contrast to the 
reservations of other opinion producers gathered around Toplumcu DüĢün, who 
welcomed Aybar‟s oppositional stance but claimed that his theses still drew upon 
Marxist methodology, Bumin seemed to adopt Aybar‟s version of socialism. 
Bumin‟s difference of opinion (compared the rest of Toplumcu DüĢün) in the 
early 1980s, also indicates how Bumin‟s positions on democracy in Turkey differ 
from the other two prominent opinion producers that are being discussed in this 
chapter. Bumin‟s distinctive position as a democrat opinion producer does not 
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only stem from his insistence on the civic rights and freedoms but also his 
emphasis on social rights.  
KürĢat Bumin was one of the central intellectual architects of the YDH 
project. He assumed key positions in the movement and his name was mentioned 
as the leader of the YDH (Bumin, in-depth interview 2011; Ergül, in-depth 
interview 2011). According to Bumin, the YDH implied a courageous attempt 
arguing for radical political reforms which would bring a western type democracy 
to Turkey. Asserting for a radical democratization within the country, the YDH 
could bring about a change in mentality towards democratization, Bumin believed 
(in-depth interview 2011).  
However Bumin was among those who left the YDH after the decision to 
transform the movement into a political party. The major reason behind Bumin‟s 
leaving the movement was related to his conviction that the anti-democratic 
political culture in Turkey would contaminate YDH as well. Additionally, despite 
his pivotal position within YDH, Bumin retained certain reservations about the 
movement. His major objection concerned the movement‟s ignorance of the social 
problems of the working people in Turkey (in-depth interview 2011). Bumin 
thought that the barriers before the free functioning of the market should be 
eliminated, but also added that this alone would not ensure social justice. In his 
own words, “the category of „social‟ was not only confined to issues concerning 
secularism, Islam, ethnicity or democracy. It also included the struggle for living, 
and labor problems” (2011 in-depth interview).  
Bumin held that the YDH had to limit its mission to influencing policy 
makers through preparing reports on critical issues such as the supremacy of law, 
military tutelage, Kurdish problem and political Islam and operate as a civil 
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platform encouraging democratic discussion (in-depth interview 2011). He admits 
that, at least for a short period of time, the YDH provided a reasonable platform 
upon which ideas supporting the empowerment of a truly democratic political 
culture could be spread (in-depth interview 2011). Unfortunately, with the 
decision of becoming a political party, the missions of this democratic platform 
could no longer be advanced (in-depth interview 2011). Bumin was not involved 
with the process at the end of which the YDH became a political party. Following 
his wife, he went to Germany and stayed there until 1997.  
Unlike Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu, Bumin was closer to socialism and 
therefore he contributed to left-leaning journals that represented the early steps 
towards a formulation of democratic socialism in Turkey. For instance, he wrote 
an article for Yeni Gündem focusing on the problems of the education system in 
Turkey and its connections with the official ideology.
264
 He also wrote for Zemin, 
a monthly journal covering plurality of critical voices within the socialist left, 
published by the political circle around Mehmet Ali Aybar.
265
 However Bumin 
never preferred to join any one of the anti-Stalinist socialist circles. For instance, 
despite his lifelong friendship with and admiration of Aybar, Bumin did not 
choose to be a member of Aybar‟s Socialist Revolution Party (SDP).266 Aybar‟s 
interpretation of socialism remained as an intellectual source that inspired 
Bumin‟s ideas and was not regarded a political focus offering feasible policies for 
existing socio-political issues. In addition to his reservations related to the 
authoritarian features inherent in Marxian socialism, his decision of being 
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distanced to party politics seems to be a deliberate choice revealing his own 
definition of himself as a truly independent opinion producer. Bumin deliberately 
prefers not to be associated with any political party or ideological circle and even 
refuses to be identified as a thinker connected to any specific tradition.  
A detailed examination of Bumin‟s articles covering a wide range of topics 
from problems associated with top-down practices of secularism in Turkey to the 
issues related to gender or social inequalities reveals an interesting clue about his 
thought: Hannah Arendt‟s writings have obviously been a source of inspiration in 
the formation of his political opinions. Most significantly, Bumin‟s ideas on 
Marxian socialism make considerable use of Arendt‟s famous book, The Origins 
of Totalitarianism.
267
 Moreover, Bumin‟s writings on ideology bear the mark of 
Arendt‟s thoughts on totalitarianism to a great extent.268 Arendt‟s remarks that 
both fascism of Nazi Germany and the socialism under Stalinist Russia 
represented distinctive forms of governments built upon terror and ideological 
reshaping, and thereby exemplified the modern totalitarian regimes, have 
provided sound theoretical basis for Bumin‟s rethinking over issues related to the 
democracy.
269
  
Bumin‟s intellectual affinity with Arendt‟s analysis on totalitarianism has 
certain implications for understanding his political mindset. Most commentators 
associate Bumin with political right in part because he draws largely upon a 
canonical text of Cold War liberal anti-communism. It was argued by left wing 
critics that Arendt‟s analysis on totalitarianism, drawing parallels between Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Union, provided intellectual justifications for the anti-
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communist politics of the Cold War (Isaac, 1998: 57). For some on the left of 
political spectrum, particularly in the United States, Arendt has been read as the 
theoretician of anti-communism (Isaac, 1998: 56, 57). Even for anti-Stalinist 
socialists, Arendt‟s assault against Marxism was regarded as a sign of her political 
preferences within the Cold War environment (Isaac, 1998: 57). Since Arendt had 
a bad reputation within socialist circles, Bumin‟s thoughts in turn, were 
interpreted as pro-establishment. Indeed, one other factor that seems to contribute 
to this line of thinking is Bumin‟s utilization of two keywords of the Cold War 
terminology: „totalitarianism‟ and „free world.‟ In several essays, he coined „free 
world‟ as the opposite of totalitarianism. Needless to say, within the post-Cold 
War era, the term implied functioning democracies of the West.
270
 Yet, it should 
once more be stated that Bumin never fits into the mold of a right wing opinion 
producer or a conservative establishment figure. For instance, his frequent 
reference to totalitarianism or his usage of the notion of „free world‟ might well be 
linked to Bumin‟s dissatisfaction with the popular understanding of the socialist 
and left leaning circles undermining the value of democracy.  
7.3.3.3.Columnist in an Islamist Daily, Yeni Şafak  
After his return to Turkey in 1997 during the February 28 process, Bumin 
started to write for the pro-Islamist daily Yeni Şafak. The post-modern coup of 
February 28, 1997, is undoubtedly the most significant case over which the issue 
of military tutelage over politics, for the first time since 1980, has been debated on 
solid grounds. With the episode of February 1997, political Islam and military 
tutelage were problematized in detail. This problematization and soul-searching 
has led to the further consolidation of the Democrat as a social type. In line with 
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the definitive characteristics of our social type, KürĢat Bumin wrote articles 
criticizing media‟s responses to the February 1997 episode with particular 
emphasis on the issues of political Islam and military tutelage. In Yeni Şafak he 
and Alper GörmüĢ prepared a media-critical page (called Medyakronik) where 
they exposed the relations between political power and journalism. Behind 
Bumin‟s own journalism effort was his deep belief that in order to be truly 
democratized, Turkey had to eliminate all forms of lawlessness that haunt the 
relations between the media, politics and jurisdiction.  
It would be incorrect to suggest that the 1997 coup resembled the previous 
military coups experienced in Turkey. In contrast to the previous coups, the 
military, in this case, played behind the scenes. The coup was also distinctive in 
terms of the role played by „civil‟ society organizations and the media during its 
execution. That is, alongside the overt pressure of the NSC over the Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan and the coalition government, certain segments of 
the secular establishment have played considerable role in delegitimizing the 
government and thus strengthening the hand of the armed forces. As a result of 
the combined efforts of the media, the „civil society‟ organizations and the 
military, Refah-Yol coalition government was forced to collapse in June 1997. 
With reference to the role played by the so-called civil society organizations 
during the process, some commentators tended to explain February 28, as an 
outcome of the internal logic of democratic politics in Turkey (Toprak, 2005: 
172).
271
 These commentators believed that the involvement of the media and civil 
society in support of the armed forces was “normal,” to be expected as part of the 
operation of the democratic process (Toprak, 2005: 172).  
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However the 1997 episode revealed that the military rule did not always 
have to take over directly. Moreover, using indirect strategies of influence and 
manipulation may give the military even greater opportunities to influence public 
policy (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 310). Contrary to the previous coups, the February 
28 intervention demonstrated the military‟s strategy of redefining Turkey‟s 
political landscape by manufacturing consent (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 322). In that 
atmosphere, media helped the military by serving fabricated news of “sharia 
threat” and by appealing to the fears that have been sown the mindset of the 
secular groups. 
Bumin spent a lot of time and energy during this episode to expose the 
manipulations of the media (Bumin, 1998: 39, 103; 2002a: 130, 2002b: 87, 274, 
277).  In this respect, his initial task was to question the „civil‟ character of the 
civil society organizations welcomed as the democratic forces that supported the 
military intervention. He maintained that, despite common perceptions, being 
“unofficial” was not the only criterion to be “civilian” (1998). Civil society was a 
platform to oppose power outside the state and thus reinforce democracy (1998). 
Bumin thought that, as an example, the only civil society organization that 
operated true to its mission was Mazlumder, because Mazlumder did not 
discriminate ideologically, religiously or ethnically while it focused on human 
rights advocacy (2002b: 186).  
  Throughout his critical readings of the media, he coined the term of “state 
columnist” in order to criticize the positions adopted by columnists and journalists 
in favor of prevailing power relations (1998: 62). According to Bumin, these 
journalists could not write well organized articles that were coherent. Instead their 
columns were based on short sentences, written sloppily and mostly talked about 
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how they had been socializing with powerful state figures (1998: 63). These 
columns almost never questioned political issues seriously and their discourse 
reflected the dominant positions of the state on issues like national security, 
political Islam or the Kurdish question (1998: 65). Bumin‟s observations on the 
category of the “state columnist” overlapped with the following political analysis: 
within the conditions of February 28 process, the „civil‟ societal actors and the 
media adopted state-dependent and state-defending roles which in turn brought 
about the subordination of the political realm to the secular state power (Cizre and 
Çınar, 2003: 316). According to Bumin, the attempts of some state institutions to 
define their authority as surpassing politics reinforce the perception that politics is 
a bad, negative thing (2002a: 34). These institutions, imposing themselves 
covertly as political actors, try to give the impression that they are a-political as if 
they try to assert that the political is an evil concept. Yet according to Bumin, 
these institutions cause the contraction of the political sphere in Turkey (2002a: 
35).  
Bumin has frequently written about rights violations of organizations and 
persons that were discriminated against during the February 1997 episode because 
their Islamist identities. He discussed the issues of rule of law and banning parties 
after the ban against Felicity Party and argued that justifications of such bans by 
saying that democracy has to defend itself are incompatible with the principle of 
rule of law (2002b: 180, 85, 45; 1998: 39). A significant event Bumin has delved 
upon with regard to the issue of rule of law was the “Merve Kavakçı Affair.” 
Kavakçı, a veiled Deputy of Fazilet Partisi in 1999 elections (Virtue Party) was 
prevented to take her oath in the swear-in ceremony. Bumin focused on the 
midnight raid operation launched on the house of Merve Kavakçı, by the Chief 
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Prosecutor of State Security Courts Nuh Mete Yüksel and pointed to the 
incompability of this situation with the principle of the supremacy of law.
272
 
According to Bumin, the very existence of State Security Courts is a problem 
compromising democracy; these courts give special powers to prosecutors who in 
turn tend to violate individuals‟ rights with decisions that appears to be arbitrarily 
given. (Bumin, 2002b: 226).  
Needless to say, one major incident that brought the discussions on the 
rule of law into Turkey‟s agenda was the Susurluk Scandal. Just as the February 
1997 intervention has led to the discussion of military tutelage in detail, the event 
at Susurluk opened up debates on the status of the principle of rule of law in 
Turkey at the end of the 1990s. Before 1996-1997, debates on the rule of law were 
associated with the Kurdish Question and rights violations related to that issue. 
But with the scandal that involved a politician, a paramilitary intelligence officer 
and the director of a Police School, the concept of the “deep state” and Mafioso 
relations within state institutions has permanently been integrated into the agendas 
of opinion producers and academics in Turkey. As Bumin discussed the Susurluk 
event on the grounds of the relation between law and politics, he noted that the 
media limits its criticisms by arguing that the only “offenders” in this event were 
the politicians (1998: 115, 222; 2002a: 58).  
In accordance with his conception of „the social,‟ Bumin has not confined 
his intellectual investigation with the topics directly related to the broad and 
interrelated issues of military tutelage, political Islam and the Kurdish Question as 
he problematized the perception of rule of law in Turkey. Nor did he accept a 
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hierarchical order among these constant themes of the Turkish political scene. He 
rather preferred to discuss different facets of social and political issues in 
delineating the fundamental shortcomings of Turkish democracy. In that respect, 
he did not refrain from exposing the hypocritical attitude of Turkish mainstream 
media with respect to the incidents of torture and maltreatment in Turkish prisons, 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances in custody and human rights abuses by the 
security officers. Bumin‟s articles focused on disputed cases such as: the trial of 
sixteen youngsters by police officers in 1995, known as the case of “Manisa 
Children” (1998: 223), the struggle of “Saturday Mothers,” siblings of the 
disappeared persons in custody (2002a: 57), extrajudicial killing of Murat BektaĢ 
in 1999 and the silence shared by both Islamist and secular media in face of this 
incident (2002b: 99), widespread cases of maltreatment in Turkish prisons (2002a: 
81), and the double standards of the juridical system against children who were 
arrested while stealing baklava (2002a: 58).  
Bumin did not confine himself to raising sharp criticisms against the 
secular establishment and its mouthpieces in the media. He also heavily criticized 
Islamist media, including his own newspaper Yeni Şafak. Most significantly, 
Bumin condemned the attitudes of the Islamist media with respect to the 
massacres of Alevis in Sivas in 1993.When, after the court decision sentencing 33 
participants of the Sivas events to death, the daily Akit (“Is Aziz Nesin the State?”) 
and Yeni Şafak (“Death Sentences Are Being Debated”) came out with critical 
headlines, Bumin sharply argued against the Islamist discourse. He criticized the 
stigmatization off Aziz Nesin as an “atheist writer” (1998: 194, 196). Again, when 
Yeni Şafak chose the frame the issue of Heybeliada School of Theology in anti-
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Christian terms, Bumin argued against the paper‟s denial of the rights violation 
involved (1998: 103).  
Another significant criticism of Bumin against Islamists concerns this 
group‟s occasional defenses of the State. Obedience to the State, according to 
Bumin, was justified from time to time using religious arguments, which in turn 
hinders the spread of democratic dispositions among Islamists (2002a: 144). As an 
example, Bumin heavily criticized Yeni ġafak‟s positive and approving coverage 
of a protest event organized by 4000 armed policemen in Istanbul on December 
12, 2000 (2002a: 115).  
Alongside the above mentioned points, what makes Bumin‟s critical and 
pro-democratic attitude distinctive is his concern with one major topic, that of 
gender, which has been largely neglected by most other liberal and democratic 
opinion producers. One example discussed by Bumin on gender issues can be 
recalled to give an idea about his sensitivities: After the broadcast of scenes of the 
female theologian Dr. Hidayet Tuksal where she crossed her legs, the Islamist 
media attacked her with a sexist, almost pornographic discourse. Bumin took up 
this issue and problematized how the Islamist media reproduced the general, 
structural patriarchal discourses dominant in Turkish society (2002a: 156). 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
8.1. On Methodology 
In this dissertation it has been argued that within Turkey‟s political and 
cultural fields, a social type of opinion producers, namely the Democrat, has 
emerged. This social type was shaped by the various moments of the democratic 
consolidation process in the two decades following the 1980 coup. Throughout the 
dissertation, “social type analysis,” an understudied social-scientific paradigm 
developed through the works of Georg Simmel, has been explicated and deployed 
for the study of this particular type of political opinion producers that appeared in 
Turkey throughout the 1980s. In this vein, the Democrat, in this dissertation, has 
been analyzed as the product of particular political and social relations. Following 
the theoretical insights offered by Simmel, the Democrat social type is examined 
as a mediating concept between the general democratization dynamics of Turkey 
and the specific responses given to these dynamics in the political culture.  
The dissertation maintained that the state of “being liberal and democratic” 
includes but cannot singularly be reduced to class positions, strategies of cultural 
distinction, political criticism or patterns of socialization. Throughout the 
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dissertation, the emergence and embodiment of the Democrat has been explored 
within a process of conglomeration of personality traits, socio-political 
convictions, mannerisms and mentalities that can be observed inside the social-
political space of Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s.  
In this dissertation, the analysis of the Democrat as a social type drew 
upon the following methodological steps: Firstly, in order to identify the 
components of our social type, a socio-historical analysis has been developed in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Secondly, three individual representatives (Etyen 
Mahçupyan, Ali Bayramoğlu and KürĢat Bumin) have been chosen to provide the 
detailed portrait of the social type. Writings of these figures are used as discursive 
data, and in-depth interviews have been completed with each of them. Finally, in 
this Chapter, the components of the social type will be brought together to 
construct an “epistemic individual” in order to demonstrate the presence and 
influence of the social type in Turkish political discourse.  
The major reasoning behind the methodological preferences of the 
dissertation derives from the shortcomings arising from either over-theorized or 
over-sociologized accounts on specialist political opinion producers. An analysis 
built upon the pervasive concept of “intellectual” is constraining for the political-
scientific task of studying heterogeneous emergent groups representing political 
opinions during Turkey‟s experiences with democratic consolidation since early 
1980s. As I aimed to demonstrate throughout the dissertation, despite various 
well-intentioned attempts to historicize “intellectuals” by drawing upon their 
relation to politics, the category is always consecrated, surrounded by an aura of 
good or bad “missions,” liked or disliked “functions” or overburdened “tasks.” 
Therefore, it is difficult to retool either the concept of the “intellectual” or that of 
  
290 
 
the “intelligentsia” by attempting to eliminate the moralistic baggage that comes 
with it. Then, instead of using a morally burdened catch-all concept that is more 
fit for philosophical treatises and was not intended for operationalization in 
specific political studies, I contended that we are better off with a different tool. A 
concept that can do the job of providing insights on a specific group of individuals 
with common characteristics embedded into a particular era of Turkish politics is 
offered – naming and framing a particular “social type”.  
The dissertation argues social type analysis delivers more methodological 
flexibility without the moralism of the “task of intellectuals” debates: The 
Democrat of the two decades following the 1980 coup is an emergent, distinctive, 
nevertheless ordinary social type, no superior or sacred or special than the social 
types of the Hobo, the Stranger or the Loser. To clarify a perhaps obvious point: 
The Democrat of this era is not the same as the Democrat in 1950s‟ Turkey. Nor 
does he have a trans-historical “responsibility” (although he may misrecognize his 
“disinterestedness” as such and this misrecognition is a significant object of 
analysis). Moreover, the Democrat is not a “vocational” category, like the 
politician or the journalist. The Democrat is both a creature of the shortcomings of 
democracy in Turkey‟s political sphere and civil society, and acts and socializes 
through these shortcomings, and leaves his impressions in the public sphere with 
her opinions. Furthermore, the operationalization of the social type of the 
Democrat enables us the following: It helps reveal how certain characteristics, 
political attitudes, opinionated dispositions, reactions to authority, etc. coming 
from different individuals with comparable trajectories form recognizable social 
and political patterns, patterns that inspire or antagonize others and gain causal 
power over political and even mental structures.  
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There are three case studies in the dissertation completed using social type 
analysis: Opinion producers Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan and KürĢat 
Bumin are studied as representatives of the Democrat. These individuals are part 
of the heterogeneous group of scholars, journalists, writers, etc. that contributes to 
the shaping of public opinion on the democratic profile of rights, liberties and rule 
of law in Turkey. Their political opinions provide direct or indirect consultancy 
service to the government. They critically comment on the policies of the state 
and provide insight for policy-makers about what the citizens think of those 
policies. They function as „gate-keepers:‟ through their liberal and/or democratic 
opinions they draw boundaries between what is properly political and what is 
outside the boundaries of the political. 
8.2. Analysis: Bringing the Components of the Social Type Together 
As stated previously, the Democrat, in this dissertation, is not a category of 
individuals that carry the heavy burden of some consecrated „mission‟ or 
„function.‟ The significance of this dissertation is to demonstrate the Democrat‟s 
ordinariness and distinctiveness at the same time, in relation to three fundamental 
turning points in recent Turkish politics: The 1980 coup and its aftermath, the 
Political-Islamist movement and the Kurdish insurgency.  
Three prominent figures, analyzed as representatives of the Democrat as a 
social type, Mahçupyan, Bayramoğlu and Bumin, socialized and politicized under 
distinctive historical circumstances (very different, for Turkey, than the positions 
of political opinion producers of late Ottoman modernization, or of the 1950s and 
1960s) have left their political and cultural impression on their era through their 
columns, TV appearances, books or academic works. Nevertheless, they are still 
mere creatures of the political developments of their times.  
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We may begin with Klapp‟s assumption (1956:37): for a social type to be 
perceived as significant, people would create names or give newer meanings to 
existing names. This assumption may serve as a guideline for the identification of 
our social type. In the political culture of Turkey, the qualification „liberal‟ has 
been frequently used for smearing by both the left and right, particularly by 
nationalist and/or Kemalist circles. Given this, the portrayal „liberal left,‟ „left 
liberal‟ or „liberal democrat,‟ for instance, is an attribution made by others rather 
than being a qualification preferred by some. Even within the nationalist and 
Kemalist circles, opinion producers emphasizing individual freedoms, developing 
an ethical approach to democracy and calling for elimination of military tutelage 
and strengthening of rule of law, have been labeled as “Second Republicanists”, 
“civil society advocators” used synonymously with “the domestic collaborators of 
imperialism” or the sexist epithet “liboĢ.” Indeed, the dispositions and attitudes 
critically associated with the social type, while caricaturized, point towards real 
convictions and political relations. Accordingly, the identification of the 
Democrat as a social type can also be methodologically justified by the analysis of 
the way nick names are used (Klapp, 1956).  
The next major step of our analysis concerns the processes of naming and 
justifying the basic components of the Democrat as a social type. In this vein, 
cultural, political, ideological features that characterize our social type 
exemplified by three key figures, Mahçupyan, Bayramoğlu and Bumin, will be 
listed. In order to sum up its various components, a mnemonic name has been 
attached to each feature defining the type (Sway, 1981; Smith 1974).  
It should once more be emphasized that, equipped with social type 
analysis, we examine our cases in the context of their intellectual worlds, relations 
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they establish, alliances they join and the positions they take before the public as a 
part of reality they experience. Accordingly, in order to compile the distinguishing 
characteristics that form the social type the following mnemonic names are 
employed: having a beef with classical liberalism, emphasis on the cultural over 
the political, political disinterestedness, anti-Leninism, gender negligence, and 
public visibility. 
8.2.1. Having a beef with classical liberalism   
One basic characteristic that distinguishes the opinion producers that 
constitute the research subject of this dissertation is their theoretical ambition to 
transcend the conception of democracy defined within the theoretical and 
ideological limitations of the liberal thought. Uncomfortable with the label 
“liberal,” they define their own political identities far beyond the ideological 
borders that define liberal understanding of democratic functioning. In their view, 
liberal democracy disregards multiculturalist values and ideals concerning the 
coexistence of cultural differences. They argue for a multi-culturalist model of 
democracy defined on the basis of multiculturalism, values of toleration and 
coexistence of cultural differences. For instance, according to Mahçupyan, who 
categorically denies any connection of democratic position to liberalism‟s 
conception of liberty and the individual, the liberal construction of the atomistic 
and solitary individual who never needs to communicate with the others to verify 
his taken-for-granted rational decisions, ignores different voices and thereby fails 
to recognize „the Other‟ (Mahçupyan, 2007: 109-110). Put differently, heavily 
preoccupied with protecting his liberty in his private realm, the liberal individual 
disregards the plurality and diversity of the demands of others (Mahçupyan, 2007; 
Bayramoğlu, 2007: 43; Bumin, 2002a). Furthermore, according to these three 
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figures, philosophically benefited from the methodological framework offered by 
post-structuralism, democrats retaining the belief in the identification of truth 
through tentative common subjectivities, in contrast to liberals, avoid 
authoritarian aspects of liberal thought. Besides, they raise sharp objections to 
what they regard inherent to liberalism, that of the instrumentalization of 
democracy. In their view, democracy cannot and should not be reduced to a 
political mechanism of regulation based upon free and fair elections (Mahçupyan, 
2006; Bayramoğlu, 2007a; Bumin, 2002a). Their formulation of democracy 
envisages a multicultural society that provides the conditions conducive for free 
exchange of ideas and that encourages the mutual recognition of identities. 
According to this model, interaction of different groups and communities would 
bring about the common values constituting the ethical basis for the peaceful 
coexistence of differences (Mahçupyan, 1998). Within this perceptive, the 
antagonisms inherent in the social and political fabric are deliberately overlooked 
and considered to correspond to totalitarian positions stemming from a conflictual 
understanding (Mahçupyan, 1998: 231). In this respect, democratic politics 
deriving from a true deliberation and reflection denies the existence of 
antagonistic demands and takes for granted the possibility of an everlasting 
consensus. 
8.2.2. Emphasis on „the Cultural‟ over „ the Political‟  
Another common denominator of the cases that exemplify the social type 
of the Democrat is their methodological insistence on the significance of culture 
in social scientific analysis. They share a common concern in seeking to explain 
the peculiarities of the Turkish political landscape by putting particular emphasis 
on culture and cultural cleavages. Each of the figures exemplary of the Democrat 
  
295 
 
has retained a distanced and critical position towards Marxism and they have 
employed, to a large extent, a Weberian analytical framework in shaping their 
arguments. In that vein, they all adopt Mardin‟s culture-centered analysis of 
Turkish political history, which presumes that the cultural codes of the state elites 
and popular masses are in constant conflict. In this respect, the Democrat seems to 
accept this model‟s “cultural alienation” thesis, which lumps the complex 
dynamic of Turkish politics into the axis of culture. This priviledged status of 
culture is mostly manifest in Mahçupyan‟s analysis that seeks to map ot the 
Turkish political landscape (Mahçupyan, 1996: 91). In Mahçupyan‟s 
understanding, the innately cultural contention between universal and traditional 
values in politics pits political actors against each other. In other words, 
Mahçupyan examines Turkey‟s political scene through the polarization he 
perceives between global and local values (1996: 92). Likewise, in Bayramoğlu‟s 
sociological analysis, cultural cleavages have occupied substantial place. 
Retaining close affinity to the Weberian perspective, and sharing the central 
premises of center-periphery analysis to understand the history of Ottoman-
Turkish modernization, Bayramoğlu has also evaluated the major dynamics of 
Turkey‟s socio-political landscape through the methodological pillars of center 
and periphery cleavage (2007). Although he does write extensively on the topics 
directly related to the cultural alienation thesis, Bumin‟s corpus of writings has 
also retained the imprint of the culture-centric approach (2002a). All in all, while 
prioritizing the cultural over the political, the social type of the Democrat de-
emphasizes the wide range of dynamics at play within the realm of politics and 
merely reads the Turkish political landscape as a sphere under the monopoly of 
exclusionist elite. Yet, the most important implication of the culture-oriented 
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inclination concerns the definition of the political. Built upon cultural 
determinations, the definition of the political presumes a hierarchy of issues 
within the course of socio-historical analysis. This hierarchy of socio-political 
issues drawing upon the insights derived from the cultural alienation thesis 
privileges some specific topics related to rights and liberties (state and the 
military, for instance) and excludes or overlooks others (gender, for instance).       
8.2.3. Disinterestedness towards Party Politics 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, a characteristic of the newly 
emergent social type is a longing for democratic debate, but without cumbersome 
practical-political chores that come along with it. This characteristic is evident in 
the social trajectories of each of our case examples whose paths were carefully 
separated from political activism. Regardless of their own subjective perception of 
how they are positioned, they were comfortably confined to a space of pure 
analysis, commentary-making and theorization. Their sole engagement with the 
realm of reelpolitik has been confined to occasional involvement with activities 
like petitions and protests. All in all, the Democrat hopes that his or her anti-
authoritarian opinions on civil liberties and democratic governance would be 
picked up by effective policy-makers, or at least, convince them.   
The YDH experience of our three case figures tells a lot in this respect. 
The three case examples of our social type had varying degrees of commitment to 
the YDH movement, but for each of them, this unsuccessful platform became a 
point of convergence of ideals about individual liberties and democratic 
governance. At the beginning of YDH all three figures - Mahçupyan, Bumin, and 
Bayramoğlu - had participated in various political workshops organized by the 
volunteers of the movement. They contributed to the writing of analytical reports 
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(in the name of the movement) in which they proposed assessments and possible 
solutions for the principal political problems in Turkey. Yet, all three figures, 
keeping reservations about YDH becoming a political party that would compete 
for power, agreed that YDH should rather remain a civil society organization and 
perhaps operate like a political think tank. In their view, the YDH had to limit its 
mission to influencing political opinion making mainly through preparing reports 
on such major problems and issues as the Kurdish problem, military tutelage and 
political Islam. Among the three, Mahçupyan, though unwilling, participated 
actively in the preparations for the establishment and provincial organization of 
YDH as a political party. Bumin and Bayramoğlu were much more hostile to the 
idea of a political party and following the episode of workshops and meetings, 
they distanced themselves from the movement as YDH prepared for the upcoming 
1995 parliamentary elections. Hence, all of the three case examples under 
investigation have preferred to stand on a ground distanced from party politics and 
sought to serve democratization from outside.  
It is possible to explain the disinterestedness in engagement with active 
politics with the desire of maintaining distance towards particularistic demands 
and pretending to stand high and above existing political groups and forces. By 
refusing active involvement in the political realm, the Democrat seems to 
strengthen his or her privileged and distinctive status, which in turn enables him to 
patronize over different political actors (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2002: 207).  
8.2.4. Anti-Leninism  
 The individuals focused in this dissertation as the representatives of the 
social type of the Democrat agree that socialism, especially as it is understood in 
Turkey, is an authoritarian initiative geared to social engineering. They share the 
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similar distant or even reactionary critical attitude to Marxism and socialist ideas 
inspired by Marxism. They all agree upon the authoritarian nature of the Soviet 
version of socialism and Leninism. In their early writings, both Mahçupyan and 
Bumin were preoccupied with topics like vulgar materialism, the Jacobin 
character of Leninism, and the totalitarianism of Soviet-style socialism.  
During the in-depth  interviews, all three opinion producers have 
mentioned the name of Mehmet Ali Aybar as the sole political figure in the 
socialist left who had the greatest influence upon them. They expressed that 
Aybar‟s political views had a significant impacts in the shaping of their social and 
political convictions. Aybar‟s exceptional opposition against dogmatism and his 
rejection of the Leninist model as a socialist organization made him an 
intellectually attractive figure for the opinion producers who were uneasy with the 
authoritarian aspects of Marxism. Aybar, notably with his reaction to the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia and his original theses on the social formation of Turkey, 
underlying the bureaucracy as the hegemonic class, had a considerable impact in 
the development of social type of the Democrat. Moreover, Aybar‟s exceptional 
status within the socialist left particularly related to his accusations of Soviet 
socialism as a totalitarian and oppressive regime, made him a symbol of 
inspiration for liberal and democratic opinion producers. Aybar‟s interpretation of 
Marxism with the themes of alienation and emancipation at its heart; his criticism 
of the interpretation of Marx that is centered on the concept of exploitation as 
reductionist; these factors made him an intellectually and politically attractive 
figure for pinion producers working with liberal and democratic premises. 
Moreover, the approach of libertarian socialism which was the main reference 
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point of Aybar‟s analyses particularly after 1968 and his sharp criticisms against 
the USSR was considered by as a challenge against dogmatism.  
One particular point deserves to be mentioned: The language that the three 
of our case examples prefer to utilize is reminiscent of the Cold War terminology. 
Oftentimes, they employ the terms like „totalitarianism‟ and „free world.‟ This is 
particularly manifest in Bumin‟s essays, within which he has coined „free world‟ 
as the opposite of totalitarianism. Yet, references to totalitarianism or usage of the 
notion of „free world‟ might well be linked to the dissatisfaction with the popular 
understanding of the socialist and left leaning circles undermining the value of 
democracy.   
8.2.5. Underemphasizing Gender  
One major characteristic shared by the individual figures exemplary of the 
Democrat is their lack of emphasis on the wide range of gender-related socio-
political issues. Indeed, once their political writings are analyzed in detail, it can 
be argued that the opinion producers that fit in the mold of our social type do not 
work with gender-sensitive assumptions. Their lack of interest towards this key 
and highly contentious dimension of social life and culture cannot be regarded as 
an innocent omission. These opinion producers have raised sharp criticisms 
against liberalism on the grounds that it falls short of fulfilling the promise of a 
multiculturalist society that provides the conditions conducive for free exchange 
of ideas and that encourages the mutual recognition of identities. Despite this 
critical investment, the Democrat avoids problematizing gender-related demands 
and issues. All three figures‟ insistence on building an ethical basis for the 
peaceful coexistence of differences does not seem to take into consideration 
different identities defined on the basis of gender.  
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In their analyses, gender inequality and oppression of women are 
deliberately overlooked. During the in-depth interviews, each of the opinion 
producers tended to justify this omission in an over-theorized manner. For 
instance, Bayramoğlu emphasized that his definition of „the political‟ presumed a 
hierarchical ordering of the problems determined through the prism of culture 
centered outlook (in-depth interview 2011). At the top of this hierarchy stood 
problems related to State and its relations with the society. This line of 
justification, exposing a male-dominant approach which locates the topic of 
gender outside “real” social and political problems, fails to comprehend the 
multifaceted nature of gender relations within which practical and theoretical 
issues of justice, equality and the like operate.  
The negligence of gender by the Democrat might be elaborated on 
theoretical grounds as well. The main theoretical premises upon which the 
Democrat builds his political positions are derived from the culture-centered 
approach of ġerif Mardin. As it has been discussed earlier, Mardin‟s “cultural 
alienation” thesis is rather reductionistic as it attempts to make culture of the main 
principle of explanation. Such an approach is far from presenting a full picture of 
the problems of democratization in Turkey since it overlooks fundamental aspects 
of societal and political dynamics. Cultural reductionism tends to de-emphasize 
issues related to poverty, international dynamics and of course the gender. 
Accordingly, topics like military tutelage, rule of law and intolerance against 
different ethnic groups are examined in isolation from the basic dynamics and 
components of the social and political landscape. To illustrate this: the Democrat 
takes demands raised by Islamic groups into consideration because these demands 
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are excluded from the cultural realm. But demands raised by feminists are 
overlooked since they do not fit in the cultural alienation perspective.  
Mahçupyan‟s ideas on feminism are illuminating in this respect. 
According to him, feminism is a product of modernism and therefore it is 
confined with the limitations posed by modernism itself, and thereby is far from 
presenting alternatives within the democratizing context through which 
modernism has been surpassed (in-depth interview, 2011). More importantly, 
Mahçupyan does not seem to be uncomfortable with the patriarchal value system. 
He even point out the legacy of patriarchal mentality as one of the protective 
barriers that avoid shift to totalitarianism/fascism (2008: 19). In his view, setting 
totalitarian structures at intellectual level by feeding on religions is not possible 
for the heterogeneous structure of religions. Religions may get closer to 
totalitarian approaches only if they are locked in authoritarian structures and their 
essential nature is disturbed (Mahçupyan, 1999: 212-213). In that respect, while 
acceding that it is not an ideal solution against totalitarianism, he underlines that 
the religious community outlook, with its all patriarchal facets, can serve in the 
traditions of this land as a safety valve against modern forms of oppression (1999: 
213).   
 Bumin‟s approach towards gender-related issues diverges from the 
perspectives adopted either by Mahçupyan or Bayramoğlu. Bumin frequently 
appreciates women‟s movements in Turkey and emphasizes their significance 
within the general processes leading to a true democracy (in-depth interview, 
2011). For him, feminism materialized in Turkey in the 1980s and contributed to 
the process of democratization. It exemplified a model of struggle that was 
capable of going beyond hierarchical and centralized habits. In Bumin‟s 
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understanding figures like Duygu Asena were the pioneers of the democratic 
struggle in that respect (in-depth interview, 2011). In this respect, Bumin has 
stressed that he has continuously denied a hierarchical order among the constant 
themes of democracy in Turkey. As it has been mentioned previously, his 
insistence on the double standards of the Islamic media in the case of Hidayet 
Tuksal is revealing. He asserted that the Islamist media attacked Tuksal with a 
sexist and almost pornographic discourse (2002a:156). Unfortunately, a detailed 
examination of whole body of Bumin‟s writings reveals that gender is a topic that 
has a minor place in his corpus of works compared to other topics.  
Consequently, it can be argued that the Democrat fails the litmus test of 
gender, which in turn casts doubt on the “strongly democratic” posture of these 
opinion producers. At the end of the day, these three individuals exemplary of our 
social type reproduce the masculine standpoint in their reflection on democracy 
and democratization.  
8.2.6. Public Visibility  
Another characteristic of the Democrat, who, as discussed, stays away 
from the “dirty” game of politics, is his accumulation of reputation through public 
visibility. Exposure to the public through their newspaper columns, but more 
importantly, through TV appearances, is their main means to attempt changing or 
influencing political agendas with their opinions. 
The three public figures investigated in this dissertation have all increased 
their public visibility during their engagement with the New Democracy 
Movement (YDH), launched under the leadership of Cem Boyner. They have all 
began their careers as column-writers towards the end of 1990s, around the time 
the process leading to the February 1997 intervention was unfolding. Their 
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influence as opinion producers was thus shaped by sharp engagements with the 
debates on the Kurdish Question and on Political Islam. This episode of hot 
debates, accompanied by the undermining of rule of law with the 1997 
intervention and the Susurluk Affair, reinforced the public visibility of the 
Democrat.  
With their role as the “opinion leaders” of Turkey‟s main democratic 
issues, a role that also sustained them economically, these figures representing the 
Democrat did not need gaining renown through active politics. Regardless of 
whether their opinions had any actual impact on policy-making, public visibility 
bestowed respect upon them. 
8.3. Embedding the Social Type in its Proper Socio-Historical Context 
The social type of the Democrat, as a mediating concept between the 
general democratization dynamics of Turkey and the specific responses given to 
those dynamics, is obviously a product of political and social relations. Yet, the 
Democrat owes his credit to the systemic deficiencies of democratization in 
Turkey.  
The political establishment‟s questionable performance in the area of civil 
liberties, in responding to the challenges of the Kurdish and Islamist movements 
and the accountability problems with civil-military relations have “selected” the 
emergence of a social space: in this space, political opinions that were derived 
from liberal and democratic principles and were structurally excluded from state 
affairs offered discursive checks and balances to Turkish politics. In that respect, 
the Democrat‟s opinion production is directly associated with the “criticism of 
military tutelage”, as the impact of the Turkish Armed Forces on politics has 
experienced various turning points throughout the two decades following the 1980 
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coup. The relationship between the Democrat and the criticism of the praetorian 
state is constituted through three episodes: During the rule of Turgut Özal‟s 
ANAP; engagement with the Kurdish issue; and the debates on democratization 
triggered by the 1997 intervention. Therefore, in order to provide a reasonable 
portrait of the social type, accounting for the historical conditions that create the 
social space in which the type matures is of great importance. The socio-political 
atmosphere of the post-coup era should be seen as the hotbed of the development 
of democratic thinking.  The liberal epoch starting with the economic reforms 
initiated by successive governments under the leadership of Turgut Özal, along 
with the individualist values becoming widespread in Turkish society, have 
created the basis conducive to the flourishing of a liberal and democratic 
criticism. The story of the neoliberal reformation of Turkey had significant 
implications for the field of cultural and scholarly production as well: Opinion 
producers, mostly associated with the left-oriented tradition, adopted the basic 
premises of post-structuralist or post-modernist thought and interpreted the 
ongoing socio-political developments as justification of their political and 
theoretical positions. Accordingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence of 
micro-nationalisms and the proliferation of identity politics have all reinforced the 
beliefs in the end of class struggle, the death of ideologies and the bankruptcy of 
conception of politics as a struggle for power (Bayramoğlu, 2007).  
 The episode spanning the two final decades of the 20
th
 century has left its 
imprint on Turkish politics in two fundamental axis of contention – regarding the 
Islamist and Kurdish demands. The dominion of these two spheres of contentious 
politics over Turkey has definitively shaped the characteristics of the social type 
of the Democrat. As I have discussed throughout the dissertation, the maturation 
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of the political dispositions that characterize the Democrat as social type is 
innately related to the responses given to the Islamist and Kurdish challenges.  
Each of the three figures I have investigated under the category of the 
social type of the Democrat has maintained that two primary political dynamics of 
the 1990s, the Kurdish and Islamist challenges made it easier to think about 
democracy and being democratic. The challenges of political demands coming 
from these two movements have helped the maturing of thinking on democracy, 
not through rigidly Western paradigms, but through very concrete and immediate 
problems about rights and liberties. 
Since late 1990s, the Democrat has become a permanent figure of the 
Turkish political and cultural scene. Today‟s, his characteristics are immediately 
recognized when, for example, TV producers have to think about names with 
opposing political convictions to be invited to their debate programs. Throughout 
numerous such interactions, the mold into which the Democrat is cast has become 
even more solid. The Democrat has been politically vilified and glorified, names 
have been named about him, and he has been referenced to make points about the 
nature of democracy in Turkey. 
In this dissertation, my point about the Democrat is not that he (or she) is a 
figure that can be homogeneously described. Individuals who are exemplary of 
the Democrat are not clones: Social type analysis as applied in this dissertation is 
not about arguing that all opinion producers defending similar political viewpoints 
are the same. My main contention has been that Turkey‟s agonizing struggle with 
rule of law and democratization has produced a semi-abstract, semi-concrete 
public figure, almost like a familiar face we tend to recognize in different people. 
The Democrat had an impact on important public debates by keeping nationalists, 
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conservatives or socialists on their toes and by setting new standards for judging 
governments in Turkey. This way, the Democrat has become something more 
than the specific individual opinion producers in which we recognize the social 
type‟s presence. Nevertheless, the Democrat, whatever individual figures might 
think, does not have any historical task and sacred mission.  
  
  
307 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 
Daily Newspapers and Periodicals 
 
Aydınlık 
 
Cumhuriyet 
 
Saçak 
 
Yeni Gündem 
 
11. Tez 
 
Gelenek 
 
Zemin 
 
Yön 
 
Ant 
 
Türk Solu 
 
Sosyalist Politika 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Bayramoğlu, Ali. May 2011, Ġstanbul. 
 
Bumin, KürĢat. May 2011, Ġstanbul. 
 
Mahçupyan, Etyen. May 2011. Ġstanbul.  
  
308 
 
 
 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
 
Adamson, L. Walter. 1983. Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio 
Gramsci‟s Political and Cultural Theory. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
 
 
Adıgüzel, Emre. 1984.  “Politik Toplum ve Sivil Toplum” Saçak 8.  
 
 
Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge.  
 
 
Almog, Oz. 1998. “The Problem of Social Type: A Review,” Electronic Journal 
of Sociology, ISSN: 1198 3655.  
 
 
Altan, Mehmet.2008. İkinci Cumhuriyet‟in Yol Hikâyesi. In Defne Asal Er ed. 
Ġstanbul: Hayy Kitap.  
 
 
Anderson, Perry. 1977. “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review 
100: 5-78. 
 
 
Anderson, Nels. 1923. The Hobo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Arditi, George. 1982. Social Types: Towards a Theoretical Respecification. 
Unpublished M.A., thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Israel: University of Haifa. 
 
 
-----. 1987. "Role as a Cultural Concept," Theory and Society 16:565-591. 
 
 
Ayata, AyĢe. 1997. "The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey,” New 
Perspectives on Turkey, 17: 59-73. 
 
 
Barthes, Roland. 1967. Elements of Semiology. New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
 
-----. (1977). Image, Music, Text. New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
  
309 
 
 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1987. Legislators and interpreters: On Modernity, Post-
Modernity, Intellectuals. New York, N.Y. Cornell University Press. 
 
 
-----. 1988. "Sociology and Postmodernity," Sociological Review, 36: 790-813. 
 
 
Bayramoğlu, Ali. 2001. Türkiye‟de İslami Hareket. Ġstanbul: Patika Yayıncılık.  
 
 
-----. 2007. 28 Şubat: Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim.  
 
 
Becker, S. H. 1976. "Art Worlds and Social Types," American Behavioral 
Scientist, 19: 703-718. 
 
 
Belge, Murat. 1986.  “Ulusal Konsensüs,” Yeni Gündem, 39: 1.  
 
 
-----. 1984. “Berlinguer‟in Soruları Türkiye Ġçin Geçerliliğini Koruyor,” Yeni 
Gündem, 5.  
 
 
-----. 1989. Sosyalizm, Türkiye ve Gelecek. Ġstanbul: Birikim Yay.  
 
 
-----. 2011. Tarihten Güncelliğe. (Third Edition) Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim.  
 
 
Bellah, N. Robert., et al. 1985. Habits of the Heart - Individualism and 
Commitment in American Life. Berkley: University of California Press. 
 
 
Benda, Julien. 1969. The Treason of Intellectuals (La trahison des clercs). New 
York: Norton & Co Inc. 
 
 
Berktay, Halil. 1983. Kabileden Feodalizme.Ġstanbul: Kaynak. 
 
 
-----. 1984. “Yeni Gündem‟e ĠliĢkin Bazı Gözlem ve DüĢünceler,”  Saçak, 8-9. 
 
 
-----. 1987. “Türkiye‟nin Özgürlükleri Üzerine Bazı DüĢünceler-I,” Saçak, 41. 
 
 
-----. 1990. Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi. Ġstanbul: Belge Yay.  
 
  
310 
 
 
-----. 1992. Doğu Mitingleri, Analizi. Ankara: Yurt Yay. 
 
 
Birand, Mehmet Ali. 1987. The General‟s Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 
September 1980. London; Washington D. C.: Brassey Publishers.   
 
Bobbio, Norberto. 1988. ''Gramsci and the Conception of Civil Society,'' in 
Chantal Mouffe ed. Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge: 21–
47. 
 
 
Brooker, Peter. 1999. Cultural Theory : A Glossary. New York: Arnold 
Publishers.  
 
 
Bruinessen, Martin Van. 1992. Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan. London: Zed Books.  
 
 
Boggs, Carl. 1993. Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity. Albany: State 
University of New York.  
 
 
Bolger, S. Garret. 1976. The Irish Character in American Fiction, 1830-1860. 
New York: Arno Press. 
 
 
Booth, Barbara and Michael Blair,. 1989. Thesaurus of Sociological Indexing 
Terms. San Diego: Sociological Abstracts Inc. 
 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Homo Academicus. Paris: Minuit. 
 
 
Bozarslan, Hamit. 2004. “Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in 
Contemporary Turkey,” In Hari S. Vasadevan, Shri Prakash and Mujib 
Alam eds. Global Politics of the Iraq Crisis and India‟s Options. New 
Delphi: Academy of Third World Studies Press: 95-115. 
 
 
Bora, Tanıl. 2003. “Nationalist Discourses in Turkey,” South Atlantic Quarterly 
102(2/3): 433-451. 
 
 
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine. 1974. Gramsci and the State. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart.  
 
 
Bumin, KürĢat. 1981. Sivil Toplum ve Devlet. Istanbul: Yazko. 
  
311 
 
 
 
-----. 1991. Pasifizme Övgü ve Resmi İdeolojimiz Okulumuz. Ġzmir: S.O.S 
Akdeniz.  
 
 
-----. 1998. Medyakronik. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
 
 
-----. 2002a. Otoriter Demagoji. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim.  
 
 
-----. 2002b. Hukusuzluğun Günlüğü. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları.  
 
 
Camus, Albert. 1954. The Rebel. New York: Knopf. 
 
 
Carnoy, Martin. 1984. The State and the Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
 
 
Callinicos, Alex. 2000. Equality. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
 
Chailand, Gerard ed. 1993. A People without a Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan. London: Zed Books Press.  
 
 
Charle, Christopher. 2001. Les Intellectuels en Europe au XIXe Siécle: Essai 
d‟historie Compareé. Seuil. 
 
 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Ümit. 1988. “Kurdish Nationalism from an Islamist 
Perspective: The Discourses of Turkish Islamist Writers,” Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs 18(1): 73-89.  
 
 
Cizre, Ümit. 1994. “Kemalism, Hyper-Nationalism and Islam in Turkey,” History 
of European Ideas, 18:255-270. 
 
 
-----. 1996. “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican 
Turkey,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, (28)2:231-251. 
 
 
Cizre, Ümit and Menderes Çınar. 2003. “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and 
Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 102(2/3):309-332.  
 
  
312 
 
 
Cizre, Ümit. ed. 2008. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the 
Justice and Development Party. London: Routledge.  
 
 
Cohen, Stanley. 1972. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Mods and 
Rockers. London: Paladin Books. 
 
 
Collins, Randall. 1979. The Credential Society - an Historical Sociology of 
Education and Stratification. New York: Academic Press. 
 
 
Coser, A. Lewis. 1974. The Pleasures of Sociology. New York: Signet. 
 
 
-----. 1977.  Men of Ideas: A Sociologist‟s Views. New York: Free Press. 
 
 
Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 1999. Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary 
Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish 
Political Thought,” Muslim World, 89: 350-376.  
 
  
Çınar, Menderes. 2004. “Modified Orientalism: The Case of Hakan Yavuz‟s 
Islamic Poltical Identitiy in Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 30: 155-
168.   
 
 
Çulhaoğlu, Metin. 1994. “Devlete Yıkılan Siyaset,” Sosyalist Politika 2. 
 
 
-----. 2001. “Devlet, Sivil Toplum ve DemokratikleĢme” in Ġlker Maga ed. Sivil 
Toplum: Devletin Büyümesi. Ġstanbul:YGS Yayınları: 44-4. 
 
 
Çulhaoğlu, Metin and Can Soyer. 2000. „Sivil Toplum Söylemi‟: Gerçekler ve 
Yanılsamalar. Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Yayınları.  
 
 
Dolci, Danilo. 1968. The Man Who Plays Alone. London: MacGibbon and Kee. 
 
 
Durkheim, Emile. 1964. The Rules of Sociological Methods. New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe. 
 
 
Denise, Natali. 2005. The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, 
Turkey and Iran. New York: Syracuse University Press. 
 
  
313 
 
Demir, Eyyüp. 2005. Yasal Kürtler. Istanbul: Tevn Yayınları. 
 
 
Drake, David. 2002. Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France. New York: 
Palgrave.  
 
 
Erdoğan, Necmi and Fahriye Üstüner, “Quest for Hegemony: Discourses on 
Democracy" in NeĢecan Balkan and Sungur Savran eds. The Politics of 
Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey. Nova Science.  
 
 
Eyerman, Ron. 1987. Intellectuals, Universities, and the State in Western Modern 
Societies. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
 
-----. 1994. Between Culture and Politics : Intellectuals in Modern Society. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977 in Colin Gordon ed. New York: Pantheon. 
 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1984. “Truth and Power,” in Rabinow, Paul ed. The Foucault 
Reader. New York: Pantheon. 
 
 
Foucault, Michel. 2000. Entelektüelin Siyasi İşlevi.Ġstanbul: Ayrıntı. 
 
 
Fuller, E. Graham, Ian O. Lesser, Paul B. Henze and James F. Brown. 1993. 
Turkey's New Geopolitics: from the Balkans to Western China. Boulder, 
C.O.: Westview Press. 
 
 
Giritli, Aydın. 1987.  “Saçak: Bir Yazı ve Bir „Ahlak‟” Gelenek, 9.  
 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1986 (1973). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci. New York: International Publishers. 
 
 
Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New-York: 
Doubleday. 
 
 
-----. 1961. Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction. New York: 
Bobbs-Merril. 
 
  
314 
 
 
Göle, Nilüfer. 1989. “Islamism, Feminism and Post-Modernism: Women‟s 
Movements in Islamic Countries,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 19: 53-70.  
 
 
Gunter, Michael. 1991. The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
 
 
Gülalp, Haldun. 1999. "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah 
Party," The Muslim World, 89 (1). 
 
 
-----. 2001. "Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's 
Welfare Party," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33(3). 
 
 
-----. 2003. "Whatever Happened to Secularization? The Multiple Islams in 
Turkey," South Atlantic Quarterly, 102 (2/3). 
 
 
Gülbey, Gülistan. 1996. “The Development of Kurdish Nationalist Movement in 
Turkey,” in Robert Olson ed. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 
1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and Middle East. Kentucky: University Press of 
Kentucky: 9-37.  
 
 
GüneĢli, Ali Doğan. 2000. “Avrupa Birlikçi Liberalizm ve Solda Reformist 
Dalga,” Gelenek, 64. 
 
Hamilton D. A., Katz L. B. and Leirer V. 1980. "Organizational Processes in 
Impression Formation." in R. Hastie T. M. Ostrom, E. B. Ebbesen, R. S. 
Wyer, D. L. Hamilton, and D. E. Carlson eds. Person Memory. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum: 121-153. 
 
 
Harris, T. 1957. "The Building of Popular Images: Grace Kelly and Marilyn 
Monroe," Studies in Public Communication 1: 45-48. 
 
 
Hekimoğlu, Cemal. 1988. “Türkiye‟den Dünyaya Berktay‟ın Büyük Dönemeci,” 
Gelenek, 19. 
 
 
Heper, Metin. 1985. The State Tradition in Turkey. Walkington: Eothen. 
 
 
-----. 1992. “Strong state as a problem for the consolidation of democracy: Turkey 
and Germany compared,” Comparative Political Studies 25: 169-194. 
 
  
315 
 
 
Hewlett, Nick. 1998. Modern French Politics: Analysing Conflict and Consensus 
since 1945. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
 
Hoare Quintin and G. N. Smith, eds. 1973. Selections from the Prison Notebooks 
of Antonio Gramsci. New York: International Publishers. 
 
 
Ġnsel, Ahmet. 1984. “Militarizm ve Demokrasi,” Yeni Gündem, 3: 40-43. 
 
 
-----. 2003. “AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly 102(2/3): 293-308. 
 
 
Ġnsel, Ahmet and Ali Bayramoğlu eds. 2004. Türkiye‟de Ordu: Bir Zümre, Bir 
Parti. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim.  
 
 
Judd, Peter. 1985. "America's Hippies Revisited: Lessons in Compassion for a 
Conservative Decade," Social Development Issues 9: 88-99. 
 
 
Jwaideh, Wadie. 2006. The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origin and 
Development. New York: Syracuse University Press.  
 
Karabel, Jerome. 1976. “Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the 
Problem of Intellectuals” Politics and Society 6: 123-172. 
 
 
Karpat, Kemal H. 1959. Turkey's Politics. The Transition to a Multi-party System. 
Princeton. 
 
 
Karpat, Kemal. H. 1960. “Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature,” 
Middle East Journal  
 
 
Kanter, Moss Rosebeth. 1977. "Managers" in Men and Women of the 
Corporation, New-York, Basic Books, pp. 47-67. 
 
 
Katriel, T. 1987. Talking Straight - Dugri Speech in Israeli Sabra Culture. 
London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Kerckhoff, A. C. and McCormic T. C. 1955. "Marginal Status and Marginal 
Personality," Social Forces 34: 48-55. 
 
  
316 
 
 
Klapp, E. Olin. 1949. "The Fool as a Social Type," American Journal of 
Sociology 55: 157-162. 
 
 
-----. 1954. "The Clever Hero," Journal of American Folklore 67: 21-34. 
 
 
-----. 1956. "American Villain-Types," American Sociological Review 21:337-
340. 
 
 
-----. 1958. "Social Types: Process and Structure," American Sociological Review 
23: 674-678. 
 
 
-----. 1962. Heroes Villains, and Fools. Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice-Hall. 
 
 
-----. 1964. Symbolic Leaders. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 
 
-----. 1991. Inflation of Symbols: Loss of Values in American Culture. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
 
 
Kolakowski, Leszek. 1971. Marxism and Beyond: On Historical Understanding 
of Individual Responsibility. London: Paladin Press. 
 
 
Kongar, Emre. 2000. 28 Şubat ve Demokrasi. Ġstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.   
 
 
Küçükömer, Ġdris. 1994. Düzenin yabancılaşması. Ġstanbul: Bağlam.  
 
 
Lemert, Charles. 1990. Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory beyond the 
Academy. Los Angeles: Sage. 
 
 
Lyons, Paul. 1989. "Yuppies: A Contemporary American Keyword," Socialist 
Review 19:11-122. 
 
 
Lipset, Seymour and Dobson Robert. 1972. “The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: 
USSR and USA,” Daedalus 101(3): 137-198. 
 
 
Loader, Colin. 1985. On Mannheim. London: Macmillan Press. 
 
 
  
317 
 
Longhurst, Brian. 1989. Karl Mannheim and the Contemporary Sociology of 
Knowledge. London: Macmillan Press. 
 
 
Macpherson, C. Brough. 1977. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Mahçupyan, Etyen. 1996. Osmanlı‟dan Postmoderniteye. Ġstanbul: Patika 
Yayıncılık. 
 
 
-----. 1997. İdeolojiler ve Modernite. Ġstanbul: Patika Yayıncılık. 
 
 
-----. 1998. Türkiye‟de Merkeziyetçilik: Devlet ve Din. Ġstanbul: Yol Yayıncılık. 
 
 
-----. 2000. Zihniyet Yapıları ve Değişim Batı'dan Doğu'ya, Dünden Bugüne. 
Ġstanbul: Patika.  
 
 
-----. 2005. İçimizdeki Öteki. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim.  
 
 
-----. 2007. Bir Demokratın Gündemi. Ġstanbul: Hayy Kitap.    
 
 
Mannheim, Karl. 1985. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge. London: Routledge. 
 
 
-----. 1992. Essays on the Sociology of Culture. London: Routledge. 
 
 
Mardin, ġerif. 1973. “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?,” 
Daedalus, 102: 169-190. 
  
 
McDowall, David. 1991. The Kurds. London: Minority Rights Publications.  
 
 
-----. 1992. The Kurds: A Nation Denied. London: Minority Rights Publications.  
 
 
-----. 1996. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I. B. Tauris.  
 
 
Merton, R. Merton. 1967. Social Theory and Social Structure. New-York: The 
Free Press. 
  
318 
 
 
 
Mitchel, G. Duncan. 1979. A New Dictionary of Sociology. London and Henley: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Michels, Robert. 2002 [1937]. “Intellectuals.” In Edwin R. A. Seligman ed. 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan.  
 
 
Morris-Reich, A. 2003. „The Beautiful Jew is a Moneylender: Money and 
Individuality in Simmel‟s Rehabilitation of the “Jew” Theory, Culture & 
Society 20(4): 127–42. 
 
 
Montefione, Alan. 1990. “The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals.” In Ian 
Maclean, Alan Montefione, and Peter Rinch, eds. The Responsibility of 
Intellectuals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Mumcu, Uğur. 2006. Ortadoğu‟da Amerikan Bilardosu: 1 Ocak-16 Mayıs 1991 
Yazıları. Ankara: um:ag. 
 
 
-----. 2007a. Kemalizm Sendromu ve Pax-Amerikan: 25 Temmuz-31 Aralık 1993 
Yazıları. Ankara: um:ag. 
 
 
-----. 2007b. Örs ve Çekiç: 1 Şubat-24 Temmuz 1992 Yazıları. Ankara: um:ag.  
 
 
Mumcu, Uğur. 2009. Serbest Piyasa ve Kemalizm: 17 Mayıs-5 Kasım 1991 
Yazıları. Ankara: um:ag. 
 
 
Nahirny, Vladimir C. 1983. The Russian Intelligentsia: from Torment to Silence. 
New Jersey: Transaction Books. 
 
 
Nalbantoğlu, Hasan Ünal. 2003. “Üniversite A.ġ.‟de  bir „homo academicus‟: 
“ersatz” yuppie akademisyen,” Toplum ve Bilim, (97): 7-42.  
 
 
Olson, Robert. 1991. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion, 1880-1925. Austin: University of Texas Press.  
 
 
-----. 2009. Blood, Belief and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in 
Turkey, 2007-2009. California: Mazda Publishers.  
 
 
  
319 
 
ÖniĢ, Ziya. 1997. “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The 
Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 18(4): 
743-766. 
Özcan, Ali Kemal. 2006. Turkey‟s Kurd: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and 
Abdullah Öcalan. New York: Routledge. 
 
 
Özbudun, Ergun. 1981. "The Nature of the Kemalist Regime." In Ali Kazancıgil 
and Ergun Özbudun, eds. Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State. London: C. 
Hurst & Company: 79-102. 
 
 
Park, E. Robert. and Burgess E. Watson. 1921. "The Sociological Significance of 
the Stranger" in Introduction to the Science of Sociology. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Perinçek, Doğu. 1986. Osmanlı'dan Bugüne Toplum ve Devlet.  Ġstanbul: Kaynak. 
 
 
-----. 1987.  “Sivil ANAP,” Saçak, 44.  
 
 
Pritchard, Craig. 2000. Managing Knowledge: Critical Investigations of Work and 
Learning. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
Pyythinen, Olli. 2010. Simmel and the „Social.‟ London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
Reading, Hugo. F. 1977. Dictionary of the Social Sciences. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
 
 
Rex, John. 1977. "Scientific Laws and Ideal Types: The Sociological 
Methodology of Max Weber," Canadian Journal of Sociology 2: 151-166. 
 
 
Robertson, Ian. 1987. Sociology. (3d ed). New-York: Worth. 
 
Romano, David. 2006. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, 
Mobilization and Identity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Rosenthal, Franz. 1990. Muslim Intellectual and Social History: A Collection of 
Essays. Aldershot: Variorum. 
 
 
  
320 
 
Ross, George. 1991. “Intellectuals against the Left: The Case of France” in Ralph 
Milliband and Leo Panitch eds. The Retreat of the Intellectuals: The 
Socialist Register. London: Merlin.  
 
 
Rubin, Barry and Metin Heper, eds. 2002. Political Parties in Turkey. London: 
Cass. 
 
 
Sartre, Jean Paul. 1988. What is Literature and Other Essays. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.   
 
 
Sa'd al-Din, Ibrahim. 1982. "Arab Social Change: Six Profiles," The Jerusalem 
Quarterly 23:60-65. 
 
 
Savells, Jerry. 1986. "Who are the "Yuppies"? A Popular View," International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology 27: 234-241. 
 
 
Savran, Sungur. 1986. “Sol Liberalizm: Maddeci Bir EleĢtiriye Doğru,” 11. Tez 
(2):10-40.  
 
 
-----. 1992. Türkiye‟de Sınıf Mücadeleleri. Ġstanbul: Kardelen.  
 
 
-----. 2006. “Burjuva Sosyalizminin DüĢman KardeĢleri: Liberal Sol ve Ulusal 
Sol” devrimcimarksizmnet.  
 
 
-----. 2008. “Sol Liberalizm ve Ulusal Solculuk Yenilgi Ġdeolojileridir” Mesele 
(20): 15-23. 
 
 
Savran, Gülnur. 1988. “Gramsci‟nin Çıkmazları,” Sınıf Bilinci, 2: 161-162.  
 
 
Schoenburn, David. 1973. The New Israelis. New York: Atheneum. 
 
 
Sever, Metin and Cem Dizdar. 1993. Ġkinci Cumhuriyet TartıĢmaları. Ankara: 
BaĢak. 
 
 
Shaw, Clifford, R. 1968. The Jack-Roller. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
 
  
321 
 
Shils, Edward. 1982. On the Constitution of Society. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
 
Showstack-Sassoon, Anne. 1983. Gramsci's Politics. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
 
 
Simmel, Georg. 1950. "The Stranger" In Wolff H. Kurt ed. The Sociology of 
George Simmel, Glencoe: The Free Press: 402-409. 
 
 
-----. 1964. "The Metropolis and Mental Life" In Wolff H. Kurt, ed. The Sociology 
of George Simmel, New-York: The Free Press: 409-427. 
 
 
-----. 1971. "The Spendthrift" in Donald Levine, ed. George Simmel on 
Individuality and Social Forms. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
-----. 2004. The Philosophy of Money. D.Frisby and T.Bottomore (trans.) London: 
Routledge. 
 
 
Smart, Barry. 2002. Michel Foucault. London: Routledge. 
 
 
Snow, A. David. and Richard Machaleck. 1983. "The Convert as a Social Type" 
In Collins Randall ed. Sociological Theory, San Franscisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
 
 
Somer, Murat. 2004. “Turkey‟s Kurdish conflict: changing context, and domestic 
and regional implications,” Middle East Journal 58(2): 235–253. 
 
 
Spencer, Herbert. 1967. “The Evolution of Society” In Carneiro Robert L ed. 
Selection From Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Strong, M. Samuel. 1943. "Social Types in a Minority Group: Formulation of a 
Method," American Journal of Sociology XLVIII: 563-573. 
 
 
-----. 1946. "Negro-White Relations as Reflected in Social Types," American 
Journal of Sociology LII: 23-30. 
 
 
  
322 
 
Sutherland, Edwin H. 1963. The Professional Thief. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Sunar, Ġlkay and Sabri Sayarı. 1986. “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and 
Prospects” in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead, eds. Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Experiences in 
Southern Europe and Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press: 165-187. 
 
 
Taub, E. Diane and Robert G. Leger. 1984. "Argot and the Creation of Social 
Types in a Young Gay Community" Human Relations 37: 181-189. 
 
 
Texier, Jacques. 1988. “Gramsci, theoretican of the superstructures,” in Chantal 
Mouffe ed. Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge: 48-80. 
 
 
Thomas, William. I. and Florian Znaniecki. 1927. The Polish Peasant in Europe 
and America. New-York: Dover. 
 
 
-----. 1968. "The Problem of Personality in the Urban Environment" in Ernest W. 
Burgess ed. The Urban Community. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press: 38-47. 
 
 
Thrasher, Frederic M. 1928. The Gang: A Study of 1313 Gangs in Chicago. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Toprak, Binnaz. “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 6(2):167-186. 
 
 
Ulgar, Steven. 1988. “Inroduction” in Jean Paul Sartre What is Literature and 
Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   
 
 
Wald, Alan. 1992. The Responsibility of Intellectuals: Selected Essays on Marxist 
Tradition. Atlantic Highland: Humanities Press. 
 
 
Weber, Max 1949. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe. 
 
 
-----. 1958. "The Bureaucracy" in Gerth H.H and Mills C. Wright eds. From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press: 196-244. 
 
  
323 
 
Weiner, Eugene and Anita Weiner. 1990. The Martyr's Conviction - A 
Sociological Analysis. Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
 
 
Weston,  Jack. 1985. The Real American Cowboy. New York: Schocken Books. 
 
 
White, Paul. 2000 Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish 
National Movement in Turkey. New York: St. Martin‟s Press. 
 
 
Whyte, William F. 1943. Street Corner Society: The Structure of an Italian Slum. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
Wirth, Louis. 1926. The Ghetto. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
-----. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life" American Journal of Sociology 44: 8-20. 
 
 
-----. 1968. (1925) "Some Jewish Types of Personality" in Ernest W. Burgess ed. 
The Urban Community, New York: Greenwood Press: 106-115. 
 
 
Yavuz, Hakan. 2000.  “Turkey‟s Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism,” 
Current History, 99:  33-39. 
 
 
Zileli, Gün. 2002a. Yarılma. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim.  
 
 
-----. 2002b. Havariler. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
 
 
-----. 2003.  Sapak. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
 
 
Zorbaugh, W. H. 1968. (1925) "The Dweller in Furnished Rooms: An Urban 
Type" in Ernest W. Burgess ed. The Urban Community, New York: 
Greenwood Press: 98-106. 
 
 
Zürcher, Erik Jan. 1998. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris. 
